[RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[Paul Moore]

Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This patch
preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use
the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints
are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---

 policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
--- a/policy/mcs
+++ b/policy/mcs
@@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
 	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
 
 #
+# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
+# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
+# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
+
+#
 # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
 #
 


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[refpolicy] [RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[Paul Moore]

Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This patch
preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use
the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints
are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
---

 policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
--- a/policy/mcs
+++ b/policy/mcs
@@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
 	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
 
 #
+# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
+#
+
+# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
+# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
+# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
+mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
+
+# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
+# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
+# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
+
+#
+# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
+#
+
+# the peer/packet recv op
+mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
+	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
+
+#
 # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
 #
 

Re: [refpolicy] [RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[Christopher J. PeBenito]

On Thu, 2009-10-01 at 17:35 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This patch
> preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use
> the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints
> are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

> Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
> 
>  policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
> --- a/policy/mcs
> +++ b/policy/mcs
> @@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
>  	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
>  
>  #
> +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> +#
> +
> +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
> +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
> +# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
> +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> +
> +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
> +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
> +# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
> +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> +
> +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
> +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
> +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
> +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +
> +#
> +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> +#
> +
> +# the peer/packet recv op
> +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
> +
> +#
>  # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
>  #

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150



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[refpolicy] [RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[Christopher J. PeBenito]

On Thu, 2009-10-01 at 17:35 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This patch
> preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts them to use
> the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 ))" constraints
> are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".

These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

> Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
> 
>  policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
> --- a/policy/mcs
> +++ b/policy/mcs
> @@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
>  	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
>  
>  #
> +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> +#
> +
> +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write" operation
> +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
> +# writing data out the network interface which is acting as the object
> +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> +
> +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation
> +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is
> +# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object
> +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> +
> +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation because the
> +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is writing data
> +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in this case
> +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> +
> +#
> +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> +#
> +
> +# the peer/packet recv op
> +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
> +
> +#
>  # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
>  #

-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
(410) 290-1411 x150

Re: [refpolicy] [RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[Paul Moore]

On Tuesday 06 October 2009 09:20:11 am Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Thu, 2009-10-01 at 17:35 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This
> > patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts
> > them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby
> > h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".
> 
> These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

[Ooops, forgot to reply-all ...]

Sorry, I saw other MLS attributes being used in the MCS constraints file so I 
thought it was okay ... I'll resend soon.

> > Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> > ---
> >
> >  policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> > index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
> > --- a/policy/mcs
> > +++ b/policy/mcs
> > @@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
> >  	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
> >
> >  #
> > +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network interface which is acting
> > as the object +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as
> > the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation
> > because the +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which
> > is writing data +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in
> > this case
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +
> > +#
> > +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the peer/packet recv op
> > +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
> > +
> > +#
> >  # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
> >  #
> 

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp

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the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

[refpolicy] [RFC PATCH v1] refpol: Add netif, node and peer constraints for MCS based policies

[Paul Moore]

On Tuesday 06 October 2009 09:20:11 am Christopher J. PeBenito wrote:
> On Thu, 2009-10-01 at 17:35 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > Adapt the MLS netif, node and peer networking constraints for MCS.  This
> > patch preserves the basic structure of the MLS constraints and converts
> > them to use the MCS model which means the "(( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby
> > h2 ))" constraints are converted to "( h1 dom h2 )".
> 
> These need to be switched to MCS-specific attributes.

[Ooops, forgot to reply-all ...]

Sorry, I saw other MLS attributes being used in the MCS constraints file so I 
thought it was okay ... I'll resend soon.

> > Signed-of-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> > ---
> >
> >  policy/mcs |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs
> > index b8dc0d6..0759021 100644
> > --- a/policy/mcs
> > +++ b/policy/mcs
> > @@ -99,6 +99,42 @@ mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop }
> >  	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall ));
> >
> >  #
> > +# MCS policy for the network ingress/egress controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the netif ingress/egress ops, the ingress permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network interface which is acting
> > as the object +mlsconstrain { netif } { ingress }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { netif } { egress }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write"
> > operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote
> > domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as
> > the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ));
> > +
> > +# the forward ops, the forward_in permission is a "write" operation
> > because the +# subject in this particular case is the remote domain which
> > is writing data +# to the network with a secmark label, the object in
> > this case
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_in }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetinbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +mlsconstrain { packet } { forward_out }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetoutbound ) or ( t1 == unlabeled_t ));
> > +
> > +#
> > +# MCS policy for the secmark and peer controls
> > +#
> > +
> > +# the peer/packet recv op
> > +mlsconstrain { peer packet } { recv }
> > +	(( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlsnetread ));
> > +
> > +#
> >  # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases
> >  #
> 

-- 
paul moore
linux @ hp