[syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    98b1cc82c4af Linux 6.7-rc2
git tree:       upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12e89e10e80000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6ae1a4ee971a7305
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=174f0bd4e80000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14b83b84e80000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/39c6cdad13fc/disk-98b1cc82.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5a77b5daef9b/vmlinux-98b1cc82.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5e09ae712e0d/bzImage-98b1cc82.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

INFO: task hwrng:749 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
      Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:hwrng           state:D stack:29040 pid:749   tgid:749   ppid:2      flags:0x00004000
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5376 [inline]
 __schedule+0xedb/0x5af0 kernel/sched/core.c:6688
 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6763 [inline]
 schedule+0xe9/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:6778
 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x20 kernel/sched/core.c:6835
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:679 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x5b9/0x9d0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
 hwrng_fillfn+0x145/0x430 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:504
 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
 </TASK>

Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/29:
 #0: ffffffff8cfabce0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline]
 #0: ffffffff8cfabce0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline]
 #0: ffffffff8cfabce0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x75/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6613
2 locks held by kswapd0/86:
1 lock held by hwrng/749:
 #0: ffffffff8dbafee8 (reading_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hwrng_fillfn+0x145/0x430 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:504
2 locks held by getty/4824:
 #0: ffff888025fa10a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x24/0x80 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
 #1: ffffc90002f062f0 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: n_tty_read+0xfc6/0x1490 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2201
2 locks held by syz-executor391/5105:
2 locks held by syz-executor391/5106:

=============================================

NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 29 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x277/0x390 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:113
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x299/0x300 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:160 [inline]
 check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:222 [inline]
 watchdog+0xf87/0x1210 kernel/hung_task.c:379
 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
 </TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 5105 Comm: syz-executor391 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x30/0x3b10 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4992
Code: f6 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 55 89 d5 53 44 89 cb 48 81 ec f0 00 00 00 48 8b 84 24 28 01 00 00 48 c7 84 24 90 00 00 00 b3 8a b5 41 <44> 89 44 24 08 44 8b ac 24 48 01 00 00 48 c7 84 24 98 00 00 00 1b
RSP: 0018:ffffc900044271d8 EFLAGS: 00000086
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8cfabce0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff8f1934d7 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffffff8cfabce0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3c785f96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005565d7bb9be7 CR3: 000000001af30000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
 <NMI>
 </NMI>
 <TASK>
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5753 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5718
 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:301 [inline]
 rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline]
 get_mem_cgroup_from_mm+0x4b/0x4c0 mm/memcontrol.c:1081
 __mem_cgroup_charge+0x1c/0x140 mm/memcontrol.c:7224
 mem_cgroup_charge include/linux/memcontrol.h:684 [inline]
 __filemap_add_folio+0x88c/0xed0 mm/filemap.c:854
 filemap_add_folio+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/filemap.c:937
 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1d0/0x5f0 mm/readahead.c:250
 do_page_cache_ra mm/readahead.c:299 [inline]
 page_cache_ra_order+0x72b/0xa80 mm/readahead.c:546
 do_sync_mmap_readahead mm/filemap.c:3141 [inline]
 filemap_fault+0x16a8/0x3570 mm/filemap.c:3233
 __do_fault+0x107/0x600 mm/memory.c:4265
 do_cow_fault mm/memory.c:4662 [inline]
 do_fault mm/memory.c:4764 [inline]
 do_pte_missing mm/memory.c:3730 [inline]
 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:5038 [inline]
 __handle_mm_fault+0x3a8d/0x3d70 mm/memory.c:5179
 handle_mm_fault+0x47a/0xa10 mm/memory.c:5344
 do_user_addr_fault+0x3d1/0x1000 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1413
 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1505 [inline]
 exc_page_fault+0x5d/0xc0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1561
 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570
RIP: 0010:rep_movs_alternative+0x57/0x70 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:80
Code: 00 66 90 48 8b 06 48 89 07 48 83 c6 08 48 83 c7 08 83 e9 08 74 df 83 f9 08 73 e8 eb c9 eb 01 c3 48 89 c8 48 c1 e9 03 83 e0 07 <f3> 48 a5 89 c1 85 c9 75 b3 c3 48 8d 0c c8 eb ac 66 0f 1f 84 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004427bb0 EFLAGS: 00050246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000008
RDX: ffffed1028a4ab48 RSI: ffff888145255a00 RDI: 0000000020019980
RBP: 0000000020019980 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1028a4ab47
R10: ffff888145255a3f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888145255a00
R13: 00000000200199c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
 copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:112 [inline]
 raw_copy_to_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:133 [inline]
 _copy_to_user lib/usercopy.c:41 [inline]
 _copy_to_user+0xa8/0xb0 lib/usercopy.c:34
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
 rng_dev_read+0x184/0x580 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:255
 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:755 [inline]
 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:743 [inline]
 do_iter_read+0x567/0x830 fs/read_write.c:797
 vfs_readv+0x12d/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:915
 do_preadv fs/read_write.c:1007 [inline]
 __do_sys_preadv fs/read_write.c:1057 [inline]
 __se_sys_preadv fs/read_write.c:1052 [inline]
 __x64_sys_preadv+0x228/0x300 fs/read_write.c:1052
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f3c78638b29
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f3c78638aff.
RSP: 002b:00007f3c785f9168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000127
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3c786c2328 RCX: 00007f3c78638b29
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020001880 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f3c786c2320 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3c786c232c
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8a220310 R15: 00007ffc8a2203f8
 </TASK>
INFO: NMI handler (nmi_cpu_backtrace_handler) took too long to run: 1.464 msecs


