From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:28:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+haqMgKxkH12M3O358oBR-jU0uWTZSrCrm462mtgf26A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <060150b2-4bb4-bdcb-760a-5aa5e1ade381@canonical.com>
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:26 PM, John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 09/17/2018 04:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>> Landlock, because it target unprivileged users, should only be called
>>> after all other major (access-control) LSMs. The admin or distro must
>>> not be able to change that order in any way. This constraint doesn't
>>> apply to current LSMs, though.
>>
>> Good point! It will be easy to add LSM_ORDER_LAST, though, given the
>> machinery introduced in this series.
>>
>
> And when we have two LSMs that want to use that?
We'll cross that bridge when we come to it, but perhaps "last
exclusive"? (lsm.enable/disable to choose)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:28:24 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+haqMgKxkH12M3O358oBR-jU0uWTZSrCrm462mtgf26A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <060150b2-4bb4-bdcb-760a-5aa5e1ade381@canonical.com>
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:26 PM, John Johansen
<john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
> On 09/17/2018 04:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Micka?l Sala?n <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>> Landlock, because it target unprivileged users, should only be called
>>> after all other major (access-control) LSMs. The admin or distro must
>>> not be able to change that order in any way. This constraint doesn't
>>> apply to current LSMs, though.
>>
>> Good point! It will be easy to add LSM_ORDER_LAST, though, given the
>> machinery introduced in this series.
>>
>
> And when we have two LSMs that want to use that?
We'll cross that bridge when we come to it, but perhaps "last
exclusive"? (lsm.enable/disable to choose)
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-17 23:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-16 0:30 [PATCH 00/18] LSM: Prepare for explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 01/18] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 02/18] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 03/18] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 04/18] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 05/18] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 06/18] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 07/18] LSM: Add minor LSM initialization loop Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 1:27 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-16 1:27 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-16 1:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 1:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 08/18] integrity: Initialize as LSM_TYPE_MINOR Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 09/18] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 10/18] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 11/18] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 1:32 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-16 1:32 ` Jann Horn
2018-09-16 1:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 1:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 12/18] LSM: Introduce ordering details in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 13/18] LoadPin: Initialize as LSM_TYPE_MINOR Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 14/18] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 15/18] capability: " Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 18:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-16 18:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-16 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 23:00 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 0:46 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-17 0:46 ` Tetsuo Handa
2018-09-17 15:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 15:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 16:24 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 16:24 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 17:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 17:13 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 19:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 19:23 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 19:55 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 19:55 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 21:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 21:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 22:36 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 22:36 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 23:10 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-09-17 23:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 23:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 23:26 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 23:26 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 23:28 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-17 23:28 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-17 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 23:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 23:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-09-18 0:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-18 0:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 23:25 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 23:25 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 23:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-17 23:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-18 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-18 0:00 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-18 0:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-18 0:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-18 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-18 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-18 0:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-18 0:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-18 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-18 0:59 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-18 1:08 ` John Johansen
2018-09-18 1:08 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 19:35 ` John Johansen
2018-09-17 19:35 ` John Johansen
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 17/18] LSM: Provide init debugging Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` [PATCH 18/18] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-16 0:30 ` Kees Cook
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