* [v2 PATCH 0/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel-kz+m5ild9QBg9hUCZPvPmw, linux-bluetooth-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Tudor Ambarus
That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
With this patch set, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
ecdh private key. We let the crypto subsystem to generate and handle
the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware ecc private key
generation and retention.
Tested with selftest and with btmon and smp-tester on top of hci_vhci,
with ecdh done in both software and hardware (through atmel-ecc driver).
All tests passed.
RFC version can be found at:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org/msg28036.html
Changes in v2:
- add patches 2, 3, 4.
- adress Marcel's suggestions:
- revive the check for accidentally generated debug keys
- bypass the handling of private key to the crypto subsytem,
even when using debug keys.
Tudor Ambarus (5):
Bluetooth: move ecdh allocation outside of ecdh_helper
Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - reveal error codes
Bluetooth: selftest - check for errors when computing ZZ
Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - fix leak of private key
Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 +-
net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 46 +++++++--
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 127 +++++++++++++++---------
4 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 0/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel, linux-bluetooth; +Cc: linux-crypto, Tudor Ambarus
That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
With this patch set, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
ecdh private key. We let the crypto subsystem to generate and handle
the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware ecc private key
generation and retention.
Tested with selftest and with btmon and smp-tester on top of hci_vhci,
with ecdh done in both software and hardware (through atmel-ecc driver).
All tests passed.
RFC version can be found at:
https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg28036.html
Changes in v2:
- add patches 2, 3, 4.
- adress Marcel's suggestions:
- revive the check for accidentally generated debug keys
- bypass the handling of private key to the crypto subsytem,
even when using debug keys.
Tudor Ambarus (5):
Bluetooth: move ecdh allocation outside of ecdh_helper
Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - reveal error codes
Bluetooth: selftest - check for errors when computing ZZ
Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - fix leak of private key
Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 +-
net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 46 +++++++--
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 127 +++++++++++++++---------
4 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 1/5] Bluetooth: move ecdh allocation outside of ecdh_helper
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
(?)
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel, linux-bluetooth; +Cc: linux-crypto, Tudor Ambarus
Before this change, a new crypto tfm was allocated, each time,
for both key generation and shared secret computation.
Allocate a single tfm for both cases.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
---
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 32 ++++-----------------
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 8 ++++--
net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 29 +++++++++++++------
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index c7b1a9a..ac2c708 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#include "ecdh_helper.h"
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
-#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/ecdh.h>
struct ecdh_completion {
@@ -50,10 +49,9 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
}
-bool compute_ecdh_secret(const u8 public_key[64], const u8 private_key[32],
- u8 secret[32])
+bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
+ const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
{
- struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
struct kpp_request *req;
struct ecdh p;
struct ecdh_completion result;
@@ -66,16 +64,9 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(const u8 public_key[64], const u8 private_key[32],
if (!tmp)
return false;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
- pr_err("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for kpp: %ld\n",
- PTR_ERR(tfm));
- goto free_tmp;
- }
-
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
- goto free_kpp;
+ goto free_tmp;
init_completion(&result.completion);
@@ -126,16 +117,14 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(const u8 public_key[64], const u8 private_key[32],
kzfree(buf);
free_req:
kpp_request_free(req);
-free_kpp:
- crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
return (err == 0);
}
-bool generate_ecdh_keys(u8 public_key[64], u8 private_key[32])
+bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
+ u8 private_key[32])
{
- struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
struct kpp_request *req;
struct ecdh p;
struct ecdh_completion result;
@@ -150,16 +139,9 @@ bool generate_ecdh_keys(u8 public_key[64], u8 private_key[32])
if (!tmp)
return false;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
- pr_err("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for kpp: %ld\n",
- PTR_ERR(tfm));
- goto free_tmp;
- }
-
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
- goto free_kpp;
+ goto free_tmp;
init_completion(&result.completion);
@@ -218,8 +200,6 @@ bool generate_ecdh_keys(u8 public_key[64], u8 private_key[32])
kzfree(buf);
free_req:
kpp_request_free(req);
-free_kpp:
- crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
return (err == 0);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
index 7a423fa..5cde37d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
@@ -20,8 +20,10 @@
* COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-bool compute_ecdh_secret(const u8 pub_a[64], const u8 priv_b[32],
- u8 secret[32]);
-bool generate_ecdh_keys(u8 public_key[64], u8 private_key[32]);
+bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
+ const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
+bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
+ u8 private_key[32]);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
index 34a1227..126bdc5 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ static const u8 dhkey_3[32] __initconst = {
0x7c, 0x1c, 0xf9, 0x49, 0xe6, 0xd7, 0xaa, 0x70,
};
-static int __init test_ecdh_sample(const u8 priv_a[32], const u8 priv_b[32],
- const u8 pub_a[64], const u8 pub_b[64],
- const u8 dhkey[32])
+static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
+ const u8 priv_b[32], const u8 pub_a[64],
+ const u8 pub_b[64], const u8 dhkey[32])
{
u8 *tmp, *dhkey_a, *dhkey_b;
int ret = 0;
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(const u8 priv_a[32], const u8 priv_b[32],
dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
- compute_ecdh_secret(pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
- compute_ecdh_secret(pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
+ compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
+ compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
if (memcmp(dhkey_a, dhkey, 32)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -185,30 +185,43 @@ static const struct file_operations test_ecdh_fops = {
static int __init test_ecdh(void)
{
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
unsigned long long duration;
int err;
calltime = ktime_get();
- err = test_ecdh_sample(priv_a_1, priv_b_1, pub_a_1, pub_b_1, dhkey_1);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ err = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ err = test_ecdh_sample(tfm, priv_a_1, priv_b_1, pub_a_1, pub_b_1,
+ dhkey_1);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("ECDH sample 1 failed");
goto done;
}
- err = test_ecdh_sample(priv_a_2, priv_b_2, pub_a_2, pub_b_2, dhkey_2);
+ err = test_ecdh_sample(tfm, priv_a_2, priv_b_2, pub_a_2, pub_b_2,
+ dhkey_2);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("ECDH sample 2 failed");
goto done;
}
- err = test_ecdh_sample(priv_a_3, priv_a_3, pub_a_3, pub_a_3, dhkey_3);
+ err = test_ecdh_sample(tfm, priv_a_3, priv_a_3, pub_a_3, pub_a_3,
+ dhkey_3);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("ECDH sample 3 failed");
goto done;
}
+ crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
+
rettime = ktime_get();
delta = ktime_sub(rettime, calltime);
duration = (unsigned long long) ktime_to_ns(delta) >> 10;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index a0ef897..31b64bc 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ struct smp_dev {
struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
};
struct smp_chan {
@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
};
/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
@@ -574,7 +577,8 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+ if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_sk))
return -EIO;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
@@ -771,6 +775,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
* support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
@@ -1391,16 +1396,19 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
- kzfree(smp);
- return NULL;
+ goto zfree_smp;
}
smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
- crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
- kzfree(smp);
- return NULL;
+ goto free_cipher;
+ }
+
+ smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ goto free_shash;
}
smp->conn = conn;
@@ -1413,6 +1421,14 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
return smp;
+
+free_shash:
+ crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+free_cipher:
+ crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+zfree_smp:
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return NULL;
}
static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
@@ -1903,7 +1919,8 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+ if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_sk))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
@@ -2677,7 +2694,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
- if (!compute_ecdh_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
+ if (!compute_ecdh_secret(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk,
+ smp->dhkey))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
@@ -3169,6 +3187,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
struct smp_dev *smp;
struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
smp = NULL;
@@ -3194,8 +3213,18 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
}
+ tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ kzfree(smp);
+ return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
+ }
+
smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
+ smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
smp->min_key_size = SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
smp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
@@ -3205,6 +3234,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
if (smp) {
crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
kzfree(smp);
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -3252,6 +3282,7 @@ static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
chan->data = NULL;
crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
kzfree(smp);
}
@@ -3498,13 +3529,13 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
}
-static int __init test_debug_key(void)
+static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
{
u8 pk[64], sk[32];
swap_digits((u64 *)debug_sk, (u64 *)sk, 4);
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(pk, sk))
+ if (!generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk))
return -EINVAL;
if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
@@ -3763,7 +3794,8 @@ static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
};
static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
- struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac)
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
{
ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
unsigned long long duration;
@@ -3771,7 +3803,7 @@ static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
calltime = ktime_get();
- err = test_debug_key();
+ err = test_debug_key(tfm_ecdh);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("debug_key test failed");
goto done;
@@ -3848,6 +3880,7 @@ int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
{
struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
int err;
tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
@@ -3863,10 +3896,19 @@ int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
}
- err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac);
+ tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
+ crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
+ }
+
+ err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
+ crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);
return err;
}
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 2/5] Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - reveal error codes
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel-kz+m5ild9QBg9hUCZPvPmw, linux-bluetooth-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Tudor Ambarus
ecdh_helper functions were hiding the error codes and chose to return
the return value of an relational operator, "==". Remove the unnecessary
query and reveal the error codes.