---
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Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn
Author: eadavis@qq.com

please test task hung in hwrng_fillfn

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 98b1cc82c4af

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 420f155d251f..ebfa5eab84df 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -501,7 +501,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 		rng = get_current_rng();
 		if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
 			break;
-		mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+			put_rng(rng);
+			return = -ERESTARTSYS;
+		}
 		rc = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf,
 				  rng_buffer_size(), 1);
 		if (current_quality != rng->quality)

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn
Author: eadavis@qq.com

please test task hung in hwrng_fillfn

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 98b1cc82c4af

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 420f155d251f..883412bbf9f2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -225,17 +225,18 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
-			err = -ERESTARTSYS;
-			goto out_put;
-		}
 		if (!data_avail) {
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+				err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				goto out_put;
+			}
 			bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
 				rng_buffer_size(),
 				!(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK));
+			mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 			if (bytes_read < 0) {
 				err = bytes_read;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 			data_avail = bytes_read;
 		}
@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 		if (!data_avail) {
 			if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
 				err = -EAGAIN;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 		} else {
 			len = data_avail;
@@ -255,14 +256,13 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, rng_buffer + data_avail,
 								len)) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 
 			size -= len;
 			ret += len;
 		}
 
-		mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 		put_rng(rng);
 
 		if (need_resched())
@@ -276,8 +276,6 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 out:
 	return ret ? : err;
 
-out_unlock_reading:
-	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 out_put:
 	put_rng(rng);
 	goto out;
@@ -501,7 +499,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 		rng = get_current_rng();
 		if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
 			break;
-		mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+			put_rng(rng);
+			return = -ERESTARTSYS;
+		}
 		rc = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf,
 				  rng_buffer_size(), 1);
 		if (current_quality != rng->quality)

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn
Author: eadavis@qq.com

please test task hung in hwrng_fillfn

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 98b1cc82c4af

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 420f155d251f..883412bbf9f2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -225,17 +225,18 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
-			err = -ERESTARTSYS;
-			goto out_put;
-		}
 		if (!data_avail) {
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+				err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				goto out_put;
+			}
 			bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
 				rng_buffer_size(),
 				!(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK));
+			mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 			if (bytes_read < 0) {
 				err = bytes_read;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 			data_avail = bytes_read;
 		}
@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 		if (!data_avail) {
 			if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
 				err = -EAGAIN;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 		} else {
 			len = data_avail;
@@ -255,14 +256,13 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, rng_buffer + data_avail,
 								len)) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 
 			size -= len;
 			ret += len;
 		}
 
-		mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 		put_rng(rng);
 
 		if (need_resched())
@@ -276,8 +276,6 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 out:
 	return ret ? : err;
 
