From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 16:08:30 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CALCETrWLNFJbwaYKkjBi7XPLBQ2=gEGmW=G==+_9jcrLPW+JdA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKFte0ZvqU8RYcqjWDCoegWeu66gdwX83tiL8vprcvMgQ@mail.gmail.com> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 4:05 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >>>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>>>> Hi Andrew, >>>>> >>>>> Would you be willing to carry this series? Andy Lutomirski appears >>>>> happy with it now. (Thanks again for all the feedback Andy!) If so, it >>>>> has a relatively small merge conflict with the bpf changes living in >>>>> net-next. Would you prefer I rebase against net-next, let sfr handle >>>>> it, get carried in net-next, or some other option? >>>> >>>> Well, I'm still not entirely convinced that we want to have this much >>>> multiplexing in a prctl, and I'm still a bit unconvinced that the code >>> >>> I don't want to get caught without interface argument flexibility >>> again, so that's why the prctl interface is being set up that way. >> >> I was thinking that a syscall might be a lot prettier. It may pay to >> cc linux-api, too. >> >> I'll offer you a deal: if you try to come up with a nice, clean >> syscall, I'll try to write a fast(er) path for x86_64 to reduce >> overhead. I bet I can save 90-100ns per syscall. :) > > Now added to the Cc. > > Which path do you mean to improve? Neither the prctl nor a syscall for > this would need to be fast at all. Non-seccomp-related syscalls when seccomp is enabled. > > I don't want to go in circles on this. I've been there before on my > VFS link hardening series, and my module restriction series. I would > like consensus from more than just one person. :) I can't offer you anyone else's review, unfortunately :-/ > > I'd like to hear from other folks on this (akpm?). My instinct is to > continue using prctl since that is already where mediation for seccomp > happens. I don't see why prctl vs a new syscall makes a difference > here, frankly. Aesthetics? There's a tendency for people to get annoyed at big multiplexed APIs, and your patches will be doubly multiplexed. TBH, I care more about the atomicity thing than about the actual form of the API. --Andy > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org> To: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> Cc: Linux API <linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, James Morris <james.l.morris-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr-3FnU+UHB4dNDw9hX6IcOSA@public.gmane.org>, "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>, LKML <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, Will Drewry <wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast-uqk4Ao+rVK5Wk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 16:08:30 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CALCETrWLNFJbwaYKkjBi7XPLBQ2=gEGmW=G==+_9jcrLPW+JdA@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKFte0ZvqU8RYcqjWDCoegWeu66gdwX83tiL8vprcvMgQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 4:05 PM, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote: >>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org> wrote: >>>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote: >>>>> Hi Andrew, >>>>> >>>>> Would you be willing to carry this series? Andy Lutomirski appears >>>>> happy with it now. (Thanks again for all the feedback Andy!) If so, it >>>>> has a relatively small merge conflict with the bpf changes living in >>>>> net-next. Would you prefer I rebase against net-next, let sfr handle >>>>> it, get carried in net-next, or some other option? >>>> >>>> Well, I'm still not entirely convinced that we want to have this much >>>> multiplexing in a prctl, and I'm still a bit unconvinced that the code >>> >>> I don't want to get caught without interface argument flexibility >>> again, so that's why the prctl interface is being set up that way. >> >> I was thinking that a syscall might be a lot prettier. It may pay to >> cc linux-api, too. >> >> I'll offer you a deal: if you try to come up with a nice, clean >> syscall, I'll try to write a fast(er) path for x86_64 to reduce >> overhead. I bet I can save 90-100ns per syscall. :) > > Now added to the Cc. > > Which path do you mean to improve? Neither the prctl nor a syscall for > this would need to be fast at all. Non-seccomp-related syscalls when seccomp is enabled. > > I don't want to go in circles on this. I've been there before on my > VFS link hardening series, and my module restriction series. I would > like consensus from more than just one person. :) I can't offer you anyone else's review, unfortunately :-/ > > I'd like to hear from other folks on this (akpm?). My instinct is to > continue using prctl since that is already where mediation for seccomp > happens. I don't see why prctl vs a new syscall makes a difference > here, frankly. Aesthetics? There's a tendency for people to get annoyed at big multiplexed APIs, and your patches will be doubly multiplexed. TBH, I care more about the atomicity thing than about the actual form of the API. --Andy > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-02 23:08 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2014-05-22 23:05 [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook 2014-05-23 0:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2014-05-23 8:49 ` Peter Zijlstra 2014-05-23 21:05 ` Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] seccomp: move no_new_privs into seccomp Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_FILTER Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] seccomp: add SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC and SECCOMP_FILTER_TSYNC Kees Cook 2014-05-22 23:11 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-05-23 17:05 ` Kees Cook 2014-05-26 19:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-05-27 18:24 ` Kees Cook 2014-05-27 18:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-05-27 18:45 ` Kees Cook 2014-05-27 19:10 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-05-27 19:23 ` Kees Cook 2014-05-27 19:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-05-27 19:55 ` Kees Cook 2014-06-02 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-06-03 0:14 ` Kees Cook 2014-06-03 0:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-06-03 1:09 ` Kees Cook 2014-06-03 1:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-06-03 19:53 ` Kees Cook 2014-06-02 19:47 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] seccomp: add PR_SECCOMP_EXT and SECCOMP_EXT_ACT_TSYNC Kees Cook 2014-06-02 19:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-06-02 20:06 ` Kees Cook 2014-06-02 21:17 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-06-02 23:05 ` Kees Cook 2014-06-02 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message] 2014-06-02 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2014-06-03 10:12 ` Michael Kerrisk 2014-06-03 10:12 ` Michael Kerrisk 2014-06-03 23:47 ` Julien Tinnes
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