* [RFC v2 01/10] lsm: add security_socket_closed()
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook" Samir Bellabes
` (9 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
Allow a security module to update security informations when a socket is closed.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++
net/socket.c | 1 +
security/capability.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2c627d3..74e564b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -981,6 +981,9 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @sock contains the socket structure.
* @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives are handled.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_close:
+ * Allow a module to update security informations when a socket is closed
+ * @sock is closed.
* @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
* Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct
* from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
@@ -1680,6 +1683,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket *sock, int how);
+ void (*socket_close) (struct socket *sock);
int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int (*socket_getpeersec_stream) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
@@ -2700,6 +2704,7 @@ int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock);
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
+void security_socket_close(struct socket *sock);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
@@ -2812,6 +2817,11 @@ static inline int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline void security_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index 769c386..b4eb361 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1055,6 +1055,7 @@ static int sock_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n");
return 0;
}
+ security_socket_close(SOCKET_I(inode));
sock_release(SOCKET_I(inode));
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 5c700e1..a9810dc 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -677,6 +677,10 @@ static int cap_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
return 0;
}
+static void cap_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+}
+
static int cap_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return 0;
@@ -1084,6 +1088,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_close);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 122b748..288c3a8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1118,6 +1118,11 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how);
}
+void security_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return security_ops->socket_close(sock);
+}
+
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook"
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 01/10] lsm: add security_socket_closed() Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 03/10] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes Samir Bellabes
` (8 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
This reverts commit 8651d5c0b1f874c5b8307ae2b858bc40f9f02482.
snet needs to reintroduce this hook, as it was designed to be: a hook for
updating security informations on objects.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++
net/socket.c | 2 ++
security/capability.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 74e564b..d8ad624 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -938,6 +938,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @sock contains the listening socket structure.
* @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_accept:
+ * This hook allows a security module to copy security
+ * information into the newly created socket's inode.
+ * @sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
* @socket_sendmsg:
* Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
* @sock contains the socket structure.
@@ -1674,6 +1679,8 @@ struct security_operations {
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog);
int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+ void (*socket_post_accept) (struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *newsock);
int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size);
int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock,
@@ -2696,6 +2703,7 @@ int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addr
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size);
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags);
@@ -2778,6 +2786,11 @@ static inline int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *newsock)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index b4eb361..2e66a5a 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
fd_install(newfd, newfile);
err = newfd;
+ security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index a9810dc..61eae40 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -641,6 +641,10 @@ static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
return 0;
}
+static void cap_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+}
+
static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return 0;
@@ -1081,6 +1085,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 288c3a8..673979f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1082,6 +1082,11 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
}
+void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ security_ops->socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+}
+
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 03/10] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 01/10] lsm: add security_socket_closed() Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook" Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-03 0:03 ` Greg KH
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core Samir Bellabes
` (7 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
security/Makefile | 2 ++
security/snet/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
security/snet/Makefile | 14 ++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/Kconfig
create mode 100644 security/snet/Makefile
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 226b955..eb37e9a 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+source security/snet/Kconfig
source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ choice
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET if SECURITY_SNET
default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
help
@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ choice
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
+ config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet" if SECURITY_SNET=y
+
config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
@@ -173,6 +178,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ default "snet" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SNET
default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index da20a19..9374523 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) += snet/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/snet/Kconfig b/security/snet/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dabd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+#
+# snet
+#
+
+config SECURITY_SNET
+ bool "snet - Security for NETwork syscalls"
+ depends on SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ ---help---
+ If this option is enabled, the kernel will include support for reporting
+ networking's syscalls to userspace and wait for a verdict
diff --git a/security/snet/Makefile b/security/snet/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8f52f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the Security Network Events module.
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SNET) := snet.o
+
+snet-y := snet_event.o \
+ snet_netlink_helper.o \
+ snet_netlink.o \
+ snet_verdict.o \
+ snet_ticket_helper.o \
+ snet_ticket.o \
+ snet_hooks.o \
+ snet_core.o \
+ snet_utils.o
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 03/10] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 03/10] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-03 0:03 ` Greg KH
2010-03-03 0:23 ` Samir Bellabes
0 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2010-03-03 0:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Samir Bellabes
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
jamal, Patrick McHardy, Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman,
Grzegorz Nosek
On Tue, Mar 02, 2010 at 09:23:07PM +0100, Samir Bellabes wrote:
> this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
But it breaks the build, as you are referring to files here that are not
present yet. Please put this at the end of your patch series to make
the tree always build for every individual patch.
thanks,
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC v2 03/10] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes
2010-03-03 0:03 ` Greg KH
@ 2010-03-03 0:23 ` Samir Bellabes
0 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-03 0:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg KH
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
jamal, Patrick McHardy, Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman,
Grzegorz Nosek
Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> writes:
> On Tue, Mar 02, 2010 at 09:23:07PM +0100, Samir Bellabes wrote:
>> this patch creates folder security/snet and adds changes for Kconfig and Makefile
>
> But it breaks the build, as you are referring to files here that are not
> present yet. Please put this at the end of your patch series to make
> the tree always build for every individual patch.
yes, sure.
thank you Greg
sam
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread
* [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 03/10] snet: introduce security/snet, Makefile and Kconfig changes Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 05/10] snet: introduce snet_event Samir Bellabes
` (6 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
this patch introduce snet_core.c, which provides functions to start and stop
snet's subsystems, and include/linux/snet.h, which provides interface with
userspace
subsytems are:
- snet_hooks : LSM hooks
- snet_netlink : kernel-user communication (genetlink)
- snet_event : manages the list of protected syscalls
- snet_verdict : provides a waitqueue for syscalls and manage verdicts
from userspace
- snet_ticket : provides a granted-access ticket mecanism
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
include/linux/snet.h | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_core.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/snet.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_core.c
diff --git a/include/linux/snet.h b/include/linux/snet.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..739601d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/snet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_SNET_H
+#define _LINUX_SNET_H
+
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+
+#define SNET_VERSION 0x1
+#define SNET_NAME "snet"
+
+enum snet_syscall {
+ SNET_SOCKET_CREATE = 0,
+ SNET_SOCKET_BIND,
+ SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN,
+ SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT,
+ SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG,
+ SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG,
+ SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB,
+ SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE,
+ SNET_SOCKET_INVALID,
+};
+
+#define SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES SNET_SOCKET_INVALID
+
+struct snet_event {
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+};
+
+enum snet_verdict {
+ SNET_VERDICT_GRANT = 0, /* grant the syscall */
