[bluetooth-next 00/15] SM Just Works Implementation

[bluetooth-next 00/15] SM Just Works Implementation

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

Hi,

Changes from the previous version:
- fixed a problem when SM was disabled;
- (a little) improved negotiation of pairing parameters;

--
Cheers,

Anderson Briglia (7):
  Bluetooth: Implement the first SMP commands
  Bluetooth: Start SMP procedure
  Bluetooth: simple SMP pairing negotiation
  Bluetooth: LE SMP Cryptoolbox functions
  Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs
  Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation checks methods
  Bluetooth: Minor fix in SMP methods

Vinicius Costa Gomes (8):
  Bluetooth: Add support for using the crypto subsystem
  Bluetooth: Add support for LE Start Encryption
  Bluetooth: Add support for resuming socket when SMP is finished
  Bluetooth: Fix initial security level of LE links
  Bluetooth: Update the security level when link is encrypted
  Bluetooth: Add support for Pairing features exchange
  Bluetooth: Add support for SMP timeout
  Bluetooth: Add key size checks for SMP

 include/net/bluetooth/hci.h      |   34 +++
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |   10 +
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h    |    9 +
 include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |   46 ++++
 net/bluetooth/Kconfig            |    6 +
 net/bluetooth/Makefile           |    2 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |   47 ++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         |   22 ++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   69 +++++
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c       |  137 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c       |   16 ++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  538 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 12 files changed, 878 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 net/bluetooth/smp.c

--
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 01/15] Bluetooth: Implement the first SMP commands

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

These simple commands will allow the SMP procedure to be started
and terminated with a not supported error. This is the first step
toward something useful.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/smp.h |   26 ++++++++
 net/bluetooth/Makefile      |    2 +-
 net/bluetooth/smp.c         |  146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 net/bluetooth/smp.c

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 8f2edbf..36bdd6e 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+/*
+   BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+   Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+   published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+   THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+   IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+   CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+   WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+   ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+   OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+   ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+   COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+   SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
 #ifndef __SMP_H
 #define __SMP_H
 
@@ -73,4 +95,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
 #define SMP_UNSPECIFIED		0x08
 #define SMP_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS		0x09
 
+/* SMP Commands */
+int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
+int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
 #endif /* __SMP_H */
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Makefile b/net/bluetooth/Makefile
index f04fe9a..9b67f3d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Makefile
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Makefile
@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BT_CMTP)	+= cmtp/
 obj-$(CONFIG_BT_HIDP)	+= hidp/
 
 bluetooth-y := af_bluetooth.o hci_core.o hci_conn.o hci_event.o mgmt.o hci_sock.o hci_sysfs.o lib.o
-bluetooth-$(CONFIG_BT_L2CAP)	+= l2cap_core.o l2cap_sock.o
+bluetooth-$(CONFIG_BT_L2CAP)	+= l2cap_core.o l2cap_sock.o smp.o
 bluetooth-$(CONFIG_BT_SCO)	+= sco.o
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b67a56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/*
+   BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+   Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+   published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+   THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+   IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+   CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+   WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+   ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+   OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+   ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+   COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+   SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
+#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
+
+static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
+		u16 dlen, void *data)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
+	int len;
+
+	len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
+
+	if (len > conn->mtu)
+		return NULL;
+
+	skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!skb)
+		return NULL;
+
+	lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
+	lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
+	lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+
+	memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
+
+	memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
+
+	return skb;
+}
+
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
+
+	BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+	if (!skb)
+		return;
+
+	hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
+}
+
+int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
+{
+	__u8 authreq;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, conn->hcon, sec_level);
+
+	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+		/* Encrypted, no MITM protection */
+		authreq = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
+		break;
+
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		/* Bonding, MITM protection */
+		authreq = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
+		break;
+
+	case BT_SECURITY_LOW:
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+		cp.io_capability = 0x00;
+		cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
+		cp.max_key_size = 16;
+		cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
+		cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
+		cp.auth_req = authreq;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	} else {
+		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+		cp.auth_req = authreq;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	__u8 code = skb->data[0];
+	__u8 reason;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
+
+	switch (code) {
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+								&reason);
+		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+	case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+	case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
+	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+	case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+	default:
+		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+								&reason);
+		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+	return err;
+}
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 02/15] Bluetooth: Start SMP procedure

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

Start SMP procedure for LE connections. This modification intercepts
l2cap received frames and call proper SMP functions to start the SMP
procedure. By now, no keys are being used.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index c3cebed..0cec292 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
 
 int disable_ertm;
 
@@ -683,6 +684,8 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
 			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
 			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
+			if (smp_conn_security(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level))
+				BT_DBG("Insufficient security");
 		}
 
 		if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
@@ -3683,6 +3686,11 @@ static void l2cap_recv_frame(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		l2cap_conless_channel(conn, psm, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case L2CAP_CID_SMP:
+		if (smp_sig_channel(conn, skb))
+			l2cap_conn_del(conn->hcon, EACCES);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		l2cap_data_channel(conn, cid, skb);
 		break;
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 03/15] Bluetooth: simple SMP pairing negotiation

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

This implementation only exchanges SMP messages between the Host and the
Remote. No keys are being generated. TK and STK generation will be
provided in further patches.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/smp.h |   17 +++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c         |  107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 36bdd6e..111853a 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -38,6 +38,23 @@ struct smp_cmd_pairing {
 	__u8	resp_key_dist;
 } __packed;
 
+#define SMP_IO_DISPLAY_ONLY	0x00
+#define SMP_IO_DISPLAY_YESNO	0x01
+#define SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_ONLY	0x02
+#define SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT	0x03
+#define SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY	0x04
+
+#define SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT	0x00
+#define SMP_OOB_PRESENT		0x01
+
+#define SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY	0x01
+#define SMP_DIST_ID_KEY		0x02
+#define SMP_DIST_SIGN		0x04
+
+#define SMP_AUTH_NONE		0x00
+#define SMP_AUTH_BONDING	0x01
+#define SMP_AUTH_MITM		0x04
+
 #define SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM	0x03
 struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm {
 	__u8	confirm_val[16];
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 8b67a56..373e2f3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -64,6 +64,94 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 	hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
 }
 
+static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	rp->io_capability = 0x00;
+	rp->oob_flag = 0x00;
+	rp->max_key_size = 16;
+	rp->init_key_dist = 0x00;
+	rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
+	rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
+}
+
+static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+
+static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+							struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing_random random;
+
+		memset(&random, 0, sizeof(random));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
+								&random);
+	} else {
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm confirm;
+
+		memset(&confirm, 0, sizeof(confirm));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(confirm),
+								&confirm);
+	}
+}
+
+static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_random cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(cp));
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		/* FIXME: start encryption */
+	} else {
+		memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	}
+}
+
+static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.io_capability = 0x00;
+	cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
+	cp.max_key_size = 16;
+	cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
+	cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
+	cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+
 int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 {
 	__u8 authreq;
@@ -114,24 +202,33 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	switch (code) {
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
-		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
-								&reason);
-		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+		smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+		smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+		smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+		smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
 	case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
 	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
 	case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
 	case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
-	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
 
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 04/15] Bluetooth: Add support for using the crypto subsystem

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This will allow using the crypto subsystem for encrypting data. As SMP
(Security Manager Protocol) is implemented almost entirely on the host
side and the crypto module already implements the needed methods
(AES-128), it makes sense to use it.