While updating the return values, code in a way that compilers will
warn in case of uninitialized err.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
---
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 8 ++++----
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index ac2c708..22c8daa 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
}
-bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
- const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
+int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
+ const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
{
struct kpp_request *req;
struct ecdh p;
@@ -58,15 +58,17 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
struct scatterlist src, dst;
u8 *tmp, *buf;
unsigned int buf_len;
- int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int err;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
- return false;
+ return -ENOMEM;
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
+ if (!req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_tmp;
+ }
init_completion(&result.completion);
@@ -80,8 +82,10 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf)
+ if (!buf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_req;
+ }
crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
@@ -119,11 +123,11 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
- return (err == 0);
+ return err;
}
-bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
- u8 private_key[32])
+int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
+ u8 private_key[32])
{
struct kpp_request *req;
struct ecdh p;
@@ -131,17 +135,19 @@ bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
struct scatterlist dst;
u8 *tmp, *buf;
unsigned int buf_len;
- int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int err;
const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
unsigned short tries = 0;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
- return false;
+ return -ENOMEM;
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
+ if (!req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_tmp;
+ }
init_completion(&result.completion);
@@ -202,5 +208,5 @@ bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
- return (err == 0);
+ return err;
}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
index 5cde37d..50e6676 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
- const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
-bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
- u8 private_key[32]);
+int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
+ const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
+int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
+ u8 private_key[32]);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 31b64bc..af7e610 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -577,9 +577,10 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
- smp->local_sk))
- return -EIO;
+ err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
@@ -1919,8 +1920,8 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
- smp->local_sk))
+ if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_sk))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
@@ -3532,11 +3533,13 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
{
u8 pk[64], sk[32];
+ int err;
swap_digits((u64 *)debug_sk, (u64 *)sk, 4);
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk))
- return -EINVAL;
+ err = generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 2/5] Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - reveal error codes
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel, linux-bluetooth; +Cc: linux-crypto, Tudor Ambarus
ecdh_helper functions were hiding the error codes and chose to return
the return value of an relational operator, "==". Remove the unnecessary
query and reveal the error codes.
While updating the return values, code in a way that compilers will
warn in case of uninitialized err.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
---
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 8 ++++----
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index ac2c708..22c8daa 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
}
-bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
- const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
+int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
+ const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
{
struct kpp_request *req;
struct ecdh p;
@@ -58,15 +58,17 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
struct scatterlist src, dst;
u8 *tmp, *buf;
unsigned int buf_len;
- int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int err;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
- return false;
+ return -ENOMEM;
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
+ if (!req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_tmp;
+ }
init_completion(&result.completion);
@@ -80,8 +82,10 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf)
+ if (!buf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_req;
+ }
crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
@@ -119,11 +123,11 @@ bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
- return (err == 0);
+ return err;
}
-bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
- u8 private_key[32])
+int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
+ u8 private_key[32])
{
struct kpp_request *req;
struct ecdh p;
@@ -131,17 +135,19 @@ bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
struct scatterlist dst;
u8 *tmp, *buf;
unsigned int buf_len;
- int err = -ENOMEM;
+ int err;
const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
unsigned short tries = 0;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
- return false;
+ return -ENOMEM;
req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
+ if (!req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_tmp;
+ }
init_completion(&result.completion);
@@ -202,5 +208,5 @@ bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
- return (err == 0);
+ return err;
}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
index 5cde37d..50e6676 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-bool compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
- const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
-bool generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
- u8 private_key[32]);
+int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
+ const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
+int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
+ u8 private_key[32]);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 31b64bc..af7e610 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -577,9 +577,10 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
- smp->local_sk))
- return -EIO;
+ err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
@@ -1919,8 +1920,8 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
- smp->local_sk))
+ if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
+ smp->local_sk))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
@@ -3532,11 +3533,13 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
{
u8 pk[64], sk[32];
+ int err;
swap_digits((u64 *)debug_sk, (u64 *)sk, 4);
- if (!generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk))
- return -EINVAL;
+ err = generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 3/5] Bluetooth: selftest - check for errors when computing ZZ
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel-kz+m5ild9QBg9hUCZPvPmw, linux-bluetooth-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Tudor Ambarus
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
---
net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
index 126bdc5..ce99648 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
const u8 pub_b[64], const u8 dhkey[32])
{
u8 *tmp, *dhkey_a, *dhkey_b;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
@@ -152,8 +152,13 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
- compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
- compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
+ ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
if (memcmp(dhkey_a, dhkey, 32)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 3/5] Bluetooth: selftest - check for errors when computing ZZ
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel, linux-bluetooth; +Cc: linux-crypto, Tudor Ambarus
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
---
net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
index 126bdc5..ce99648 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
const u8 pub_b[64], const u8 dhkey[32])
{
u8 *tmp, *dhkey_a, *dhkey_b;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
@@ -152,8 +152,13 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
- compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
- compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
+ ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
if (memcmp(dhkey_a, dhkey, 32)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 4/5] Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - fix leak of private key
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel-kz+m5ild9QBg9hUCZPvPmw, linux-bluetooth-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Tudor Ambarus
tmp buffer contains the swapped private key. In case the setkey call
failed, the tmp buffer was freed without clearing the private key.
Zeroize the temporary buffer so we don't leak the private key.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
---
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index 22c8daa..16e022f 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
free_req:
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
- kfree(tmp);
+ kzfree(tmp);
return err;
}
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 4/5] Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - fix leak of private key
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel, linux-bluetooth; +Cc: linux-crypto, Tudor Ambarus
tmp buffer contains the swapped private key. In case the setkey call
failed, the tmp buffer was freed without clearing the private key.
Zeroize the temporary buffer so we don't leak the private key.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
---
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index 22c8daa..16e022f 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
free_req:
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
- kfree(tmp);
+ kzfree(tmp);
return err;
}
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
(?)
@ 2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 16:50 ` Marcel Holtmann
-1 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-28 14:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: marcel, linux-bluetooth; +Cc: linux-crypto, Tudor Ambarus
That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
With this patch, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
ecdh private key and will let the crypto subsystem to generate and
handle the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware
ecc private key generation and retention.
The loop that tries to generate a correct private key is now removed and
we trust the crypto subsystem to generate a correct private key. This
backup logic should be done in crypto, if really needed.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
---
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 ++-
net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 14 +++-
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++---------
4 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
index 16e022f..2155ce8 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
@@ -49,15 +49,21 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
}
+/* compute_ecdh_secret() - function assumes that the private key was
+ * already set.
+ * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
+ * @public_key: pair's ecc public key.
