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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: 'Ard Biesheuvel' <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	"linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-sh@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sh@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	"open list:SPARC + UltraSPARC (sparc/sparc64)" 
	<sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-riscv <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-csky@vger.kernel.org" <linux-csky@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	"open list:TENSILICA XTENSA PORT (xtensa)" 
	<linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	alpha <linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-um <linux-um@lists.infradead.org>,
	"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" 
	<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	linux-m68k <linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org>,
	"openrisc@lists.librecores.org" <openrisc@lists.librecores.org>,
	Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>,
	Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"monstr@monstr.eu" <monstr@monstr.eu>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	"open list:PARISC ARCHITECTURE" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>, Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
	"linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dinguyen@kernel.org" <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: 'Ard Biesheuvel' <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	"linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-sh@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sh@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	"open list:SPARC + UltraSPARC (sparc/sparc64)"
	<sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-riscv <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-csky@vger.kernel.org" <linux-csky@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	"open list:TENSILICA XTENSA PORT (xtensa)"
	<linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	alpha <linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-um <linux-um@lists.infradead.org>,
	"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	 linux-m68k <linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org>,
	"openrisc@lists.librecores.org" <openrisc@lists.librecores.org>,
	Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>,
	Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"monstr@monstr.eu" <monstr@monstr.eu>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	"open list:PARISC ARCHITECTURE" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>, Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
	"linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dinguyen@kernel.org" <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

_______________________________________________
linux-snps-arc mailing list
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: 'Ard Biesheuvel' <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	"linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-sh@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sh@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	"open list:SPARC + UltraSPARC (sparc/sparc64)"
	<sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-riscv <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-csky@vger.kernel.org" <linux-csky@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	"open list:TENSILICA XTENSA PORT (xtensa)"
	<linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	alpha <linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-um <linux-um@lists.infradead.org>,
	"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	 linux-m68k <linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org>,
	"openrisc@lists.librecores.org" <openrisc@lists.librecores.org>,
	Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>,
	Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"monstr@monstr.eu" <monstr@monstr.eu>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	"open list:PARISC ARCHITECTURE" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>, Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
	"linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dinguyen@kernel.org" <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	"linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-sh@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sh@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	"open list:SPARC + UltraSPARC \(sparc/sparc64\)"
	<sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-riscv <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>,
	"linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org>,
	Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-csky@vger.kernel.org" <linux-csky@vger.kernel.org>,
	'Ard Biesheuvel' <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org>,
	"open list:TENSILICA XTENSA PORT \(xtensa\)"
	<linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-um <linux-um@lists.infradead.org>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	linux-m68k <linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org>,
	"openrisc@lists.librecores.org" <openrisc@lists.librecores.org>,
	Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>,
	Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>,
	"monstr@monstr.eu" <monstr@monstr.eu>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>,
	"open list:PARISC ARCHITECTURE" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
	"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC \(32-BIT AND 64-BIT\)"
	<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dinguyen@kernel.org" <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	alpha <linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Subject: [OpenRISC] [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: 'Ard Biesheuvel' <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	"linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-sh@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sh@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	"open list:SPARC + UltraSPARC (sparc/sparc64)"
	<sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-riscv <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>, Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>,
	X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"linux-csky@vger.kernel.org" <linux-csky@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	"open list:TENSILICA XTENSA PORT (xtensa)"
	<linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	alpha <linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-um <linux-um@lists.infradead.org>,
	"open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	linux-m68k <linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org>,
	"openrisc@lists.librecores.org" <openrisc@lists.librecores.org>,
	Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>,
	Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"monstr@monstr.eu" <monstr@monstr.eu>,
	Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
	"open list:PARISC ARCHITECTURE" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>, Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
	"linux-api@vger.kernel.org" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dinguyen@kernel.org" <dinguyen@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X = 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C = 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: 'Ard Biesheuvel' <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	"linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-sh@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sh@vger.kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"open list:MIPS" <linux-mips@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
	"open list:SPARC + UltraSPARC (sparc/sparc64)"
	<sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-riscv <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
	Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org>,
	Helge
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok()
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:24:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YguNamXeOtGVPyJf@FVFF77S0Q05N> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <153bb1887f484ed79ce8224845a4b2ea@AcuMS.aculab.com>