There's now a new module option to enable/disable SMP support.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    2 ++
 net/bluetooth/Kconfig            |    6 ++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              |   17 +++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 4093133..4ab2c5d 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ struct hci_dev {
 
 	__u16			init_last_cmd;
 
+	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm;
+
 	struct inquiry_cache	inq_cache;
 	struct hci_conn_hash	conn_hash;
 	struct list_head	blacklist;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
index 6ae5ec5..7c71878 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ menuconfig BT
 	     BNEP Module (Bluetooth Network Encapsulation Protocol)
 	     CMTP Module (CAPI Message Transport Protocol)
 	     HIDP Module (Human Interface Device Protocol)
+	     SMP Module (Security Manager Protocol)
 
 	  Say Y here to compile Bluetooth support into the kernel or say M to
 	  compile it as module (bluetooth).
@@ -36,11 +37,16 @@ if BT != n
 config BT_L2CAP
 	bool "L2CAP protocol support"
 	select CRC16
+	select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+	select CRYPTO_AES
 	help
 	  L2CAP (Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol) provides
 	  connection oriented and connection-less data transport.  L2CAP
 	  support is required for most Bluetooth applications.
 
+	  Also included is support for SMP (Security Manager Protocol) which
+	  is the security layer on top of LE (Low Energy) links.
+
 config BT_SCO
 	bool "SCO links support"
 	help
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index a80bc1c..a03f965 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <linux/rfkill.h>
 #include <linux/timer.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
 #include <asm/system.h>
@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ static void hci_tx_task(unsigned long arg);
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(hci_task_lock);
 
+static int enable_smp;
+
 /* HCI device list */
 LIST_HEAD(hci_dev_list);
 DEFINE_RWLOCK(hci_dev_list_lock);
@@ -1146,6 +1149,14 @@ int hci_add_remote_oob_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 *hash,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static struct crypto_blkcipher *alloc_cypher(void)
+{
+	if (enable_smp)
+		return crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+
+	return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
+}
+
 /* Register HCI device */
 int hci_register_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 {
@@ -1226,6 +1237,11 @@ int hci_register_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	if (!hdev->workqueue)
 		goto nomem;
 
+	hdev->tfm = alloc_cypher();
+	if (IS_ERR(hdev->tfm))
+		BT_INFO("Failed to load transform for ecb(aes): %ld",
+							PTR_ERR(hdev->tfm));
+
 	hci_register_sysfs(hdev);
 
 	hdev->rfkill = rfkill_alloc(hdev->name, &hdev->dev,
@@ -1274,6 +1290,9 @@ int hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 					!test_bit(HCI_SETUP, &hdev->flags))
 		mgmt_index_removed(hdev->id);
 
+	if (!IS_ERR(hdev->tfm))
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(hdev->tfm);
+
 	hci_notify(hdev, HCI_DEV_UNREG);
 
 	if (hdev->rfkill) {
@@ -2108,3 +2127,6 @@ static void hci_cmd_task(unsigned long arg)
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+module_param(enable_smp, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enable_smp, "Enable SMP support (LE only)");
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 373e2f3..42aed82 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, conn->hcon, sec_level);
 
+	if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm))
+		return 1;
+
 	switch (sec_level) {
 	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
 		/* Encrypted, no MITM protection */
@@ -198,6 +201,12 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	__u8 reason;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm);
+		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
 
 	switch (code) {
@@ -233,11 +242,15 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
 
 		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
-								&reason);
 		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
+done:
+	if (reason)
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+								&reason);
+
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	return err;
 }
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 05/15] Bluetooth: LE SMP Cryptoolbox functions

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

This patch implements SMP crypto functions called ah, c1, s1 and e.
It also implements auxiliary functions. All These functions are needed
for SMP keys generation.

Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Bruna Moreira <bruna.moreira@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c |  122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 42aed82..58047e8 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -24,6 +24,128 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+
+static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		dst[15 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static inline void swap56(u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+		dst[6 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	int err, iv_len;
+	unsigned char iv[128];
+
+	if (tfm == NULL) {
+		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc.tfm = tfm;
+	desc.flags = 0;
+
+	err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, k, 16);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&sg, r, 16);
+
+	iv_len = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+	if (iv_len) {
+		memset(&iv, 0xff, iv_len);
+		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, iv, iv_len);
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
+		u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
+		u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 p1[16], p2[16], pair[7];
+	bdaddr_t addr;
+	int err;
+
+	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+	memset(p1, 0, 16);
+	swap56(pres, pair);
+
+	memcpy(p1, pair, 7);
+	swap56(preq, pair);
+
+	memcpy(p1 + 7, pair, 7);
+	*(p1 + 14) = _rat;
+	*(p1 + 15) = _iat;
+
+	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+	memset(p2, 0, 16);
+	baswap(&addr, ia);
+	memcpy(p2 + 4, &addr, 6);
+	baswap(&addr, ra);
+	memcpy(p2 + 10, &addr, 6);
+
+	/* res = r XOR p1 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* res = res XOR p2 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16],
+			u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+	memcpy(_r, r1 + 8, 8);
+	memcpy(_r + 8, r2 + 8, 8);
+
+	err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_rand(u8 *buf)
+{
+	get_random_bytes(buf, 16);
+
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
 		u16 dlen, void *data)
-- 
1.7.4.1

Re: [bluetooth-next 05/15] Bluetooth: LE SMP Cryptoolbox functions

[Gustavo F. Padovan]

Hi Vinicius,

* Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:46 -0300]:

