From: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> To: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>, <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>, <diana.craciun@nxp.com>, <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>, <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, <paulus@samba.org>, <npiggin@gmail.com>, <keescook@chromium.org>, <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <jingxiangfeng@huawei.com>, <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>, <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>, <fanchengyang@huawei.com>, <yebin10@huawei.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/12] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32 Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 09:57:20 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <923983fc-364d-440d-5c3a-3d3d6de60d14@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <a39b81562bcdeda7ffe0c2c29a60ff08c77047a6.camel@buserror.net> On 2019/8/28 12:05, Scott Wood wrote: > On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote: >> This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security >> feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location >> of kernel internals. >> >> Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is >> map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. > > Have you tested this with a kernel that was loaded at a non-zero address? I > tried loading a kernel at 0x04000000 (by changing the address in the uImage, > and setting bootm_low to 04000000 in U-Boot), and it works without > CONFIG_RANDOMIZE and fails with. > Not yet. I will test this kind of cases in the next days. Thank you so much. If there are any other corner cases that have to be tested, please let me know. >> Freescale Book-E >> parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1 >> entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized >> region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to >> relocate. >> >> Entropy is derived from the banner and timer base, which will change every >> build and boot. This not so much safe so additionally the bootloader may >> pass entropy via the /chosen/kaslr-seed node in device tree. > > How complicated would it be to directly access the HW RNG (if present) that > early in the boot? It'd be nice if a U-Boot update weren't required (and > particularly concerning that KASLR would appear to work without a U-Boot > update, but without decent entropy). > > -Scott > > > > . >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> To: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>, <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>, <diana.craciun@nxp.com>, <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>, <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, <paulus@samba.org>, <npiggin@gmail.com>, <keescook@chromium.org>, <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jingxiangfeng@huawei.com, zhaohongjiang@huawei.com, thunder.leizhen@huawei.com, fanchengyang@huawei.com, yebin10@huawei.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/12] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32 Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 09:57:20 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <923983fc-364d-440d-5c3a-3d3d6de60d14@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <a39b81562bcdeda7ffe0c2c29a60ff08c77047a6.camel@buserror.net> On 2019/8/28 12:05, Scott Wood wrote: > On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 18:07 +0800, Jason Yan wrote: >> This series implements KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32, as a security >> feature that deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location >> of kernel internals. >> >> Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is >> map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. > > Have you tested this with a kernel that was loaded at a non-zero address? I > tried loading a kernel at 0x04000000 (by changing the address in the uImage, > and setting bootm_low to 04000000 in U-Boot), and it works without > CONFIG_RANDOMIZE and fails with. > Not yet. I will test this kind of cases in the next days. Thank you so much. If there are any other corner cases that have to be tested, please let me know. >> Freescale Book-E >> parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1 >> entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized >> region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to >> relocate. >> >> Entropy is derived from the banner and timer base, which will change every >> build and boot. This not so much safe so additionally the bootloader may >> pass entropy via the /chosen/kaslr-seed node in device tree. > > How complicated would it be to directly access the HW RNG (if present) that > early in the boot? It'd be nice if a U-Boot update weren't required (and > particularly concerning that KASLR would appear to work without a U-Boot > update, but without decent entropy). > > -Scott > > > > . >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-29 1:57 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-08-09 10:07 [PATCH v6 00/12] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32 Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 01/12] powerpc: unify definition of M_IF_NEEDED Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 02/12] powerpc: move memstart_addr and kernstart_addr to init-common.c Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 03/12] powerpc: introduce kernstart_virt_addr to store the kernel base Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 04/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/32: introduce create_tlb_entry() helper Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-27 22:07 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-27 22:07 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 5:33 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-28 5:33 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 05/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/32: introduce reloc_kernel_entry() helper Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 06/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/32: implement KASLR infrastructure Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-28 4:54 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 4:54 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 5:47 ` Christophe Leroy 2019-08-28 5:47 ` Christophe Leroy 2019-08-29 6:26 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-29 6:26 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-28 11:03 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-28 11:03 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-28 16:44 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 16:44 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 16:44 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 07/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/32: randomize the kernel image offset Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 08/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/kaslr: clear the original kernel if randomized Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 09/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/kaslr: support nokaslr cmdline parameter Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 10/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/kaslr: dump out kernel offset information on panic Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` [PATCH v6 11/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/kaslr: export offset in VMCOREINFO ELF notes Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:07 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:08 ` [PATCH v6 12/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/32: Document KASLR implementation Jason Yan 2019-08-09 10:08 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-19 6:12 ` [PATCH v6 00/12] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/32 Jason Yan 2019-08-19 6:12 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-27 0:39 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-27 0:39 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-27 1:33 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-08-27 1:33 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-08-28 5:08 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 5:08 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 5:08 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 13:01 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-08-28 13:01 ` Michael Ellerman 2019-08-28 4:05 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 4:05 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 4:05 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 4:59 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 4:59 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-28 4:59 ` Scott Wood 2019-08-29 2:41 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-29 2:41 ` Jason Yan 2019-08-29 1:57 ` Jason Yan [this message] 2019-08-29 1:57 ` Jason Yan 2019-09-10 5:34 ` Jason Yan 2019-09-10 5:34 ` Jason Yan 2019-09-14 14:28 ` Scott Wood 2019-09-14 14:28 ` Scott Wood 2019-09-14 14:28 ` Scott Wood
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