+ * secret: memory where the ecdh computed shared secret will be saved.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
+ */
int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
- const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
+ u8 secret[32])
{
struct kpp_request *req;
- struct ecdh p;
+ u8 *tmp;
struct ecdh_completion result;
struct scatterlist src, dst;
- u8 *tmp, *buf;
- unsigned int buf_len;
int err;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -72,28 +78,6 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
init_completion(&result.completion);
- /* Security Manager Protocol holds digits in litte-endian order
- * while ECC API expect big-endian data
- */
- swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
- p.key = (char *)tmp;
- p.key_size = 32;
- /* Set curve_id */
- p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
- buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
- buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf) {
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free_req;
- }
-
- crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
-
- /* Set A private Key */
- err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, (void *)buf, buf_len);
- if (err)
- goto free_all;
-
swap_digits((u64 *)public_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4); /* x */
swap_digits((u64 *)&public_key[32], (u64 *)&tmp[32], 4); /* y */
@@ -118,26 +102,76 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
memcpy(secret, tmp, 32);
free_all:
- kzfree(buf);
-free_req:
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
kzfree(tmp);
return err;
}
-int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
- u8 private_key[32])
+/* set_ecdh_privkey() - set or generate ecc private key.
+ *
+ * Function generates an ecc private key in the crypto subsystem when receiving
+ * a NULL private key or sets the received key when not NULL.
+ *
+ * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
+ * @private_key: user's ecc private key. When not NULL, the key is expected
+ * in little endian format.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
+ */
+int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 private_key[32])
+{
+ u8 *buf, *tmp = NULL;
+ unsigned int buf_len;
+ int err;
+ struct ecdh p = {0};
+
+ p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
+
+ if (private_key) {
+ tmp = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
+ p.key = tmp;
+ p.key_size = 32;
+ }
+
+ buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
+ buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_tmp;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_all;
+
+ err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
+ /* fall through */
+free_all:
+ kzfree(buf);
+free_tmp:
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* generate_ecdh_public_key() - function assumes that the private key was
+ * already set.
+ *
+ * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
+ * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
+ */
+int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
{
struct kpp_request *req;
- struct ecdh p;
+ u8 *tmp;
struct ecdh_completion result;
struct scatterlist dst;
- u8 *tmp, *buf;
- unsigned int buf_len;
int err;
- const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
- unsigned short tries = 0;
tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
@@ -150,63 +184,47 @@ int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
}
init_completion(&result.completion);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ ecdh_complete, &result);
- /* Set curve_id */
- p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
- p.key_size = 32;
- buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
- buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf)
- goto free_req;
-
- do {
- if (tries++ >= max_tries)
- goto free_all;
-
- /* Set private Key */
- p.key = (char *)private_key;
- crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
- err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
- if (err)
- goto free_all;
-
- sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
- kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
- kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
- kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- ecdh_complete, &result);
-
- err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
-
- if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
- wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
- err = result.err;
- }
-
- /* Private key is not valid. Regenerate */
- if (err == -EINVAL)
- continue;
-
- if (err < 0)
- goto free_all;
- else
- break;
-
- } while (true);
-
- /* Keys are handed back in little endian as expected by Security
- * Manager Protocol
+ err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
+ err = result.err;
+ }
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_all;
+
+ /* The public key is handed back in little endian as expected by
+ * the Security Manager Protocol.
*/
swap_digits((u64 *)tmp, (u64 *)public_key, 4); /* x */
swap_digits((u64 *)&tmp[32], (u64 *)&public_key[32], 4); /* y */
- swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
- memcpy(private_key, tmp, 32);
free_all:
- kzfree(buf);
-free_req:
kpp_request_free(req);
free_tmp:
kfree(tmp);
return err;
}
+
+/* generate_ecdh_keys() - generate ecc key pair.
+ *
+ * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
+ * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
+ */
+int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm, public_key);
+}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
index 50e6676..a6f8d03 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
- const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
-int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
- u8 private_key[32]);
+int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pair_public_key[64],
+ u8 secret[32]);
+int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 *private_key);
+int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
+int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
index ce99648..2d1519d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
@@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
- ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
+ ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_a);
if (ret)
goto out;
- ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
+ ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, dhkey_a);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -165,9 +165,17 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
goto out;
}
+ ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_b);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, dhkey_b);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
if (memcmp(dhkey_b, dhkey, 32))
ret = -EINVAL;
-
+ /* fall through*/
out:
kfree(tmp);
return ret;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index af7e610..d41449b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ enum {
struct smp_dev {
/* Secure Connections OOB data */
u8 local_pk[64];
- u8 local_sk[32];
u8 local_rand[16];
bool debug_key;
@@ -126,7 +125,6 @@ struct smp_chan {
/* Secure Connections variables */
u8 local_pk[64];
- u8 local_sk[32];
u8 remote_pk[64];
u8 dhkey[32];
u8 mackey[16];
@@ -568,24 +566,22 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
- memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
smp->debug_key = true;
} else {
while (true) {
- /* Seed private key with random number */
- get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
-
- /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
- smp->local_sk);
+ /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
+ err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
if (err)
return err;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
*/
- if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
break;
}
smp->debug_key = false;
@@ -593,7 +589,6 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
- SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
@@ -1900,7 +1895,6 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
smp_dev = chan->data;
memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
- memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
if (smp_dev->debug_key)
@@ -1911,23 +1905,20 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
- memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
} else {
while (true) {
- /* Seed private key with random number */
- get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
-
- /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
- if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
- smp->local_sk))
+ /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
+ if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
* we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
*/
- if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+ if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
break;
}
}
@@ -1935,7 +1926,6 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
done:
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
- SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
@@ -2663,6 +2653,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
int err;
@@ -2695,8 +2686,18 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
- if (!compute_ecdh_secret(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk,
- smp->dhkey))
+ /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
+ * key was set/generated.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+ struct smp_dev *smp_dev = chan->data;
+
+ tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
+ } else {
+ tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
+ }
+
+ if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
@@ -3522,27 +3523,18 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
-static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ndigits; i++)
- out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
-}
-
static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
{
- u8 pk[64], sk[32];
+ u8 pk[64];
int err;
- swap_digits((u64 *)debug_sk, (u64 *)sk, 4);
-
- err = generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk);
+ err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
if (err)
return err;
- if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
- return -EINVAL;
+ err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
if (crypto_memneq(pk, debug_pk, 64))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.9.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
2017-09-28 14:14 ` [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey Tudor Ambarus
@ 2017-09-28 16:50 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-09-29 6:58 ` Tudor Ambarus
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Marcel Holtmann @ 2017-09-28 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tudor Ambarus
Cc: bluez mailin list (linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org), linux-crypto
Hi Tudor,
> That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
> detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
> With this patch, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
> ecdh private key and will let the crypto subsystem to generate and
> handle the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware
> ecc private key generation and retention.
>
> The loop that tries to generate a correct private key is now removed and
> we trust the crypto subsystem to generate a correct private key. This
> backup logic should be done in crypto, if really needed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
> ---
> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 ++-
> net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 14 +++-
> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++---------
> 4 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
> index 16e022f..2155ce8 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
> @@ -49,15 +49,21 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
> out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
> }
>
> +/* compute_ecdh_secret() - function assumes that the private key was
> + * already set.
> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
> + * @public_key: pair's ecc public key.
> + * secret: memory where the ecdh computed shared secret will be saved.
> + *
> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
> + */
> int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
> - const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
> + u8 secret[32])
> {
> struct kpp_request *req;
> - struct ecdh p;
> + u8 *tmp;
> struct ecdh_completion result;
> struct scatterlist src, dst;
> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
> - unsigned int buf_len;
> int err;
>
> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -72,28 +78,6 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>
> init_completion(&result.completion);
>
> - /* Security Manager Protocol holds digits in litte-endian order
> - * while ECC API expect big-endian data
> - */
> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
> - p.key = (char *)tmp;
> - p.key_size = 32;
> - /* Set curve_id */
> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!buf) {
> - err = -ENOMEM;
> - goto free_req;
> - }
> -
> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
> -
> - /* Set A private Key */
> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, (void *)buf, buf_len);
> - if (err)
> - goto free_all;
> -
> swap_digits((u64 *)public_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4); /* x */
> swap_digits((u64 *)&public_key[32], (u64 *)&tmp[32], 4); /* y */
>
> @@ -118,26 +102,76 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
> memcpy(secret, tmp, 32);
>
> free_all:
> - kzfree(buf);
> -free_req:
> kpp_request_free(req);
> free_tmp:
> kzfree(tmp);
> return err;
> }
>
> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
> - u8 private_key[32])
> +/* set_ecdh_privkey() - set or generate ecc private key.
