From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 08:57:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMzpN2h=AAF6OVfeGJnf5va2Msmd_BPU5BrVENvs0zGQtRMdzQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170707133925.29711.39301.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
> perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
> mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
> resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
> that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
> intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
> bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
>
> Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
> usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
> remaining ioremap() path.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 7 +------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 4c1b5fd..bfc3e2d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
> @@ -106,12 +107,6 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
> - */
> - if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
> - return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
> -
> - /*
> * Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
> */
> pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
Removing this also affects 32-bit, which is more likely to access
legacy devices in this range. Put in a check for SME instead
(provided you follow my recommendations to not set the SME feature bit
on 32-bit even when the processor supports it).
--
Brian Gerst
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 08:57:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMzpN2h=AAF6OVfeGJnf5va2Msmd_BPU5BrVENvs0zGQtRMdzQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170707133925.29711.39301.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
> perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
> mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
> resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
> that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
> intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
> bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
>
> Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
> usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
> remaining ioremap() path.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 7 +------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 4c1b5fd..bfc3e2d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
> @@ -106,12 +107,6 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
> - */
> - if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
> - return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
> -
> - /*
> * Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
> */
> pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
Removing this also affects 32-bit, which is more likely to access
legacy devices in this range. Put in a check for SME instead
(provided you follow my recommendations to not set the SME feature bit
on 32-bit even when the processor supports it).
--
Brian Gerst
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 08:57:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMzpN2h=AAF6OVfeGJnf5va2Msmd_BPU5BrVENvs0zGQtRMdzQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170707133925.29711.39301.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
> perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
> mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
> resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
> that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
> intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
> bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
>
> Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
> usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
> remaining ioremap() path.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 7 +------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 4c1b5fd..bfc3e2d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
> @@ -106,12 +107,6 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
> - */
> - if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
> - return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
> -
> - /*
> * Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
> */
> pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
Removing this also affects 32-bit, which is more likely to access
legacy devices in this range. Put in a check for SME instead
(provided you follow my recommendations to not set the SME feature bit
on 32-bit even when the processor supports it).
--
Brian Gerst
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
xen-devel@lists.xen.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2017 08:57:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMzpN2h=AAF6OVfeGJnf5va2Msmd_BPU5BrVENvs0zGQtRMdzQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170707133925.29711.39301.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
> Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA
> range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to
> perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable
> mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The
> resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping
> that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is
> intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption
> bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value.
>
> Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and
> usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the
> remaining ioremap() path.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 7 +------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 4c1b5fd..bfc3e2d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
>
> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
> #include <asm/e820/api.h>
> @@ -106,12 +107,6 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
> - */
> - if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
> - return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
> -
> - /*
> * Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
> */
> pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
Removing this also affects 32-bit, which is more likely to access
legacy devices in this range. Put in a check for SME instead
(provided you follow my recommendations to not set the SME feature bit
on 32-bit even when the processor supports it).
--
Brian Gerst
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-08 12:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 253+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-07 13:38 [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-11 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 5:07 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:50 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-07 13:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst [this message]
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 4:58 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 8:35 ` Arnd Bergmann
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 12:00 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:38 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-11 15:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 19:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 12:57 ` Brian Gerst
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4 Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-07 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-08 9:24 ` [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Ingo Molnar
2017-07-08 9:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-07-08 9:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-07-08 9:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-07-08 9:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-10 18:04 ` Tom Lendacky
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