All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 10:57:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrV_syrp79rpoqDrfx2cZZ-XTuNx2ip8uJBpQ8kC1wTtJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160616175036.uoks47kizfavkwzk@treble>

On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 10:50 AM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 05:28:30PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
>> recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow
>> do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack.  The latter gives
>> us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a
>> stack overflow to write out our logs.
>>
>> I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that
>> disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks.  This way, if we need to
>> revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack
>> overflow handling.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++----
>>  3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> index 983e5d3a0d27..1499db695a88 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> @@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
>>       jmp     error_code
>>  END(async_page_fault)
>>  #endif
>> +
>> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
>> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
>> +
>> +     movl    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
>> +     leal    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PT_OLDSS(%esi), %esp
>> +
>> +     call    do_exit
>> +1:   jmp 1b
>> +END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index 9ee0da1807ed..394cad73e890 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
>>       mov     $-ENOSYS, %eax
>>       sysret
>>  END(ignore_sysret)
>> +
>> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
>> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
>> +
>> +     movq    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rax
>> +     leaq    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-SS(%rax), %rsp
>
> I think this should be:
>
>         leaq    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-SIZEOF_PTREGS, %rsp
>
> That way when it calls do_exit(), the stack frame will be placed at the
> conventional spot where a smart unwinder would expect to find it.

Whoops!

--Andy

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2016 10:57:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrV_syrp79rpoqDrfx2cZZ-XTuNx2ip8uJBpQ8kC1wTtJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160616175036.uoks47kizfavkwzk@treble>

On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 10:50 AM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 15, 2016 at 05:28:30PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> If we call do_exit with a clean stack, we greatly reduce the risk of
>> recursive oopses due to stack overflow in do_exit, and we allow
>> do_exit to work even if we OOPS from an IST stack.  The latter gives
>> us a much better chance of surviving long enough after we detect a
>> stack overflow to write out our logs.
>>
>> I intentionally separated this from the preceding patch that
>> disables do_exit-on-OOPS on IST stacks.  This way, if we need to
>> revert this patch, we still end up in an acceptable state wrt stack
>> overflow handling.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   | 11 +++++++++++
>>  arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 +++++++++----
>>  3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> index 983e5d3a0d27..1499db695a88 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
>> @@ -1153,3 +1153,14 @@ ENTRY(async_page_fault)
>>       jmp     error_code
>>  END(async_page_fault)
>>  #endif
>> +
>> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
>> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
>> +
>> +     movl    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
>> +     leal    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PT_OLDSS(%esi), %esp
>> +
>> +     call    do_exit
>> +1:   jmp 1b
>> +END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index 9ee0da1807ed..394cad73e890 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -1423,3 +1423,14 @@ ENTRY(ignore_sysret)
>>       mov     $-ENOSYS, %eax
>>       sysret
>>  END(ignore_sysret)
>> +
>> +ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
>> +     /* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
>> +     xorl    %ebp, %ebp
>> +
>> +     movq    PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rax
>> +     leaq    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-SS(%rax), %rsp
>
> I think this should be:
>
>         leaq    -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-SIZEOF_PTREGS, %rsp
>
> That way when it calls do_exit(), the stack frame will be placed at the
> conventional spot where a smart unwinder would expect to find it.

Whoops!

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2016-06-16 17:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 112+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-06-16  0:28 [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of number of stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 11:10   ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-16 11:10     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-16 11:10     ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-06-16 17:21     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:21       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 19:20       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 19:20         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 19:20         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 15:33   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 15:33     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 15:33     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 17:39     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:39       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 19:39       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 19:39         ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 19:39         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:25   ` Kees Cook
2016-06-16 17:25     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-06-16 17:37     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 17:50     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 17:57     ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-06-16 17:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 11:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-06-16 11:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Borislav Petkov
2016-07-08 12:07   ` [tip:x86/debug] x86/dumpstack: Honor supplied @regs arg tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:16   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 18:16     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 18:22     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:22       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:33       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 18:33         ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 18:37         ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:37           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:54           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16 18:54             ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  4:17   ` Mika Penttilä
2016-06-16  4:17     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mika Penttilä
2016-06-16  5:33     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  5:33       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 13:11       ` Rik van Riel
2016-06-16  0:28 ` [PATCH 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  0:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16  6:05 ` [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) Heiko Carstens
2016-06-16  6:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Heiko Carstens
2016-06-16 17:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 17:50     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:14     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 18:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 21:27       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-16 21:27         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-17  3:58   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-17  3:58     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-17  7:27     ` Heiko Carstens
2016-06-17  7:27       ` [kernel-hardening] " Heiko Carstens
2016-06-17 17:38       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-17 17:38         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20  5:58         ` Heiko Carstens
2016-06-20  5:58           ` [kernel-hardening] " Heiko Carstens
2016-06-20  6:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20  6:01             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-06-20  7:07             ` Heiko Carstens
2016-06-20  7:07               ` [kernel-hardening] " Heiko Carstens
2016-06-16 17:24 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-16 17:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-07-04 22:31 [PATCH -v2 0/3] x86/MSR: Improve unhandled MSR access error message Borislav Petkov
2016-07-04 22:31 ` [PATCH -v2 1/3] x86/dumpstack: Honor supplied @regs arg Borislav Petkov
2016-07-04 22:31 ` [PATCH -v2 2/3] printk: Make the printk*once() variants return a value Borislav Petkov
2016-07-08 12:08   ` [tip:x86/debug] " tip-bot for Borislav Petkov
2016-07-09  2:40     ` Joe Perches
2016-07-09  7:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-07-09 17:56         ` Joe Perches
2016-07-10  6:49           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-07-10  8:23             ` Joe Perches
2016-07-10 12:06               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-07-10 12:33                 ` Joe Perches
2016-07-04 22:31 ` [PATCH -v2 3/3] x86/dumpstack: Add show_stack_regs() and use it Borislav Petkov
2016-07-08 12:08   ` [tip:x86/debug] " tip-bot for Borislav Petkov
2016-07-06 12:58 ` [PATCH -v2 0/3] x86/MSR: Improve unhandled MSR access error message Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-06 13:11   ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CALCETrV_syrp79rpoqDrfx2cZZ-XTuNx2ip8uJBpQ8kC1wTtJQ@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brgerst@gmail.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.