* [PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support
@ 2021-04-28 12:19 Masahisa Kojima
2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima
2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima
0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-04-28 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
This patch series add the PE/COFF measurement support.
Extending PCR and Event Log is tested with fTPM
running as a OP-TEE TA.
Unit test will be added in the separate series.
Masahisa Kojima (2):
efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is
disabled
efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement
include/efi_loader.h | 6 +
include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++
include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +
lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 132 +++++++++++++++----
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +---------
lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 +
9 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-04-28 12:19 [PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-04-28 12:19 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-04-28 13:16 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-04-28 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support. PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled. This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- Changes in v3: - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option Changes in v2: - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++ lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +--------------------------- lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule @@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. @@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, at least, PK, KEK and db. +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT + bool + depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE + config EFI_ESRT bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation" depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o -obj-y += efi_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)) $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( } } -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +/** + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region + * @regs: Pointer to array of regions + * @start: Start address of region (included) + * @end: End address of region (excluded) + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions + * + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. + * + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. + * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. + * + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence + * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, + const void *start, const void *end, + int nocheck) +{ + struct image_region *reg; + int i, j; + + if (regs->num >= regs->max) { + EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + if (end < start) + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + if (nocheck) + continue; + + /* new data after registered region */ + if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) + continue; + + /* new data preceding registered region */ + if (end <= reg->data) { + for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) + memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], + sizeof(*reg)); + break; + } + + /* new data overlapping registered region */ + EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + reg->data = start; + reg->size = end - start; + regs->num++; + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + /** * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) + return true; + if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true; @@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err: EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } -#else -static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) -{ - return true; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ - /** * efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { /* SEQUENCE */ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out: return !revoked; } -/** - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region - * @regs: Pointer to array of regions - * @start: Start address of region (included) - * @end: End address of region (excluded) - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions - * - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. - * - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. - * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. - * - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence - * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. - * - * Return: status code - */ -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, - const void *start, const void *end, - int nocheck) -{ - struct image_region *reg; - int i, j; - - if (regs->num >= regs->max) { - EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - } - - if (end < start) - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - - for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - if (nocheck) - continue; - - /* new data after registered region */ - if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) - continue; - - /* new data preceding registered region */ - if (end <= reg->data) { - for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) - memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], - sizeof(*reg)); - break; - } - - /* new data overlapping registered region */ - EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - } - - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - reg->data = start; - reg->size = end - start; - regs->num++; - - return EFI_SUCCESS; -} - /** * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store * @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type { const enum efi_auth_var_type type; }; +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; + static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK}, {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK}, -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-04-28 13:16 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-08 14:08 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-04-28 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support. > PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both > UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in > measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are > gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if > UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled. > > This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option > to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled. > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > --- > > Changes in v3: > - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option > > Changes in v2: > - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c > - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option > - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> > - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c > - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c > > > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++ > lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- > lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +--------------------------- > lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++ > 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE > select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER > select PKCS7_VERIFY > select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO > + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > default n > help > Select this option if you want to enable capsule > @@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT > select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER > select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER > select PKCS7_VERIFY > + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > default n > help > Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. > @@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT > it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, > at least, PK, KEK and db. > > +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT > + bool > + depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE > + > config EFI_ESRT > bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation" > depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile > index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile > @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o > obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o > obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o > obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o > -obj-y += efi_signature.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o > > EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)) > $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE) > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( > } > } > > -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT > +/** > + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region > + * @regs: Pointer to array of regions > + * @start: Start address of region (included) > + * @end: End address of region (excluded) > + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions > + * > + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. > + * > + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. > + * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. > + * > + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence > + * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. > + * > + * Return: status code > + */ > +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, > + const void *start, const void *end, > + int nocheck) > +{ > + struct image_region *reg; > + int i, j; > + > + if (regs->num >= regs->max) { > + EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + } > + > + if (end < start) > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + > + for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { > + reg = ®s->reg[i]; > + if (nocheck) > + continue; > + > + /* new data after registered region */ > + if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) > + continue; > + > + /* new data preceding registered region */ > + if (end <= reg->data) { > + for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) > + memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], > + sizeof(*reg)); > + break; > + } > + > + /* new data overlapping registered region */ > + EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + } > + > + reg = ®s->reg[i]; > + reg->data = start; > + reg->size = end - start; > + regs->num++; > + > + return EFI_SUCCESS; > +} > + > /** > * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections > * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header > @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > + return true; > + Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in this case? Best