> From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> 
> This patch implements SMP crypto functions called ah, c1, s1 and e.
> It also implements auxiliary functions. All These functions are needed
> for SMP keys generation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
> Signed-off-by: Bruna Moreira <bruna.moreira@openbossa.org>
> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c |  122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 42aed82..58047e8 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,128 @@
>  #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
> +#include <linux/crypto.h>
> +#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
> +
> +static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
> +{
> +	int i;
> +	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
> +		dst[15 - i] = src[i];
> +}
> +
> +static inline void swap56(u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
> +{
> +	int i;
> +	for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
> +		dst[6 - i] = src[i];
> +}
> +
> +static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
> +{
> +	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
> +	struct scatterlist sg;
> +	int err, iv_len;
> +	unsigned char iv[128];
> +
> +	if (tfm == NULL) {
> +		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	desc.tfm = tfm;
> +	desc.flags = 0;
> +
> +	err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, k, 16);
> +	if (err) {
> +		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
> +		return err;
> +	}
> +
> +	sg_init_one(&sg, r, 16);
> +
> +	iv_len = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
> +	if (iv_len) {
> +		memset(&iv, 0xff, iv_len);
> +		crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, iv, iv_len);
> +	}
> +
> +	err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
> +	if (err)
> +		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
> +
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
> +		u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
> +		u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
> +{
> +	u8 p1[16], p2[16], pair[7];
> +	bdaddr_t addr;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
> +	memset(p1, 0, 16);
> +	swap56(pres, pair);
> +
> +	memcpy(p1, pair, 7);
> +	swap56(preq, pair);
> +
> +	memcpy(p1 + 7, pair, 7);

	swap56(pres, p1)
	swap56(preq, pi + 7)

> +	*(p1 + 14) = _rat;
> +	*(p1 + 15) = _iat;

Isn't p1[14] = _rat better?

btw, if fill all 16 bytes here, there is no need for a memset(p1)

> +
> +	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
> +	memset(p2, 0, 16);
> +	baswap(&addr, ia);
> +	memcpy(p2 + 4, &addr, 6);
> +	baswap(&addr, ra);
> +	memcpy(p2 + 10, &addr, 6);

baswap(p2 + 4, ia) should have the same effect.

> +	/* res = r XOR p1 */
> +	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
> +
> +	/* res = e(k, res) */
> +	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
> +	if (err) {
> +		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
> +		return err;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* res = res XOR p2 */
> +	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
> +
> +	/* res = e(k, res) */
> +	err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
> +	if (err)
> +		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
> +
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16],
> +			u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
> +{
> +	int err;
> +
> +	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
> +	memcpy(_r, r1 + 8, 8);
> +	memcpy(_r + 8, r2 + 8, 8);
> +
> +	err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
> +	if (err)
> +		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
> +
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int smp_rand(u8 *buf)

This can be void.

> +{
> +	get_random_bytes(buf, 16);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  

-- 
Gustavo F. Padovan
http://profusion.mobi

[bluetooth-next 06/15] Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

This patch adds initial support for verifying the confirmation value
that the remote side has sent.

Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    5 +++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c           |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index 2b9ca0d..dc4aa63 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -305,6 +305,11 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
 
 	__u8		disc_reason;
 
+	__u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
+	__u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
+	__u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */
+	__u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
+
 	struct l2cap_chan_list chan_list;
 };
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 58047e8..7fa3542 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
 	rp->io_capability = 0x00;
@@ -201,17 +203,25 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
 	rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
 
+	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
+
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
 }
 
 static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
 
+	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 }
 
@@ -271,6 +281,9 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
 	cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
 
+	conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 }
 
@@ -307,6 +320,10 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
 		cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
 		cp.auth_req = authreq;
+
+		conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+		memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	} else {
 		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
-- 
1.7.4.1

Re: [bluetooth-next 06/15] Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs

[Gustavo F. Padovan]

Hi Vinicius,

* Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:47 -0300]:

> From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> 
> This patch adds initial support for verifying the confirmation value
> that the remote side has sent.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> ---
>  include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    5 +++++
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c           |   17 +++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
> index 2b9ca0d..dc4aa63 100644
> --- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
> +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
> @@ -305,6 +305,11 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
>  
>  	__u8		disc_reason;
>  
> +	__u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
> +	__u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
> +	__u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */
> +	__u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
> +
>  	struct l2cap_chan_list chan_list;
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 58047e8..7fa3542 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  
>  	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
>  
> +	conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
> +	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
>  	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
>  
>  	rp->io_capability = 0x00;
> @@ -201,17 +203,25 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
>  	rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
>  
> +	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
> +	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
> +
>  	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
>  }
>  
>  static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> +	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;

No need for cast here.

-- 
Gustavo F. Padovan
http://profusion.mobi

Re: [bluetooth-next 06/15] Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

Hi Gustavo,

On 20:36 Wed 06 Apr, Gustavo F. Padovan wrote:
> Hi Vinicius,
> 
> * Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:47 -0300]:
> 
> > From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> > 
> > This patch adds initial support for verifying the confirmation value
> > that the remote side has sent.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> > ---
> >  include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    5 +++++
> >  net/bluetooth/smp.c           |   17 +++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
> > index 2b9ca0d..dc4aa63 100644
> > --- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
> > +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
> > @@ -305,6 +305,11 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
> >  
> >  	__u8		disc_reason;
> >  
> > +	__u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
> > +	__u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
> > +	__u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */
> > +	__u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
> > +
> >  	struct l2cap_chan_list chan_list;
> >  };
> >  
> > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> > index 58047e8..7fa3542 100644
> > --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> > +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> > @@ -192,6 +192,8 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >  
> >  	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
> >  
> > +	conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
> > +	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
> >  	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
> >  
> >  	rp->io_capability = 0x00;
> > @@ -201,17 +203,25 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >  	rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
> >  	rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
> >  
> > +	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
> > +	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
> > +
> >  	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
> >  }
> >  
> >  static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >  {
> > +	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
> 
> No need for cast here.

Yes, the cast is needed. The pointers types are incompatible.

> 
> -- 
> Gustavo F. Padovan
> http://profusion.mobi


Cheers,
-- 
Vinicius

[bluetooth-next 07/15] Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation checks methods

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

This patch includes support for generating and sending the random value
used to produce the confirmation value.

Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    1 +
 net/bluetooth/smp.c           |   94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index dc4aa63..1d288a5 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
 	__u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
 	__u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */
 	__u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
+	__u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
 
 	struct l2cap_chan_list chan_list;
 };
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 7fa3542..fd9c3ff 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -203,6 +203,9 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
 	rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
 
+	/* Just works */
+	memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
+
 	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
 
@@ -213,54 +216,117 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+	int ret;
+	u8 res[16];
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+	/* Just works */
+	memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
 
 	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
+	ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
+	if (ret)
+		return;
+
+	ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
+			conn->src, 0, conn->dst, res);
+	if (ret)
+		return;
+
+	swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
+
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 }
 
 static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 							struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
-	if (conn->hcon->out) {
-		struct smp_cmd_pairing_random random;
+	memcpy(conn->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(conn->pcnf));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(conn->pcnf));
 
-		memset(&random, 0, sizeof(random));
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		u8 random[16];
 
+		swap128(conn->prnd, random);
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
-								&random);
+								random);
 	} else {
-		struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm confirm;
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+		int ret;
+		u8 res[16];
 
-		memset(&confirm, 0, sizeof(confirm));
+		ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
+		if (ret)
+			return;
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(confirm),
-								&confirm);
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, conn->preq, conn->prsp,
+					0, conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
+		if (ret)
+			return;
+
+		swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
 }
 
 static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing_random cp;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+	int ret;
+	u8 key[16], res[16], random[16], confirm[16], buf[128];
+
+	swap128(skb->data, random);
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(random));
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
+				conn->src, 0, conn->dst, res);
+	else
+		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
+				conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
+	if (ret)
+		return;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
-	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(cp));
+	swap128(res, confirm);
+
+	if (memcmp(conn->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(conn->pcnf)) != 0) {
+		struct smp_cmd_pairing_fail cp;
+
+		BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
+		cp.reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
-		/* FIXME: start encryption */
+		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->prnd, key);
+
+		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf,
+							sizeof(buf), 0);
+		BT_DBG("key %s", buf);
 	} else {
-		memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+		u8 r[16];
+
+		swap128(conn->prnd, r);
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r);
+
+		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, random, key);
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf,
+							sizeof(buf), 0);
+		BT_DBG("key %s", buf);
 	}
 }
 
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 08/15] Bluetooth: Minor fix in SMP methods

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>

Minor fix in smp_conn_security function.

Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c |    7 ++++---
 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index fd9c3ff..f03513d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -355,11 +355,12 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 {
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	__u8 authreq;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, conn->hcon, sec_level);
+	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
 
-	if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm))
+	if (IS_ERR(hcon->hdev->tfm))
 		return 1;
 
 	switch (sec_level) {
@@ -378,7 +379,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
+	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 		cp.io_capability = 0x00;
 		cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
-- 
1.7.4.1

Re: [bluetooth-next 08/15] Bluetooth: Minor fix in SMP methods

[Gustavo F. Padovan]

Hi Vinicius,

* Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:49 -0300]:

> From: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> 
> Minor fix in smp_conn_security function.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c |    7 ++++---
>  1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index fd9c3ff..f03513d 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -355,11 +355,12 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  
>  int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
>  {
> +	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
>  	__u8 authreq;
>  
> -	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, conn->hcon, sec_level);
> +	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
>  
> -	if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm))
> +	if (IS_ERR(hcon->hdev->tfm))

Merge these changes in the commits that add this code for the first time,
patch 01 and others.

>  		return 1;
>  
>  	switch (sec_level) {
> @@ -378,7 +379,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
>  		return 1;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
> +	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {

Same here.

-- 
Gustavo F. Padovan
http://profusion.mobi

[bluetooth-next 09/15] Bluetooth: Add support for LE Start Encryption

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This adds support for starting SMP Phase 2 Encryption, when the initial
SMP negotiation is successful. This adds the LE Start Encryption and LE
Long Term Key Request commands and related events.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci.h      |   34 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    5 +++
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              |    9 ++++-
 5 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
index 6138e31..4555493 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
@@ -730,6 +730,33 @@ struct hci_cp_le_conn_update {
 	__le16   max_ce_len;
 } __packed;
 
+#define HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC		0x2019
+struct hci_cp_le_start_enc {
+	__le16	handle;
+	__u8	rand[8];
+	__le16	ediv;
+	__u8	ltk[16];
+} __packed;
+
+#define HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY		0x201a
+struct hci_cp_le_ltk_reply {
+	__le16	handle;
+	__u8	ltk[16];
+} __packed;
+struct hci_rp_le_ltk_reply {
+	__u8	status;
+	__le16	handle;
+} __packed;
+
+#define HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY		0x201b
+struct hci_cp_le_ltk_neg_reply {
+	__le16	handle;
+} __packed;
+struct hci_rp_le_ltk_neg_reply {
+	__u8	status;
+	__le16	handle;
+} __packed;
+
 /* ---- HCI Events ---- */
 #define HCI_EV_INQUIRY_COMPLETE		0x01
 
@@ -1020,6 +1047,13 @@ struct hci_ev_le_conn_complete {
 	__u8     clk_accurancy;
 } __packed;
 
+#define HCI_EV_LE_LTK_REQ		0x05
+struct hci_ev_le_ltk_req {
+	__le16	handle;
+	__u8	random[8];
+	__le16	ediv;
+} __packed;
+
 /* Internal events generated by Bluetooth stack */
 #define HCI_EV_STACK_INTERNAL	0xfd
 struct hci_ev_stack_internal {
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 4ab2c5d..28e03e2 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ struct hci_conn {
 	__u8		power_save;
 	__u16		disc_timeout;
 	unsigned long	pend;
+	__u8		ltk[16];
 
 	__u8		remote_cap;
 	__u8		remote_oob;
@@ -825,4 +826,8 @@ void hci_req_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 cmd, int result);
 
 void hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max,
 					u16 latency, u16 to_multiplier);
+void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16]);
+void hci_le_ltk_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16]);
+void hci_le_ltk_neg_reply(struct hci_conn *conn);
+
 #endif /* __HCI_CORE_H */
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index 7a6f56b..d2ef350 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -203,6 +203,52 @@ void hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_le_conn_update);
 
+void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
+	struct hci_cp_le_start_enc cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("%p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+	memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk, sizeof(cp.ltk));
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_le_start_enc);
+
+void hci_le_ltk_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
+	struct hci_cp_le_ltk_reply cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("%p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+	memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk, sizeof(ltk));
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_le_ltk_reply);
+
+void hci_le_ltk_neg_reply(struct hci_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
+	struct hci_cp_le_ltk_neg_reply cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("%p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+
 /* Device _must_ be locked */
 void hci_sco_setup(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 7a3398d..364e6f9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -835,6 +835,30 @@ static void hci_cc_read_local_oob_data_reply(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 						rp->randomizer, rp->status);
 }
 
+static void hci_cc_le_ltk_reply(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct hci_rp_le_ltk_reply *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, rp->status);
+
+	if (rp->status)
+		return;
+
+	hci_req_complete(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, rp->status);
+}
+
+static void hci_cc_le_ltk_neg_reply(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct hci_rp_le_ltk_neg_reply *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, rp->status);
+
+	if (rp->status)
+		return;
+
+	hci_req_complete(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY, rp->status);
+}
+
 static inline void hci_cs_inquiry(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 status)
 {
 	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, status);
@@ -1202,6 +1226,11 @@ static void hci_cs_le_create_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 status)
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 }
 
