All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Francis Laniel <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add capabilities file to sysfs
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 12:20:15 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wniu2rs0.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220120180116.167702-1-flaniel@linux.microsoft.com> (Francis Laniel's message of "Thu, 20 Jan 2022 19:01:14 +0100")

Francis Laniel <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com> writes:

> Hi.
>
>
> First, I hope you are fine and the same for your relatives.
>
>
> Capabilities are used to check if a thread has the right to perform a given
> action [1].
> For example, a thread with CAP_BPF set can use the bpf() syscall.
>
> Capabilities are used in the container world.
> In terms of code, several projects related to container maintain code where the
> capabilities are written alike include/uapi/linux/capability.h [2][3][4][5].
> For these projects, their codebase should be updated when a new capability is
> added to the kernel.
> Some other projects rely on <sys/capability.h> [6].
> In this case, this header file should reflect the capabilities offered by the
> kernel.
>
> So, in this series, I added a new file to sysfs:
> /sys/kernel/security/capabilities.

Actually that is a file in securityfs.  Which is related but slightly
different.  For sysfs this would be immediately unacceptable as it
breaks the one value per file rule.  I don't know what the rules
are for securityfs but I do know files that contain many many lines
and get very large tend to be problematic in both their kernel
implementation and in userspace parsing speed.

So I am looking for what the advantage of this file that justifies the
cost of maintaining it.

> The goal of this file is to be used by "container world" software to know kernel
> capabilities at run time instead of compile time.

I don't understand the problem you are trying to solve.  If the software
needs to updated what benefit is there for all of the information to be
available at runtime?

>
> The "file" is read-only and its content is the capability number associated with
> the capability name:
> root@vm-amd64:~# cat /sys/kernel/security/capabilities
> 0       CAP_CHOWN
> 1       CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
> ...
> 40      CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>

> The kernel already exposes the last capability number under:
> /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap
> So, I think there should not be any issue exposing all the capabilities it
> offers.
> If there is any, please share it as I do not want to introduce issue with this
> series.

The mapping between capabilities and numbers should never change it is
ABI.  I seem to remember a version number in the file capability so that
if the mappings do change that number can be changed in a way that
existing software is not confused.

What is the advantage in printing all of the mappings?
>
> Also, if you see any way to improve this series please share it as it would
> increase this contribution quality.
>
> Change since v2:
> * Use a char * for cap_string instead of an array, each line of this char *
> contains the capability number and its name.
> * Move the file under /sys/kernel/security instead of /sys/kernel.
>
> Francis Laniel (2):
>   capability: Add cap_string.
>   security/inode.c: Add capabilities file.
>
>  include/uapi/linux/capability.h |  1 +
>  kernel/capability.c             | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/inode.c                | 16 ++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
>
>
> Best regards and thank you in advance for your reviews.
> ---
> [1] man capabilities
> [2] https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/1a078e6893d07fec10a4940a5664fab21d6f7d1e/pkg/cap/cap_linux.go#L135
> [3] https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/485cf38d48e7111b3d1f584d5e9eab46a902aabc#diff-2e04625b209932e74c617de96682ed72fbd1bb0d0cb9fb7c709cf47a86b6f9c1
> moby relies on containerd code.
> [4] https://github.com/syndtr/gocapability/blob/42c35b4376354fd554efc7ad35e0b7f94e3a0ffb/capability/enum.go#L47
> [5] https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/00f56786bb220b55b41748231880ba0e6380519a/libcontainer/capabilities/capabilities.go#L12
> runc relies on syndtr package.
> [6] https://github.com/containers/crun/blob/fafb556f09e6ffd4690c452ff51856b880c089f1/src/libcrun/linux.c#L35

Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-01-20 18:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-20 18:01 [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add capabilities file to sysfs Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] capability: Add cap_string Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] security/inode.c: Add capabilities file Francis Laniel
2022-01-21  4:01   ` kernel test robot
2022-01-21  8:58   ` Francis Laniel
2022-01-22 14:44   ` kernel test robot
2022-01-22 14:44     ` kernel test robot
2022-01-20 18:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add capabilities file to sysfs Casey Schaufler
2022-01-20 18:14   ` Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:20 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-01-20 19:01   ` Francis Laniel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87wniu2rs0.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org \
    --to=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=flaniel@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.