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From: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, glider@google.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, paulmck@kernel.org, andreyknvl@google.com,
	aryabinin@virtuozzo.com, luto@kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, cl@linux.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	dvyukov@google.com, edumazet@google.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, mingo@redhat.com, jannh@google.com,
	Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, penberg@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, vbabka@suse.cz, will@kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 07:17:06 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <115e74b249417340b5c411f286768dbdb916fd12.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200915132046.3332537-1-elver@google.com>

On Tue, 2020-09-15 at 15:20 +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
> low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
> use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.  This
> series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
> KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.
> 
> KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
> enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
> exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
> large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
> fleet of machines.
> 
> KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
> right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
> page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
> state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
> faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
> gracefully by reporting a memory access error.
> 
> Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set
> via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval,
> the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB) returns a
> guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool. At this point, the timer
> is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the
> interval.
> 
> To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's
> fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the
> static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the
> allocation to KFENCE.
> 
> The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted no
> further KFENCE allocations occur. The default config is conservative
> with only 255 objects, resulting in a pool size of 2 MiB (with 4 KiB
> pages).
> 
> We have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O,
> hackbench) that a kernel with KFENCE is performance-neutral compared to
> a non-KFENCE baseline kernel.
> 
> KFENCE is inspired by GWP-ASan [1], a userspace tool with similar
> properties. The name "KFENCE" is a homage to the Electric Fence Malloc
> Debugger [2].
> 
> For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added in the
> series -- also viewable here:

Does anybody else grow tried of all those different *imperfect* versions of in-
kernel memory safety error detectors? KASAN-generic, KFENCE, KASAN-tag-based
etc. Then, we have old things like page_poison, SLUB debugging, debug_pagealloc
etc which are pretty much inefficient to detect bugs those days compared to
KASAN. Can't we work towards having a single implementation and clean up all
those mess?


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org,  glider@google.com
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	edumazet@google.com, hpa@zytor.com, cl@linux.com,
	will@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, x86@kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, mingo@redhat.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	rientjes@google.com, aryabinin@virtuozzo.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, paulmck@kernel.org, jannh@google.com,
	andreyknvl@google.com, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org,
	Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	dvyukov@google.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	penberg@kernel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 07:17:06 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <115e74b249417340b5c411f286768dbdb916fd12.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200915132046.3332537-1-elver@google.com>

On Tue, 2020-09-15 at 15:20 +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
> low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
> use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.  This
> series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
> KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.
> 
> KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
> enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
> exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
> large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
> fleet of machines.
> 
> KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
> right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
> page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
> state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
> faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
> gracefully by reporting a memory access error.
> 
> Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set
> via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval,
> the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB) returns a
> guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool. At this point, the timer
> is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the
> interval.
> 
> To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's
> fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the
> static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the
> allocation to KFENCE.
> 
> The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted no
> further KFENCE allocations occur. The default config is conservative
> with only 255 objects, resulting in a pool size of 2 MiB (with 4 KiB
> pages).
> 
> We have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O,
> hackbench) that a kernel with KFENCE is performance-neutral compared to
> a non-KFENCE baseline kernel.
> 
> KFENCE is inspired by GWP-ASan [1], a userspace tool with similar
> properties. The name "KFENCE" is a homage to the Electric Fence Malloc
> Debugger [2].
> 
> For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added in the
> series -- also viewable here:

Does anybody else grow tried of all those different *imperfect* versions of in-
kernel memory safety error detectors? KASAN-generic, KFENCE, KASAN-tag-based
etc. Then, we have old things like page_poison, SLUB debugging, debug_pagealloc
etc which are pretty much inefficient to detect bugs those days compared to
KASAN. Can't we work towards having a single implementation and clean up all
those mess?


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-18 11:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-15 13:20 [PATCH v2 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-17 13:26   ` Hillf Danton
2020-09-17 13:26     ` Hillf Danton
2020-09-17 13:36     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-17 13:36       ` Marco Elver
2020-09-17 23:45       ` Hillf Danton
2020-09-17 23:45         ` Hillf Danton
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86 Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64 Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-17  9:37   ` Christopher Lameter
2020-09-17  9:37     ` Christopher Lameter
2020-09-17  9:37     ` Christopher Lameter
2020-09-17  9:47     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-17  9:47       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-17  9:47       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-17  9:40   ` Christopher Lameter
2020-09-17  9:40     ` Christopher Lameter
2020-09-17  9:40     ` Christopher Lameter
2020-09-17  9:51     ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-17  9:51       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-17  9:51       ` Alexander Potapenko
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] kfence, kmemleak: make KFENCE compatible with KMEMLEAK Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] kfence, lockdep: make KFENCE compatible with lockdep Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] kfence: add test suite Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-15 13:20   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-16  5:13   ` kernel test robot
2020-09-15 13:49 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-15 13:49   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-15 13:49   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-09-18 11:17 ` Qian Cai [this message]
2020-09-18 11:17   ` Qian Cai
2020-09-18 11:17   ` Qian Cai
2020-09-18 11:59   ` Marco Elver
2020-09-18 11:59     ` Marco Elver
2020-09-18 11:59     ` Marco Elver

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