From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 21:29:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160715020550.GB13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:56:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a
>> redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman.
>>
>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> init/Kconfig | 1 +
>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB
>>
>> config SLUB
>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
>
> Should this patch come in earlier from a build perspective? I think
> patch 1 introduces and uses __check_heap_object.
__check_heap_object in patch 1 is protected by a check for
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR.
It seemed better to be to do arch enablement first, and then add the
per-allocator heap object size check since it was a distinct piece.
I'm happy to rearrange things, though, if there's a good reason.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Ja
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 21:29:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160715020550.GB13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:56:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a
>> redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman.
>>
>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> init/Kconfig | 1 +
>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB
>>
>> config SLUB
>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
>
> Should this patch come in earlier from a build perspective? I think
> patch 1 introduces and uses __check_heap_object.
__check_heap_object in patch 1 is protected by a check for
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR.
It seemed better to be to do arch enablement first, and then add the
per-allocator heap object size check since it was a distinct piece.
I'm happy to rearrange things, though, if there's a good reason.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 04:29:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160715020550.GB13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:56:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a
>> redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman.
>>
>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> init/Kconfig | 1 +
>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB
>>
>> config SLUB
>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
>
> Should this patch come in earlier from a build perspective? I think
> patch 1 introduces and uses __check_heap_object.
__check_heap_object in patch 1 is protected by a check for
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR.
It seemed better to be to do arch enablement first, and then add the
per-allocator heap object size check since it was a distinct piece.
I'm happy to rearrange things, though, if there's a good reason.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 21:29:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160715020550.GB13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:56:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a
>> redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman.
>>
>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> init/Kconfig | 1 +
>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB
>>
>> config SLUB
>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
>
> Should this patch come in earlier from a build perspective? I think
> patch 1 introduces and uses __check_heap_object.
__check_heap_object in patch 1 is protected by a check for
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR.
It seemed better to be to do arch enablement first, and then add the
per-allocator heap object size check since it was a distinct piece.
I'm happy to rearrange things, though, if there's a good reason.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 21:29:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160715020550.GB13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:56:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a
>> redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman.
>>
>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> init/Kconfig | 1 +
>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB
>>
>> config SLUB
>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
>
> Should this patch come in earlier from a build perspective? I think
> patch 1 introduces and uses __check_heap_object.
__check_heap_object in patch 1 is protected by a check for
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR.
It seemed better to be to do arch enablement first, and then add the
per-allocator heap object size check since it was a distinct piece.
I'm happy to rearrange things, though, if there's a good reason.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 21:29:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160715020550.GB13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:56:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the
>> SLUB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Includes a
>> redzone handling fix from Michael Ellerman.
>>
>> Based on code from PaX and grsecurity.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> init/Kconfig | 1 +
>> mm/slub.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index 798c2020ee7c..1c4711819dfd 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1765,6 +1765,7 @@ config SLAB
>>
>> config SLUB
>> bool "SLUB (Unqueued Allocator)"
>> + select HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
>
> Should this patch come in earlier from a build perspective? I think
> patch 1 introduces and uses __check_heap_object.
__check_heap_object in patch 1 is protected by a check for
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR.
It seemed better to be to do arch enablement first, and then add the
per-allocator heap object size check since it was a distinct piece.
I'm happy to rearrange things, though, if there's a good reason.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-15 4:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 203+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-13 21:55 [PATCH v2 0/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 5:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 18:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 19:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 21:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-14 23:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-15 1:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 12:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:00 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:00 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:00 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:00 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:00 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 10:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-14 10:07 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 2:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-07-15 4:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CAGXu5j+Ub2-jmTa-XmF90Gd+ze1os+eqk_yijouCSQoLvU1hNQ@mail.gmail.com \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=labbott@fedoraproject.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=minipli@googlemail.com \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=pageexec@freemail.hu \
--cc=penberg@kernel.org \
--cc=riel@redhat.com \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=sparclinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=spender@grsecurity.net \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=vitalywool@gmail.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.