+static void hci_cs_le_start_enc(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+{
+	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, status);
+}
+
 static inline void hci_inquiry_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	__u8 status = *((__u8 *) skb->data);
@@ -1785,6 +1814,14 @@ static inline void hci_cmd_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *sk
 		hci_cc_user_confirm_neg_reply(hdev, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY:
+		hci_cc_le_ltk_reply(hdev, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY:
+		hci_cc_le_ltk_neg_reply(hdev, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("%s opcode 0x%x", hdev->name, opcode);
 		break;
@@ -1863,6 +1900,10 @@ static inline void hci_cmd_status_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		hci_cs_le_create_conn(hdev, ev->status);
 		break;
 
+	case HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC:
+		hci_cs_le_start_enc(hdev, ev->status);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("%s opcode 0x%x", hdev->name, opcode);
 		break;
@@ -2556,6 +2597,28 @@ unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 }
 
+static inline void hci_le_ltk_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
+						struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct hci_ev_le_ltk_req *ev = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct hci_cp_le_ltk_reply cp;
+	struct hci_conn *conn;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s handle %d", hdev->name, cpu_to_le16(ev->handle));
+
+	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+	conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, __le16_to_cpu(ev->handle));
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+	memcpy(cp.ltk, conn->ltk, sizeof(conn->ltk));
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+}
+
 static inline void hci_le_meta_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct hci_ev_le_meta *le_ev = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -2567,6 +2630,10 @@ static inline void hci_le_meta_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		hci_le_conn_complete_evt(hdev, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case HCI_EV_LE_LTK_REQ:
+		hci_le_ltk_request_evt(hdev, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index f03513d..e39db75 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -281,13 +281,16 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hcon->hdev->tfm;
 	int ret;
 	u8 key[16], res[16], random[16], confirm[16], buf[128];
 
 	swap128(skb->data, random);
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(random));
 
+	memset(hcon->ltk, 0, sizeof(hcon->ltk));
+
 	if (conn->hcon->out)
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
 				conn->src, 0, conn->dst, res);
@@ -312,6 +315,9 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->prnd, key);
+		swap128(key, hcon->ltk);
+
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, hcon->ltk);
 
 		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf,
 							sizeof(buf), 0);
@@ -323,6 +329,7 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r);
 
 		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, random, key);
+		swap128(key, hcon->ltk);
 
 		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf,
 							sizeof(buf), 0);
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 10/15] Bluetooth: Add support for resuming socket when SMP is finished

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This adds support for resuming the user space traffic when SMP
negotiation is complete.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   61 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c |   16 +++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c        |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 0cec292..a5062f14 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -665,6 +665,22 @@ clean:
 	bh_unlock_sock(parent);
 }
 
+static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
+
+	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
+
+	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
+	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
+
+	sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
+	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
+
+	if (parent)
+		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
+}
+
 static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan_list *l = &conn->chan_list;
@@ -680,15 +696,11 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
 		bh_lock_sock(sk);
 
-		if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
-			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
-			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
-			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
+		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
 			if (smp_conn_security(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level))
-				BT_DBG("Insufficient security");
-		}
+				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
 
-		if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
+		} else if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
 				sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
 			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
 			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
@@ -1362,29 +1374,6 @@ int l2cap_sar_segment_sdu(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	return size;
 }
 
-static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
-
-	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
-
-	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
-	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
-
-	if (!parent) {
-		/* Outgoing channel.
-		 * Wake up socket sleeping on connect.
-		 */
-		sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
-		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
-	} else {
-		/* Incoming channel.
-		 * Wake up socket sleeping on accept.
-		 */
-		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
-	}
-}
-
 /* Copy frame to all raw sockets on that connection */
 static void l2cap_raw_recv(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -3810,6 +3799,18 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
 		bh_lock_sock(sk);
 
+		BT_DBG("sk->scid %d", l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
+
+		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
+			if (!status && encrypt) {
+				l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
+				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
+			}
+
+			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state & L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND) {
 			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 			continue;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index f77308e..14e491a 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
 
 /* ---- L2CAP timers ---- */
 static void l2cap_sock_timeout(unsigned long arg)
@@ -614,6 +615,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct bt_security sec;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
 	int len, err = 0;
 	u32 opt;
 
@@ -650,6 +652,20 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
 		}
 
 		l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec.level;
+
+		conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
+		if (conn && l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
+			if (!conn->hcon->out) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (smp_conn_security(conn, sec.level))
+				break;
+
+			err = 0;
+			sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
+		}
 		break;
 
 	case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index e39db75..2724b70 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -341,9 +341,13 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend))
+		return;
+
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
 
@@ -358,6 +362,20 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend);
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
+{
+	switch (level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		/* For now we don't support bonding */
+		return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+	default:
+		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	}
 }
 
 int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
@@ -370,21 +388,16 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 	if (IS_ERR(hcon->hdev->tfm))
 		return 1;
 
-	switch (sec_level) {
-	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
-		/* Encrypted, no MITM protection */
-		authreq = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
-		break;
+	if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend))
+		return -EINPROGRESS;
 
-	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
-		/* Bonding, MITM protection */
-		authreq = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
-		break;
+	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+		return 1;
 
-	case BT_SECURITY_LOW:
-	default:
+	if (hcon->sec_level > sec_level)
 		return 1;
-	}
+
+	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
@@ -405,6 +418,9 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
 
+	hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+	set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
1.7.4.1

Re: [bluetooth-next 10/15] Bluetooth: Add support for resuming socket when SMP is finished

[Gustavo F. Padovan]

Hi Vinicius,

* Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:51 -0300]:

