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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:00:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a47dd0338ff37ebaa7888f291d05a5fccf1cb44b.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bf8a6390-97a6-1ab6-90ef-6399437ed38c@intel.com>

On Wed, 2019-08-14 at 09:48 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 8/14/19 9:27 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > On Tue, 2019-08-13 at 15:55 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 2:02 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > > > When a task does fork(), its shadow stack (SHSTK) must be duplicated
> > > > for the child.  This patch implements a flow similar to copy-on-write
> > > > of an anonymous page, but for SHSTK.
> > > > 
> > > > A SHSTK PTE must be RO and dirty.  This dirty bit requirement is used
> > > > to effect the copying.  In copy_one_pte(), clear the dirty bit from a
> > > > SHSTK PTE to cause a page fault upon the next SHSTK access.  At that
> > > > time, fix the PTE and copy/re-use the page.
> > > 
> > > Is using VM_SHSTK and special-casing all of this really better than
> > > using a special mapping or other pseudo-file-backed VMA and putting
> > > all the magic in the vm_operations?
> > 
> > A special mapping is cleaner.  However, we also need to exclude normal [RO +
> > dirty] pages from shadow stack.
> 
> I don't understand what you are saying.
> 
> Are you saying that we need this VM_SHSTK flag in order to exclude
> RO+HW-Dirty pages from being created in non-shadow-stack VMAs?

We use VM_SHSTK for page fault handling (the special-casing).  If we have a
special mapping, all these become cleaner (but more code).  However, we still
need most of the PTE macros (e.g. ptep_set_wrprotect, PAGE_DIRTY_SW, etc.).

Yu-cheng

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@or>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2019 10:00:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a47dd0338ff37ebaa7888f291d05a5fccf1cb44b.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bf8a6390-97a6-1ab6-90ef-6399437ed38c@intel.com>

On Wed, 2019-08-14 at 09:48 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 8/14/19 9:27 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > On Tue, 2019-08-13 at 15:55 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 2:02 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > > > When a task does fork(), its shadow stack (SHSTK) must be duplicated
> > > > for the child.  This patch implements a flow similar to copy-on-write
> > > > of an anonymous page, but for SHSTK.
> > > > 
> > > > A SHSTK PTE must be RO and dirty.  This dirty bit requirement is used
> > > > to effect the copying.  In copy_one_pte(), clear the dirty bit from a
> > > > SHSTK PTE to cause a page fault upon the next SHSTK access.  At that
> > > > time, fix the PTE and copy/re-use the page.
> > > 
> > > Is using VM_SHSTK and special-casing all of this really better than
> > > using a special mapping or other pseudo-file-backed VMA and putting
> > > all the magic in the vm_operations?
> > 
> > A special mapping is cleaner.  However, we also need to exclude normal [RO +
> > dirty] pages from shadow stack.
> 
> I don't understand what you are saying.
> 
> Are you saying that we need this VM_SHSTK flag in order to exclude
> RO+HW-Dirty pages from being created in non-shadow-stack VMAs?

We use VM_SHSTK for page fault handling (the special-casing).  If we have a
special mapping, all these become cleaner (but more code).  However, we still
need most of the PTE macros (e.g. ptep_set_wrprotect, PAGE_DIRTY_SW, etc.).

Yu-cheng

  reply	other threads:[~2019-08-14 17:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 124+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-13 20:51 [PATCH v8 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:51 ` [PATCH v8 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:51   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14  8:07   ` Florian Weimer
2019-08-14  8:07     ` Florian Weimer
2019-08-14  8:07     ` Florian Weimer
2019-08-14 15:57     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 15:57       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 15:57       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-21 10:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-21 10:20     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-21 14:46     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-21 14:46       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-21 14:46       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-21 14:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-21 14:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-16 19:56   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-16 19:56     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-16 19:56     ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-16 19:59     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-16 19:59       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-16 19:59       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 05/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR " Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 06/27] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 09/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 22:34   ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-13 22:34     ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-14 16:20     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:20       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 10/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 23:02   ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-13 23:02     ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-13 23:49     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 23:49       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-14 16:42     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:42       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:42       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:58       ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-14 16:58         ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-23 14:02   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-08-23 14:02     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-08-27 22:37     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-27 22:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-27 22:37       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-28  7:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-08-28  7:03         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-08-28 14:57         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-28 14:57           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-28 14:57           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 12/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 13/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 14/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 22:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 22:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 22:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-14 16:27     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:27       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:27       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 16:48       ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-14 16:48         ` Dave Hansen
2019-08-14 17:00         ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2019-08-14 17:00           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-14 17:00           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 16/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 17/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 18/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-20  1:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20  1:02     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-20 16:08     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-20 16:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-20 16:08       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 22/27] binfmt_elf: Extract .note.gnu.property from an ELF file Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-16 13:55   ` Dave Martin
2019-08-16 13:55     ` Dave Martin
2019-08-20 10:02   ` Dave Martin
2019-08-20 10:02     ` Dave Martin
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52 ` [PATCH v8 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2019-08-13 20:52   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-11-08 13:27   ` Adrian Hunter
2019-11-08 13:27     ` Adrian Hunter
2019-11-08 18:09     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-11-08 18:09       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-11-08 18:09       ` Yu-cheng Yu

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