> + *
> + * Function generates an ecc private key in the crypto subsystem when receiving
> + * a NULL private key or sets the received key when not NULL.
> + *
> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
> + * @private_key: user's ecc private key. When not NULL, the key is expected
> + * in little endian format.
> + *
> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
> + */
> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 private_key[32])
> +{
> + u8 *buf, *tmp = NULL;
> + unsigned int buf_len;
> + int err;
> + struct ecdh p = {0};
> +
> + p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
> +
> + if (private_key) {
> + tmp = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!tmp)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
> + p.key = tmp;
> + p.key_size = 32;
> + }
> +
> + buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
> + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!buf) {
> + err = -ENOMEM;
> + goto free_tmp;
> + }
> +
> + err = crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
> + if (err)
> + goto free_all;
> +
> + err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
> + /* fall through */
> +free_all:
> + kzfree(buf);
> +free_tmp:
> + kzfree(tmp);
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* generate_ecdh_public_key() - function assumes that the private key was
> + * already set.
> + *
> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
> + *
> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
> + */
> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
> {
> struct kpp_request *req;
> - struct ecdh p;
> + u8 *tmp;
> struct ecdh_completion result;
> struct scatterlist dst;
> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
> - unsigned int buf_len;
> int err;
> - const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
> - unsigned short tries = 0;
>
> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!tmp)
> @@ -150,63 +184,47 @@ int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
> }
>
> init_completion(&result.completion);
> + sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
> + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
> + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
> + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> + ecdh_complete, &result);
>
> - /* Set curve_id */
> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
> - p.key_size = 32;
> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!buf)
> - goto free_req;
> -
> - do {
> - if (tries++ >= max_tries)
> - goto free_all;
> -
> - /* Set private Key */
> - p.key = (char *)private_key;
> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
> - if (err)
> - goto free_all;
> -
> - sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
> - kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
> - kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
> - kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> - ecdh_complete, &result);
> -
> - err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
> -
> - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
> - wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
> - err = result.err;
> - }
> -
> - /* Private key is not valid. Regenerate */
> - if (err == -EINVAL)
> - continue;
> -
> - if (err < 0)
> - goto free_all;
> - else
> - break;
> -
> - } while (true);
> -
> - /* Keys are handed back in little endian as expected by Security
> - * Manager Protocol
> + err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
> + if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
> + wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
> + err = result.err;
> + }
> + if (err < 0)
> + goto free_all;
> +
> + /* The public key is handed back in little endian as expected by
> + * the Security Manager Protocol.
> */
> swap_digits((u64 *)tmp, (u64 *)public_key, 4); /* x */
> swap_digits((u64 *)&tmp[32], (u64 *)&public_key[32], 4); /* y */
> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
> - memcpy(private_key, tmp, 32);
>
> free_all:
> - kzfree(buf);
> -free_req:
> kpp_request_free(req);
> free_tmp:
> kfree(tmp);
> return err;
> }
> +
> +/* generate_ecdh_keys() - generate ecc key pair.
> + *
> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
> + *
> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
> + */
> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
> +{
> + int err;
> +
> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, NULL);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + return generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm, public_key);
> +}
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
> index 50e6676..a6f8d03 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
> @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
> #include <crypto/kpp.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
>
> -int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
> - const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
> - u8 private_key[32]);
> +int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pair_public_key[64],
> + u8 secret[32]);
> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 *private_key);
> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
> index ce99648..2d1519d 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
> @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
> dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
> dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
>
> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_a);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
>
> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, dhkey_a);
> if (ret)
> goto out;
>
> @@ -165,9 +165,17 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
> goto out;
> }
>
> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_b);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, dhkey_b);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> if (memcmp(dhkey_b, dhkey, 32))
> ret = -EINVAL;
> -
> + /* fall through*/
> out:
> kfree(tmp);
> return ret;
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index af7e610..d41449b 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ enum {
> struct smp_dev {
> /* Secure Connections OOB data */
> u8 local_pk[64];
> - u8 local_sk[32];
> u8 local_rand[16];
> bool debug_key;
>
> @@ -126,7 +125,6 @@ struct smp_chan {
>
> /* Secure Connections variables */
> u8 local_pk[64];
> - u8 local_sk[32];
> u8 remote_pk[64];
> u8 dhkey[32];
> u8 mackey[16];
> @@ -568,24 +566,22 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
>
> if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
> BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
> smp->debug_key = true;
this all looks good, but I do wonder why not have a helper function here.
err = generate_ecdh_debug_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
And then have that function defined like this:
int generate_ecdh_debug_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
{
int err;
err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, debug_sk);
if (err)
return err;
memcpy(public_key, debug_pk, 64);
return 0;
}
I know this seems duplicate, but I wonder if that reduces the number of functions that have to be public. I prefer having most function static if possible.
> } else {
> while (true) {
> - /* Seed private key with random number */
> - get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
> -
> - /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
> - err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
> - smp->local_sk);
> + /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
> + err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
> * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
> */
> - if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
> + if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
> break;
> }
> smp->debug_key = false;
> @@ -593,7 +589,6 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
>
> SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
> SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
> - SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
>
> get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
>
> @@ -1900,7 +1895,6 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
> smp_dev = chan->data;
>
> memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
> memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
>
> if (smp_dev->debug_key)
> @@ -1911,23 +1905,20 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
>
> if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
> BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
> + if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
> + return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
> set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
> } else {
> while (true) {
> - /* Seed private key with random number */
> - get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
> -
> - /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
> - if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
> - smp->local_sk))
> + /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
> + if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
> return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
>
> /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
> * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
> */
> - if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
> + if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
> break;
> }
> }
> @@ -1935,7 +1926,6 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
> done:
> SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
> SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
> - SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
>
> smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
>
> @@ -2663,6 +2653,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
> struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
> struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
> + struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
> struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
> int err;
>
> @@ -2695,8 +2686,18 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
> SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
>
> - if (!compute_ecdh_secret(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk,
> - smp->dhkey))
> + /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
> + * key was set/generated.
> + */
> + if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
> + struct smp_dev *smp_dev = chan->data;
> +
> + tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
> + } else {
> + tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
> + }
> +
> + if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
> return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
>
> SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
> @@ -3522,27 +3523,18 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
>
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
>
> -static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
> -{
> - int i;
> -
> - for (i = 0; i < ndigits; i++)
> - out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
> -}
> -
> static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
> {
> - u8 pk[64], sk[32];
> + u8 pk[64];
> int err;
>
> - swap_digits((u64 *)debug_sk, (u64 *)sk, 4);
> -
> - err = generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk);
> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
> - return -EINVAL;
> + err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
And here using the mentioned generate_ecdh_debug_keys() would make things just simple as well.
Regards
Marcel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
2017-09-28 16:50 ` Marcel Holtmann
@ 2017-09-29 6:58 ` Tudor Ambarus
[not found] ` <bb7544d4-a6e1-47bd-e6ed-04c6c8d4bfd5-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Tudor Ambarus @ 2017-09-29 6:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marcel Holtmann
Cc: bluez mailin list (linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org), linux-crypto
Hi, Marcel,
On 09/28/2017 07:50 PM, Marcel Holtmann wrote:
> Hi Tudor,
>
>> That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
>> detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
>> With this patch, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
>> ecdh private key and will let the crypto subsystem to generate and
>> handle the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware
>> ecc private key generation and retention.
>>
>> The loop that tries to generate a correct private key is now removed and
>> we trust the crypto subsystem to generate a correct private key. This
>> backup logic should be done in crypto, if really needed.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
>> ---
>> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 ++-
>> net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 14 +++-
>> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++---------
>> 4 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>> index 16e022f..2155ce8 100644
>> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>> @@ -49,15 +49,21 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
>> out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
>> }
>>
>> +/* compute_ecdh_secret() - function assumes that the private key was
>> + * already set.