> This adds support for resuming the user space traffic when SMP
> negotiation is complete.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   61 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
>  net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c |   16 +++++++++++
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c        |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> index 0cec292..a5062f14 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> @@ -665,6 +665,22 @@ clean:
>  	bh_unlock_sock(parent);
>  }
>  
> +static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> +	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
> +
> +	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
> +
> +	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
> +	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> +
> +	sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> +	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> +
> +	if (parent)
> +		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
> +}
> +
>  static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
>  {
>  	struct l2cap_chan_list *l = &conn->chan_list;
> @@ -680,15 +696,11 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
>  	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
>  		bh_lock_sock(sk);
>  
> -		if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
> -			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> -			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> -			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> +		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
>  			if (smp_conn_security(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level))
> -				BT_DBG("Insufficient security");
> -		}
> +				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
>  
> -		if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
> +		} else if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
>  				sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
>  			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
>  			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> @@ -1362,29 +1374,6 @@ int l2cap_sar_segment_sdu(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
>  	return size;
>  }
>  
> -static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
> -{
> -	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
> -
> -	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
> -
> -	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
> -	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> -
> -	if (!parent) {
> -		/* Outgoing channel.
> -		 * Wake up socket sleeping on connect.
> -		 */
> -		sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> -		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> -	} else {
> -		/* Incoming channel.
> -		 * Wake up socket sleeping on accept.
> -		 */
> -		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
> -	}
> -}
> -
>  /* Copy frame to all raw sockets on that connection */
>  static void l2cap_raw_recv(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
> @@ -3810,6 +3799,18 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
>  	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
>  		bh_lock_sock(sk);
>  
> +		BT_DBG("sk->scid %d", l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
> +
> +		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> +			if (!status && encrypt) {
> +				l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
> +				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
> +			}
> +
> +			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
> +			continue;
> +		}
> +
>  		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state & L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND) {
>  			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
>  			continue;
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> index f77308e..14e491a 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>  #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
>  #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
> +#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
>  
>  /* ---- L2CAP timers ---- */
>  static void l2cap_sock_timeout(unsigned long arg)
> @@ -614,6 +615,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
>  {
>  	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
>  	struct bt_security sec;
> +	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
>  	int len, err = 0;
>  	u32 opt;
>  
> @@ -650,6 +652,20 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
>  		}
>  
>  		l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec.level;
> +
> +		conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
> +		if (conn && l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> +			if (!conn->hcon->out) {
> +				err = -EINVAL;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +
> +			if (smp_conn_security(conn, sec.level))
> +				break;
> +
> +			err = 0;
> +			sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
> +		}

I don't like the idea of bring SMP stuff to l2cap_sock.c, we are working now
to clean up that file and keep only socket related stuff there, and only
channel related stuff in l2cap_core.c. I've already sent a patchset on that
direction to mailing list. However, I don't have any idea now on how to remove
smp_conn_security() from here.

-- 
Gustavo F. Padovan
http://profusion.mobi

Re: [bluetooth-next 10/15] Bluetooth: Add support for resuming socket when SMP is finished

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

Hi Gustavo,

On 21:11 Wed 06 Apr, Gustavo F. Padovan wrote:
> Hi Vinicius,
> 
> * Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:51 -0300]:
> 
> > This adds support for resuming the user space traffic when SMP
> > negotiation is complete.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> > ---
> >  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   61 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
> >  net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c |   16 +++++++++++
> >  net/bluetooth/smp.c        |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
> >  3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> > index 0cec292..a5062f14 100644
> > --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> > +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> > @@ -665,6 +665,22 @@ clean:
> >  	bh_unlock_sock(parent);
> >  }
> >  
> > +static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
> > +{
> > +	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
> > +
> > +	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
> > +
> > +	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
> > +	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> > +
> > +	sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > +	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> > +
> > +	if (parent)
> > +		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
> > +}
> > +
> >  static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
> >  {
> >  	struct l2cap_chan_list *l = &conn->chan_list;
> > @@ -680,15 +696,11 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
> >  	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
> >  		bh_lock_sock(sk);
> >  
> > -		if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
> > -			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> > -			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > -			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> > +		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> >  			if (smp_conn_security(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level))
> > -				BT_DBG("Insufficient security");
> > -		}
> > +				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
> >  
> > -		if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
> > +		} else if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
> >  				sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
> >  			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> >  			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > @@ -1362,29 +1374,6 @@ int l2cap_sar_segment_sdu(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
> >  	return size;
> >  }
> >  
> > -static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
> > -{
> > -	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
> > -
> > -	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
> > -
> > -	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
> > -	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> > -
> > -	if (!parent) {
> > -		/* Outgoing channel.
> > -		 * Wake up socket sleeping on connect.
> > -		 */
> > -		sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > -		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> > -	} else {
> > -		/* Incoming channel.
> > -		 * Wake up socket sleeping on accept.
> > -		 */
> > -		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
> > -	}
> > -}
> > -
> >  /* Copy frame to all raw sockets on that connection */
> >  static void l2cap_raw_recv(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >  {
> > @@ -3810,6 +3799,18 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
> >  	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
> >  		bh_lock_sock(sk);
> >  
> > +		BT_DBG("sk->scid %d", l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
> > +
> > +		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> > +			if (!status && encrypt) {
> > +				l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
> > +				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
> > +			continue;
> > +		}
> > +
> >  		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state & L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND) {
> >  			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
> >  			continue;
> > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> > index f77308e..14e491a 100644
> > --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> > +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> >  #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
> >  #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
> >  #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
> > +#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
> >  
> >  /* ---- L2CAP timers ---- */
> >  static void l2cap_sock_timeout(unsigned long arg)
> > @@ -614,6 +615,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
> >  {
> >  	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> >  	struct bt_security sec;
> > +	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
> >  	int len, err = 0;
> >  	u32 opt;
> >  
> > @@ -650,6 +652,20 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
> >  		}
> >  
> >  		l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec.level;
> > +
> > +		conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
> > +		if (conn && l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> > +			if (!conn->hcon->out) {
> > +				err = -EINVAL;
> > +				break;
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			if (smp_conn_security(conn, sec.level))
> > +				break;
> > +
> > +			err = 0;
> > +			sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
> > +		}
> 
> I don't like the idea of bring SMP stuff to l2cap_sock.c, we are working now
> to clean up that file and keep only socket related stuff there, and only
> channel related stuff in l2cap_core.c. I've already sent a patchset on that
> direction to mailing list. However, I don't have any idea now on how to remove
> smp_conn_security() from here.

I understand, but I guess that in order to solve some problems there will be 
need for having some points of contact between those parts.

For this security case, one solution is having some kind of mechanism that
checks if the security level of the link/channel attends the security level
requested by the socket. And, in principle, this could even work for BR/EDR
links.

Another thing, is that in the LE case the MTU is negotiated over GATT, so
in our architecture, if we want to support this there will be need for
changing MTU from userspace, most probably setting one socket option.

I think that these are the examples I have against keeping the channel 
and the socket *totally* isolated from each other.

