From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>, KVM <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm/arm64: Allow usercopy to vcpu->arch.ctxt and arm64 debug
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 12:40:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKoLP8jN4ZtRQnFpy6RWK1JJTa7eBuA2p9huBfh11bWvg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d2a7dcec-060b-6279-1c1d-a18b3eedb394@redhat.com>
On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 7:14 AM, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 22/10/2017 09:44, Christoffer Dall wrote:
>> However, I think it's much clearer if I
>> rewrite these to use get_user() and put_user(). v2 incoming.
>
> I'd actually prefer if you all do a trivial conversion to
> kvm_init_usercopy to begin with. In fact, we could just change the
> default from "0, 0" to "0, sizeof (kvm_arch_vcpu)" in kvm_init. Any
> other change can be applied after the patches are merged to Linus's
> tree, especially with KVM Forum and the merge window both coming soon.
>
> I'll send a v2 myself later this week.
Okay, which patches would you like me to carry in the usercopy
whitelisting tree for the coming merge window?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: arm/arm64: Allow usercopy to vcpu->arch.ctxt and arm64 debug
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 12:40:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKoLP8jN4ZtRQnFpy6RWK1JJTa7eBuA2p9huBfh11bWvg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d2a7dcec-060b-6279-1c1d-a18b3eedb394@redhat.com>
On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 7:14 AM, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 22/10/2017 09:44, Christoffer Dall wrote:
>> However, I think it's much clearer if I
>> rewrite these to use get_user() and put_user(). v2 incoming.
>
> I'd actually prefer if you all do a trivial conversion to
> kvm_init_usercopy to begin with. In fact, we could just change the
> default from "0, 0" to "0, sizeof (kvm_arch_vcpu)" in kvm_init. Any
> other change can be applied after the patches are merged to Linus's
> tree, especially with KVM Forum and the merge window both coming soon.
>
> I'll send a v2 myself later this week.
Okay, which patches would you like me to carry in the usercopy
whitelisting tree for the coming merge window?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Christoffer Dall" <cdall@linaro.org>,
"Christoffer Dall" <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, KVM <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Marc Zyngier" <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] KVM: arm/arm64: Allow usercopy to vcpu->arch.ctxt and arm64 debug
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 12:40:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKoLP8jN4ZtRQnFpy6RWK1JJTa7eBuA2p9huBfh11bWvg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d2a7dcec-060b-6279-1c1d-a18b3eedb394@redhat.com>
On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 7:14 AM, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 22/10/2017 09:44, Christoffer Dall wrote:
>> However, I think it's much clearer if I
>> rewrite these to use get_user() and put_user(). v2 incoming.
>
> I'd actually prefer if you all do a trivial conversion to
> kvm_init_usercopy to begin with. In fact, we could just change the
> default from "0, 0" to "0, sizeof (kvm_arch_vcpu)" in kvm_init. Any
> other change can be applied after the patches are merged to Linus's
> tree, especially with KVM Forum and the merge window both coming soon.
>
> I'll send a v2 myself later this week.
Okay, which patches would you like me to carry in the usercopy
whitelisting tree for the coming merge window?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-23 19:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-20 23:25 [PATCH 0/2] KVM: fixes for the kernel-hardening tree Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: allow setting a usercopy region in struct kvm_vcpu Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-21 14:53 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-21 14:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-10-20 23:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-20 23:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-21 18:45 ` [PATCH] KVM: arm/arm64: Allow usercopy to vcpu->arch.ctxt and arm64 debug Christoffer Dall
2017-10-21 18:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-10-21 18:45 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-22 3:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-22 3:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-10-22 3:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-22 7:44 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-22 7:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-10-22 7:44 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-23 14:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-23 14:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-23 14:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-23 14:49 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-23 14:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoffer Dall
2017-10-23 14:49 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-23 19:40 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-10-23 19:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-10-23 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-23 21:06 ` R: " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-23 21:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-23 21:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-22 7:48 ` [PATCH v2] " Christoffer Dall
2017-10-22 7:48 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-10-23 9:52 ` [PATCH 0/2] KVM: fixes for the kernel-hardening tree David Hildenbrand
2017-10-23 9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Hildenbrand
2017-10-23 11:10 ` Christian Borntraeger
2017-10-23 11:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
2017-10-23 12:39 ` Cornelia Huck
2017-10-23 12:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Cornelia Huck
2017-10-23 14:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-23 14:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-25 9:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2017-10-25 9:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Hildenbrand
2017-10-25 10:31 ` Christian Borntraeger
2017-10-25 10:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Borntraeger
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