>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>> + * @public_key: pair's ecc public key.
>> + * secret: memory where the ecdh computed shared secret will be saved.
>> + *
>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>> + */
>> int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>> - const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
>> + u8 secret[32])
>> {
>> struct kpp_request *req;
>> - struct ecdh p;
>> + u8 *tmp;
>> struct ecdh_completion result;
>> struct scatterlist src, dst;
>> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
>> - unsigned int buf_len;
>> int err;
>>
>> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -72,28 +78,6 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>
>> init_completion(&result.completion);
>>
>> - /* Security Manager Protocol holds digits in litte-endian order
>> - * while ECC API expect big-endian data
>> - */
>> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>> - p.key = (char *)tmp;
>> - p.key_size = 32;
>> - /* Set curve_id */
>> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (!buf) {
>> - err = -ENOMEM;
>> - goto free_req;
>> - }
>> -
>> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>> -
>> - /* Set A private Key */
>> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, (void *)buf, buf_len);
>> - if (err)
>> - goto free_all;
>> -
>> swap_digits((u64 *)public_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4); /* x */
>> swap_digits((u64 *)&public_key[32], (u64 *)&tmp[32], 4); /* y */
>>
>> @@ -118,26 +102,76 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>> memcpy(secret, tmp, 32);
>>
>> free_all:
>> - kzfree(buf);
>> -free_req:
>> kpp_request_free(req);
>> free_tmp:
>> kzfree(tmp);
>> return err;
>> }
>>
>> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>> - u8 private_key[32])
>> +/* set_ecdh_privkey() - set or generate ecc private key.
>> + *
>> + * Function generates an ecc private key in the crypto subsystem when receiving
>> + * a NULL private key or sets the received key when not NULL.
>> + *
>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>> + * @private_key: user's ecc private key. When not NULL, the key is expected
>> + * in little endian format.
>> + *
>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>> + */
>> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 private_key[32])
>> +{
>> + u8 *buf, *tmp = NULL;
>> + unsigned int buf_len;
>> + int err;
>> + struct ecdh p = {0};
>> +
>> + p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>> +
>> + if (private_key) {
>> + tmp = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!tmp)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>> + p.key = tmp;
>> + p.key_size = 32;
>> + }
>> +
>> + buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>> + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!buf) {
>> + err = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto free_tmp;
>> + }
>> +
>> + err = crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto free_all;
>> +
>> + err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
>> + /* fall through */
>> +free_all:
>> + kzfree(buf);
>> +free_tmp:
>> + kzfree(tmp);
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* generate_ecdh_public_key() - function assumes that the private key was
>> + * already set.
>> + *
>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
>> + *
>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>> + */
>> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>> {
>> struct kpp_request *req;
>> - struct ecdh p;
>> + u8 *tmp;
>> struct ecdh_completion result;
>> struct scatterlist dst;
>> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
>> - unsigned int buf_len;
>> int err;
>> - const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
>> - unsigned short tries = 0;
>>
>> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (!tmp)
>> @@ -150,63 +184,47 @@ int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>> }
>>
>> init_completion(&result.completion);
>> + sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
>> + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
>> + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
>> + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>> + ecdh_complete, &result);
>>
>> - /* Set curve_id */
>> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>> - p.key_size = 32;
>> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (!buf)
>> - goto free_req;
>> -
>> - do {
>> - if (tries++ >= max_tries)
>> - goto free_all;
>> -
>> - /* Set private Key */
>> - p.key = (char *)private_key;
>> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
>> - if (err)
>> - goto free_all;
>> -
>> - sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
>> - kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
>> - kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
>> - kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>> - ecdh_complete, &result);
>> -
>> - err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
>> -
>> - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
>> - wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
>> - err = result.err;
>> - }
>> -
>> - /* Private key is not valid. Regenerate */
>> - if (err == -EINVAL)
>> - continue;
>> -
>> - if (err < 0)
>> - goto free_all;
>> - else
>> - break;
>> -
>> - } while (true);
>> -
>> - /* Keys are handed back in little endian as expected by Security
>> - * Manager Protocol
>> + err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
>> + if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
>> + wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
>> + err = result.err;
>> + }
>> + if (err < 0)
>> + goto free_all;
>> +
>> + /* The public key is handed back in little endian as expected by
>> + * the Security Manager Protocol.
>> */
>> swap_digits((u64 *)tmp, (u64 *)public_key, 4); /* x */
>> swap_digits((u64 *)&tmp[32], (u64 *)&public_key[32], 4); /* y */
>> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>> - memcpy(private_key, tmp, 32);
>>
>> free_all:
>> - kzfree(buf);
>> -free_req:
>> kpp_request_free(req);
>> free_tmp:
>> kfree(tmp);
>> return err;
>> }
>> +
>> +/* generate_ecdh_keys() - generate ecc key pair.
>> + *
>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
>> + *
>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>> + */
>> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>> +{
>> + int err;
>> +
>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, NULL);
>> + if (err)
>> + return err;
>> +
>> + return generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm, public_key);
>> +}
>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>> index 50e6676..a6f8d03 100644
>> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>> @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
>> #include <crypto/kpp.h>
>> #include <linux/types.h>
>>
>> -int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
>> - const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
>> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>> - u8 private_key[32]);
>> +int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pair_public_key[64],
>> + u8 secret[32]);
>> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 *private_key);
>> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
>> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>> index ce99648..2d1519d 100644
>> --- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>> @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
>> dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
>> dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
>>
>> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
>> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_a);
>> if (ret)
>> goto out;
>>
>> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
>> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, dhkey_a);
>> if (ret)
>> goto out;
>>
>> @@ -165,9 +165,17 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
>> goto out;
>> }
>>
>> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_b);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> +
>> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, dhkey_b);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> +
>> if (memcmp(dhkey_b, dhkey, 32))
>> ret = -EINVAL;
>> -
>> + /* fall through*/
>> out:
>> kfree(tmp);
>> return ret;
>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>> index af7e610..d41449b 100644
>> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>> @@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ enum {
>> struct smp_dev {
>> /* Secure Connections OOB data */
>> u8 local_pk[64];
>> - u8 local_sk[32];
>> u8 local_rand[16];
>> bool debug_key;
>>
>> @@ -126,7 +125,6 @@ struct smp_chan {
>>
>> /* Secure Connections variables */
>> u8 local_pk[64];
>> - u8 local_sk[32];
>> u8 remote_pk[64];
>> u8 dhkey[32];
>> u8 mackey[16];
>> @@ -568,24 +566,22 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
>>
>> if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
>> BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
>> + if (err)
>> + return err;
>> memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
>> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
>> smp->debug_key = true;
>
> this all looks good, but I do wonder why not have a helper function here.
>
> err = generate_ecdh_debug_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
>
> And then have that function defined like this:
>
> int generate_ecdh_debug_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
> {
> int err;
>
> err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, debug_sk);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> memcpy(public_key, debug_pk, 64);
> return 0;
> }
>
> I know this seems duplicate, but I wonder if that reduces the number of functions that have to be public. I prefer having most function static if possible.
You want set_ecdh_privkey() to be static in ecdh_helper.c?
test_ecdh_sample() and test_debug_key() don't need to copy the public
key, so they need set_ecdh_privkey() as public.
I can make generate_ecdh_debug_keys() static to smp.c, but we will be
mixing helpers in smp.c and ecdh_helper.c.