On Tue, Feb 15, 2022 at 09:30:41AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Ard Biesheuvel
> > Sent: 15 February 2022 08:18
> > 
> > On Mon, 14 Feb 2022 at 17:37, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > >
> > > arm64 has an inline asm implementation of access_ok() that is derived from
> > > the 32-bit arm version and optimized for the case that both the limit and
> > > the size are variable. With set_fs() gone, the limit is always constant,
> > > and the size usually is as well, so just using the default implementation
> > > reduces the check into a comparison against a constant that can be
> > > scheduled by the compiler.
> > >
> > > On a defconfig build, this saves over 28KB of .text.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> > > ---
> > >  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 28 +++++-----------------------
> > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > index 357f7bd9c981..e8dce0cc5eaa 100644
> > > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > > @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
> > >  #include <asm/memory.h>
> > >  #include <asm/extable.h>
> > >
> > > +static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
> > > +
> > >  /*
> > >   * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
> > >   * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
> > > @@ -33,10 +35,8 @@
> > >   * This is equivalent to the following test:
> > >   * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
> > >   */
> > > -static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > > +static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
> > >  {
> > > -       unsigned long ret, limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX - 1;
> > > -
> > >         /*
> > >          * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
> > >          * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
> > > @@ -46,27 +46,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long s
> > >             (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
> > >                 addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> > >
> > > -       __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> > > -       asm volatile(
> > > -       // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> > > -       // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64
> > > -       "       adds    %0, %3, %2\n"
> > > -       // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4
> > > -       "       csel    %1, xzr, %1, hi\n"
> > > -       // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X'
> > > -       //    to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For
> > > -       //    X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does.
> > > -       "       csinv   %0, %0, xzr, cc\n"
> > > -       // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1
> > > -       //    comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are
> > > -       //    testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments.
> > > -       "       sbcs    xzr, %0, %1\n"
> > > -       "       cset    %0, ls\n"
> > > -       : "=&r" (ret), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size), "0" (addr) : "cc");
> > > -
> > > -       return ret;
> > > +       return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
> > >  }
> > > -#define __access_ok __access_ok
> > > +#define access_ok access_ok
> > >
> > >  #include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
> > >
> > > --
> > > 2.29.2
> > >
> > 
> > With set_fs() out of the picture, wouldn't it be sufficient to check
> > that bit #55 is clear? (the bit that selects between TTBR0 and TTBR1)
> > That would also remove the need to strip the tag from the address.
> > 
> > Something like
> > 
> >     asm goto("tbnz  %0, #55, %2     \n"
> >              "tbnz  %1, #55, %2     \n"
> >              :: "r"(addr), "r"(addr + size - 1) :: notok);
> >     return 1;
> > notok:
> >     return 0;
> > 
> > with an additional sanity check on the size which the compiler could
> > eliminate for compile-time constant values.
> 
> Is there are reason not to just use:
> 	size < 1u << 48 && !((addr | (addr + size - 1)) & 1u << 55)

That has a few problems, including being an ABI change for tasks not using the
relaxed tag ABI and not working for 52-bit VAs.

If we really want to relax the tag checking aspect, there are simpler options,
including variations on Ard's approach above.

> Ugg, is arm64 addressing as horrid as it looks - with the 'kernel'
> bit in the middle of the virtual address space?

It's just sign-extension/canonical addressing, except bits [63:56] are
configurable between a few uses, so the achitecture says bit 55 is the one to
look at in all configurations to figure out if an address is high/low (in
addition to checking the remaining bits are canonical).

Thanks,
Mark.

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-15 11:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 450+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 16:34 [PATCH 00/14] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 01/14] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:58   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:58     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get, put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 02/14] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 03/14] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:01   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:01     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:10     ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-14 17:10       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:18     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:18       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:25       ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` [OpenRISC] " Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-15 10:25         ` Greg KH
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 04/14] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:02   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 19:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:45       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 20:00       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:00         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 20:01       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:17         ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:17           ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47           ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  2:47             ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 20:24         ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 20:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 22:13           ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 22:13             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:02   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:02     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  0:31   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:31     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15 13:16     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` [PATCH 05/14] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 06/14] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 07/14] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:04   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:15   ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 17:15     ` Al Viro
2022-02-14 19:25     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:58   ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:58     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 21:06   ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-14 21:06     ` Robin Murphy
2022-02-15  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` [OpenRISC] " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:12     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:12       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:21       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` [OpenRISC] " Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:21         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2022-02-15  9:39         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  9:39           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:39           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:39             ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 10:37           ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-16 19:43       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-16 19:43         ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-15  9:30     ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-15 11:24       ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:24         ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07   ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` [OpenRISC] " Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-15 11:07     ` Mark Rutland
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 09/14] m68k: drop custom __access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  0:37   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:37     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  6:29       ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-15  7:13       ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:13         ` Al Viro
2022-02-15 10:02         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 10:02           ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15 13:28           ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-15 13:28             ` David Laight
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 10/14] uaccess: remove most CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 19:40     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 19:40       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 11/14] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:06   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-14 17:06     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:06     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:06       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  0:48   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  0:48     ` Al Viro
2022-02-16 13:07     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:07       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 12/14] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 13/14] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34 ` [PATCH 14/14] uaccess: drop set_fs leftovers Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 16:34   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  3:03   ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  3:03     ` Al Viro
2022-02-15  7:46     ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` [OpenRISC] " Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  7:46       ` Helge Deller
2022-02-15  8:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-15  8:10         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-14 17:35 ` [PATCH 00/14] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-14 17:35   ` Linus Torvalds

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