+ SNET_VERDICT_DENY, /* deny the syscall */
+ SNET_VERDICT_PENDING, /* waiting for a decision */
+ SNET_VERDICT_NONE, /* no decision can be set */
+ SNET_VERDICT_INVALID,
+};
+
+#define SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES SNET_VERDICT_INVALID
+
+enum snet_ticket_mode {
+ SNET_TICKET_OFF = 0,
+ SNET_TICKET_FIX,
+ SNET_TICKET_EXTEND,
+};
+
+/* genetlink commands */
+enum {
+ SNET_C_UNSPEC,
+ SNET_C_VERSION,
+ SNET_C_REGISTER,
+ SNET_C_UNREGISTER,
+ SNET_C_INSERT,
+ SNET_C_REMOVE,
+ SNET_C_FLUSH,
+ SNET_C_LIST,
+ SNET_C_VERDICT,
+ SNET_C_CONFIG,
+ __SNET_C_MAX,
+};
+
+#define SNET_C_MAX (__SNET_C_MAX - 1)
+
+/* genetlink attributes */
+enum {
+ SNET_A_UNSPEC,
+ SNET_A_VERSION, /* (NLA_U32) the snet protocol version */
+ SNET_A_VERDICT_ID,
+ SNET_A_FAMILY,
+ SNET_A_SYSCALL, /* (NLA_U8) a syscall identifier */
+ SNET_A_PROTOCOL, /* (NLA_U8) a protocol identifier */
+ SNET_A_UID,
+ SNET_A_PID,
+ SNET_A_TYPE,
+ SNET_A_IPV4SADDR,
+ SNET_A_IPV6SADDR,
+ SNET_A_IPV4DADDR,
+ SNET_A_IPV6DADDR,
+ SNET_A_SPORT,
+ SNET_A_DPORT,
+ SNET_A_BUFFER,
+ SNET_A_BUFFER_LEN,
+ SNET_A_VERDICT,
+ SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY,
+ SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY,
+ SNET_A_TICKET_MODE,
+ __SNET_A_MAX,
+};
+
+#define SNET_A_MAX (__SNET_A_MAX - 1)
+
+#define SNET_GENL_NAME "SNET"
+#define SNET_GENL_VERSION SNET_VERSION
+
+struct snet_sock_half {
+ struct {
+ union {
+ __be32 ip;
+ struct in6_addr ip6;
+ };
+ } u3;
+ struct {
+ __be16 port;
+ } u;
+};
+
+struct snet_info {
+ u32 verdict_id;
+
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+ u8 family;
+
+ int type;
+ struct snet_sock_half src;
+ struct snet_sock_half dst;
+ void *buffer;
+ int len;
+};
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SNET_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_core.c b/security/snet/snet_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f2eb2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <net/genetlink.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_hooks.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+unsigned int snet_evh_size = 16;
+module_param(snet_evh_size, uint, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_evh_size, "Set the size of the event hash table");
+
+unsigned int snet_vdh_size = 16;
+module_param(snet_vdh_size, uint, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_vdh_size, "Set the size of the verdict hash table");
+
+unsigned int snet_verdict_delay = 5;
+module_param(snet_verdict_delay, uint, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_verdict_delay, "Set the timeout for verdicts in secs");
+
+unsigned int snet_verdict_policy = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT; /* permissive by default */
+module_param(snet_verdict_policy, uint, 0400);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_verdict_policy, "Set the default verdict");
+
+unsigned int snet_ticket_delay = 15;
+module_param(snet_ticket_delay, uint, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_ticket_delay, "Set the timeout for tickets in secs");
+
+unsigned int snet_ticket_mode = SNET_TICKET_FIX;
+module_param(snet_ticket_mode, uint, 0600);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(snet_ticket_mode, "Set the mode for tickets");
+
+static __init int snet_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_debug("initializing: event_hash_size=%u "
+ "verdict_hash_size=%u verdict_delay=%usecs "
+ "default_policy=%s\n",
+ snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
+ snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
+
+ ret = snet_event_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto event_failed;
+
+ ret = snet_verdict_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto verdict_failed;
+
+ ret = snet_ticket_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto ticket_failed;
+
+ /* snet_hooks_init() returns 0 or execute panic() */
+ snet_hooks_init();
+
+ pr_debug("started\n");
+ return 0;
+
+ticket_failed:
+ snet_verdict_exit();
+verdict_failed:
+ snet_event_exit();
+event_failed:
+ pr_debug("stopped\n");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+security_initcall(snet_init);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("snet - Security for NETwork syscalls");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>");
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 05/10] snet: introduce snet_event
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 06/10] snet: introduce snet_hooks Samir Bellabes
` (5 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
This patch adds the snet's subsystem responsive of managing events
snet is using the word 'event' for a couple of values [syscall, protocol].
For example, [listen, tcp] or [sendmsg, dccp] are events.
This patch introduces a hastable 'event_hash' and operations (add/remove/search..)
in order to manage which events have to be protected.
With the help of the communication's subsystem, managing orders are coming from
userspace.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_event.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_event.h | 21 +++++
2 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_event.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e3f7d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+static struct list_head *snet_evh;
+static rwlock_t snet_evh_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
+
+struct snet_event_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct snet_event se;
+};
+
+/* lookup for a snet_evh - before using this function, lock snet_evh_lock */
+static struct snet_event_entry *__snet_event_lookup(const enum snet_syscall syscall,
+ const u8 protocol)
+{
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct snet_event_entry *s;
+
+ /* computing its hash value */
+ h = jhash_2words(syscall, protocol, 0) % snet_evh_size;
+ l = &snet_evh[h];
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if ((s->se.protocol == protocol) &&
+ (s->se.syscall == syscall)) {
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0, n = 0;
+ int ret = -1;
+ unsigned hashs_to_skip = cb->args[0];
+ unsigned events_to_skip = cb->args[1];
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct snet_event_entry *s;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_evh_size; i++) {
+ if (i < hashs_to_skip)
+ continue;
+ l = &snet_evh[i];
+ n = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if (++n < events_to_skip)
+ continue;
+ ret = snet_nl_list_fill_info(skb,
+ NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
+ cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
+ NLM_F_MULTI,
+ s->se.protocol,
+ s->se.syscall);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ }
+
+errout:
+ read_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+
+ cb->args[0] = i;
+ cb->args[1] = n;
+ return skb->len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if a event is registered or not
+ * return 1 if event is registered, 0 if not
+ */
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ if (__snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL)
+ ret = 1;
+ read_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* adding a event */
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_event_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ /* check if event is already registered */
+ if (__snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol) != NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ kfree(data);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ data->se.syscall = syscall;
+ data->se.protocol = protocol;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(data->list));
+ h = jhash_2words(data->se.syscall, data->se.protocol, 0) % snet_evh_size;
+ list_add_tail(&data->list, &snet_evh[h]);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ pr_debug("[%u]=(syscall=%s, protocol=%u)\n",
+ h, snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* removing a event */
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
+{
+ struct snet_event_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ data = __snet_event_lookup(syscall, protocol);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pr_debug("(syscall=%s, protocol=%u)\n",
+ snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol);
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ kfree(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* flushing all events */
+void snet_event_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_evh_size; i++) {
+ struct snet_event_entry *data, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(data, tmp, &snet_evh[i], list) {
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ kfree(data);
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_evh_lock);
+ return;
+}
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void)
+{
+ int err = 0, i = 0;
+
+ snet_evh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_evh_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!snet_evh) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "snet: can't alloc memory for snet_evh\n");
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_evh_size; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&snet_evh[i]);
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* exit function */
+void snet_event_exit(void)
+{
+ kfree(snet_evh);
+ snet_evh = NULL;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.h b/security/snet/snet_event.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa991c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_EVENT_H
+#define _SNET_EVENT_H
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+extern unsigned int snet_evh_size;
+
+/* manipulate the events hash table */
+int snet_event_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_insert(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+int snet_event_remove(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol);
+void snet_event_flush(void);
+void snet_event_dumpall(void);
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_event_init(void);
+/* exit funtion */
+void snet_event_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_EVENT_H */
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 06/10] snet: introduce snet_hooks
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 05/10] snet: introduce snet_event Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 07/10] snet: introduce snet_netlink Samir Bellabes
` (4 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
This patch adds the snet LSM's subsystem
snet_hooks provides the security hook's functions and the security_operations
structure. Currently hook functions are only related to network stack.
For each hook function, there is a generic mecanism:
0. check if the event [syscall, protocol] is registered
1. prepare informations for userspace
2. send informations to userspace (snet_netlink)
3. wait for verdict from userspace (snet_verdict)
4. apply verdict for the syscall
steps 3 and 4 are only valid for LSM hooks which are returning a value (a way to
'filter' the syscall). For hooks returning 'void', steps 3 and 4 don't exist,
but snet sends security informations to userspace (step 2) to update the global
security policy.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_hooks.c | 710 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_hooks.h | 10 +
2 files changed, 720 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_hooks.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_hooks.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_hooks.c b/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..689babe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+/*
+ * snet_hook.c
+ *
+ * here are interesting informations which can be picked up from hooks.
