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From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Andrey Konovalov" <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	"Vincenzo Frascino" <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, "Ruhl,
	Michael J" <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>,
	"Hyeonggon Yoo" <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
	"Pekka Enberg" <penberg@kernel.org>,
	"David Rientjes" <rientjes@google.com>,
	"Joonsoo Kim" <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"Paolo Abeni" <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	"Alex Elder" <elder@kernel.org>,
	"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	"David Sterba" <dsterba@suse.com>,
	"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Jesse Brandeburg" <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>,
	"Daniel Micay" <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	"Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>, "Marco Elver" <elver@google.com>,
	"Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-media@vger.kernel.org,
	dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org,
	dev@openvswitch.org, x86@kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/16] kasan: Remove ksize()-related tests
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2022 10:15:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bg=j9VdteQwrJTNFF_t4EE5uDTMLj07+uMJ9-NcooXGQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220923202822.2667581-15-keescook@chromium.org>

On Fri, 23 Sept 2022 at 22:28, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> In preparation for no longer unpoisoning in ksize(), remove the behavioral
> self-tests for ksize().
>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  lib/test_kasan.c  | 42 ------------------------------------------
>  mm/kasan/shadow.c |  4 +---
>  2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 45 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 58c1b01ccfe2..bdd0ced8f8d7 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -753,46 +753,6 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
>         KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
>  }
>
> -/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
> -static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> -{
> -       char *ptr;
> -       size_t size = 123, real_size;
> -
> -       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> -       KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> -       real_size = ksize(ptr);
> -
> -       OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> -
> -       /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
 > -       ptr[size] = 'x';

I would rather keep the tests and update to the new behavior. We had
bugs in ksize, we need test coverage.
I assume ptr[size] access must now produce an error even after ksize.


> -       /* This one must. */
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
> -
> -       kfree(ptr);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Check that a use-after-free is detected by ksize() and via normal accesses
> - * after it.
> - */
> -static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test)
> -{
> -       char *ptr;
> -       int size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> -
> -       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> -       KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> -       kfree(ptr);
> -
> -       OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr));

This is still a bug that should be detected, right? Calling ksize on a
freed pointer is a bug.

> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]);
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
> -}
> -
>  static void kasan_stack_oob(struct kunit *test)
>  {
>         char stack_array[10];
> @@ -1392,8 +1352,6 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_stack_oob),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_left),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_right),
> -       KUNIT_CASE(ksize_unpoisons_memory),
> -       KUNIT_CASE(ksize_uaf),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_free),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_invalid_free),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_destroy),
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index 0e3648b603a6..0895c73e9b69 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
>         addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
>
>         /*
> -        * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note
> -        * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word
> -        * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word.
> +        * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b.
>          */
>         if (is_kfence_address(addr))
>                 return;
> --
> 2.34.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, "Ruhl,
	Michael J" <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	"Hyeonggon Yoo" <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
	"Vincenzo Frascino" <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
	dev@openvswitch.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Jesse Brandeburg" <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org,
	"David Rientjes" <rientjes@google.com>,
	"Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"Paolo Abeni" <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	linux-media@vger.kernel.org, "Marco Elver" <elver@google.com>,
	"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
	"David Sterba" <dsterba@suse.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Andrey Konovalov" <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	"Alex Elder" <elder@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Pekka Enberg" <penberg@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Micay" <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Joonsoo Kim" <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/16] kasan: Remove ksize()-related tests
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2022 10:15:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bg=j9VdteQwrJTNFF_t4EE5uDTMLj07+uMJ9-NcooXGQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220923202822.2667581-15-keescook@chromium.org>

On Fri, 23 Sept 2022 at 22:28, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> In preparation for no longer unpoisoning in ksize(), remove the behavioral
> self-tests for ksize().
>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  lib/test_kasan.c  | 42 ------------------------------------------
>  mm/kasan/shadow.c |  4 +---
>  2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 45 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 58c1b01ccfe2..bdd0ced8f8d7 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -753,46 +753,6 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
>         KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
>  }
>
> -/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
> -static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> -{
> -       char *ptr;
> -       size_t size = 123, real_size;
> -
> -       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> -       KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> -       real_size = ksize(ptr);
> -
> -       OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> -
> -       /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
 > -       ptr[size] = 'x';

I would rather keep the tests and update to the new behavior. We had
bugs in ksize, we need test coverage.
I assume ptr[size] access must now produce an error even after ksize.