-out_unlock_reading:
-	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 out_put:
 	put_rng(rng);
 	goto out;
@@ -501,7 +499,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 		rng = get_current_rng();
 		if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
 			break;
-		mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+			put_rng(rng);
+			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		}
 		rc = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf,
 				  rng_buffer_size(), 1);
 		if (current_quality != rng->quality)

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn
Author: eadavis@qq.com

please test task hung in hwrng_fillfn

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 98b1cc82c4af

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 420f155d251f..883412bbf9f2 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -225,17 +225,18 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
-			err = -ERESTARTSYS;
-			goto out_put;
-		}
 		if (!data_avail) {
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+				err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				goto out_put;
+			}
 			bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
 				rng_buffer_size(),
 				!(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK));
+			mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 			if (bytes_read < 0) {
 				err = bytes_read;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 			data_avail = bytes_read;
 		}
@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 		if (!data_avail) {
 			if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
 				err = -EAGAIN;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 		} else {
 			len = data_avail;
@@ -255,14 +256,13 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, rng_buffer + data_avail,
 								len)) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 
 			size -= len;
 			ret += len;
 		}
 
-		mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 		put_rng(rng);
 
 		if (need_resched())
@@ -276,8 +276,6 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 out:
 	return ret ? : err;
 
-out_unlock_reading:
-	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 out_put:
 	put_rng(rng);
 	goto out;
@@ -501,7 +499,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 		rng = get_current_rng();
 		if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
 			break;
-		mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+			put_rng(rng);
+			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		}
 		rc = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf,
 				  rng_buffer_size(), 1);
 		if (current_quality != rng->quality)

[PATCH] hwrng: core - fix task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[Edward Adam Davis]

[Syz repo]
INFO: task hwrng:749 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
      Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:hwrng           state:D stack:29040 pid:749   tgid:749   ppid:2      flags:0x00004000
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5376 [inline]
 __schedule+0xedb/0x5af0 kernel/sched/core.c:6688
 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6763 [inline]
 schedule+0xe9/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:6778
 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x20 kernel/sched/core.c:6835
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:679 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x5b9/0x9d0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
 hwrng_fillfn+0x145/0x430 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:504
 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
 </TASK>

...

RIP: 0010:rep_movs_alternative+0x57/0x70 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:80
Code: 00 66 90 48 8b 06 48 89 07 48 83 c6 08 48 83 c7 08 83 e9 08 74 df 83 f9 08 73 e8 eb c9 eb 01 c3 48 89 c8 48 c1 e9 03 83 e0 07 <f3> 48 a5 89 c1 85 c9 75 b3 c3 48 8d 0c c8 eb ac 66 0f 1f 84 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004427bb0 EFLAGS: 00050246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000008
RDX: ffffed1028a4ab48 RSI: ffff888145255a00 RDI: 0000000020019980
RBP: 0000000020019980 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1028a4ab47
R10: ffff888145255a3f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888145255a00
R13: 00000000200199c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
 copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:112 [inline]
 raw_copy_to_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:133 [inline]
 _copy_to_user lib/usercopy.c:41 [inline]
 _copy_to_user+0xa8/0xb0 lib/usercopy.c:34
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline]
 rng_dev_read+0x184/0x580 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:255
 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:755 [inline]
 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:743 [inline]
 do_iter_read+0x567/0x830 fs/read_write.c:797
 vfs_readv+0x12d/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:915
 do_preadv fs/read_write.c:1007 [inline]
 __do_sys_preadv fs/read_write.c:1057 [inline]
 __se_sys_preadv fs/read_write.c:1052 [inline]
 __x64_sys_preadv+0x228/0x300 fs/read_write.c:1052
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

[Analysis]
The lock reading_mutex in rng_dev_read() has been occupied for too long, 
causing the thread callback function hwrng_fillfn() to wait for a timeout.