+ *
+ *
+ * SOCKET_CREATE:
+ * family, type, protocol
+ * SOCKET_BIND:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport
+ * SOCKET_CONNECT:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport, daddr, dport
+ * SOCKET_LISTEN:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport
+ * SOCKET_ACCEPT:
+ * family, protocol, saddr, sport
+ *
+ * SOCKET_SENDMSG:
+ * SOCKET_RECVMSG:
+ * SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB:
+ *
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_hooks.h"
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+
+static inline void snet_pr_tuple(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ pr_debug("%pI4:%u->%pI4:%u\n",
+ &info->src.u3.ip, info->src.u.port,
+ &info->dst.u3.ip, info->dst.u.port);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ pr_debug("%pI6:%u->%pI6:%u\n",
+ &info->src.u3.ip6, info->src.u.port,
+ &info->dst.u3.ip6, info->dst.u.port);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int snet_check_listeners(enum snet_verdict *verdict)
+{
+ if (snet_nl_pid == 0 || snet_nl_pid == current->pid ) {
+ if (verdict != NULL)
+ *verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int snet_do_verdict(enum snet_verdict *verdict, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ if (info->verdict_id == 0)
+ return -1;
+ /* sending networking informations to userspace */
+ if (snet_nl_send_event(info) == 0)
+ /* waiting for userspace reply or timeout */
+ *verdict = snet_verdict_wait(info->verdict_id);
+ /* removing verdict */
+ snet_verdict_remove(info->verdict_id);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void snet_do_send_event(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ snet_nl_send_event(info);
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security operations helper functions
+ */
+
+/*
+ * security operations functions members
+ */
+
+static int snet_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+
+ /* if (kern) */
+ /* ; /\* do something smart *\/ */
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_CREATE, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_CREATE;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = family;
+ info.type = type;
+
+ pr_debug("family=%u type=%u protocol=%u kern=%u\n",
+ family, type, protocol, kern);
+
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_BIND, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+ struct sockaddr_in *a = (struct sockaddr_in *) address;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) address;
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_BIND;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = a->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(a->sin_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&a6->sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(a6->sin6_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+ struct sockaddr_in *a = (struct sockaddr_in *) address;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) address;
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct snet_info));
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = a->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(a->sin_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&a6->sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(a6->sin6_port);
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct snet_info));
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static void snet_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(NULL) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(newsock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.verdict_id = 0;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_send_event(&info);
+ }
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+ info.len = size;
+ info.buffer = msg->msg_iov->iov_base;
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ /* check tickets */
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ goto out;
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_verdict(&verdict, &info);
+ /* create ticket */
+ snet_ticket_create(&info, verdict);
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static int snet_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(&verdict) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sk->sk_family;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ /* info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert(); */
+
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ /* inserting verdict PENDING */
+ /* info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert(); */
+
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ goto skip_send_wait;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ /* SNET_DOC_VERDICT(info); */
+ } else {
+ verdict = SNET_VERDICT_GRANT;
+ }
+
+skip_send_wait:
+ if (verdict == SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_verdict_policy;
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static void snet_socket_close(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ u8 protocol = 0;
+
+ if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (snet_check_listeners(NULL) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ protocol = sock->sk->sk_protocol;
+
+ if (snet_event_is_registered(SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE, protocol)) {
+ struct snet_info info;
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sock->sk);
+
+ /* prepare networking informations for userspace */
+ info.syscall = SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE;
+ info.protocol = protocol;
+ info.family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ info.verdict_id = 0;
+ info.src.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
+ info.dst.u.port = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
+ info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
+ break;
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&info.src.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->saddr,
+ sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
+ sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ snet_pr_tuple(&info);
+ snet_do_send_event(&info);
+ }
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations snet_security_ops = {
+ .name = "snet",
+
+ .socket_create = snet_socket_create,
+ .socket_bind = snet_socket_bind,
+ .socket_connect = snet_socket_connect,
+ .socket_listen = snet_socket_listen,
+ .socket_accept = snet_socket_accept,
+ .socket_post_accept = snet_socket_post_accept,
+ .socket_sendmsg = snet_socket_sendmsg,
+ .socket_recvmsg = snet_socket_recvmsg,
+ .socket_sock_rcv_skb = snet_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+ .socket_close = snet_socket_close,
+
+ .cred_prepare = snet_prepare_creds,
+ .cred_free = snet_cred_free,
+};
+
+int snet_hooks_init(void)
+{
+ if (!security_module_enable(&snet_security_ops))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (register_security(&snet_security_ops))
+ panic("snet: failed to register security_ops\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_hooks.h b/security/snet/snet_hooks.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05fe5e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_hooks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_HOOKS_H
+#define _SNET_HOOKS_H
+
+extern uint32_t snet_nl_pid;
+extern unsigned int snet_verdict_policy;
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_hooks_init(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_HOOK_H */
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 07/10] snet: introduce snet_netlink
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 06/10] snet: introduce snet_hooks Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 08/10] snet: introduce snet_verdict Samir Bellabes
` (3 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
this patch adds the snet communication's subsystem.
snet_netlink is using genetlink for sending/receiving messages to/from userspace.
the genetlink operations permit to receive orders to manage the list of events
- events are values [syscall, protocol] - which is used to know which syscall
and protocol have to be protected. genl operations are also used to manage
communication of events to userspace, and to receive the related verdict.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_netlink.c | 431 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink.h | 17 ++
security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c | 230 +++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h | 7 +
4 files changed, 685 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0dd163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <net/genetlink.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_netlink.h"
+#include "snet_netlink_helper.h"
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+#include "snet_event.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+atomic_t snet_nl_seq = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+uint32_t snet_nl_pid;
+static struct genl_family snet_genl_family;
+
+/*
+ * snet genetlink
+ */
+int snet_nl_send_event(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb_rsp;
+ void *msg_head;
+ int ret = 0, sbs = -1;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ sbs = snet_nl_size_by_syscall(info);
+ if (sbs < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = sbs +
+ 2 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)) +
+ 1 * nla_total_size(sizeof(u16)) +
+ (info->verdict_id ? 3 : 2) * nla_total_size(sizeof(u32));
+
+ skb_rsp = genlmsg_new(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skb_rsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ msg_head = genlmsg_put(skb_rsp, snet_nl_pid,
+ atomic_inc_return(&snet_nl_seq),
+ &snet_genl_family, 0, SNET_C_VERDICT);
+ if (msg_head == NULL)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ pr_debug("verdict_id=0x%x syscall=%s protocol=%u "
+ "family=%u uid=%u pid=%u\n",
+ info->verdict_id, snet_syscall_name(info->syscall),
+ info->protocol, info->family, current_uid(), current->pid);
+
+ if (info->verdict_id)
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_VERDICT_ID, info->verdict_id);
+ NLA_PUT_U16(skb_rsp, SNET_A_SYSCALL, info->syscall);
+ NLA_PUT_U8(skb_rsp, SNET_A_PROTOCOL, info->protocol);
+ NLA_PUT_U8(skb_rsp, SNET_A_FAMILY, info->family);
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_UID, current_uid());
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_PID, current->pid);
+
+ ret = snet_nl_fill_by_syscall(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ ret = genlmsg_end(skb_rsp, msg_head);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ return genlmsg_unicast(&init_net, skb_rsp, snet_nl_pid);
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ kfree_skb(skb_rsp);
+ return -ECONNABORTED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * snet genetlink functions
+ */
+
+static struct genl_family snet_genl_family = {
+ .id = GENL_ID_GENERATE,
+ .hdrsize = 0,
+ .name = SNET_GENL_NAME,
+ .version = SNET_GENL_VERSION,
+ .maxattr = SNET_A_MAX,
+};
+
+static const struct nla_policy snet_genl_policy[SNET_A_MAX + 1] = {
+ [SNET_A_VERSION] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_VERDICT_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_FAMILY] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [SNET_A_SYSCALL] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+ [SNET_A_PROTOCOL] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [SNET_A_UID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_PID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_IPV4SADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_IPV6SADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_IPV4DADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_IPV6DADDR] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+ .len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
+ [SNET_A_BUFFER] = { .type = NLA_BINARY },
+ [SNET_A_BUFFER_LEN] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_SPORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+ [SNET_A_DPORT] = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+ [SNET_A_VERDICT] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+ [SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+ [SNET_A_TICKET_MODE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+};
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_version - Handle a VERSION message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user generated VERSION message and respond accordingly.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_version(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct sk_buff *skb_rsp = NULL;
+ void *msg_head;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ skb_rsp = genlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skb_rsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ msg_head = genlmsg_put_reply(skb_rsp, info, &snet_genl_family,
+ 0, SNET_C_VERSION);
+ if (msg_head == NULL)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ NLA_PUT_U32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_VERSION, SNET_VERSION);
+
+ ret = genlmsg_end(skb_rsp, msg_head);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ ret = genlmsg_reply(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+ return 0;
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ kfree_skb(skb_rsp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_register - Handle a REGISTER message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Notify the kernel that an application is listening for events.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_register(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 version = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_VERSION]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ version = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERSION]);
+
+ if (version != SNET_VERSION) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (snet_nl_pid > 0) {
+ ret = -ECONNREFUSED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_nl_pid = info->snd_pid;
+ pr_debug("pid=%u\n", snet_nl_pid);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_unregister - Handle a UNREGISTER message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Notify the kernel that the application is no more listening for events.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_unregister(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (snet_nl_pid == 0) {
+ ret = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ snet_nl_pid = 0;
+ pr_debug("pid=%u\n", snet_nl_pid);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_insert - Handle a INSERT message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Insert a new event to the events' hashtable. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_insert(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL] || !info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ syscall = nla_get_u16(info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL]);
+ protocol = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]);
+ ret = snet_event_insert(syscall, protocol);
+ pr_debug("syscall=%s protocol=%u insert=%s\n",
+ snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol,
+ (ret == 0) ? "success" : "failed");
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_remove - Handle a REMOVE message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove a event from the events' hastable. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_remove(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL] || !info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ syscall = nla_get_u16(info->attrs[SNET_A_SYSCALL]);
+ protocol = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SNET_A_PROTOCOL]);
+ ret = snet_event_remove(syscall, protocol);
+ pr_debug("syscall=%s protocol=%u remove=%s\n",
+ snet_syscall_name(syscall), protocol,
+ (ret == 0) ? "success" : "failed");
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_flush - Handle a FLUSH message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info: the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all events from the hashtable. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_flush(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+ snet_event_flush();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int snet_nl_list_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq,
+ u32 flags, u8 protocol, enum snet_syscall syscall)
+{
+ void *hdr;
+
+ hdr = genlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, &snet_genl_family, flags, SNET_C_LIST);
+ if (hdr == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ NLA_PUT_U16(skb, SNET_A_SYSCALL, syscall);
+ NLA_PUT_U8(skb, SNET_A_PROTOCOL, protocol);
+
+ return genlmsg_end(skb, hdr);
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr);
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+}
+/**
+ * snet_nl_list - Handle a LIST message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @cb:
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Process a user LIST message and respond. Returns zero on success,
+ * and negative values on error.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_list(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
+{
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq);
+ len = snet_event_fill_info(skb, cb);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * snet_nl_verdict - Handle a VERDICT message
+ * @skb: the NETLINK buffer
+ * @info the Generic NETLINK info block
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Provides userspace with a VERDICT message, ie we are sending informations
+ * with this command. Userspace is sending the appropriate verdict for the
+ * event. Returns zero on success,and negative values on error.
