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From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	overlayfs <linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/10] ovl: check privs before decoding file handle
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 20:16:10 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAOQ4uxjDEVnz3Y_BqH41J4+E5dWRPyut_VPokEeMBNALx9oQhw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJfpeguvt-Mia9YmT55q3R9tSFocpgq7FzjDKJgnaOEQsaBNVA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Dec 9, 2020 at 6:20 PM Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2020 at 11:13 AM Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> wrote:
>
> > Hard link indexing should work without fh decoding, since it is only
> > encoding the file handle to search for the index entry, and encoding
> > is not privileged.
>
> Tested this a bit and while hard link indexing does work,  inode
> lookup is broken since it uses the origin inode as a key (which is not

Yes, that is what I meant by ovl_check_origin() is broken.

> available) instead of using the origin value directly.  This is
> fixable, but needs a fair amount of restructuring, so let's just

Maybe it also requires on-disk changes.
We should be able to use the origin fh as the key for lower inode,
but we need the lower st_inode for initializing the ovl inode with
correct ino. If we cannot decode lower inode from origin fh, I think
we would need to store the ino in user.overlay.ino on copy up or
maintain redirect, but redirect is not supported either with user ns mount...

> postpone this and disable index for now, as you suggested.
>

Nobody seems to be enabling it anyway :-/

Thanks,
Amir.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-12-09 18:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-07 16:32 [PATCH v2 00/10] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr() Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09  1:53   ` James Morris
2021-01-01 17:35   ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-11 13:49     ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12  0:14       ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-12  9:43         ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 10:04           ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 18:36           ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-12 18:49             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] vfs: verify source area in vfs_dedupe_file_range_one() Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] ovl: check privs before decoding file handle Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 13:49   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-09 10:13     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09 16:20       ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09 18:16         ` Amir Goldstein [this message]
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] ovl: make ioctl() safe Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 11:11   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-10 15:18     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14  5:44       ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-14 13:23         ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14 14:47           ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-09  1:57   ` James Morris
2020-12-10 15:19     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] ovl: simplify file splice Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] ovl: user xattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 13:10   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-11 14:55     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14  5:13       ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 11:29   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-11 14:44     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14  5:49       ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] ovl: unprivieged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 10:27 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Tetsuo Handa
2020-12-10  8:56   ` John Johansen
2020-12-10  9:39     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-15 11:03       ` John Johansen

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