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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 20:04:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+SXCJpm9xnX1UaY0Qz2+E0qNETc+s8kwrH6hE9LLjgpw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180424195845.GB23575@mail.hallyn.com>

On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 12:58 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho@tycho.ws):
>> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 11:46:38PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> > Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> > > > > +     if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE)) {
>> > > > > +             WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
>> >
>> > Please avoid using WARN() WARN_ON() etc.
>> > syzbot would catch it and panic() due to panic_on_warn = 1.
>>
>> But it is really a programming bug in this case (and it seems better
>> than BUG()...). Isn't this exactly the sort of case we want to catch?
>>
>> Tycho
>
> Right - is there a url to some discussion about this?  Because not
> using WARN when WARN should be used, because it troubles a bot, seems
> the wrong solution.  If this *is* what's been agreed upon, then
> what is the new recommended thing to do here?

BUG() is basically supposed to never be used, as decreed by Linus.
WARN() here is entirely correct: if we encounter a case where
crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE is not true, we
run the risk of stack memory corruption. If this is an EXPECTED
failure case, then okay, drop the WARN() but we have to keep the
-EINVAL.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 13:04:58 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+SXCJpm9xnX1UaY0Qz2+E0qNETc+s8kwrH6hE9LLjgpw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180424195845.GB23575@mail.hallyn.com>

On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 12:58 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho@tycho.ws):
>> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 11:46:38PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> > Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> > > > > +     if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE)) {
>> > > > > +             WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
>> >
>> > Please avoid using WARN() WARN_ON() etc.
>> > syzbot would catch it and panic() due to panic_on_warn == 1.
>>
>> But it is really a programming bug in this case (and it seems better
>> than BUG()...). Isn't this exactly the sort of case we want to catch?
>>
>> Tycho
>
> Right - is there a url to some discussion about this?  Because not
> using WARN when WARN should be used, because it troubles a bot, seems
> the wrong solution.  If this *is* what's been agreed upon, then
> what is the new recommended thing to do here?

BUG() is basically supposed to never be used, as decreed by Linus.
WARN() here is entirely correct: if we encounter a case where
crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE is not true, we
run the risk of stack memory corruption. If this is an EXPECTED
failure case, then okay, drop the WARN() but we have to keep the
-EINVAL.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 13:04:58 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+SXCJpm9xnX1UaY0Qz2+E0qNETc+s8kwrH6hE9LLjgpw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180424195845.GB23575@mail.hallyn.com>

On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 12:58 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho at tycho.ws):
>> On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 11:46:38PM +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> > Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> > > > > +     if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE)) {
>> > > > > +             WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
>> >
>> > Please avoid using WARN() WARN_ON() etc.
>> > syzbot would catch it and panic() due to panic_on_warn == 1.
>>
>> But it is really a programming bug in this case (and it seems better
>> than BUG()...). Isn't this exactly the sort of case we want to catch?
>>
>> Tycho
>
> Right - is there a url to some discussion about this?  Because not
> using WARN when WARN should be used, because it troubles a bot, seems
> the wrong solution.  If this *is* what's been agreed upon, then
> what is the new recommended thing to do here?

BUG() is basically supposed to never be used, as decreed by Linus.
WARN() here is entirely correct: if we encounter a case where
crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != GCM_AES_IV_SIZE is not true, we
run the risk of stack memory corruption. If this is an EXPECTED
failure case, then okay, drop the WARN() but we have to keep the
-EINVAL.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
--
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-24 20:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-24  1:03 [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03 ` [PATCH 2/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03 ` [PATCH 3/3] dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  1:03   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  3:13   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  3:13     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  3:13     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24  4:50 ` [PATCH 1/3] big key: get rid of stack array allocation Eric Biggers
2018-04-24  4:50   ` Eric Biggers
2018-04-24  4:50   ` Eric Biggers
2018-04-24 14:35   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 14:35     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 14:35     ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 14:46     ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-24 14:46       ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-24 14:46       ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-24 14:51       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 14:51         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 14:51         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 19:58         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-04-24 19:58           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-04-24 19:58           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-04-24 20:04           ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-04-24 20:04             ` Kees Cook
2018-04-24 20:04             ` Kees Cook
2018-04-25 10:36             ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-25 10:36               ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-25 10:36               ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-04-25 14:15               ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-25 14:15                 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-25 14:15                 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-24 20:09           ` Eric Biggers
2018-04-24 20:09             ` Eric Biggers
2018-04-24 20:09             ` Eric Biggers

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