+ */
+static int snet_nl_verdict(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 verdict_id;
+ enum snet_verdict verdict;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (snet_nl_pid == 0) {
+ ret = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_ID] || !info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT]) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ verdict_id = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_ID]);
+ verdict = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT]);
+ ret = snet_verdict_set(verdict_id, verdict);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_nl_config(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
+
+ if (info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]) {
+ snet_verdict_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]);
+ pr_debug("snet_nl_config: verdict_delay=%u\n", snet_verdict_delay);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]) {
+ snet_ticket_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]);
+ pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_delay=%u\n", snet_ticket_delay);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]) {
+ snet_ticket_mode = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]);
+ pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_mode=%u\n", snet_ticket_mode);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define SNET_GENL_OPS(_cmd, _flags, _policy, _op, _opname) \
+ { \
+ .cmd = _cmd, \
+ .flags = _flags, \
+ .policy = _policy, \
+ ._op = snet_nl_##_opname, \
+ }
+
+static struct genl_ops snet_genl_ops[] = {
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_VERSION, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, version),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_REGISTER, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, register),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_UNREGISTER, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, unregister),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_INSERT, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, insert),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_REMOVE, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, remove),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_FLUSH, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, flush),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_LIST, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ dumpit, list),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_VERDICT, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, verdict),
+ SNET_GENL_OPS(SNET_C_CONFIG, GENL_ADMIN_PERM, snet_genl_policy,
+ doit, config),
+};
+
+#undef SNET_GENL_OPS
+
+static __init int snet_netlink_init(void)
+{
+ return genl_register_family_with_ops(&snet_genl_family,
+ snet_genl_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(snet_genl_ops));
+}
+
+void snet_netlink_exit(void)
+{
+ genl_unregister_family(&snet_genl_family);
+}
+
+__initcall(snet_netlink_init);
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.h b/security/snet/snet_netlink.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e80d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_NETLINK_H
+#define _SNET_NETLINK_H
+
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+
+extern unsigned int snet_verdict_delay;
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_delay;
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_mode;
+
+int snet_nl_send_event(struct snet_info *info);
+
+int snet_nl_list_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq,
+ u32 flags, u8 protocol, enum snet_syscall syscall);
+
+void snet_netlink_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_NETLINK_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6b5343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <net/genetlink.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+static int fill_src(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV4SADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr), &(info->src.u3.ip));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV6SADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr), &(info->src.u3.ip6));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = nla_put_u16(skb_rsp, SNET_A_SPORT, info->src.u.port);
+out:
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+static int fill_dst(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV4DADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr), &(info->dst.u3.ip));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_IPV6DADDR,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr), &(info->dst.u3.ip6));
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = nla_put_u16(skb_rsp, SNET_A_DPORT, info->dst.u.port);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_create(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = nla_put_u8(skb_rsp, SNET_A_TYPE, info->type);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_bind(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_connect(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_listen(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_accept(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_post_accept(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp,
+ struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_sendmsg(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = nla_put(skb_rsp, SNET_A_BUFFER, info->len, info->buffer);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = nla_put_u32(skb_rsp, SNET_A_BUFFER_LEN, info->len);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_recvmsg(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp,
+ struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int snet_fill_close(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fill_src(skb_rsp, info);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = fill_dst(skb_rsp, info);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int snet_nl_fill_by_syscall(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ static int (*snet_df[])(struct sk_buff *, struct snet_info *) = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = &snet_fill_create,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = &snet_fill_bind,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = &snet_fill_connect,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = &snet_fill_listen,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = &snet_fill_accept,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = &snet_fill_post_accept,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = &snet_fill_sendmsg,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = &snet_fill_recvmsg,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = &snet_fill_sock_rcv_skb,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = &snet_fill_close,
+ };
+
+ if (info->syscall >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else
+ return snet_df[info->syscall](skb_rsp, info);
+}
+
+int snet_nl_size_by_syscall(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ unsigned int size_addr4_port = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in_addr)) +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u16));
+ unsigned int size_addr6_port = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u16));
+
+ unsigned int sbs4[] = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)),
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = 2 * size_addr4_port +
+ info->len +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)),
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = 2 * size_addr4_port,
+ };
+
+ unsigned int sbs6[] = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = nla_total_size(sizeof(u8)),
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = 2 * size_addr6_port +
+ info->len +
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)),
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = 2 * size_addr6_port,
+ };
+
+ if (info->syscall >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else {
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return sbs4[info->syscall];
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return sbs6[info->syscall];
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d12e563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_NETLINK_HELPER_H
+#define _SNET_NETLINK_HELPER_H
+
+int snet_nl_fill_by_syscall(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info);
+int snet_nl_size_by_syscall(struct snet_info *info);
+
+#endif /* SNET_NETLINK_HELPER_H */
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 08/10] snet: introduce snet_verdict
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 07/10] snet: introduce snet_netlink Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket Samir Bellabes
` (2 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
This patch adds the snet's subsystem responsive of managing verdicts
snet is using the word 'verdict' for the returning value of LSM hooks.
Different states exist (grant/deny/pending/none).
This patch introduces a hashtable 'verdict_hash' and operations (set/get/search..)
in order to manage verdicts. Syscalls are waiting, inside a classical waitqueue,
for theirs verdicts or for a timeout. Timeout value and the default verdict
policy are configurable at boot or by the snet_netlink subsystem.