regards Heinrich > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > return true; > > @@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err: > EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret); > return ret; > } > -#else > -static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > -{ > - return true; > -} > -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ > - > > /** > * efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c > index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c > @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ > #include <crypto/public_key.h> > #include <linux/compat.h> > #include <linux/oid_registry.h> > +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> > #include <u-boot/rsa.h> > #include <u-boot/sha256.h> > > -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = > - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID; > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; > const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; > > -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) > static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { > /* SEQUENCE */ > 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, > @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out: > return !revoked; > } > > -/** > - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region > - * @regs: Pointer to array of regions > - * @start: Start address of region (included) > - * @end: End address of region (excluded) > - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions > - * > - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. > - * > - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. > - * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. > - * > - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence > - * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. > - * > - * Return: status code > - */ > -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, > - const void *start, const void *end, > - int nocheck) > -{ > - struct image_region *reg; > - int i, j; > - > - if (regs->num >= regs->max) { > - EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); > - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > - } > - > - if (end < start) > - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > - > - for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { > - reg = ®s->reg[i]; > - if (nocheck) > - continue; > - > - /* new data after registered region */ > - if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) > - continue; > - > - /* new data preceding registered region */ > - if (end <= reg->data) { > - for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) > - memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], > - sizeof(*reg)); > - break; > - } > - > - /* new data overlapping registered region */ > - EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); > - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > - } > - > - reg = ®s->reg[i]; > - reg->data = start; > - reg->size = end - start; > - regs->num++; > - > - return EFI_SUCCESS; > -} > - > /** > * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store > * @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure > @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) > > return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); > } > -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c > index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c > @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type { > const enum efi_auth_var_type type; > }; > > +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = > + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; > + > static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { > {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK}, > {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK}, > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-04-28 13:16 ` Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-05-08 14:08 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-10 0:49 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-05-08 14:08 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote: <snip /> >> /** >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) >> >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); >> >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) >> + return true; >> + > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > this case? Hello Masahisa, I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost? Best regards Heinrich ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-05-08 14:08 ` Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-05-10 0:49 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-10 2:07 ` Takahiro Akashi 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-10 0:49 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi Heinrich, Sorry for the late reply. On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote: > > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > <snip /> > >> /** > >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections > >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > >> > >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > >> > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > >> + return true; > >> + > > > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > > this case? The original code is as follows. #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { < snip > } #else static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, so I keep the original implementation, always return true if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled. Thanks, Masahisa > > Hello Masahisa, > > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost? > > Best regards > > Heinrich ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-05-10 0:49 ` Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-10 2:07 ` Takahiro Akashi 2021-05-10 22:06 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Takahiro Akashi @ 2021-05-10 2:07 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > Hi Heinrich, > > Sorry for the late reply. > > On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote: > > > > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > <snip /> > > >> /** > > >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections > > >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header > > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > >> > > >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > > >> > > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > >> + return true; > > >> + > > > > > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > > > this case? > > The original code is as follows. Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that > > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > >> + return true; and the succeeding check, if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true; are somehow redundant. But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate(). -Takahiro Akashi > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { > > < snip > > > } > #else > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > { > return true; > } > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ > > The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, > so I keep the original implementation, always return true > if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled. > > Thanks, > Masahisa > > > > > Hello Masahisa, > > > > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost? > > > > Best regards > > > > Heinrich ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-05-10 2:07 ` Takahiro Akashi @ 2021-05-10 22:06 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:57 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-10 22:06 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 11:07, Takahiro Akashi <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote: > > On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > Hi Heinrich, > > > > Sorry for the late reply. > > > > On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote: > > > > > > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > > > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > > <snip /> > > > >> /** > > > >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections > > > >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header > > > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > > >> > > > >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > > > >> > > > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > > >> + return true; > > > >> + > > > > > > > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > > > > this case? > > > > The original code is as follows. > > Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that > > > > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > > >> + return true; > > and the succeeding check, > > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > return true; > > are somehow redundant. > But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out > the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate(). Hi Heinrich, Takahiro, Sorry for the late reply. I now understand Takahiro's concern. If I remove following check, > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > + return true; compiler optimization does not work and link error occurs. lib/built-in.o: In function `efi_image_authenticate': /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:601: undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:607: undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:613: undefined reference to `efi_signature_lookup_digest' I would like to propose two resolution. 