>
>> } else {
>> while (true) {
>> - /* Seed private key with random number */
>> - get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
>> -
>> - /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
>> - err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
>> - smp->local_sk);
>> + /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
>> + err = generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
>> if (err)
>> return err;
>>
>> /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
>> * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
>> */
>> - if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
>> + if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
>> break;
>> }
>> smp->debug_key = false;
>> @@ -593,7 +589,6 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
>>
>> SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
>> SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
>> - SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
>>
>> get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
>>
>> @@ -1900,7 +1895,6 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
>> smp_dev = chan->data;
>>
>> memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
>> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
>> memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
>>
>> if (smp_dev->debug_key)
>> @@ -1911,23 +1905,20 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
>>
>> if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
>> BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
>> + if (set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk))
>> + return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
>> memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
>> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
>> set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
>> } else {
>> while (true) {
>> - /* Seed private key with random number */
>> - get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32);
>> -
>> - /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
>> - if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk,
>> - smp->local_sk))
>> + /* Generate key pair for Secure Connections */
>> + if (generate_ecdh_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk))
>> return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
>>
>> /* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
>> * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
>> */
>> - if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
>> + if (crypto_memneq(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64))
>> break;
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -1935,7 +1926,6 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
>> done:
>> SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
>> SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
>> - SMP_DBG("Local Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk);
>>
>> smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
>>
>> @@ -2663,6 +2653,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
>> struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
>> struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
>> + struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
>> struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
>> int err;
>>
>> @@ -2695,8 +2686,18 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
>> SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
>>
>> - if (!compute_ecdh_secret(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk,
>> - smp->dhkey))
>> + /* Compute the shared secret on the same crypto tfm on which the private
>> + * key was set/generated.
>> + */
>> + if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
>> + struct smp_dev *smp_dev = chan->data;
>> +
>> + tfm_ecdh = smp_dev->tfm_ecdh;
>> + } else {
>> + tfm_ecdh = smp->tfm_ecdh;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (compute_ecdh_secret(tfm_ecdh, smp->remote_pk, smp->dhkey))
>> return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
>>
>> SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
>> @@ -3522,27 +3523,18 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
>>
>> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST_SMP)
>>
>> -static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
>> -{
>> - int i;
>> -
>> - for (i = 0; i < ndigits; i++)
>> - out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
>> -}
>> -
>> static int __init test_debug_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
>> {
>> - u8 pk[64], sk[32];
>> + u8 pk[64];
>> int err;
>>
>> - swap_digits((u64 *)debug_sk, (u64 *)sk, 4);
>> -
>> - err = generate_ecdh_keys(tfm_ecdh, pk, sk);
>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
>> if (err)
>> return err;
>>
>> - if (crypto_memneq(sk, debug_sk, 32))
>> - return -EINVAL;
>> + err = generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm_ecdh, pk);
>> + if (err)
>> + return err;
>
> And here using the mentioned generate_ecdh_debug_keys() would make things just simple as well.
Copying of the public key is not necessary here,
generate_ecdh_debug_keys() shouldn't be used.
Cheers,
ta
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [v2 PATCH 0/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
(?)
@ 2017-09-29 11:55 ` Marcel Holtmann
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Marcel Holtmann @ 2017-09-29 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tudor Ambarus; +Cc: linux-bluetooth, linux-crypto
Hi Tudor,
> That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
> detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
> With this patch set, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
> ecdh private key. We let the crypto subsystem to generate and handle
> the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware ecc private key
> generation and retention.
>
> Tested with selftest and with btmon and smp-tester on top of hci_vhci,
> with ecdh done in both software and hardware (through atmel-ecc driver).
> All tests passed.
>
> RFC version can be found at:
> https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg28036.html
>
> Changes in v2:
> - add patches 2, 3, 4.
> - adress Marcel's suggestions:
> - revive the check for accidentally generated debug keys
> - bypass the handling of private key to the crypto subsytem,
> even when using debug keys.
>
>
> Tudor Ambarus (5):
> Bluetooth: move ecdh allocation outside of ecdh_helper
> Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - reveal error codes
> Bluetooth: selftest - check for errors when computing ZZ
> Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - fix leak of private key
> Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
>
> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 +-
> net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 46 +++++++--
> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 127 +++++++++++++++---------
> 4 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
all 5 patches have been applied to bluetooth-next tree.
Regards
Marcel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
2017-09-29 6:58 ` Tudor Ambarus
@ 2017-09-29 11:55 ` Marcel Holtmann
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Marcel Holtmann @ 2017-09-29 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tudor Ambarus
Cc: bluez mailin list
(linux-bluetooth-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org),
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Hi Tudor,
>>> That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
>>> detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
>>> With this patch, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
>>> ecdh private key and will let the crypto subsystem to generate and
>>> handle the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware
>>> ecc private key generation and retention.
>>>
>>> The loop that tries to generate a correct private key is now removed and
>>> we trust the crypto subsystem to generate a correct private key. This
>>> backup logic should be done in crypto, if really needed.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
>>> ---
>>> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>>> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 ++-
>>> net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 14 +++-
>>> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++---------
>>> 4 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>>> index 16e022f..2155ce8 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>>> @@ -49,15 +49,21 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
>>> out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +/* compute_ecdh_secret() - function assumes that the private key was
>>> + * already set.
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @public_key: pair's ecc public key.
>>> + * secret: memory where the ecdh computed shared secret will be saved.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>> - const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
>>> + u8 secret[32])
>>> {
>>> struct kpp_request *req;
>>> - struct ecdh p;
>>> + u8 *tmp;
>>> struct ecdh_completion result;
>>> struct scatterlist src, dst;
>>> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
>>> - unsigned int buf_len;
>>> int err;
>>>
>>> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> @@ -72,28 +78,6 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>>
>>> init_completion(&result.completion);
>>>
>>> - /* Security Manager Protocol holds digits in litte-endian order
>>> - * while ECC API expect big-endian data
>>> - */
>>> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>>> - p.key = (char *)tmp;
>>> - p.key_size = 32;
>>> - /* Set curve_id */
>>> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>>> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>>> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> - if (!buf) {
>>> - err = -ENOMEM;
>>> - goto free_req;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>>> -
>>> - /* Set A private Key */
>>> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, (void *)buf, buf_len);
>>> - if (err)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> -
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)public_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4); /* x */
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)&public_key[32], (u64 *)&tmp[32], 4); /* y */
>>>
>>> @@ -118,26 +102,76 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>> memcpy(secret, tmp, 32);
>>>
>>> free_all:
>>> - kzfree(buf);
>>> -free_req:
>>> kpp_request_free(req);
>>> free_tmp:
>>> kzfree(tmp);
>>> return err;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>>> - u8 private_key[32])
>>> +/* set_ecdh_privkey() - set or generate ecc private key.
>>> + *
>>> + * Function generates an ecc private key in the crypto subsystem when receiving
>>> + * a NULL private key or sets the received key when not NULL.
>>> + *
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @private_key: user's ecc private key. When not NULL, the key is expected
>>> + * in little endian format.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 private_key[32])
>>> +{
>>> + u8 *buf, *tmp = NULL;
>>> + unsigned int buf_len;
>>> + int err;
>>> + struct ecdh p = {0};
>>> +
>>> + p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>>> +
>>> + if (private_key) {
>>> + tmp = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + if (!tmp)
>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>> + swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>>> + p.key = tmp;
>>> + p.key_size = 32;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>>> + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + if (!buf) {
>>> + err = -ENOMEM;
>>> + goto free_tmp;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + err = crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + goto free_all;
>>> +
>>> + err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> +free_all:
>>> + kzfree(buf);
>>> +free_tmp:
>>> + kzfree(tmp);
>>> + return err;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/* generate_ecdh_public_key() - function assumes that the private key was
>>> + * already set.