With the help of the communication's subsystem, verdicts are coming from userspace
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_verdict.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_verdict.h | 23 +++++
2 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_verdict.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_verdict.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..480a7f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_verdict.h"
+
+static struct list_head *snet_vdh;
+static rwlock_t snet_vdh_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
+
+struct snet_verdict_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ u32 verdict_id;
+ enum snet_verdict verdict;
+};
+
+static atomic_t value = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+
+/* when waiting for a verdict, process is added to this queue */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(snet_wq);
+
+/* lookup for a verdict - before using this function, lock snet_vdh_lock */
+static struct snet_verdict_entry *__snet_verdict_lookup(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ struct list_head *l = NULL;
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *s = NULL;
+
+ h = verdict_id % snet_vdh_size;
+ l = &snet_vdh[h];
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, l, list) {
+ if (s->verdict_id == verdict_id) {
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_wait(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ long ret = 0;
+
+ ret = wait_event_timeout(snet_wq,
+ (verdict = snet_verdict_get(verdict_id))
+ != SNET_VERDICT_PENDING,
+ snet_verdict_delay * HZ);
+ if (ret)
+ return snet_verdict_get(verdict_id);
+ else
+ return SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+}
+
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_get(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ enum snet_verdict v = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ data = __snet_verdict_lookup(verdict_id);
+ if (data != NULL)
+ v = data->verdict;
+
+ read_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ return v;
+}
+
+int snet_verdict_set(const u32 verdict_id, const enum snet_verdict verdict)
+{
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (verdict >= SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES)
+ goto out;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ data = __snet_verdict_lookup(verdict_id);
+ if (data != NULL) {
+ /* if verdict is already set because of
+ timeout, we won't modify it */
+ if (data->verdict == SNET_VERDICT_PENDING) {
+ data->verdict = verdict;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ wake_up(&snet_wq);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int snet_verdict_remove(const u32 verdict_id)
+{
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ data = __snet_verdict_lookup(verdict_id);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pr_debug("(verdict_id=%u)\n", data->verdict_id);
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ kfree(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int snet_verdict_insert(void)
+{
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0;
+ u32 verdict_id = 0;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_verdict_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ do {
+ verdict_id = atomic_inc_return(&value);
+ } while (verdict_id == 0);
+
+ data->verdict_id = verdict_id;
+ data->verdict = SNET_VERDICT_PENDING;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(data->list));
+ h = data->verdict_id % snet_vdh_size;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ list_add_tail(&data->list, &snet_vdh[h]);
+ pr_debug("[%u]=(verdict_id=%u)\n", h, data->verdict_id);
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+
+ return verdict_id;
+}
+
+void snet_verdict_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ write_lock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_vdh_size; i++) {
+ struct snet_verdict_entry *data, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(data, tmp, &snet_vdh[i], list) {
+ list_del(&data->list);
+ kfree(data);
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_bh(&snet_vdh_lock);
+ return;
+}
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_verdict_init(void)
+{
+ int err = 0, i = 0;
+
+ snet_vdh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_vdh_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!snet_vdh) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "snet: can't alloc memory for verdict\n");
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < snet_vdh_size; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&snet_vdh[i]);
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* exit function */
+void snet_verdict_exit(void)
+{
+ if (snet_vdh) {
+ kfree(snet_vdh);
+ snet_vdh = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.h b/security/snet/snet_verdict.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07e8638
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_VERDICT_H
+#define _SNET_VERDICT_H
+
+extern unsigned int snet_vdh_size;
+extern unsigned int snet_verdict_delay;
+
+/* helper functions */
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_wait(const u32 verdict_id);
+
+/* manipulate the verdicts hash table */
+const enum snet_verdict snet_verdict_get(const u32 verdict_id);
+int snet_verdict_set(const u32 verdict_id, const enum snet_verdict verdict);
+int snet_verdict_insert(void);
+int snet_verdict_remove(const u32 verdict_id);
+int snet_verdict_insert(void);
+void snet_verdict_flush(void);
+
+/* init function */
+int snet_verdict_init(void);
+/* exit function */
+void snet_verdict_exit(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_VERDICT_H */
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 08/10] snet: introduce snet_verdict Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 10/10] snet: introduce snet_utils Samir Bellabes
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
10 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
this patch adds the snet's subsystem managing granted-access tickets
snet is using the term 'ticket' for refering to a structure which keeps
informations about verdict, coming from userspace.
generic informations:
timeout
syscall
protocol
verdict
protocol-dependant informations : (so some infos may not be used)
address family
socket type
source address
source port
distant address
distant port
ticket are attached to the "void *security" pointer of task_struct
there are 3 modes:
0. no ticket - SNET_TICKET_OFF
every syscalls has to be verified by userspace.
1. timeout fixed - SNET_TICKET_FIX
for each response from the userspace, we are creating a ticket,
attached to the task_struct, with the filled informations, and a
fixed timeout value (10 secs by default).
then before asking userspace, kernel mecanism is checking existing
tickets for the task_struct, if there is a granted-access ticket, we
are using the verdict value attached.
after the timeout value, the ticket is destroyed.
2. timeout with extendable value - SNET_TICKET_EXTEND
this is the same mecanism as 1, but every time a ticket is matched
and used, the timeout value is reset to the default value, so its
life is extended.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_ticket.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket.h | 37 ++++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h | 8 ++
4 files changed, 343 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket.h
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62ced7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_ticket_helper.h"
+
+#define HSIZE 16
+
+enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0, verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ struct list_head *l = NULL;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
+
+ h = jhash_2words(info->syscall, info->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
+ l = &tsec->hash[h];
+
+ read_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(st, l, list) {
+ if (__ticket_check(st, info)) {
+ verdict = st->verdict;
+ pr_debug("snet_ticket found: ticket=%p tsec=%p\n",
+ st, st->tsec);
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_EXTEND) {
+ mod_timer(&st->timeout,
+ jiffies + snet_ticket_delay * HZ);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+out:
+ return verdict;
+}
+
+static void snet_ticket_timeout(unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = (struct snet_ticket*)arg;
+
+ pr_debug("snet_ticket_timeout: ticket=%p tsec=%p\n", st, st->tsec);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&st->tsec->lock);
+ list_del(&st->list);
+ write_unlock_bh(&st->tsec->lock);
+ kfree(st);
+ return;
+}
+
+static struct snet_ticket *snet_ticket_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
+
+ st = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_ticket), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (st == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&st->list);
+ init_timer(&st->timeout);
+ st->timeout.expires = snet_ticket_delay * HZ;
+out:
+ return st;
+}
+
+static void snet_ticket_insert(struct snet_ticket *st)
+{
+ unsigned int h;
+ struct list_head *l;
+
+ h = jhash_2words(st->syscall, st->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
+ l = &(st->tsec->hash[h]);
+
+ st->timeout.expires += jiffies;
+ add_timer(&st->timeout);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&(st->tsec->lock));
+ list_add_tail(&st->list, l);
+ write_unlock_bh(&(st->tsec->lock));
+ return;
+}
+
+void snet_ticket_create(struct snet_info *info, enum snet_verdict verdict)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
+
+ st = snet_ticket_alloc();
+ if (st == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ st->tsec = tsec;
+ snet_ticket_fill(st, info, verdict);
+ setup_timer(&st->timeout, snet_ticket_timeout, (unsigned long)st);
+ snet_ticket_insert(st);
+out:
+ return;
+}
+
+int snet_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ unsigned int index = 0;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_task_security), gfp);
+ if (tsec == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ pr_debug("ticket_prepare_creds: pid=%u tsec=%p\n", current->pid, tsec);
+ rwlock_init(&tsec->lock);
+ for (index = 0; index < HSIZE; index++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsec->hash[index]);
+
+ new->security = tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void snet_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = cred->security;
+ unsigned int index;
+
+ pr_debug("ticket_free_cred: pid=%u tsec=%p\n", current->pid, tsec);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+ /* destroy all tickets */
+ for (index = 0; index < HSIZE; index++) {
+ struct snet_ticket *st, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(st, tmp, &tsec->hash[index], list) {
+ if (del_timer_sync(&st->timeout)) {
+ pr_debug("ticket_cred_free: [%u] ticket=%p tsec=%p\n",
+ index, st, st->tsec);
+ list_del(&st->list);
+ kfree(st);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ cred->security = NULL;
+ write_unlock_bh(&tsec->lock);
+ kfree(tsec);
+ return;
+}
+
+int snet_ticket_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int index = 0;
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_task_security), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (tsec == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rwlock_init(&tsec->lock);
+ for (index = 0; index < HSIZE; index++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsec->hash[index]);
+
+ cred->security = tsec;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.h b/security/snet/snet_ticket.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6d1020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_TICKET_H
+#define _SNET_TICKET_H
+
+#include <linux/timer.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+struct snet_task_security {
+ struct list_head hash[16];
+ rwlock_t lock;
+};
+
+struct snet_ticket {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec;
+ struct timer_list timeout;
+
+ enum snet_syscall syscall;
+ u8 protocol;
+ u8 family;
+ int type;
+ struct snet_sock_half src;
+ struct snet_sock_half dst;
+ enum snet_verdict verdict;
+};
+
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_delay;
+extern unsigned int snet_ticket_mode;
+
+void snet_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
+int snet_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
+enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info);
+void snet_ticket_create(struct snet_info *info, enum snet_verdict verdict);
