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From: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, dvyukov@google.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, labbott@redhat.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the init_allocations=1 boot option
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 15:24:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0100016a5a3f6121-e7ed483e-bc29-4d75-bd0a-8e3b973529f5-000000@email.amazonses.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904260911570.8340@nuc-kabylake>

Hmmmm.... Maybe its better to zero on free? That way you dont need to
initialize the allocations. You could even check if someone mucked with
the object during allocation. This is a replication of some of the
inherent debugging facilities in the allocator though.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-26 15:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-18 15:42 [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:42 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:42 ` [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: introduce the " Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:42   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 16:35   ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-18 16:43     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 16:43       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 16:50       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 16:50         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-23  8:31     ` Michal Hocko
2019-04-18 22:08   ` Randy Dunlap
2019-04-23 19:00   ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 19:00     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-26 12:12     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-26 12:12       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-23 20:36   ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-26 14:14   ` Christopher Lameter
2019-04-26 14:14     ` Christopher Lameter
     [not found]   ` <alpine.DEB.2.21.1904260911570.8340@nuc-kabylake>
2019-04-26 15:24     ` Christopher Lameter [this message]
2019-04-26 15:24       ` Christopher Lameter
2019-04-26 15:48       ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-26 15:48         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:42 ` [PATCH 2/3] gfp: mm: introduce __GFP_NOINIT Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:42   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 16:52   ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-23 19:14     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 19:14       ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 20:40       ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-23 19:11   ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 19:11     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-18 15:42 ` [PATCH 3/3] RFC: net: apply __GFP_NOINIT to AF_UNIX sk_buff allocations Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:42   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-23 19:17   ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 19:17     ` Kees Cook
2019-04-18 15:44 ` [PATCH 0/3] RFC: add init_allocations=1 boot option Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 15:44   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-18 22:07 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-04-23 18:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-23 18:49   ` Kees Cook
2019-04-26 12:39   ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-04-26 12:39     ` Alexander Potapenko

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