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From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: "'Salvatore Mesoraca'" <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] Protected O_CREAT open in sticky directories
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2017 16:53:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9fe9b2cd312748ddb31f63f9dc1b1ed8@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511337706-8297-3-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

From: Salvatore Mesoraca
> Sent: 22 November 2017 08:02
> 
> Disallows O_CREAT open missing the O_EXCL flag, in world or
> group writable directories, even if the file doesn't exist yet.
> With few exceptions (e.g. shared lock files based on flock())
> if a program tries to open a file, in a sticky directory,
> with the O_CREAT flag and without the O_EXCL, it probably has a bug.
> This feature allows to detect and potentially block programs that
> act this way, it can be used to find vulnerabilities (like those
> prevented by patch #1) and to do policy enforcement.

(Going back to the original post)

I presume the 'vulnerabilities' are related to symlinks being created
just before the open?

Trouble is this change breaks a lot of general use of /tmp.
I always assumed that code that cared would use O_EXCL and
everything else wasn't worth subverting.

I found code in vi (and elsewhere) that subverted these checks
by opening with O_WRONLY if stat() showed the file existed and
O_CREAT|O_EXCL if it didn't.

I'm pretty sure that traditionally a lot of these opens were done
with O_CREAT|O_TRUNC.
Implementing that as unlink() followed by a create would stop
'random' (ok all) symlinks being followed.

Overall I'm pretty sure this change will break things badly somewhere.

	David

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
To: 'Salvatore Mesoraca' <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] Protected O_CREAT open in sticky directories
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2017 16:53:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9fe9b2cd312748ddb31f63f9dc1b1ed8@AcuMS.aculab.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511337706-8297-3-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

From: Salvatore Mesoraca
> Sent: 22 November 2017 08:02
> 
> Disallows O_CREAT open missing the O_EXCL flag, in world or
> group writable directories, even if the file doesn't exist yet.
> With few exceptions (e.g. shared lock files based on flock())
> if a program tries to open a file, in a sticky directory,
> with the O_CREAT flag and without the O_EXCL, it probably has a bug.
> This feature allows to detect and potentially block programs that
> act this way, it can be used to find vulnerabilities (like those
> prevented by patch #1) and to do policy enforcement.

(Going back to the original post)

I presume the 'vulnerabilities' are related to symlinks being created
just before the open?

Trouble is this change breaks a lot of general use of /tmp.
I always assumed that code that cared would use O_EXCL and
everything else wasn't worth subverting.

I found code in vi (and elsewhere) that subverted these checks
by opening with O_WRONLY if stat() showed the file existed and
O_CREAT|O_EXCL if it didn't.

I'm pretty sure that traditionally a lot of these opens were done
with O_CREAT|O_TRUNC.
Implementing that as unlink() followed by a create would stop
'random' (ok all) symlinks being followed.

Overall I'm pretty sure this change will break things badly somewhere.

	David

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-11-30 16:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-11-22  8:01 [PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict dangerous open in sticky directories Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22  8:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22  8:01 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] Protected FIFOs and regular files Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22  8:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-23 22:43   ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-24  8:24     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22  8:01 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] Protected O_CREAT open in sticky directories Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22  8:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22 12:03   ` Pavel Vasilyev
2017-11-24  8:28     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22 13:22   ` Matthew Wilcox
2017-11-22 13:22     ` [kernel-hardening] " Matthew Wilcox
2017-11-22 14:38     ` Pavel Vasilyev
2017-11-24  8:29     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-24  8:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-22 16:51   ` Alan Cox
2017-11-22 16:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-11-24  8:31     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-24  8:31       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-24 10:53     ` David Laight
2017-11-24 10:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2017-11-24 11:43       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-24 11:43         ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-24 11:53         ` David Laight
2017-11-24 11:53           ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2017-11-26 11:29           ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-26 11:29             ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-27  0:26         ` Solar Designer
2017-11-27  0:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2017-11-30 14:39           ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-30 14:39             ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-30 14:57             ` Ian Campbell
2017-11-30 16:30               ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2017-12-05 10:21                 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-12-07 21:47                   ` Solar Designer
2017-12-11 12:08                     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-23 22:57   ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-24  8:34     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-30 16:53   ` David Laight [this message]
2017-11-30 16:53     ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2017-11-30 17:51     ` Solar Designer
2017-11-30 17:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2017-12-01  9:46       ` David Laight
2017-12-01  9:46         ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2017-12-01 15:52         ` Alan Cox
2017-12-01 15:52           ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-11-27  1:14 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict dangerous " Solar Designer
2017-11-27 13:18   ` Solar Designer
2017-11-30 14:38     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-30 14:37   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-11-30 19:05     ` Solar Designer
2017-11-30 19:14       ` Solar Designer
2017-12-05 10:13       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-12-07 22:23         ` Solar Designer
2017-12-08 12:17           ` Solar Designer
2017-12-11 12:07             ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-12-11 15:33               ` Solar Designer
2017-12-12 18:00                 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-12-11 16:07           ` Solar Designer
2017-12-12 18:01             ` Salvatore Mesoraca

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