+int snet_ticket_init(void);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_TICKET_H */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dc9b94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+#include "snet_ticket.h"
+#include "snet_utils.h"
+
+static int check_create(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return (st->type == info->type);
+}
+
+static int check_src(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if ((st->src.u3.ip == info->src.u3.ip) &&
+ (st->src.u.port == info->src.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if ((!memcmp(&st->src.u3.ip6, &info->src.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->src.u3.ip6))) &&
+ (st->src.u.port == info->src.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_dst(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if ((st->dst.u3.ip == info->dst.u3.ip) &&
+ (st->dst.u.port == info->dst.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if ((!memcmp(&st->dst.u3.ip6, &info->dst.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->dst.u3.ip6))) &&
+ (st->dst.u.port == info->dst.u.port))
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_src_and_dst(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return (check_src(st, info) && check_dst(st, info));
+}
+
+static int check_none(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __ticket_check(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ static int (*ticket_df[])(struct snet_ticket *, struct snet_info *) = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = &check_create,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = &check_src,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = &check_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = &check_src,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = &check_src,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = &check_none,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = &check_src_and_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = &check_src_and_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = &check_src_and_dst,
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = &check_none,
+ };
+
+ if (info->syscall >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ if ((st->syscall == info->syscall) &&
+ (st->protocol == info->protocol) &&
+ (st->family == info->family) &&
+ ticket_df[info->syscall](st, info))
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+void snet_ticket_fill(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info,
+ enum snet_verdict verdict)
+{
+ st->syscall = info->syscall;
+ st->protocol = info->protocol;
+ st->family = info->family;
+ st->src.u.port = info->src.u.port;
+ st->dst.u.port = info->dst.u.port;
+ st->verdict = verdict;
+
+ switch (info->family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ st->src.u3.ip = info->src.u3.ip;
+ st->dst.u3.ip = info->dst.u3.ip;
+ pr_debug("ticket=%p [syscall=%s protocol=%u "
+ "family=%u %pI4:%u->%pI4:%u] verdict=%s | tsec=%p pid=%u\n",
+ st, snet_syscall_name(st->syscall), st->protocol,
+ st->family, &st->src.u3.ip, st->src.u.port,
+ &st->dst.u3.ip, st->dst.u.port,
+ snet_verdict_name(st->verdict), st->tsec, current->pid);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(&st->src.u3.ip6, &info->src.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->src.u3.ip6));
+ memcpy(&st->dst.u3.ip6, &info->dst.u3.ip6,
+ sizeof(info->dst.u3.ip6));
+ pr_debug("ticket=%p [syscall=%s protocol=%u "
+ "family=%u %pI6:%u->%pI6:%u] verdict=%s | tsec=%p pid=%u\n",
+ st, snet_syscall_name(st->syscall), st->protocol,
+ st->family, &st->src.u3.ip6, st->src.u.port,
+ &st->dst.u3.ip6, st->dst.u.port,
+ snet_verdict_name(st->verdict), st->tsec, current->pid);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..177bca5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_TICKET_HELPER_H
+#define _SNET_TICKET_HELPER_H
+
+void snet_ticket_fill(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info,
+ enum snet_verdict verdict);
+int __ticket_check(struct snet_ticket *st, struct snet_info *info);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_TICKET_HELPER_H */
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* [RFC v2 10/10] snet: introduce snet_utils
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-02 20:23 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-03 17:55 ` Jan Engelhardt
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
10 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-02 20:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, jamal, Patrick McHardy,
Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman, Grzegorz Nosek, Samir Bellabes
This patch provides helper functions for other subsystems
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_utils.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_utils.h | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.c
create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.h
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_utils.c b/security/snet/snet_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9178d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/snet.h>
+
+const char *snet_verdict_name(const enum snet_verdict cmd)
+{
+ static const char *const verdict_name[] = {
+ [SNET_VERDICT_GRANT] = "Grant",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_DENY] = "Deny",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_PENDING] = "Pending",
+ [SNET_VERDICT_NONE] = "None",
+ };
+
+ if (cmd >= SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES)
+ return "INVALID";
+ else
+ return verdict_name[cmd];
+}
+
+const char *snet_syscall_name(const enum snet_syscall sys)
+{
+ static const char *const syscall_name[] = {
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CREATE] = "Create",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_BIND] = "Bind",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CONNECT] = "Connect",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_LISTEN] = "Listen",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_ACCEPT] = "Accept",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_POST_ACCEPT] = "Post Accept",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SENDMSG] = "Sendmsg",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_RECVMSG] = "Recvmsg",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_SOCK_RCV_SKB] = "Sock Rcv Skb",
+ [SNET_SOCKET_CLOSE] = "Close",
+ };
+
+ if (sys >= SNET_NR_SOCKET_TYPES)
+ return "INVALID";
+ else
+ return syscall_name[sys];
+}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_utils.h b/security/snet/snet_utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4dad18b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/snet/snet_utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef _SNET_UTILS_H
+#define _SNET_UTILS_H
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+int snet_data_fill(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info);
+const char *snet_verdict_name(const enum snet_verdict cmd);
+const char *snet_syscall_name(const enum snet_syscall sys);
+
+#endif /* _SNET_UTILS_H */
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 10/10] snet: introduce snet_utils
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 10/10] snet: introduce snet_utils Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-03 17:55 ` Jan Engelhardt
2010-03-06 12:41 ` Samir Bellabes
0 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Jan Engelhardt @ 2010-03-03 17:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Samir Bellabes
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
jamal, Patrick McHardy, Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman,
Grzegorz Nosek
On Tuesday 2010-03-02 21:23, Samir Bellabes wrote:
>This patch provides helper functions for other subsystems
What subsystems would that be? (Just trying to prevent premature code
bloat.)
> security/snet/snet_utils.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/snet/snet_utils.h | 10 ++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.c
> create mode 100644 security/snet/snet_utils.h
>
>diff --git a/security/snet/snet_utils.c b/security/snet/snet_utils.c
>new file mode 100644
>index 0000000..e9178d7
>--- /dev/null
>+++ b/security/snet/snet_utils.c
>@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
>+#include <linux/types.h>
>+#include <linux/snet.h>
>+
>+const char *snet_verdict_name(const enum snet_verdict cmd)
>+{
>+ static const char *const verdict_name[] = {
>+ [SNET_VERDICT_GRANT] = "Grant",
>+ [SNET_VERDICT_DENY] = "Deny",
>+ [SNET_VERDICT_PENDING] = "Pending",
>+ [SNET_VERDICT_NONE] = "None",
>+ };
>+
>+ if (cmd >= SNET_NR_VERDICT_TYPES)
>+ return "INVALID";
>+ else
>+ return verdict_name[cmd];
>+}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 10/10] snet: introduce snet_utils
2010-03-03 17:55 ` Jan Engelhardt
@ 2010-03-06 12:41 ` Samir Bellabes
0 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 12:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Engelhardt
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel,
jamal, Patrick McHardy, Evgeniy Polyakov, Neil Horman,
Grzegorz Nosek
Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de> writes:
> On Tuesday 2010-03-02 21:23, Samir Bellabes wrote:
>
>>This patch provides helper functions for other subsystems
>
> What subsystems would that be? (Just trying to prevent premature code
> bloat.)
snet_verdict_name() is used in :
- security/snet/snet_core.c
- security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
snet_syscall_name() is used in :
- security/snet/snet_event.c
- security/snet/snet_netlink.c
- security/snet/snet_ticket_helper.c
this functions are used for debug.
in the same time, I found an unused function declaration in security/snet/snet_utils.h:
int snet_data_fill(struct sk_buff *skb_rsp, struct snet_info *info);
I deleted it.
Thanks Jan,
sam
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-02 20:23 [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Samir Bellabes
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-02 20:23 ` [RFC v2 10/10] snet: introduce snet_utils Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-03 1:56 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-03-06 18:16 ` Samir Bellabes
` (5 more replies)
10 siblings, 6 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2010-03-03 1:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sam
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Hello.
Regarding [RFC v2 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook"
@@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
fd_install(newfd, newfile);
err = newfd;
+ security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
Please move security_socket_post_accept() to before fd_install().
Otherwise, other threads which share fd tables can use
security-informations-not-yet-updated accept()ed sockets.
Regarding [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core
+static __init int snet_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_debug("initializing: event_hash_size=%u "
+ "verdict_hash_size=%u verdict_delay=%usecs "
+ "default_policy=%s\n",
+ snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
+ snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
Why not to stop here if snet_evh_size == 0 or snet_vdh_size == 0 in order to
avoid "division by 0".
Regarding [RFC v2 05/10] snet: introduce snet_event
+static rwlock_t snet_evh_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
You can use "static DEFINE_RWLOCK(snet_evh_lock);".
+int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
Maybe rcu_read_lock() is better than rw spinlock because this function is
frequently called.
Regarding [RFC v2 06/10] snet: introduce snet_hooks
+ if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
Please avoid assignment in "if" statement, as scripts/checkpatch.pl suggests.
Regarding [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket
+enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info)
+{
+ struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
+ unsigned int h = 0, verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
+ struct list_head *l = NULL;
+ struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+
+ if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
+
+ h = jhash_2words(info->syscall, info->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
+ l = &tsec->hash[h];
+
+ read_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
Credentials are allocated for copy-on-write basis.
