From: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> To: ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, rjw@rjwysocki.net, lenb@kernel.org, dan.j.williams@intel.com, elliott@hpe.com, jmoyer@redhat.com, krivenok.dmitry@gmail.com, linda.knippers@hpe.com Cc: robert.moore@intel.com, lv.zheng@intel.com, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 4/6] nvdimm: Fix security issue with DSM IOCTL. Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 18:54:25 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <a438967f7ba34963ecc718a2ae19f93ac1257594.1450036445.git.jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1450036445.git.jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> In-Reply-To: <cover.1450036445.git.jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> Code attempts to prevent certain IOCTL DSM from being called when device is opened read only. This security feature can be trivially overcome by changing the size portion of the ioctl_command which isn't used. Check only the _IOC_NR (i.e. the command). Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index 1c81203..87fe545 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -513,10 +513,10 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, /* fail write commands (when read-only) */ if (read_only) - switch (ioctl_cmd) { - case ND_IOCTL_VENDOR: - case ND_IOCTL_SET_CONFIG_DATA: - case ND_IOCTL_ARS_START: + switch (cmd) { + case ND_CMD_VENDOR: + case ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA: + case ND_CMD_ARS_START: dev_dbg(&nvdimm_bus->dev, "'%s' command while read-only.\n", nvdimm ? nvdimm_cmd_name(cmd) : nvdimm_bus_cmd_name(cmd)); -- 1.7.11.3
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> To: ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com, rjw@rjwysocki.net, lenb@kernel.org, dan.j.williams@intel.com, elliott@hpe.com, jmoyer@redhat.com, krivenok.dmitry@gmail.com, linda.knippers@hpe.com Cc: robert.moore@intel.com, lv.zheng@intel.com, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, linux-nvdimm@ml01.01.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 4/6] nvdimm: Fix security issue with DSM IOCTL. Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 18:54:25 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <a438967f7ba34963ecc718a2ae19f93ac1257594.1450036445.git.jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1450036445.git.jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> In-Reply-To: <cover.1450036445.git.jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> Code attempts to prevent certain IOCTL DSM from being called when device is opened read only. This security feature can be trivially overcome by changing the size portion of the ioctl_command which isn't used. Check only the _IOC_NR (i.e. the command). Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hpe.com> --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index 1c81203..87fe545 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -513,10 +513,10 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, /* fail write commands (when read-only) */ if (read_only) - switch (ioctl_cmd) { - case ND_IOCTL_VENDOR: - case ND_IOCTL_SET_CONFIG_DATA: - case ND_IOCTL_ARS_START: + switch (cmd) { + case ND_CMD_VENDOR: + case ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA: + case ND_CMD_ARS_START: dev_dbg(&nvdimm_bus->dev, "'%s' command while read-only.\n", nvdimm ? nvdimm_cmd_name(cmd) : nvdimm_bus_cmd_name(cmd)); -- 1.7.11.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-14 1:54 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2015-12-14 1:54 [PATCH v3 0/6] nvdimm: Add an IOCTL pass thru for DSM calls Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] acpica: Correct parameter type to acpi_evaluate_dsm Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 2:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2015-12-14 2:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2015-12-14 3:20 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 3:20 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] nvdimm: Clean-up access mode check Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] nvdimm: Add wrapper for IOCTL pass thru Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann [this message] 2015-12-14 1:54 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] nvdimm: Fix security issue with DSM IOCTL Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] nvdimm: Increase max envelope size for IOCTL Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] nvdimm: Add IOCTL pass thru functions Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 1:54 ` Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 17:33 ` [PATCH v4 0/6] nvdimm: Add an IOCTL pass thru for DSM calls Jerry Hoemann 2015-12-14 17:33 ` Jerry Hoemann
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