[Fix]
Move code that does not require this lock protection out of the critical area.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
---
 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 420f155d251f..7323ddc958ce 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -225,17 +225,18 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
-			err = -ERESTARTSYS;
-			goto out_put;
-		}
 		if (!data_avail) {
+			if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+				err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				goto out_put;
+			}
 			bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
 				rng_buffer_size(),
 				!(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK));
+			mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 			if (bytes_read < 0) {
 				err = bytes_read;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 			data_avail = bytes_read;
 		}
@@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 		if (!data_avail) {
 			if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
 				err = -EAGAIN;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 		} else {
 			len = data_avail;
@@ -255,14 +256,13 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, rng_buffer + data_avail,
 								len)) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out_put;
 			}
 
 			size -= len;
 			ret += len;
 		}
 
-		mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 		put_rng(rng);
 
 		if (need_resched())
@@ -276,8 +276,6 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 out:
 	return ret ? : err;
 
-out_unlock_reading:
-	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
 out_put:
 	put_rng(rng);
 	goto out;
@@ -501,7 +499,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 		rng = get_current_rng();
 		if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
 			break;
-		mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
+		if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+			put_rng(rng);
+			return -ERESTARTSYS;
+		}
 		rc = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf,
 				  rng_buffer_size(), 1);
 		if (current_quality != rng->quality)
-- 
2.25.1

Re: [syzbot] [wireless?] WARNING in rate_control_rate_init

[syzbot]

For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org.

***

Subject: [wireless?] WARNING in rate_control_rate_init
Author: eadavis@qq.com

please test WARNING in rate_control_rate_init

#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 6e2332e0ab53

diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
index 606b1b2e4123..13d52452a124 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int sta_link_apply_parameters(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 	    !params->supported_rates_len &&
 	    !params->ht_capa && !params->vht_capa &&
 	    !params->he_capa && !params->eht_capa &&
-	    !params->opmode_notif_used)
+	    !params->opmode_notif_used && 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!link || !link_sta)
@@ -1817,6 +1817,7 @@ static int sta_link_apply_parameters(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 	} else if (new_link) {
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	printk("b, %p \n", rcu_access_pointer(sdata->vif.bss_conf.chanctx_conf));
 
 	if (params->txpwr_set) {
 		link_sta->pub->txpwr.type = params->txpwr.type;
@@ -1868,6 +1869,7 @@ static int sta_link_apply_parameters(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 					      params->opmode_notif,
 					      sband->band);
 	}
+	printk("e, %p \n", rcu_access_pointer(sdata->vif.bss_conf.chanctx_conf));
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1982,6 +1984,10 @@ static int sta_apply_parameters(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 	if (params->listen_interval >= 0)
 		sta->listen_interval = params->listen_interval;
 
+	printk("b, stp: %d, sa: %d, src: %d\n", 
+			test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_TDLS_PEER), 
+			test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_ASSOC), 
+			test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_RATE_CONTROL));
 	ret = sta_link_apply_parameters(local, sta, false,
 					&params->link_sta_params);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1996,6 +2002,10 @@ static int sta_apply_parameters(struct ieee80211_local *local,
 	if (params->airtime_weight)
 		sta->airtime_weight = params->airtime_weight;
 
+	printk("a, stp: %d, sa: %d, src: %d\n", 
+			test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_TDLS_PEER), 
+			test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_ASSOC), 
+			test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_RATE_CONTROL));
 	/* set the STA state after all sta info from usermode has been set */
 	if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_TDLS_PEER) ||
 	    set & BIT(NL80211_STA_FLAG_ASSOCIATED)) {

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - fix task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[Herbert Xu]

Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> wrote:
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> index 420f155d251f..7323ddc958ce 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> @@ -225,17 +225,18 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
>                        goto out;
>                }
> 
> -               if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
> -                       err = -ERESTARTSYS;
> -                       goto out_put;
> -               }
>                if (!data_avail) {
> +                       if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
> +                               err = -ERESTARTSYS;
> +                               goto out_put;
> +                       }
>                        bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
>                                rng_buffer_size(),
>                                !(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK));
> +                       mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
>                        if (bytes_read < 0) {
>                                err = bytes_read;
> -                               goto out_unlock_reading;
> +                               goto out_put;
>                        }
>                        data_avail = bytes_read;
>                }

Does this change anything at all? Please explain why it was holding
this lock for 143 seconds in the first place.  If it's doing it in
rng_get_data, then your change has zero effect.

> @@ -501,7 +499,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
>                rng = get_current_rng();
>                if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
>                        break;
> -               mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
> +               if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
> +                       put_rng(rng);
> +                       return -ERESTARTSYS;
> +               }

No this is just the symptom.  The real problem is why is the driver
spending 143 seconds in rng_get_data?

