From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>, LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Date: Sat, 29 Sep 2018 11:18:40 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLUaFX_jPHoOq1abEAjJdLo29Hr2q=sk07yj4KytW6psQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <eda428eb-f6e1-f048-a394-251953c388b6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> On Sat, Sep 29, 2018 at 3:48 AM, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote: > On 2018/09/29 5:01, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 8:55 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >>> On 9/24/2018 5:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>>> v3: >>>> - add CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and refactor resulting logic >>> >>> Kees, you can add my >>> >>> Reviewed-by:Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >>> >>> for this entire patch set. Thank you for taking this on, it's >>> a significant and important chunk of the LSM infrastructure >>> update. >> >> Thanks! >> >> John, you'd looked at this a bit too -- do the results line up with >> your expectations? >> >> Any thoughts from SELinux, TOMOYO, or IMA folks? > > I'm OK with this approach. Thank you. Thanks for looking it over! > Just wondering what is "__lsm_name_##lsm" for... > > +#define DEFINE_LSM(lsm) \ > + static const char __lsm_name_##lsm[] __initconst \ > + __aligned(1) = #lsm; \ > + static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ > + __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ > + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) \ > + = { \ > + .name = __lsm_name_##lsm, \ > + > +#define END_LSM } I wasn't super happy with the END_LSM thing, but I wanted to be able to declare the name as __initconst, otherwise it needlessly stays in memory after init. That said, it's not a huge deal, and maybe readability trumps a tiny meory savings? > We could do something like below so that funny END_LSM is not required? > I felt } like a typo error at the first glance. What we need is to > gather into one section with appropriate alignment, isn't it? > > #define LSM_INFO \ > static struct lsm_info __lsm_ \ > __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ > __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) \ > > LSM_INFO = { > .name = "tomoyo", > .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, > .init = tomoyo_init, > }; I thought the structure instances would need a unique name, but it seems the section naming removes that requirement. This seems only to be needed if we had multiple LSMs defined in the same source file. Though I wonder if this would be a problem for LTO in the future? I'm happy to do whatever. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Date: Sat, 29 Sep 2018 11:18:40 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLUaFX_jPHoOq1abEAjJdLo29Hr2q=sk07yj4KytW6psQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <eda428eb-f6e1-f048-a394-251953c388b6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> On Sat, Sep 29, 2018 at 3:48 AM, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote: > On 2018/09/29 5:01, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 8:55 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >>> On 9/24/2018 5:18 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>>> v3: >>>> - add CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and refactor resulting logic >>> >>> Kees, you can add my >>> >>> Reviewed-by:Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >>> >>> for this entire patch set. Thank you for taking this on, it's >>> a significant and important chunk of the LSM infrastructure >>> update. >> >> Thanks! >> >> John, you'd looked at this a bit too -- do the results line up with >> your expectations? >> >> Any thoughts from SELinux, TOMOYO, or IMA folks? > > I'm OK with this approach. Thank you. Thanks for looking it over! > Just wondering what is "__lsm_name_##lsm" for... > > +#define DEFINE_LSM(lsm) \ > + static const char __lsm_name_##lsm[] __initconst \ > + __aligned(1) = #lsm; \ > + static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ > + __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ > + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) \ > + = { \ > + .name = __lsm_name_##lsm, \ > + > +#define END_LSM } I wasn't super happy with the END_LSM thing, but I wanted to be able to declare the name as __initconst, otherwise it needlessly stays in memory after init. That said, it's not a huge deal, and maybe readability trumps a tiny meory savings? > We could do something like below so that funny END_LSM is not required? > I felt } like a typo error at the first glance. What we need is to > gather into one section with appropriate alignment, isn't it? > > #define LSM_INFO \ > static struct lsm_info __lsm_ \ > __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ > __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) \ > > LSM_INFO = { > .name = "tomoyo", > .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, > .init = tomoyo_init, > }; I thought the structure instances would need a unique name, but it seems the section naming removes that requirement. This seems only to be needed if we had multiple LSMs defined in the same source file. Though I wonder if this would be a problem for LTO in the future? I'm happy to do whatever. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-29 18:18 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-25 0:18 [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 01/29] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:53 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 02/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:56 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:05 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 03/29] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:57 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:06 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 04/29] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-09-26 16:35 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-26 18:35 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-09-30 23:25 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 1:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:07 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 21:23 ` Steven Rostedt 2018-10-01 22:38 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 05/29] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 19:59 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:08 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 06/29] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:10 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 07/29] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:12 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 08/29] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:13 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 09/29] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 10/29] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 11/29] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:15 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 12/29] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 22:03 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 13/29] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:17 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 14/29] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 21:47 ` James Morris 2018-10-01 21:56 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 22:20 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 22:29 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 22:53 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 15/29] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:18 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 16/29] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:22 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 17/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:34 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 18/29] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:46 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 22:27 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 22:48 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 23:30 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 23:38 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 23:57 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 23:44 ` John Johansen 2018-10-01 23:49 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 19/29] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-10-01 21:47 ` John Johansen 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 20/29] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 21/29] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 22/29] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 23/29] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 24/29] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 25/29] Yama: " Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 26/29] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 27/29] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 28/29] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v3 29/29] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-25 0:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 15:55 ` [PATCH security-next v3 00/29] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Casey Schaufler 2018-09-28 15:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 20:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:33 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-28 20:54 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-29 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2018-09-29 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-30 2:36 ` Tetsuo Handa 2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-30 16:57 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen 2018-09-29 18:19 ` John Johansen
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