>>> + *
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>>> {
>>> struct kpp_request *req;
>>> - struct ecdh p;
>>> + u8 *tmp;
>>> struct ecdh_completion result;
>>> struct scatterlist dst;
>>> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
>>> - unsigned int buf_len;
>>> int err;
>>> - const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
>>> - unsigned short tries = 0;
>>>
>>> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> if (!tmp)
>>> @@ -150,63 +184,47 @@ int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>>> }
>>>
>>> init_completion(&result.completion);
>>> + sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
>>> + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
>>> + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
>>> + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>>> + ecdh_complete, &result);
>>>
>>> - /* Set curve_id */
>>> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>>> - p.key_size = 32;
>>> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>>> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> - if (!buf)
>>> - goto free_req;
>>> -
>>> - do {
>>> - if (tries++ >= max_tries)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> -
>>> - /* Set private Key */
>>> - p.key = (char *)private_key;
>>> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>>> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
>>> - if (err)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> -
>>> - sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
>>> - kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
>>> - kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
>>> - kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>>> - ecdh_complete, &result);
>>> -
>>> - err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
>>> -
>>> - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
>>> - wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
>>> - err = result.err;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - /* Private key is not valid. Regenerate */
>>> - if (err == -EINVAL)
>>> - continue;
>>> -
>>> - if (err < 0)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> - else
>>> - break;
>>> -
>>> - } while (true);
>>> -
>>> - /* Keys are handed back in little endian as expected by Security
>>> - * Manager Protocol
>>> + err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
>>> + if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
>>> + wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
>>> + err = result.err;
>>> + }
>>> + if (err < 0)
>>> + goto free_all;
>>> +
>>> + /* The public key is handed back in little endian as expected by
>>> + * the Security Manager Protocol.
>>> */
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)tmp, (u64 *)public_key, 4); /* x */
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)&tmp[32], (u64 *)&public_key[32], 4); /* y */
>>> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>>> - memcpy(private_key, tmp, 32);
>>>
>>> free_all:
>>> - kzfree(buf);
>>> -free_req:
>>> kpp_request_free(req);
>>> free_tmp:
>>> kfree(tmp);
>>> return err;
>>> }
>>> +
>>> +/* generate_ecdh_keys() - generate ecc key pair.
>>> + *
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>>> +{
>>> + int err;
>>> +
>>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, NULL);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>> +
>>> + return generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm, public_key);
>>> +}
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>>> index 50e6676..a6f8d03 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>>> @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
>>> #include <crypto/kpp.h>
>>> #include <linux/types.h>
>>>
>>> -int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
>>> - const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
>>> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>>> - u8 private_key[32]);
>>> +int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pair_public_key[64],
>>> + u8 secret[32]);
>>> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 *private_key);
>>> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
>>> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>>> index ce99648..2d1519d 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>>> @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
>>> dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
>>> dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
>>>
>>> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
>>> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_a);
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto out;
>>>
>>> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
>>> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, dhkey_a);
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto out;
>>>
>>> @@ -165,9 +165,17 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
>>> goto out;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_b);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + goto out;
>>> +
>>> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, dhkey_b);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + goto out;
>>> +
>>> if (memcmp(dhkey_b, dhkey, 32))
>>> ret = -EINVAL;
>>> -
>>> + /* fall through*/
>>> out:
>>> kfree(tmp);
>>> return ret;
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>>> index af7e610..d41449b 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>>> @@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ enum {
>>> struct smp_dev {
>>> /* Secure Connections OOB data */
>>> u8 local_pk[64];
>>> - u8 local_sk[32];
>>> u8 local_rand[16];
>>> bool debug_key;
>>>
>>> @@ -126,7 +125,6 @@ struct smp_chan {
>>>
>>> /* Secure Connections variables */
>>> u8 local_pk[64];
>>> - u8 local_sk[32];
>>> u8 remote_pk[64];
>>> u8 dhkey[32];
>>> u8 mackey[16];
>>> @@ -568,24 +566,22 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
>>>
>>> if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
>>> BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
>>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>> memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
>>> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
>>> smp->debug_key = true;
>> this all looks good, but I do wonder why not have a helper function here.
>> err = generate_ecdh_debug_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
>> And then have that function defined like this:
>> int generate_ecdh_debug_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>> {
>> int err;
>> err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, debug_sk);
>> if (err)
>> return err;
>> memcpy(public_key, debug_pk, 64);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> I know this seems duplicate, but I wonder if that reduces the number of functions that have to be public. I prefer having most function static if possible.
>
> You want set_ecdh_privkey() to be static in ecdh_helper.c?
> test_ecdh_sample() and test_debug_key() don't need to copy the public
> key, so they need set_ecdh_privkey() as public.
>
> I can make generate_ecdh_debug_keys() static to smp.c, but we will be
> mixing helpers in smp.c and ecdh_helper.c.
would it make sense to just include the code from ecdh_helper.c in smp.c? I think that due to the usage of KPP it has shrunk a lot now. However we can do that in a follow up cleanup series. For now I am going to apply your patches.
Regards
Marcel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey
@ 2017-09-29 11:55 ` Marcel Holtmann
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Marcel Holtmann @ 2017-09-29 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tudor Ambarus
Cc: bluez mailin list (linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org), linux-crypto
Hi Tudor,
>>> That Bluetooth SMP knows about the private key is pointless, since the
>>> detection of debug key usage is actually via the public key portion.
>>> With this patch, the Bluetooth SMP will stop keeping a copy of the
>>> ecdh private key and will let the crypto subsystem to generate and
>>> handle the ecdh private key, potentially benefiting of hardware
>>> ecc private key generation and retention.
>>>
>>> The loop that tries to generate a correct private key is now removed and
>>> we trust the crypto subsystem to generate a correct private key. This
>>> backup logic should be done in crypto, if really needed.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
>>> ---
>>> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>>> net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h | 9 ++-
>>> net/bluetooth/selftest.c | 14 +++-
>>> net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++---------
>>> 4 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 128 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>>> index 16e022f..2155ce8 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.c
>>> @@ -49,15 +49,21 @@ static inline void swap_digits(u64 *in, u64 *out, unsigned int ndigits)
>>> out[i] = __swab64(in[ndigits - 1 - i]);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +/* compute_ecdh_secret() - function assumes that the private key was
>>> + * already set.
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @public_key: pair's ecc public key.
>>> + * secret: memory where the ecdh computed shared secret will be saved.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>> - const u8 private_key[32], u8 secret[32])
>>> + u8 secret[32])
>>> {
>>> struct kpp_request *req;
>>> - struct ecdh p;
>>> + u8 *tmp;
>>> struct ecdh_completion result;
>>> struct scatterlist src, dst;
>>> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
>>> - unsigned int buf_len;
>>> int err;
>>>
>>> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> @@ -72,28 +78,6 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>>
>>> init_completion(&result.completion);
>>>
>>> - /* Security Manager Protocol holds digits in litte-endian order
>>> - * while ECC API expect big-endian data
>>> - */
>>> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>>> - p.key = (char *)tmp;
>>> - p.key_size = 32;
>>> - /* Set curve_id */
>>> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>>> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>>> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> - if (!buf) {
>>> - err = -ENOMEM;
>>> - goto free_req;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>>> -
>>> - /* Set A private Key */
>>> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, (void *)buf, buf_len);
>>> - if (err)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> -
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)public_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4); /* x */
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)&public_key[32], (u64 *)&tmp[32], 4); /* y */
>>>
>>> @@ -118,26 +102,76 @@ int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 public_key[64],
>>> memcpy(secret, tmp, 32);
>>>
>>> free_all:
>>> - kzfree(buf);
>>> -free_req:
>>> kpp_request_free(req);
>>> free_tmp:
>>> kzfree(tmp);
>>> return err;
>>> }
>>>
>>> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>>> - u8 private_key[32])
>>> +/* set_ecdh_privkey() - set or generate ecc private key.
>>> + *
>>> + * Function generates an ecc private key in the crypto subsystem when receiving
>>> + * a NULL private key or sets the received key when not NULL.
>>> + *
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @private_key: user's ecc private key. When not NULL, the key is expected
>>> + * in little endian format.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 private_key[32])
>>> +{
>>> + u8 *buf, *tmp = NULL;
>>> + unsigned int buf_len;
>>> + int err;
>>> + struct ecdh p = {0};
>>> +
>>> + p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>>> +
>>> + if (private_key) {
>>> + tmp = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + if (!tmp)
>>> + return -ENOMEM;
>>> + swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>>> + p.key = tmp;
>>> + p.key_size = 32;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>>> + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> + if (!buf) {
>>> + err = -ENOMEM;
>>> + goto free_tmp;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + err = crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + goto free_all;
>>> +
>>> + err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
>>> + /* fall through */
>>> +free_all:
>>> + kzfree(buf);
>>> +free_tmp:
>>> + kzfree(tmp);
>>> + return err;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +/* generate_ecdh_public_key() - function assumes that the private key was
>>> + * already set.