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - fix task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[Edward Adam Davis]

On Fri, 1 Dec 2023 17:56:59 +0800, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> > index 420f155d251f..7323ddc958ce 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> > @@ -225,17 +225,18 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
> >                        goto out;
> >                }
> >
> > -               if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
> > -                       err = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > -                       goto out_put;
> > -               }
> >                if (!data_avail) {
> > +                       if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
> > +                               err = -ERESTARTSYS;
> > +                               goto out_put;
> > +                       }
> >                        bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
> >                                rng_buffer_size(),
> >                                !(filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK));
> > +                       mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
> >                        if (bytes_read < 0) {
> >                                err = bytes_read;
> > -                               goto out_unlock_reading;
> > +                               goto out_put;
> >                        }
> >                        data_avail = bytes_read;
> >                }
> 
> Does this change anything at all? Please explain why it was holding
> this lock for 143 seconds in the first place.  If it's doing it in
> rng_get_data, then your change has zero effect.
Reduce the scope of critical zone protection.
The original critical zone contains a too large range, especially like 
copy_to_user() should not be included in the critical zone.
> 
> > @@ -501,7 +499,10 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
> >                rng = get_current_rng();
> >                if (IS_ERR(rng) || !rng)
> >                        break;
> > -               mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
> > +               if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
> > +                       put_rng(rng);
> > +                       return -ERESTARTSYS;
> > +               }
> 
> No this is just the symptom.  The real problem is why is the driver
> spending 143 seconds in rng_get_data?
In the second version of the patch, I have removed the fix in hwrng_fillfn().
But for some reason, the V2 patch did not appear in the mailing list.

I think it was due to consuming too much time while executing copy_to_user() 
that resulted in 143s.
So, I narrowed down the scope of the critical area and moved the code 
copy_to_user() out of the critical area.

Edward

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - fix task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[Herbert Xu]

On Fri, Dec 01, 2023 at 07:37:39PM +0800, Edward Adam Davis wrote:
>
> Reduce the scope of critical zone protection.
> The original critical zone contains a too large range, especially like 
> copy_to_user() should not be included in the critical zone.

Which part in particular is taking 143 seconds? The buffer is
only 128 bytes long.  Why is a 128-byte copy taking 143 seconds,
even with a page fault?

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - fix task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[Edward Adam Davis]

On Fri, 1 Dec 2023 19:41:11 +0800, Herbert Xu wrote:
> >
> > Reduce the scope of critical zone protection.
> > The original critical zone contains a too large range, especially like
> > copy_to_user() should not be included in the critical zone.
> 
> Which part in particular is taking 143 seconds? The buffer is
> only 128 bytes long.  Why is a 128-byte copy taking 143 seconds,
> even with a page fault?
According to splat, after a page fault occurred, the attempt to retrieve 
rcu_read_lock() failed, resulting in a timeout of 143s. This is my speculation.

Edward

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - fix task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[Herbert Xu]

On Fri, Dec 01, 2023 at 08:34:12PM +0800, Edward Adam Davis wrote:
>
> According to splat, after a page fault occurred, the attempt to retrieve 
> rcu_read_lock() failed, resulting in a timeout of 143s. This is my speculation.

Oh I see what's going on.  The reproducer is mapping /dev/hwrng, so
the write to user-space is then triggering another read which then
dead-locks.

Let me think about this.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

[PATCH] hwrng: core - Fix page fault dead lock on mmap-ed hwrng

[Herbert Xu]

There is a dead-lock in the hwrng device read path.  This triggers
when the user reads from /dev/hwrng into memory also mmap-ed from
/dev/hwrng.  The resulting page fault triggers a recursive read
which then dead-locks.

Fix this by using a stack buffer when calling copy_to_user.