> 
> -- 
> Gustavo F. Padovan
> http://profusion.mobi


Cheers,
-- 
Vinicius

Re: [bluetooth-next 10/15] Bluetooth: Add support for resuming socket when SMP is finished

[Marcel Holtmann]

Hi Gustavo,

> > This adds support for resuming the user space traffic when SMP
> > negotiation is complete.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> > ---
> >  net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   61 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
> >  net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c |   16 +++++++++++
> >  net/bluetooth/smp.c        |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------
> >  3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> > index 0cec292..a5062f14 100644
> > --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> > +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
> > @@ -665,6 +665,22 @@ clean:
> >  	bh_unlock_sock(parent);
> >  }
> >  
> > +static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
> > +{
> > +	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
> > +
> > +	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
> > +
> > +	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
> > +	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> > +
> > +	sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > +	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> > +
> > +	if (parent)
> > +		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
> > +}
> > +
> >  static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
> >  {
> >  	struct l2cap_chan_list *l = &conn->chan_list;
> > @@ -680,15 +696,11 @@ static void l2cap_conn_ready(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
> >  	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
> >  		bh_lock_sock(sk);
> >  
> > -		if (conn->hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
> > -			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> > -			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > -			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> > +		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> >  			if (smp_conn_security(conn, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level))
> > -				BT_DBG("Insufficient security");
> > -		}
> > +				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
> >  
> > -		if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
> > +		} else if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET &&
> >  				sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
> >  			l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> >  			sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > @@ -1362,29 +1374,6 @@ int l2cap_sar_segment_sdu(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
> >  	return size;
> >  }
> >  
> > -static void l2cap_chan_ready(struct sock *sk)
> > -{
> > -	struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
> > -
> > -	BT_DBG("sk %p, parent %p", sk, parent);
> > -
> > -	l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state = 0;
> > -	l2cap_sock_clear_timer(sk);
> > -
> > -	if (!parent) {
> > -		/* Outgoing channel.
> > -		 * Wake up socket sleeping on connect.
> > -		 */
> > -		sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECTED;
> > -		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> > -	} else {
> > -		/* Incoming channel.
> > -		 * Wake up socket sleeping on accept.
> > -		 */
> > -		parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
> > -	}
> > -}
> > -
> >  /* Copy frame to all raw sockets on that connection */
> >  static void l2cap_raw_recv(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >  {
> > @@ -3810,6 +3799,18 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
> >  	for (sk = l->head; sk; sk = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c) {
> >  		bh_lock_sock(sk);
> >  
> > +		BT_DBG("sk->scid %d", l2cap_pi(sk)->scid);
> > +
> > +		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> > +			if (!status && encrypt) {
> > +				l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
> > +				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
> > +			continue;
> > +		}
> > +
> >  		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_state & L2CAP_CONF_CONNECT_PEND) {
> >  			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
> >  			continue;
> > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> > index f77308e..14e491a 100644
> > --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> > +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
> > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> >  #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
> >  #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
> >  #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
> > +#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
> >  
> >  /* ---- L2CAP timers ---- */
> >  static void l2cap_sock_timeout(unsigned long arg)
> > @@ -614,6 +615,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
> >  {
> >  	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> >  	struct bt_security sec;
> > +	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
> >  	int len, err = 0;
> >  	u32 opt;
> >  
> > @@ -650,6 +652,20 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, ch
> >  		}
> >  
> >  		l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec.level;
> > +
> > +		conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
> > +		if (conn && l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
> > +			if (!conn->hcon->out) {
> > +				err = -EINVAL;
> > +				break;
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			if (smp_conn_security(conn, sec.level))
> > +				break;
> > +
> > +			err = 0;
> > +			sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
> > +		}
> 
> I don't like the idea of bring SMP stuff to l2cap_sock.c, we are working now
> to clean up that file and keep only socket related stuff there, and only
> channel related stuff in l2cap_core.c. I've already sent a patchset on that
> direction to mailing list. However, I don't have any idea now on how to remove
> smp_conn_security() from here.

I don't think we have much choice here. We could abstract this out with
drivers, but in the end we want direct functions call and not some heavy
abstracted framework. Since lets face it, this is all pretty static.

However we might need some better function naming for this. Some of the
naming inside L2CAP is a bit odd and not really clear what it does.

Regards

Marcel

[bluetooth-next 11/15] Bluetooth: Fix initial security level of LE links

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

As the default security level (BT_SECURITY_SDP) doesn't make sense for
LE links, initialize LE links with something that makes sense.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c  |    1 +
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index d2ef350..9a4a769 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static void hci_le_connect(struct hci_conn *conn)
 	conn->state = BT_CONNECT;
 	conn->out = 1;
 	conn->link_mode |= HCI_LM_MASTER;
+	conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
 	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
 	cp.scan_interval = cpu_to_le16(0x0004);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 364e6f9..aa0d013 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -2585,6 +2585,7 @@ static inline void hci_le_conn_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
+	conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 	conn->handle = __le16_to_cpu(ev->handle);
 	conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
 
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 12/15] Bluetooth: Update the security level when link is encrypted

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

If the pending security level is greater than the current security
level and the link is now encrypted, we should update the link
security level.

This is only useful for LE links, when the only event generated
when SMP is sucessful in the Encrypt Change event.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 28e03e2..e0e690a 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -712,6 +712,9 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 encr
 	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
 		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
+	if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+		conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+
 	hci_proto_encrypt_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
 
 	read_lock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 13/15] Bluetooth: Add support for Pairing features exchange

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This patch implements a simple version of the SMP Pairing Features
exchange procedure (Vol. 3 Part H, Section 2.3.5.1).

For now, everything that would cause a Pairing Method different of
Just Works to be chosen is rejected.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c |    1 +
 net/bluetooth/smp.c       |  117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index aa0d013..e40ce9a 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -1555,6 +1555,7 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *
 				/* Encryption implies authentication */
 				conn->link_mode |= HCI_LM_AUTH;
 				conn->link_mode |= HCI_LM_ENCRYPT;
+				conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
 			} else
 				conn->link_mode &= ~HCI_LM_ENCRYPT;
 		}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 2724b70..b6f52ab 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -186,7 +186,30 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 	hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
 }
 
-static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
+{
+	switch (level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		/* Right now we don't support bonding */
+		return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+	default:
+		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
+static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+				struct smp_cmd_pairing *cmd, __u8 authreq)
+{
+	cmd->io_capability = SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT;
+	cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+	cmd->max_key_size = 16;
+	cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00;
+	cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
+	cmd->auth_req = authreq;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 
@@ -196,12 +219,11 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
-	rp->io_capability = 0x00;
-	rp->oob_flag = 0x00;
-	rp->max_key_size = 16;
-	rp->init_key_dist = 0x00;
-	rp->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
-	rp->auth_req &= (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+	if (rp->oob_flag)
+		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
+
+	/* We didn't start the pairing, so no requirements */
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, rp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
 
 	/* Just works */
 	memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
@@ -210,9 +232,11 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
@@ -222,29 +246,34 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+	if (rp->oob_flag)
+		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
+
 	/* Just works */
 	memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
 