>>> + *
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>>> {
>>> struct kpp_request *req;
>>> - struct ecdh p;
>>> + u8 *tmp;
>>> struct ecdh_completion result;
>>> struct scatterlist dst;
>>> - u8 *tmp, *buf;
>>> - unsigned int buf_len;
>>> int err;
>>> - const unsigned short max_tries = 16;
>>> - unsigned short tries = 0;
>>>
>>> tmp = kmalloc(64, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> if (!tmp)
>>> @@ -150,63 +184,47 @@ int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>>> }
>>>
>>> init_completion(&result.completion);
>>> + sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
>>> + kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
>>> + kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
>>> + kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>>> + ecdh_complete, &result);
>>>
>>> - /* Set curve_id */
>>> - p.curve_id = ECC_CURVE_NIST_P256;
>>> - p.key_size = 32;
>>> - buf_len = crypto_ecdh_key_len(&p);
>>> - buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> - if (!buf)
>>> - goto free_req;
>>> -
>>> - do {
>>> - if (tries++ >= max_tries)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> -
>>> - /* Set private Key */
>>> - p.key = (char *)private_key;
>>> - crypto_ecdh_encode_key(buf, buf_len, &p);
>>> - err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, buf, buf_len);
>>> - if (err)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> -
>>> - sg_init_one(&dst, tmp, 64);
>>> - kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
>>> - kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, 64);
>>> - kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
>>> - ecdh_complete, &result);
>>> -
>>> - err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
>>> -
>>> - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
>>> - wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
>>> - err = result.err;
>>> - }
>>> -
>>> - /* Private key is not valid. Regenerate */
>>> - if (err == -EINVAL)
>>> - continue;
>>> -
>>> - if (err < 0)
>>> - goto free_all;
>>> - else
>>> - break;
>>> -
>>> - } while (true);
>>> -
>>> - /* Keys are handed back in little endian as expected by Security
>>> - * Manager Protocol
>>> + err = crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req);
>>> + if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
>>> + wait_for_completion(&result.completion);
>>> + err = result.err;
>>> + }
>>> + if (err < 0)
>>> + goto free_all;
>>> +
>>> + /* The public key is handed back in little endian as expected by
>>> + * the Security Manager Protocol.
>>> */
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)tmp, (u64 *)public_key, 4); /* x */
>>> swap_digits((u64 *)&tmp[32], (u64 *)&public_key[32], 4); /* y */
>>> - swap_digits((u64 *)private_key, (u64 *)tmp, 4);
>>> - memcpy(private_key, tmp, 32);
>>>
>>> free_all:
>>> - kzfree(buf);
>>> -free_req:
>>> kpp_request_free(req);
>>> free_tmp:
>>> kfree(tmp);
>>> return err;
>>> }
>>> +
>>> +/* generate_ecdh_keys() - generate ecc key pair.
>>> + *
>>> + * @tfm: KPP tfm handle allocated with crypto_alloc_kpp().
>>> + * @public_key: memory where the computed ecc public key will be saved.
>>> + *
>>> + * Return: zero on success; error code in case of error.
>>> + */
>>> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>>> +{
>>> + int err;
>>> +
>>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, NULL);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>> +
>>> + return generate_ecdh_public_key(tfm, public_key);
>>> +}
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>>> index 50e6676..a6f8d03 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/ecdh_helper.h
>>> @@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
>>> #include <crypto/kpp.h>
>>> #include <linux/types.h>
>>>
>>> -int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pub_a[64],
>>> - const u8 priv_b[32], u8 secret[32]);
>>> -int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64],
>>> - u8 private_key[32]);
>>> +int compute_ecdh_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 pair_public_key[64],
>>> + u8 secret[32]);
>>> +int set_ecdh_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 *private_key);
>>> +int generate_ecdh_public_key(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
>>> +int generate_ecdh_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64]);
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>>> index ce99648..2d1519d 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/selftest.c
>>> @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
>>> dhkey_a = &tmp[0];
>>> dhkey_b = &tmp[32];
>>>
>>> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, priv_a, dhkey_a);
>>> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_a);
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto out;
>>>
>>> - ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, priv_b, dhkey_b);
>>> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_b, dhkey_a);
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto out;
>>>
>>> @@ -165,9 +165,17 @@ static int __init test_ecdh_sample(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const u8 priv_a[32],
>>> goto out;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + ret = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, priv_b);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + goto out;
>>> +
>>> + ret = compute_ecdh_secret(tfm, pub_a, dhkey_b);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + goto out;
>>> +
>>> if (memcmp(dhkey_b, dhkey, 32))
>>> ret = -EINVAL;
>>> -
>>> + /* fall through*/
>>> out:
>>> kfree(tmp);
>>> return ret;
>>> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>>> index af7e610..d41449b 100644
>>> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>>> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
>>> @@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ enum {
>>> struct smp_dev {
>>> /* Secure Connections OOB data */
>>> u8 local_pk[64];
>>> - u8 local_sk[32];
>>> u8 local_rand[16];
>>> bool debug_key;
>>>
>>> @@ -126,7 +125,6 @@ struct smp_chan {
>>>
>>> /* Secure Connections variables */
>>> u8 local_pk[64];
>>> - u8 local_sk[32];
>>> u8 remote_pk[64];
>>> u8 dhkey[32];
>>> u8 mackey[16];
>>> @@ -568,24 +566,22 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
>>>
>>> if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
>>> BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
>>> + err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
>>> + if (err)
>>> + return err;
>>> memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
>>> - memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
>>> smp->debug_key = true;
>> this all looks good, but I do wonder why not have a helper function here.
>> err = generate_ecdh_debug_keys(smp->tfm_ecdh, smp->local_pk);
>> And then have that function defined like this:
>> int generate_ecdh_debug_keys(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, u8 public_key[64])
>> {
>> int err;
>> err = set_ecdh_privkey(tfm, debug_sk);
>> if (err)
>> return err;
>> memcpy(public_key, debug_pk, 64);
>> return 0;
>> }
>> I know this seems duplicate, but I wonder if that reduces the number of functions that have to be public. I prefer having most function static if possible.
>
> You want set_ecdh_privkey() to be static in ecdh_helper.c?
> test_ecdh_sample() and test_debug_key() don't need to copy the public
> key, so they need set_ecdh_privkey() as public.
>
> I can make generate_ecdh_debug_keys() static to smp.c, but we will be
> mixing helpers in smp.c and ecdh_helper.c.
would it make sense to just include the code from ecdh_helper.c in smp.c? I think that due to the usage of KPP it has shrunk a lot now. However we can do that in a follow up cleanup series. For now I am going to apply your patches.
Regards
Marcel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-09-29 11:55 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-09-28 14:14 [v2 PATCH 0/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` [v2 PATCH 1/5] Bluetooth: move ecdh allocation outside of ecdh_helper Tudor Ambarus
[not found] ` <20170928141455.15336-1-tudor.ambarus-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-28 14:14 ` [v2 PATCH 2/5] Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - reveal error codes Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` [v2 PATCH 3/5] Bluetooth: selftest - check for errors when computing ZZ Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` [v2 PATCH 4/5] Bluetooth: ecdh_helper - fix leak of private key Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 14:14 ` [v2 PATCH 5/5] Bluetooth: let the crypto subsystem generate the ecc privkey Tudor Ambarus
2017-09-28 16:50 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-09-29 6:58 ` Tudor Ambarus
[not found] ` <bb7544d4-a6e1-47bd-e6ed-04c6c8d4bfd5-UWL1GkI3JZL3oGB3hsPCZA@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-29 11:55 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-09-29 11:55 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-09-29 11:55 ` [v2 PATCH 0/5] " Marcel Holtmann
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