Reported-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 9996508b3353 ("hwrng: core - Replace u32 in driver API with byte array")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 420f155d251f..a3bbdd6e60fc 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -23,10 +23,13 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
 #define RNG_MODULE_NAME		"hw_random"
 
+#define RNG_BUFFER_SIZE (SMP_CACHE_BYTES < 32 ? 32 : SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
+
 static struct hwrng *current_rng;
 /* the current rng has been explicitly chosen by user via sysfs */
 static int cur_rng_set_by_user;
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static inline int rng_get_data(struct hwrng *rng, u8 *buffer, size_t size,
 
 static size_t rng_buffer_size(void)
 {
-	return SMP_CACHE_BYTES < 32 ? 32 : SMP_CACHE_BYTES;
+	return RNG_BUFFER_SIZE;
 }
 
 static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
@@ -209,6 +212,7 @@ static inline int rng_get_data(struct hwrng *rng, u8 *buffer, size_t size,
 static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			    size_t size, loff_t *offp)
 {
+	u8 buffer[RNG_BUFFER_SIZE];
 	ssize_t ret = 0;
 	int err = 0;
 	int bytes_read, len;
@@ -236,34 +240,37 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			if (bytes_read < 0) {
 				err = bytes_read;
 				goto out_unlock_reading;
-			}
-			data_avail = bytes_read;
-		}
-
-		if (!data_avail) {
-			if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
+			} else if (bytes_read == 0 &&
+				   (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
 				err = -EAGAIN;
 				goto out_unlock_reading;
 			}
-		} else {
-			len = data_avail;
+
+			data_avail = bytes_read;
+		}
+
+		len = data_avail;
+		if (len) {
 			if (len > size)
 				len = size;
 
 			data_avail -= len;
 
-			if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, rng_buffer + data_avail,
-								len)) {
+			memcpy(buffer, rng_buffer + data_avail, len);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
+		put_rng(rng);
+
+		if (len) {
+			if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, buffer, len)) {
 				err = -EFAULT;
-				goto out_unlock_reading;
+				goto out;
 			}
 
 			size -= len;
 			ret += len;
 		}
 
-		mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
-		put_rng(rng);
 
 		if (need_resched())
 			schedule_timeout_interruptible(1);
@@ -274,6 +281,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 		}
 	}
 out:
+	memzero_explicit(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
 	return ret ? : err;
 
 out_unlock_reading:
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Fix page fault dead lock on mmap-ed hwrng

[PrasannaKumar Muralidharan]

On Sat, 2 Dec 2023 at 08:05, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> There is a dead-lock in the hwrng device read path.  This triggers
> when the user reads from /dev/hwrng into memory also mmap-ed from
> /dev/hwrng.  The resulting page fault triggers a recursive read
> which then dead-locks.
>
> Fix this by using a stack buffer when calling copy_to_user.
>
> Reported-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
> Reported-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: 9996508b3353 ("hwrng: core - Replace u32 in driver API with byte array")
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> index 420f155d251f..a3bbdd6e60fc 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> @@ -23,10 +23,13 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>
>  #define RNG_MODULE_NAME                "hw_random"
>
> +#define RNG_BUFFER_SIZE (SMP_CACHE_BYTES < 32 ? 32 : SMP_CACHE_BYTES)
> +
>  static struct hwrng *current_rng;
>  /* the current rng has been explicitly chosen by user via sysfs */
>  static int cur_rng_set_by_user;
> @@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static inline int rng_get_data(struct hwrng *rng, u8 *buffer, size_t size,
>
>  static size_t rng_buffer_size(void)
>  {
> -       return SMP_CACHE_BYTES < 32 ? 32 : SMP_CACHE_BYTES;
> +       return RNG_BUFFER_SIZE;
>  }
>
>  static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
> @@ -209,6 +212,7 @@ static inline int rng_get_data(struct hwrng *rng, u8 *buffer, size_t size,
>  static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
>                             size_t size, loff_t *offp)
>  {
> +       u8 buffer[RNG_BUFFER_SIZE];
>         ssize_t ret = 0;
>         int err = 0;
>         int bytes_read, len;
> @@ -236,34 +240,37 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
>                         if (bytes_read < 0) {
>                                 err = bytes_read;
>                                 goto out_unlock_reading;
> -                       }
> -                       data_avail = bytes_read;
> -               }
> -
> -               if (!data_avail) {
> -                       if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
> +                       } else if (bytes_read == 0 &&
> +                                  (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
>                                 err = -EAGAIN;
>                                 goto out_unlock_reading;
>                         }
> -               } else {
> -                       len = data_avail;
> +
> +                       data_avail = bytes_read;
> +               }
> +
> +               len = data_avail;
> +               if (len) {
>                         if (len > size)
>                                 len = size;
>
>                         data_avail -= len;
>
> -                       if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, rng_buffer + data_avail,
> -                                                               len)) {
> +                       memcpy(buffer, rng_buffer + data_avail, len);
> +               }
> +               mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
> +               put_rng(rng);
> +
> +               if (len) {
> +                       if (copy_to_user(buf + ret, buffer, len)) {
>                                 err = -EFAULT;
> -                               goto out_unlock_reading;
> +                               goto out;
>                         }
>
>                         size -= len;
>                         ret += len;
>                 }
>
> -               mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
> -               put_rng(rng);
>
>                 if (need_resched())
>                         schedule_timeout_interruptible(1);
> @@ -274,6 +281,7 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
>                 }
>         }
>  out:
> +       memzero_explicit(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
>         return ret ? : err;
>
>  out_unlock_reading:
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
>