Sharing "tsec" among multiple "struct task_struct" is what you intended?
Regards.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
@ 2010-03-06 18:16 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-06 18:17 ` Samir Bellabes
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 18:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 04/10] snet: introduce snet_core
> +static __init int snet_init(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + pr_debug("initializing: event_hash_size=%u "
> + "verdict_hash_size=%u verdict_delay=%usecs "
> + "default_policy=%s\n",
> + snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
> + snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
>
> Why not to stop here if snet_evh_size == 0 or snet_vdh_size == 0 in order to
> avoid "division by 0".
indeed. I applied this patch
>From 593614c92a1f2058c014fa674c67f434b24b26e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2010 17:32:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] snet: adding checks for bad configuration values
this patch adds some checks on boot parameters and runtime configurations for:
- snet_verdict_policy, snet_verdict_delay and snet_vdh_size
- snet_evh_size
- snet_ticket_delay and snet_ticket_mode
Noticed by Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
include/linux/snet.h | 1 +
security/snet/snet_core.c | 6 ++++++
security/snet/snet_event.c | 6 ++++++
security/snet/snet_netlink.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
security/snet/snet_ticket.c | 12 ++++++++++++
security/snet/snet_verdict.c | 12 ++++++++++++
6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/snet.h b/include/linux/snet.h
index 739601d..e6e2d52 100644
--- a/include/linux/snet.h
+++ b/include/linux/snet.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum snet_ticket_mode {
SNET_TICKET_OFF = 0,
SNET_TICKET_FIX,
SNET_TICKET_EXTEND,
+ SNET_TICKET_INVALID,
};
/* genetlink commands */
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_core.c b/security/snet/snet_core.c
index 9f2eb2e..949ecaa 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_core.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_core.c
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ static __init int snet_init(void)
snet_evh_size, snet_vdh_size, snet_verdict_delay,
snet_verdict_name(snet_verdict_policy));
+ if (snet_verdict_policy >= SNET_VERDICT_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_policy\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto event_failed;
+ }
+
ret = snet_event_init();
if (ret < 0)
goto event_failed;
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
index 5f708d0..5693aac 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_event.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -165,6 +165,12 @@ int snet_event_init(void)
{
int err = 0, i = 0;
+ if (snet_evh_size == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_evh_size value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
snet_evh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_evh_size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!snet_evh) {
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
index b0dd163..937b0fc 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_netlink.c
@@ -363,25 +363,38 @@ out:
static int snet_nl_config(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
- int ret = -EINVAL;
+ int ret = 0;
atomic_set(&snet_nl_seq, info->snd_seq);
if (info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]) {
- snet_verdict_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]);
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_VERDICT_DELAY]);
+ if (new == 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_verdict_delay = new;
pr_debug("snet_nl_config: verdict_delay=%u\n", snet_verdict_delay);
- ret = 0;
}
if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]) {
- snet_ticket_delay = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]);
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_DELAY]);
+ if (new == 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_ticket_delay = new;
pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_delay=%u\n", snet_ticket_delay);
- ret = 0;
}
if (info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]) {
- snet_ticket_mode = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]);
+ unsigned int new = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SNET_A_TICKET_MODE]);
+ if (new >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ snet_ticket_mode = new;
pr_debug("snet_nl_config: ticket_mode=%u\n", snet_ticket_mode);
- ret = 0;
}
+out:
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
index 62ced7b..80a1b0f 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_ticket.c
@@ -158,6 +158,18 @@ int snet_ticket_init(void)
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
+ if (snet_ticket_mode >= SNET_TICKET_INVALID) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_mode\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_FIX ||
+ snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_EXTEND) &&
+ (snet_ticket_delay == 0)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_ticket_delay\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snet_task_security), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsec == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
index 480a7f8..ba35d19 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_verdict.c
@@ -156,6 +156,18 @@ int snet_verdict_init(void)
{
int err = 0, i = 0;
+ if (snet_vdh_size == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_vdh_size value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (snet_verdict_delay == 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "snet: bad snet_verdict_delay value\n");
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
snet_vdh = kzalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * snet_vdh_size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!snet_vdh) {
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
2010-03-06 18:16 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-06 18:17 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-06 18:20 ` Samir Bellabes
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 18:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 05/10] snet: introduce snet_event
> +static rwlock_t snet_evh_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
>
> You can use "static DEFINE_RWLOCK(snet_evh_lock);".
>
> +int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
>
> Maybe rcu_read_lock() is better than rw spinlock because this function is
> frequently called.
here is the patch.
thank you Tetsuo
>From 34715d4d900aee2d3759e3008313b65dc2f130fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2010 15:44:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] snet: use proper rwlock_t declaration
Noticed by Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_event.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_event.c b/security/snet/snet_event.c
index 9e3f7d2..5f708d0 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_event.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_event.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#include "snet_utils.h"
static struct list_head *snet_evh;
-static rwlock_t snet_evh_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED();
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(snet_evh_lock);
struct snet_event_entry {
struct list_head list;
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
2010-03-06 18:16 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-06 18:17 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-06 18:20 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-06 18:40 ` Samir Bellabes
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 18:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 06/10] snet: introduce snet_hooks
> + if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
>
> Please avoid assignment in "if" statement, as scripts/checkpatch.pl suggests.
Right, I should have run script/checkpatch.pl on this set of patches. I
won't miss it next time.
Thanks Tetsuo.
sam
>From ea2234c07ea1bf76579ba127c8a8be6ab276515f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Date: Sat, 6 Mar 2010 17:49:22 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] snet: avoid assigment in if statement
Noticed by Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
security/snet/snet_hooks.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/snet/snet_hooks.c b/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
index 689babe..d9cf0b9 100644
--- a/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
+++ b/security/snet/snet_hooks.c
@@ -160,7 +160,8 @@ static int snet_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
info.src.u.port = ntohs(a->sin_port);
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info) ;
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -173,7 +174,8 @@ static int snet_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
info.src.u.port = ntohs(a6->sin6_port);
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -229,7 +231,8 @@ static int snet_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
info.dst.u3.ip = a->sin_addr.s_addr;
info.dst.u.port = ntohs(a->sin_port);
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -242,7 +245,8 @@ static int snet_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
info.dst.u.port = ntohs(a6->sin6_port);
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -295,7 +299,8 @@ static int snet_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -306,7 +311,9 @@ static int snet_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
sizeof(info.src.u3.ip6));
memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ /* check tickets */
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -358,7 +365,8 @@ static int snet_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -370,7 +378,8 @@ static int snet_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -470,7 +479,8 @@ static int snet_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -482,7 +492,8 @@ static int snet_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -535,7 +546,8 @@ static int snet_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
info.src.u3.ip = inet->inet_saddr;
info.dst.u3.ip = inet->inet_daddr;
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
@@ -547,7 +559,8 @@ static int snet_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
memcpy(&info.dst.u3.ip6, (void *)&inet->pinet6->daddr,
sizeof(info.dst.u3.ip6));
/* check tickets */
- if ((verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info)) != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
+ verdict = snet_ticket_check(&info);
+ if (verdict != SNET_VERDICT_NONE)
goto out;
/* inserting verdict PENDING */
info.verdict_id = snet_verdict_insert();
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-06 18:20 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-06 18:40 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-07 5:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-03-06 18:47 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-06 18:50 ` Samir Bellabes
5 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module, Serge Hallyn
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook"
> @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
> fd_install(newfd, newfile);
> err = newfd;
>
> + security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
> +
> out_put:
> fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
> out:
>
> Please move security_socket_post_accept() to before fd_install().
> Otherwise, other threads which share fd tables can use
> security-informations-not-yet-updated accept()ed sockets.
Tetsuo, what about this patch ?
>From 6bbae933058e5f0857e9d7c1a720f9d09080474e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2010 03:24:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] lsm: add security_post_accept() hook
snet need to reintroduce this hook, as it was designed to be: a hook for
updating security informations on objects.
This patch is the result of :
Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook"
the revert of 8651d5c0b1f874c5b8307ae2b858bc40f9f02482.
and the comment of Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> :
> Please move security_socket_post_accept() to before fd_install().
> Otherwise, other threads which share fd tables can use
> security-informations-not-yet-updated accept()ed sockets.
Signed-off-by: Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++++++++
net/socket.c | 2 ++
security/capability.c | 5 +++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 74e564b..d8ad624 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -938,6 +938,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @sock contains the listening socket structure.
* @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_accept:
+ * This hook allows a security module to copy security
+ * information into the newly created socket's inode.