> -       /* This one must. */
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
> -
> -       kfree(ptr);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Check that a use-after-free is detected by ksize() and via normal accesses
> - * after it.
> - */
> -static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test)
> -{
> -       char *ptr;
> -       int size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> -
> -       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> -       KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> -       kfree(ptr);
> -
> -       OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr));

This is still a bug that should be detected, right? Calling ksize on a
freed pointer is a bug.

> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]);
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
> -}
> -
>  static void kasan_stack_oob(struct kunit *test)
>  {
>         char stack_array[10];
> @@ -1392,8 +1352,6 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_stack_oob),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_left),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_right),
> -       KUNIT_CASE(ksize_unpoisons_memory),
> -       KUNIT_CASE(ksize_uaf),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_free),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_invalid_free),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_destroy),
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index 0e3648b603a6..0895c73e9b69 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
>         addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
>
>         /*
> -        * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note
> -        * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word
> -        * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word.
> +        * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b.
>          */
>         if (is_kfence_address(addr))
>                 return;
> --
> 2.34.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, "Ruhl,
	Michael J" <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	"Hyeonggon Yoo" <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	"Christoph Lameter" <cl@linux.com>,
	"Vincenzo Frascino" <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
	dev@openvswitch.org, x86@kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	intel-wired-lan@lists.osuosl.org,
	"David Rientjes" <rientjes@google.com>,
	"Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"Paolo Abeni" <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	linux-media@vger.kernel.org, "Marco Elver" <elver@google.com>,
	"Josef Bacik" <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	linaro-mm-sig@lists.linaro.org, "Yonghong Song" <yhs@fb.com>,
	"David Sterba" <dsterba@suse.com>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Andrey Konovalov" <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	"Alex Elder" <elder@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Pekka Enberg" <penberg@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Micay" <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Joonsoo Kim" <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Intel-wired-lan] [PATCH v2 14/16] kasan: Remove ksize()-related tests
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2022 10:15:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bg=j9VdteQwrJTNFF_t4EE5uDTMLj07+uMJ9-NcooXGQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220923202822.2667581-15-keescook@chromium.org>

On Fri, 23 Sept 2022 at 22:28, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> In preparation for no longer unpoisoning in ksize(), remove the behavioral
> self-tests for ksize().
>
> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  lib/test_kasan.c  | 42 ------------------------------------------
>  mm/kasan/shadow.c |  4 +---
>  2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 45 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
> index 58c1b01ccfe2..bdd0ced8f8d7 100644
> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
> @@ -753,46 +753,6 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
>         KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
>  }
>
> -/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
> -static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> -{
> -       char *ptr;
> -       size_t size = 123, real_size;
> -
> -       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> -       KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> -       real_size = ksize(ptr);
> -
> -       OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> -
> -       /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
 > -       ptr[size] = 'x';

I would rather keep the tests and update to the new behavior. We had
bugs in ksize, we need test coverage.
I assume ptr[size] access must now produce an error even after ksize.


> -       /* This one must. */
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
> -
> -       kfree(ptr);
> -}
> -
> -/*
> - * Check that a use-after-free is detected by ksize() and via normal accesses
> - * after it.
> - */
> -static void ksize_uaf(struct kunit *test)
> -{
> -       char *ptr;
> -       int size = 128 - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> -
> -       ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> -       KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> -       kfree(ptr);
> -
> -       OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ksize(ptr));

This is still a bug that should be detected, right? Calling ksize on a
freed pointer is a bug.

> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[0]);
> -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
> -}
> -
>  static void kasan_stack_oob(struct kunit *test)
>  {
>         char stack_array[10];
> @@ -1392,8 +1352,6 @@ static struct kunit_case kasan_kunit_test_cases[] = {
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_stack_oob),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_left),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kasan_alloca_oob_right),
> -       KUNIT_CASE(ksize_unpoisons_memory),
> -       KUNIT_CASE(ksize_uaf),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_free),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_invalid_free),
>         KUNIT_CASE(kmem_cache_double_destroy),
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index 0e3648b603a6..0895c73e9b69 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size, bool init)
>         addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
>
>         /*
> -        * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note
> -        * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word
> -        * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word.
> +        * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b.
>          */
>         if (is_kfence_address(addr))
>                 return;
> --
> 2.34.1
_______________________________________________
Intel-wired-lan mailing list
Intel-wired-lan@osuosl.org
https://lists.osuosl.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-wired-lan

  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-24  8:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 108+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-23 20:28 [PATCH v2 00/16] slab: Introduce kmalloc_size_roundup() Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 01/16] slab: Remove __malloc attribute from realloc functions Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-28  7:26   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-09-28  7:26     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-09-28  7:26     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-09-28 16:27     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-28 16:27       ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-28 16:27       ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-28 17:13     ` Kees Cook
2022-09-28 17:13       ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-28 17:13       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-28 21:39       ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-28 21:39         ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-28 21:39         ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-29  8:36       ` Michael Ellerman
2022-09-29  8:36         ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Michael Ellerman
2022-09-29  8:36         ` Michael Ellerman
2022-09-29  9:00         ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-09-29  9:00           ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-09-29  9:00           ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-10-01 16:09   ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2022-10-01 16:09     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Hyeonggon Yoo
2022-10-01 16:09     ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 02/16] slab: Introduce kmalloc_size_roundup() Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-26 13:15   ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-26 13:15     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-26 13:15     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-26 17:50     ` Kees Cook
2022-09-26 17:50       ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-26 17:50       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-01 16:28   ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2022-10-01 16:28     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Hyeonggon Yoo
2022-10-01 16:28     ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 03/16] skbuff: Proactively round up to kmalloc bucket size Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-24  9:11   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-24  9:11     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-24  9:11     ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 04/16] skbuff: Phase out ksize() fallback for frag_size Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-25  7:17   ` Paolo Abeni
2022-09-25  7:17     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Paolo Abeni
2022-09-25  7:17     ` Paolo Abeni
2022-09-26  0:41     ` Kees Cook
2022-09-26  0:41       ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-26  0:41       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 05/16] net: ipa: Proactively round up to kmalloc bucket size Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 06/16] igb: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-26 15:49   ` Ruhl, Michael J
2022-09-26 15:49     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Ruhl, Michael J
2022-09-26 15:49     ` Ruhl, Michael J
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 07/16] btrfs: send: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 08/16] dma-buf: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-26  9:29   ` [Linaro-mm-sig] " Christian König
2022-09-26  9:29     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Christian König
2022-09-26  9:29     ` Christian König
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 09/16] coredump: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 10/16] openvswitch: Use kmalloc_size_roundup() to match ksize() usage Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 11/16] bpf: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 12/16] devres: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 13/16] mempool: " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-26 13:50   ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-26 13:50     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-26 13:50     ` Vlastimil Babka
2022-09-26 18:24     ` Kees Cook
2022-09-26 18:24       ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-26 18:24       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 14/16] kasan: Remove ksize()-related tests Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-24  8:15   ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2022-09-24  8:15     ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Dmitry Vyukov
2022-09-24  8:15     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2022-09-26  0:38     ` Kees Cook
2022-09-26  0:38       ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-26  0:38       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 15/16] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28 ` [PATCH v2 16/16] slab: Restore __alloc_size attribute to __kmalloc_track_caller Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` [Intel-wired-lan] " Kees Cook
2022-09-23 20:28   ` Kees Cook

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