Reviewed-by: PrasannaKumar Muralidharan <prasannatsmkumar@gmail.com>

Regards,
PrasannaKumar

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch but the reproducer is still triggering an issue:
INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

INFO: task hwrng:729 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
      Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-01647-g6e2332e0ab53-dirty #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:hwrng           state:D stack:29760 pid:729   ppid:2      flags:0x00004000
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5381 [inline]
 __schedule+0xeda/0x5b60 kernel/sched/core.c:6710
 schedule+0xe7/0x1b0 kernel/sched/core.c:6786
 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x20 kernel/sched/core.c:6845
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:679 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x5b4/0x990 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
 hwrng_fillfn+0x145/0x430 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:505
 kthread+0x2c4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
 </TASK>

Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by rcu_tasks_kthre/13:
 #0: ffffffff8c9996f0 (rcu_tasks.tasks_gp_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x2c/0xe30 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:522
1 lock held by rcu_tasks_trace/14:
 #0: ffffffff8c9993f0 (rcu_tasks_trace.tasks_gp_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x2c/0xe30 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:522
1 lock held by khungtaskd/28:
 #0: ffffffff8c99a300 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x55/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6615
1 lock held by hwrng/729:
 #0: ffffffff8d4887a8 (reading_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hwrng_fillfn+0x145/0x430 drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:505
2 locks held by getty/4749:
 #0: ffff8880287f3098 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x24/0x80 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:243
 #1: ffffc900015b02f0 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: n_tty_read+0xfc5/0x1460 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2176
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/5449:
2 locks held by syz-executor.0/5450:
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/5744:
1 lock held by syz-executor.0/5762:

=============================================

NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 28 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-01647-g6e2332e0ab53-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x277/0x390 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:113
 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x2ac/0x310 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
 trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:148 [inline]
 check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:222 [inline]
 watchdog+0xf29/0x11b0 kernel/hung_task.c:379
 kthread+0x2c4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
 </TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 5744 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller-01647-g6e2332e0ab53-dirty #0


Tested on:

commit:         6e2332e0 Merge tag 'cgroup-for-6.5' of git://git.kerne..
git tree:       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1271b7ece80000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=102b18358d5797d8
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=147cc8b4e80000

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         98b1cc82 Linux 6.7-rc2
git tree:       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=161857af680000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6ae1a4ee971a7305
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=16732694e80000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         98b1cc82 Linux 6.7-rc2
git tree:       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14d59724e80000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6ae1a4ee971a7305
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=103c62e8e80000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot tried to test the proposed patch but the build/boot failed:

drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:504:32: error: expected expression before '=' token


Tested on:

commit:         98b1cc82 Linux 6.7-rc2
git tree:       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6ae1a4ee971a7305
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=169076d0e80000

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot tried to test the proposed patch but the build/boot failed:

drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:506:32: error: expected expression before '=' token


Tested on:

commit:         98b1cc82 Linux 6.7-rc2
git tree:       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6ae1a4ee971a7305
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=1627b408e80000

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] INFO: task hung in hwrng_fillfn

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c52ab18308964d248092@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         b46ae77f Merge tag 'xfs-6.7-fixes-3' of git://git.kern..
git tree:       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=129d420ce80000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6ae1a4ee971a7305
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52ab18308964d248092
compiler:       gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=11f9fd9f680000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.