+ * @sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
* @socket_sendmsg:
* Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
* @sock contains the socket structure.
@@ -1674,6 +1679,8 @@ struct security_operations {
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog);
int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+ void (*socket_post_accept) (struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *newsock);
int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size);
int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock,
@@ -2696,6 +2703,7 @@ int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addr
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size);
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags);
@@ -2778,6 +2786,11 @@ static inline int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *newsock)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index b4eb361..384e23d 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1533,6 +1533,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
goto out_fd;
}
+ security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+
/* File flags are not inherited via accept() unlike another OSes. */
fd_install(newfd, newfile);
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index a9810dc..61eae40 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -641,6 +641,10 @@ static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
return 0;
}
+static void cap_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+}
+
static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return 0;
@@ -1081,6 +1085,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 288c3a8..673979f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1082,6 +1082,11 @@ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
}
+void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ security_ops->socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
+}
+
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
--
1.6.2.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-06 18:40 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-07 5:47 ` Tetsuo Handa
0 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2010-03-07 5:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sam
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module, serue
Samir Bellabes wrote:
> Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
>
> > Regarding [RFC v2 02/10] Revert "lsm: Remove the socket_post_accept() hook"
> > @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(accept4, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, upeer_sockaddr,
> > fd_install(newfd, newfile);
> > err = newfd;
> >
> > + security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
> > +
> > out_put:
> > fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
> > out:
> >
> > Please move security_socket_post_accept() to before fd_install().
> > Otherwise, other threads which share fd tables can use
> > security-informations-not-yet-updated accept()ed sockets.
>
> Tetsuo, what about this patch ?
>
Looks OK to me. Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-06 18:40 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-06 18:47 ` Samir Bellabes
2010-03-07 5:45 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-03-06 18:50 ` Samir Bellabes
5 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 18:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket
> +enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info)
> +{
> + struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
> + unsigned int h = 0, verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
> + struct list_head *l = NULL;
> + struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
> +
> + if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
> + goto out;
> +
> + tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
> +
> + h = jhash_2words(info->syscall, info->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
> + l = &tsec->hash[h];
> +
> + read_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
>
> Credentials are allocated for copy-on-write basis.
> Sharing "tsec" among multiple "struct task_struct" is what you intended?
No, there is no shared "tsec".
snet_ticket_check() is called from the process context. So "tsec" is
a pointer to the "void *security" pointer from its own "struct
task_struct".
every task_struct have a "tsec" allocated to its "void *security"
pointer.
I will take a second look on how to access the credentials COW.
> Regards.
Tetsuo, thank you again for reviewing.
sam
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-06 18:47 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-07 5:45 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-03-15 16:43 ` Samir Bellabes
0 siblings, 1 reply; 25+ messages in thread
From: Tetsuo Handa @ 2010-03-07 5:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sam
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Hello.
Samir Bellabes wrote:
> Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
>
> > Regarding [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket
> > +enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info)
> > +{
> > + struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
> > + unsigned int h = 0, verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
> > + struct list_head *l = NULL;
> > + struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
> > +
> > + h = jhash_2words(info->syscall, info->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
> > + l = &tsec->hash[h];
> > +
> > + read_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
> >
> > Credentials are allocated for copy-on-write basis.
> > Sharing "tsec" among multiple "struct task_struct" is what you intended?
>
> No, there is no shared "tsec".
> snet_ticket_check() is called from the process context. So "tsec" is
> a pointer to the "void *security" pointer from its own "struct
> task_struct".
>
Until 2.6.28:
"void *security" is directory attached to "struct task_struct".
copy_process() calls security_task_alloc().
Therefore, task1->security != task2->security is guaranteed as long as you do
task->security = kmalloc();
at security_task_alloc().
Since 2.6.29:
"void *security" is attached to "struct cred", and "struct cred *" is
attached to "struct task_struct". copy_process() calls copy_creds() and
prepare_creds() calls security_prepare_creds(). But copy_creds() does not
call prepare_creds() for clone(CLONE_THREAD) case.
Therefore, task1->cred->security != task2->cred->security is not guaranteed
even if you do
cred->security = kmalloc();
at security_prepare_creds().
> every task_struct have a "tsec" allocated to its "void *security"
> pointer.
You meant to have assigned "void *security" dedicated to "struct task_struct".
But "void *security" is no longer directly attached to "struct task_struct".
I couldn't find code that checks whether "current->cred" is used by only
current thread or not. "current->cred" being used by only current thread is
a requirement for having a "tsec" allocated to every "struct task_struct".
Your code will share "tsec" among multiple threads if a process created
threads using clone(CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_VM). Each thread has
its own "struct task_struct" but they share "cred->security".
Sharing "tsec" among multiple threads is what you intended?
Regards.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-07 5:45 ` Tetsuo Handa
@ 2010-03-15 16:43 ` Samir Bellabes
0 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-15 16:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Hello.
>
> Samir Bellabes wrote:
>> Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
>>
>> > Regarding [RFC v2 09/10] snet: introduce snet_ticket
>> > +enum snet_verdict snet_ticket_check(struct snet_info *info)
>> > +{
>> > + struct snet_ticket *st = NULL;
>> > + unsigned int h = 0, verdict = SNET_VERDICT_NONE;
>> > + struct list_head *l = NULL;
>> > + struct snet_task_security *tsec = NULL;
>> > +
>> > + if (snet_ticket_mode == SNET_TICKET_OFF)
>> > + goto out;
>> > +
>> > + tsec = (struct snet_task_security*) current_security();
>> > +
>> > + h = jhash_2words(info->syscall, info->protocol, 0) % HSIZE;
>> > + l = &tsec->hash[h];
>> > +
>> > + read_lock_bh(&tsec->lock);
>> >
>> > Credentials are allocated for copy-on-write basis.
>> > Sharing "tsec" among multiple "struct task_struct" is what you intended?
>>
>> No, there is no shared "tsec".
>> snet_ticket_check() is called from the process context. So "tsec" is
>> a pointer to the "void *security" pointer from its own "struct
>> task_struct".
>>
> Until 2.6.28:
>
> "void *security" is directory attached to "struct task_struct".
> copy_process() calls security_task_alloc().
>
> Therefore, task1->security != task2->security is guaranteed as long as you do
>
> task->security = kmalloc();
>
> at security_task_alloc().
>
> Since 2.6.29:
>
> "void *security" is attached to "struct cred", and "struct cred *" is
> attached to "struct task_struct". copy_process() calls copy_creds() and
> prepare_creds() calls security_prepare_creds(). But copy_creds() does not
> call prepare_creds() for clone(CLONE_THREAD) case.
>
> Therefore, task1->cred->security != task2->cred->security is not guaranteed
> even if you do
>
> cred->security = kmalloc();
>
> at security_prepare_creds().
>
>> every task_struct have a "tsec" allocated to its "void *security"
>> pointer.
>
> You meant to have assigned "void *security" dedicated to "struct task_struct".
> But "void *security" is no longer directly attached to "struct task_struct".
> I couldn't find code that checks whether "current->cred" is used by only
> current thread or not. "current->cred" being used by only current thread is
> a requirement for having a "tsec" allocated to every "struct task_struct".
>
> Your code will share "tsec" among multiple threads if a process created
> threads using clone(CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_VM). Each thread has
> its own "struct task_struct" but they share "cred->security".
> Sharing "tsec" among multiple threads is what you intended?
Hello Tetsuo,
ok, I get your point now.
It seems that this is the common behaviour of credentials, so yes, "tsec"
will be shared between this kind of threads, and it makes sense.
Maybe, I need to protect read-write access to this "tsec" structure.
thank you for this comment Tetsuo,
sam
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls
2010-03-03 1:56 ` [RFC v2 00/10] snet: Security for NETwork syscalls Tetsuo Handa
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2010-03-06 18:47 ` Samir Bellabes
@ 2010-03-06 18:50 ` Samir Bellabes
5 siblings, 0 replies; 25+ messages in thread
From: Samir Bellabes @ 2010-03-06 18:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tetsuo Handa
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, netfilter-devel, hadi, kaber, zbr, nhorman,
root, linux-security-module
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> writes:
> Regarding [RFC v2 05/10] snet: introduce snet_event
> +int snet_event_is_registered(const enum snet_syscall syscall, const u8 protocol)
>
> Maybe rcu_read_lock() is better than rw spinlock because this function is
> frequently called.
Indeed. Evgeniy Polyakov already noticed that, it's on my TODO.
thank you Tetsuo
sam
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 25+ messages in thread