1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition 2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and always include efi_signature.c as compilation target. Please advise. Thanks, Masahisa > > -Takahiro Akashi > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT > > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { > > > > < snip > > > > > } > > #else > > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > { > > return true; > > } > > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ > > > > The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, > > so I keep the original implementation, always return true > > if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled. > > > > Thanks, > > Masahisa > > > > > > > > Hello Masahisa, > > > > > > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost? > > > > > > Best regards > > > > > > Heinrich ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-05-10 22:06 ` Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:57 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-12 6:57 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi Heinrich, I'm about to send v4 patch series. > 1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition I chose this option, but I reverted #ifdef statement instead of using "if (IS_ENABLED)" because I think it is better not to rely on compiler optimization. > 2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and > always include efi_signature.c as compilation target. In this option, CONFIG_PKCS7_VERIFY is required for EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL just for successful build. To minimize dependency, I did not proceed with 2). Please kindly review v4. Thanks, Masahisa On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 07:06, Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> wrote: > > On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 11:07, Takahiro Akashi > <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> wrote: > > > > On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > > Hi Heinrich, > > > > > > Sorry for the late reply. > > > > > > On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: > > > > > On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > > > <snip /> > > > > >> /** > > > > >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections > > > > >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header > > > > >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > > > >> > > > > >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > > > > >> > > > > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > > > >> + return true; > > > > >> + > > > > > > > > > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > > > > > this case? > > > > > > The original code is as follows. > > > > Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that > > > > > > >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > > > >> + return true; > > > > and the succeeding check, > > > > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > > return true; > > > > are somehow redundant. > > But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out > > the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate(). > > Hi Heinrich, Takahiro, > > Sorry for the late reply. > I now understand Takahiro's concern. > If I remove following check, > > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) > > + return true; > > compiler optimization does not work and link error occurs. > > lib/built-in.o: In function `efi_image_authenticate': > /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:601: > undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' > /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:607: > undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' > /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:613: > undefined reference to `efi_signature_lookup_digest' > > I would like to propose two resolution. > > 1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition > 2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and > always include efi_signature.c as compilation target. > > Please advise. > > Thanks, > Masahisa > > > > > > -Takahiro Akashi > > > > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT > > > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { > > > > > > < snip > > > > > > > } > > > #else > > > static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > > { > > > return true; > > > } > > > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ > > > > > > The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, > > > so I keep the original implementation, always return true > > > if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Masahisa > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Masahisa, > > > > > > > > I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost? > > > > > > > > Best regards > > > > > > > > Heinrich ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/2] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-04-28 12:19 [PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-04-28 12:19 ` Masahisa Kojima 1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-04-28 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" requires to measure every attempt to load and execute a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, and appends measurement into Event Log. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- (no changes since v2) Changes in v2: - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path - Add function comment include/efi_loader.h | 6 + include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, const char *if_typename, int diskid, @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); + bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ +#include <efi_api.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { u8 event[]; } __packed; +struct uefi_image_load_event { + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; + u64 image_length_in_memory; + u64 image_link_time_address; + u64 length_of_device_path; + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; +}; + struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { u8 size; struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h index df67a196cf..6e812c017c 100644 --- a/include/tpm-v2.h +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h @@ -62,6 +62,24 @@ struct udevice; #define EV_CPU_MICROCODE ((u32)0x00000009) #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) +/* + * event types, cf. + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 + */ +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) + /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ struct tpms_tagged_property { u32 property; diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index b8a790bcb9..cc548e1b88 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) return 1; } +/** + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image + * + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. + * + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. + */ +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) +{ + size_t new_efi_size; + void *p; + + /* + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. + */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); + if (!p) + return NULL; + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); + *efi_size = new_efi_size; + *new_efi = p; + return p; + } else { + return efi; + } +} + /** * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image * @efi: Pointer to image @@ -560,7 +594,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; void *new_efi = NULL; u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; + size_t auth_size; bool ret = false; EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); @@ -571,19 +605,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true; - /* - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. - */ - if (efi_size & 0x7) { - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); - if (!new_efi) - return false; - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); - efi = new_efi; - efi_size = new_efi_size; - } + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return false; if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, &wincerts_len)) { @@ -886,6 +910,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, goto err; } +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, + loaded_image_info)) + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); +#endif + /* Copy PE headers */ memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, sizeof(*dos) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c index 94e8f22bbb..7ad9cb2b89 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ #include <efi_loader.h> #include <efi_tcg2.h> #include <log.h> +#include <malloc.h> #include <version.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> +#include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha1.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> #include <u-boot/sha512.h> @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: return EFI_EXIT(ret); } +/** + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend + * + * Return: status code + */ +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) +{ + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; + size_t wincerts_len; + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; + void *new_efi = NULL; + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + efi_status_t ret; + u32 active; + int i; + + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, + &wincerts_len)) { + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + digest_list->count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; + + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) + continue; + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + default: + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); + digest_list->count++; + } + +out: + free(new_efi); + free(regs); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @handle: loaded image handle + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) +{ + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; + efi_status_t ret; + struct udevice *dev; + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; + struct efi_device_path *device_path; + u32 device_path_length; + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; + struct efi_handler *handler; + + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + switch (handle->image_type) { + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: + pcr_index = 4; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + default: + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, + &handler)); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); + if (device_path_length > 0) { + /* add end node size */ + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); + } + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); + if (!image_load_event) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; + + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; + + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else { + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + if (device_path_length > 0) { + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, + device_path_length); + } + + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); + +out: + free(image_load_event); + + return ret; +} + /** * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events * @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, /* * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature * Format" - * Not supported for now */ if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; - goto out; - } + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + (void **)&nt); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); + goto out; + } - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, - &digest_list); + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } else { + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-05-12 6:57 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-04-28 12:19 [PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima 2021-04-28 13:16 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-08 14:08 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-10 0:49 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-10 2:07 ` Takahiro Akashi 2021-05-10 22:06 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-12 6:57 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-04-28 12:19 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima
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