[syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    9a94d764e9bc Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2023-06-16' of git://..
git tree:       net-next
console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14774987280000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a4a7d74e6a7c3211
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd
compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1152c4ff280000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1307cbcf280000

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/79cfaaedcd27/disk-9a94d764.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/a22e22124e0b/vmlinux-9a94d764.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/fe2e1ce58898/bzImage-9a94d764.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000004: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027]
CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor202 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-01333-g9a94d764e9bc #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_alg include/crypto/hash.h:827 [inline]
RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_update crypto/shash.c:124 [inline]
RIP: 0010:shash_ahash_update+0x126/0x210 crypto/shash.c:306
Code: 8c 00 00 00 e8 bb f7 a4 fd 48 8b 04 24 48 8b 6c 24 40 80 38 00 0f 85 c3 00 00 00 4d 8b 75 00 49 8d 7e 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 1a 00 0f 85 c1 00 00 00 4d 8b 7e 20 49 8d 7f 2c 48 89 fa 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900039df948 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffed1003ce8b6b RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83df4f25 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: ffff8880732a3100 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000f00 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000f00
R13: ffff88801e745b58 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 1ffff9200073bf2b
FS:  00005555565db300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fccb3501440 CR3: 0000000021e60000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ghash_async_update+0x136/0x170 arch/x86/crypto/ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.c:206
 crypto_ahash_update include/crypto/hash.h:608 [inline]
 hash_sendmsg+0x434/0xde0 crypto/algif_hash.c:139
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x733/0x920 net/socket.c:2493
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2547
 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2576
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f95e272ecb9
Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd82939a68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f95e272ecb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f95e26f2e60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f95e26f2ef0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_alg include/crypto/hash.h:827 [inline]
RIP: 0010:crypto_shash_update crypto/shash.c:124 [inline]
RIP: 0010:shash_ahash_update+0x126/0x210 crypto/shash.c:306
Code: 8c 00 00 00 e8 bb f7 a4 fd 48 8b 04 24 48 8b 6c 24 40 80 38 00 0f 85 c3 00 00 00 4d 8b 75 00 49 8d 7e 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 1a 00 0f 85 c1 00 00 00 4d 8b 7e 20 49 8d 7f 2c 48 89 fa 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc900039df948 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffed1003ce8b6b RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83df4f25 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: ffff8880732a3100 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000f00 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000f00
R13: ffff88801e745b58 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 1ffff9200073bf2b
FS:  00005555565db300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f29a2df2304 CR3: 0000000021e60000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	8c 00                	mov    %es,(%rax)
   2:	00 00                	add    %al,(%rax)
   4:	e8 bb f7 a4 fd       	callq  0xfda4f7c4
   9:	48 8b 04 24          	mov    (%rsp),%rax
   d:	48 8b 6c 24 40       	mov    0x40(%rsp),%rbp
  12:	80 38 00             	cmpb   $0x0,(%rax)
  15:	0f 85 c3 00 00 00    	jne    0xde
  1b:	4d 8b 75 00          	mov    0x0(%r13),%r14
  1f:	49 8d 7e 20          	lea    0x20(%r14),%rdi
  23:	48 89 fa             	mov    %rdi,%rdx
  26:	48 c1 ea 03          	shr    $0x3,%rdx
* 2a:	80 3c 1a 00          	cmpb   $0x0,(%rdx,%rbx,1) <-- trapping instruction
  2e:	0f 85 c1 00 00 00    	jne    0xf5
  34:	4d 8b 7e 20          	mov    0x20(%r14),%r15
  38:	49 8d 7f 2c          	lea    0x2c(%r15),%rdi
  3c:	48 89 fa             	mov    %rdi,%rdx
  3f:	48                   	rex.W


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.

If the bug is already fixed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title

If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.

If you want to change bug's subsystems, reply with:
#syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
(See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)

If the bug is a duplicate of another bug, reply with:
#syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report

If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[syzbot]

syzbot has bisected this issue to:

commit c662b043cdca89bf0f03fc37251000ac69a3a548
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue Jun 6 13:08:56 2023 +0000

    crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES

bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=14a7cbcf280000
start commit:   9a94d764e9bc Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2023-06-16' of git://..
git tree:       net-next
final oops:     https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=16a7cbcf280000
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12a7cbcf280000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a4a7d74e6a7c3211
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1152c4ff280000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1307cbcf280000

Reported-by: syzbot+88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")

For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[David Howells]

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git main

commit c2996e733d4f2d93bdc0fed74022da082b2e6784
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed Jun 14 13:33:04 2023 +0100

    crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
    
    If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length
    message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first
    sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops
    will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in
    advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the
    hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message
    is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
    
    Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg()
    function.  If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore
    the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are
    continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not
    set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be
    ignored.
    
    Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if
    we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.
    
    Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
    Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/
    Reported-by: syzbot+14234ccf6d0ef629ec1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000c047db05fdeb8790@google.com/
    Reported-by: syzbot+4e2e47f32607d0f72d43@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000bcca3205fdeb87fb@google.com/
    Reported-by: syzbot+472626bb5e7c59fb768f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b55d8805fdeb8385@google.com/
    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
    cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
    cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
    cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
    cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
    cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index dfb048cefb60..0ab43e149f0e 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -76,13 +76,30 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (!continuing) {
-		if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
-			hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
+		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
+			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */
 		need_init = true;
+	} else if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
+		/*
+		 * No data - finalise the prev req if MSG_MORE so any error
+		 * comes out here.
+		 */
+		if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
+			err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
+			ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL,
+						ctx->result, 0);
+			err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
+					      &ctx->wait);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
+		}
+		goto done_more;
 	}
 
-	ctx->more = false;
-
 	while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
@@ -93,15 +110,6 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		if (npages == 0)
 			goto unlock_free;
 
-		if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sgl.sgl)) {
-			err = -ENOMEM;
-			ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl =
-				kvmalloc(array_size(npages,
-						    sizeof(*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)),
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)
-				goto unlock_free;
-		}
 		sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
 
 		ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
@@ -150,7 +158,9 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
 	}
 
+done_more:
 	ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
+done:
 	err = 0;
 unlock:
 	release_sock(sk);
@@ -158,6 +168,8 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 unlock_free:
 	af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
+	hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+	ctx->more = false;
 	goto unlock;
 }
 

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         49310624 Merge branch 'ipv6-random-cleanup-for-extensi..
git tree:       git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git main
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=178ba75b280000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a4a7d74e6a7c3211
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd
compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=11352c83280000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[David Howells]

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git main

    crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
    
    If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length
    message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first
    sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops
    will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in
    advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the
    hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message
    is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
    
    Fix this by always making a pass of the loop, even in the case that no data
    is provided to the sendmsg().
    
    Fix also extract_iter_to_sg() to handle a zero-length iterator by returning
    0 immediately.
    
    Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if
    we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.
    
    Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")
    Reported-by: syzbot+13a08c0bf4d212766c3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b928f705fdeb873a@google.com/
    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
    cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
    cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
    cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
    cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
    cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
    cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org

diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index dfb048cefb60..1176533a55c9 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -83,26 +83,14 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 	ctx->more = false;
 
-	while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
+	do {
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0;
 
 		err = -EIO;
 		npages = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter, max_pages);
-		if (npages == 0)
-			goto unlock_free;
-
-		if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sgl.sgl)) {
-			err = -ENOMEM;
-			ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl =
-				kvmalloc(array_size(npages,
-						    sizeof(*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)),
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)
-				goto unlock_free;
-		}
-		sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
+		sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, max_t(size_t, npages, 1));
 
 		ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
 
@@ -111,7 +99,8 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto unlock_free;
 		len = err;
-		sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents - 1);
+		if (len > 0)
+			sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents - 1);
 
 		if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
 			err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
@@ -148,7 +137,7 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 		copied += len;
 		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
-	}
+	} while (msg_data_left(msg));
 
 	ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
 	err = 0;
diff --git a/lib/scatterlist.c b/lib/scatterlist.c
index e97d7060329e..77a7b18ee751 100644
--- a/lib/scatterlist.c
+++ b/lib/scatterlist.c
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ ssize_t extract_iter_to_sg(struct iov_iter *iter, size_t maxsize,
 			   struct sg_table *sgtable, unsigned int sg_max,
 			   iov_iter_extraction_t extraction_flags)
 {
-	if (maxsize == 0)
+	if (!maxsize || !iter->count)
 		return 0;
 
 	switch (iov_iter_type(iter)) {

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[syzbot]

Hello,

syzbot has tested the proposed patch and the reproducer did not trigger any issue:

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

Tested on:

commit:         49310624 Merge branch 'ipv6-random-cleanup-for-extensi..
git tree:       git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git main
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=141473e3280000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a4a7d74e6a7c3211
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd
compiler:       gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
patch:          https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/patch.diff?x=13365e5b280000

Note: testing is done by a robot and is best-effort only.

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[syzbot]

syzbot suspects this issue was fixed by commit:

commit 1dbcf770cc2d15baf8a1e8174d6fd014a68b45ca
Author: Jiadong Zhu <Jiadong.Zhu@amd.com>
Date:   Wed May 24 03:42:19 2023 +0000

    drm/amdgpu: Reset CP_VMID_PREEMPT after trailing fence signaled

bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1622cafaa80000
start commit:   9a94d764e9bc Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2023-06-16' of git://..
git tree:       net-next
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a4a7d74e6a7c3211
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd
syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1152c4ff280000
C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1307cbcf280000

If the result looks correct, please mark the issue as fixed by replying with:

#syz fix: drm/amdgpu: Reset CP_VMID_PREEMPT after trailing fence signaled

For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[Aleksandr Nogikh]

On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 7:42 PM syzbot
<syzbot+88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
>
> syzbot suspects this issue was fixed by commit:
>
> commit 1dbcf770cc2d15baf8a1e8174d6fd014a68b45ca
> Author: Jiadong Zhu <Jiadong.Zhu@amd.com>
> Date:   Wed May 24 03:42:19 2023 +0000
>
>     drm/amdgpu: Reset CP_VMID_PREEMPT after trailing fence signaled
>
> bisection log:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=1622cafaa80000
> start commit:   9a94d764e9bc Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2023-06-16' of git://..
> git tree:       net-next
> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=a4a7d74e6a7c3211
> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=88f4b1e6cf88da11f5cd
> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1152c4ff280000
> C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=1307cbcf280000
>
> If the result looks correct, please mark the issue as fixed by replying with:

No, that's unrelated.

>
> #syz fix: drm/amdgpu: Reset CP_VMID_PREEMPT after trailing fence signaled
>
> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection
>

Re: [syzbot] [crypto?] general protection fault in shash_ahash_update

[David Howells]

#syz fix: crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)