Re: [PATCH] tools/kvm_stat: fix attack vector with user controlled FUSE mounts

From: Matthias Gerstner <matthias.gerstner@suse.de>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tools/kvm_stat: fix attack vector with user controlled FUSE mounts
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 12:16:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y2T0khQR9DtEyuF4@kasco.suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f5315936-fbdf-c7b1-e7a9-f494001eebfd@redhat.com>

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On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 03:21:12PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 11/3/22 14:59, Matthias Gerstner wrote:
> > The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace
> > in the mount path is escaped in /proc/mounts thus no further safety
> > measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.
> 
> Can you please send a patch to replace seq_printf with seq_escape in 
> afs_show_devname though?  I couldn't find anything that prevents 
> cell->name and volume->name from containing a space, so better safe than 
> sorry.

I only checked this during runtime using a tmpfs and assumed this would
be true for all file systems.

Sure I can come up with a patch. Should I send a new single patch
containing both changes, a new patch series with two patches or do I
need to send the afs change to a different mailing list? Sorry - I'm new
to kernel development.

Cheers

Matthias

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