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From: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
	"Pekka Savola (ipv6)" <pekkas@netcore.fi>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
	Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
	Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>,
	Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>, Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2011 17:48:14 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1298656094.2554.22.camel@bwh-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <135187.1298654740@localhost>

On Fri, 2011-02-25 at 12:25 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Fri, 25 Feb 2011 18:14:14 +0300, Vasiliy Kulikov said:
> > Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
> > CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/.  This doesn't mean
> > that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are limited
> > to /lib/modules/**.  However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't allow
> > anybody load any module not related to networking.
> > 
> > This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
> > with explicit aliases.  Currently there are only three users of the
> > feature: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
> 
> And you stop an attacker from simply recompiling the module with a suitable
> MODULE_ALIAS line added, how, exactly?  This patch may make sense down the
> road, but not while it's still trivial for a malicious root user to drop stuff
> into /lib/modules.

A process running as root normally has CAP_NET_ADMIN, but not every
process with CAP_NET_ADMIN will be running as root.

> And if you're going the route "but SELinux/SMACK/Tomoyo will prevent a malicious
> root user from doing that", then the obvious reply is "this should be part of those
> subsystems rather than something done one-off like this (especially as it has a chance
> of breaking legitimate setups that use the current scheme).

The notional attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN, perhaps through a vulnerable
service or a vulnerable set-capability executable.  They do not yet have
full root access and so cannot install a module, even in the absence of
an LSM.

So long as the attacker is able to load arbitrary modules, however, they
could exploit a vulnerability in any installed (not loaded) module.
Again, LSMs are irrelevant to this as they do not protect against kernel
bugs.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings, Senior Software Engineer, Solarflare Communications
Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-02-25 17:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-24 15:12 module loading with CAP_NET_ADMIN Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-24 16:34 ` Ben Hutchings
2011-02-25 12:30   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-25 15:14     ` [PATCH] don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-25 17:25       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-02-25 17:47         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-25 17:48         ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2011-02-25 18:47       ` David Miller
2011-02-25 19:02         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-25 19:05           ` David Miller
2011-02-25 19:07             ` Ben Hutchings
2011-02-25 19:16               ` David Miller
2011-02-25 19:30                 ` Ben Hutchings
2011-02-25 19:43                   ` David Miller
2011-02-25 19:53                     ` Ben Hutchings
2011-02-25 20:37                       ` David Miller
2011-02-25 20:38                       ` Ben Hutchings
2011-02-25 20:59                         ` Michał Mirosław
2011-02-27 20:22                           ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-02-28  9:29                             ` Michael Tokarev
2011-02-28  9:51                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-28 19:23                                 ` David Miller
2011-03-01 19:48                                   ` [PATCH] net: " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-01 20:13                                     ` Ben Hutchings
2011-03-01 21:33                                       ` [PATCH v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-02  7:15                                         ` Michael Tokarev
2011-03-09 22:06                                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-09 22:09                                             ` David Miller
2011-03-09 22:53                                               ` James Morris
2011-03-10  9:49                                                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-02 16:01                                         ` Kees Cook
2011-03-02 19:39                                         ` Jake Edge
2011-03-02 19:43                                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-02 19:49                                             ` Jake Edge
2011-03-02 20:18                                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-02 20:38                                                 ` Jake Edge
2011-03-02 20:40                                                 ` Jake Edge
2011-03-22 20:47                                         ` Eric Paris
2011-03-22 20:47                                           ` Eric Paris
2011-03-24 15:37                                           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-24 18:03                                             ` Eric Paris
2011-03-24 18:33                                               ` Ben Hutchings
2011-03-24 20:26                                                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-24 21:39                                                   ` Stephen Hemminger
2011-03-24 21:46                                                     ` David Miller
2011-03-24 21:57                                                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-24 22:15                                                         ` Eric Paris
2011-03-24 21:57                                                       ` Greg KH
2011-03-26 10:35                                                       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-27 11:44                 ` [PATCH] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-02-27 23:18                   ` David Miller
2011-02-27 23:19                   ` David Miller
2011-02-25 15:29     ` module loading with CAP_NET_ADMIN Michael Tokarev
2011-02-25 15:57       ` Vasiliy Kulikov

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