From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 10:27:06 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAK8P3a076DEDpzRgTRBNLWan-KZyD0LkauWpuO8RFCf-9i1mhA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-EWyfB3zbPwT9=bLwR0GDtg5mwKaD0p5AbssjbxU7sMA@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 30 June 2017 at 07:35, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem >>> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely >>> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for >>> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth >>> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm >>> maintainers due to performance impacts. >> >> I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to >> do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate >> implementations for randstruct and traditional builds. >> > > Does this not apply to *all* entries in asm-offsets? If so, I don't > see how it is tractable to fix this in the code, unless we add some > instrumentation to asm-offsets to whitelist some huge structs and > error out on new ones. Or perhaps there's really only a handful? I think the other structs are all small enough: * thread_info is at most 720 bytes (including crunch+vfp3, which you wouldn't find in one combined kernel) and not randomized at the moment * pt_regs is 72 bytes and I don't see how that would be randomized * machine_desc would be a candidate for randomizing, but is only 108 bytes * proc_info_list is 52 bytes and not currently randomized * vm_area_struct is randomized but only 96 bytes. * task_struct is clearly large enough, but we only use TSK_ACTIVE_MM and TSK_STACK_CANARY, both can be fixed with your trick. > In any case, these particular examples are fairly straightforward, > since there is no need to preserve the register's value. > > ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY] > > could be replaced with > > .if TSK_STACK_CANARAY >= PAGE_SIZE > add r7, r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & PAGE_MASK > .endif > ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & ~PAGE_MASK] Nice! Arnd
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 10:27:06 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAK8P3a076DEDpzRgTRBNLWan-KZyD0LkauWpuO8RFCf-9i1mhA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-EWyfB3zbPwT9=bLwR0GDtg5mwKaD0p5AbssjbxU7sMA@mail.gmail.com> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 30 June 2017 at 07:35, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem >>> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely >>> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for >>> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth >>> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm >>> maintainers due to performance impacts. >> >> I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to >> do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate >> implementations for randstruct and traditional builds. >> > > Does this not apply to *all* entries in asm-offsets? If so, I don't > see how it is tractable to fix this in the code, unless we add some > instrumentation to asm-offsets to whitelist some huge structs and > error out on new ones. Or perhaps there's really only a handful? I think the other structs are all small enough: * thread_info is at most 720 bytes (including crunch+vfp3, which you wouldn't find in one combined kernel) and not randomized at the moment * pt_regs is 72 bytes and I don't see how that would be randomized * machine_desc would be a candidate for randomizing, but is only 108 bytes * proc_info_list is 52 bytes and not currently randomized * vm_area_struct is randomized but only 96 bytes. * task_struct is clearly large enough, but we only use TSK_ACTIVE_MM and TSK_STACK_CANARY, both can be fixed with your trick. > In any case, these particular examples are fairly straightforward, > since there is no need to preserve the register's value. > > ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY] > > could be replaced with > > .if TSK_STACK_CANARAY >= PAGE_SIZE > add r7, r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & PAGE_MASK > .endif > ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & ~PAGE_MASK] Nice! Arnd
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-30 8:27 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-05-26 20:17 [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 7:53 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 7:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 16:55 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 16:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 02/20] gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6 Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-29 22:08 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-29 22:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-29 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-29 22:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-30 0:04 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-30 0:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-30 7:35 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 7:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 7:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-06-30 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel 2017-06-30 8:27 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message] 2017-06-30 8:27 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 14:41 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-30 14:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-30 15:22 ` Arnd Bergmann 2017-06-30 15:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:41 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 20:09 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:09 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 22:04 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-05-27 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tetsuo Handa 2017-05-27 22:04 ` Tetsuo Handa 2017-05-28 0:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 0:43 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 0:43 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-30 10:34 ` James Morris 2017-05-30 10:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris 2017-05-30 10:34 ` James Morris 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:20 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 7:56 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 7:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 8:12 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 8:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 16:59 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-06-19 19:24 ` Kees Cook 2017-06-19 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-09-07 7:20 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-07 7:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-07 22:55 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloading Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 8:15 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 8:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 17:35 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:35 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 17:37 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:42 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 20:03 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 4:55 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 4:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:44 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] drm/amdgpu: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] drm/amd/powerplay: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-27 8:47 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 8:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-27 20:10 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-27 20:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] mtk-vcodec: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] ntfs: Use ERR_CAST() to avoid cross-structure cast Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] ocfs2: " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:23 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-05-26 20:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2017-05-26 20:32 ` Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] ACPICA: Use designated initializers Kees Cook 2017-05-26 20:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2017-05-28 7:45 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-05-28 7:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
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