 	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
-	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
 	ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
 	if (ret)
-		return;
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
 			conn->src, 0, conn->dst, res);
 	if (ret)
-		return;
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
-							struct sk_buff *skb)
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
 
@@ -266,20 +295,22 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 		ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
 		if (ret)
-			return;
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, conn->preq, conn->prsp,
 					0, conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
 		if (ret)
-			return;
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
 
 		swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hcon->hdev->tfm;
@@ -298,19 +329,15 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
 				conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
 	if (ret)
-		return;
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
 	swap128(res, confirm);
 
 	if (memcmp(conn->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(conn->pcnf)) != 0) {
-		struct smp_cmd_pairing_fail cp;
-
 		BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
-		cp.reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(cp), &cp);
-		return;
+		return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
 	}
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
@@ -335,9 +362,11 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 							sizeof(buf), 0);
 		BT_DBG("key %s", buf);
 	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
@@ -346,17 +375,12 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend))
-		return;
+		return 0;
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
-	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
 
-	cp.io_capability = 0x00;
-	cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
-	cp.max_key_size = 16;
-	cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
-	cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
-	cp.auth_req = rp->auth_req & (SMP_AUTH_BONDING | SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, rp->auth_req);
 
 	conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
@@ -364,18 +388,8 @@ static void smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
 	set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend);
-}
 
-static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
-{
-	switch (level) {
-	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
-		/* For now we don't support bonding */
-		return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
-
-	default:
-		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
-	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
@@ -401,13 +415,8 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
-		cp.io_capability = 0x00;
-		cp.oob_flag = 0x00;
-		cp.max_key_size = 16;
-		cp.init_key_dist = 0x00;
-		cp.resp_key_dist = 0x00;
-		cp.auth_req = authreq;
 
+		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, authreq);
 		conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 		memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
@@ -440,26 +449,28 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	switch (code) {
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
-		smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+		reason = 0;
+		err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
-		smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
-		smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+		reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
-		smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
-		smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+		reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
-- 
1.7.4.1

Re: [bluetooth-next 13/15] Bluetooth: Add support for Pairing features exchange

[Gustavo F. Padovan]

Hi Vinícius,

* Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:54 -0300]:

> This patch implements a simple version of the SMP Pairing Features
> exchange procedure (Vol. 3 Part H, Section 2.3.5.1).
> 
> For now, everything that would cause a Pairing Method different of
> Just Works to be chosen is rejected.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
> ---
>  net/bluetooth/hci_event.c |    1 +
>  net/bluetooth/smp.c       |  117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>  2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> index aa0d013..e40ce9a 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> @@ -1555,6 +1555,7 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *
>  				/* Encryption implies authentication */
>  				conn->link_mode |= HCI_LM_AUTH;
>  				conn->link_mode |= HCI_LM_ENCRYPT;
> +				conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
>  			} else
>  				conn->link_mode &= ~HCI_LM_ENCRYPT;
>  		}
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 2724b70..b6f52ab 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -186,7 +186,30 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
>  	hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
>  }
>  
> -static void smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> +static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
> +{
> +	switch (level) {
> +	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
> +		/* Right now we don't support bonding */
> +		return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
> +
> +	default:
> +		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
> +				struct smp_cmd_pairing *cmd, __u8 authreq)
> +{
> +	cmd->io_capability = SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT;
> +	cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
> +	cmd->max_key_size = 16;
> +	cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00;
> +	cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
> +	cmd->auth_req = authreq;
> +}
> +

Separate the creation of build_pairing_cmd() in a new commit.

-- 
Gustavo F. Padovan
http://profusion.mobi

[bluetooth-next 14/15] Bluetooth: Add support for SMP timeout

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This patch adds support for disconnecting the link when SMP procedure
takes more than 30 seconds.

SMP begins when either the Pairing Request command is sent or the
Pairing Response is received, and it ends when the link is encrypted
(or terminated). Vol 3, Part H Section 3.4.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    2 +
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c    |   70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 net/bluetooth/smp.c           |   14 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index 1d288a5..a542757 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
 	__u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 	__u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
 
+	struct timer_list security_timer;
+
 	struct l2cap_chan_list chan_list;
 };
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index a5062f14..325ff26 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -732,6 +732,36 @@ static void l2cap_conn_unreliable(struct l2cap_conn *conn, int err)
 	read_unlock(&l->lock);
 }
 
+static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+	struct sock *sk;
+
+	if (!conn)
+		return;
+
+	BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p, err %d", hcon, conn, err);
+
+	kfree_skb(conn->rx_skb);
+
+	/* Kill channels */
+	while ((sk = conn->chan_list.head)) {
+		bh_lock_sock(sk);
+		l2cap_chan_del(sk, err);
+		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+		l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
+	}
+
+	if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)
+		del_timer_sync(&conn->info_timer);
+
+	if (hcon->type == LE_LINK)
+		del_timer(&conn->security_timer);
+
+	hcon->l2cap_data = NULL;
+	kfree(conn);
+}
+
 static void l2cap_info_timeout(unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = (void *) arg;
@@ -742,6 +772,13 @@ static void l2cap_info_timeout(unsigned long arg)
 	l2cap_conn_start(conn);
 }
 
+static void security_timeout(unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = (void *) arg;
+
+	l2cap_conn_del(conn->hcon, ETIMEDOUT);
+}
+
 static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
@@ -771,7 +808,10 @@ static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status)
 	spin_lock_init(&conn->lock);
 	rwlock_init(&conn->chan_list.lock);
 
-	if (hcon->type != LE_LINK)
+	if (hcon->type == LE_LINK)
+		setup_timer(&conn->security_timer, security_timeout,
+						(unsigned long) conn);
+	else
 		setup_timer(&conn->info_timer, l2cap_info_timeout,
 						(unsigned long) conn);
 
@@ -780,33 +820,6 @@ static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status)
 	return conn;
 }
 
-static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err)
-{
-	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
-	struct sock *sk;
-
-	if (!conn)
-		return;
-
-	BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p, err %d", hcon, conn, err);
-
-	kfree_skb(conn->rx_skb);
-
-	/* Kill channels */
-	while ((sk = conn->chan_list.head)) {
-		bh_lock_sock(sk);
-		l2cap_chan_del(sk, err);
-		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
-		l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
-	}
-
-	if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)
-		del_timer_sync(&conn->info_timer);
-
-	hcon->l2cap_data = NULL;
-	kfree(conn);
-}
-
 static inline void l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan_list *l = &conn->chan_list;
@@ -3804,6 +3817,7 @@ static int l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 		if (l2cap_pi(sk)->scid == L2CAP_CID_LE_DATA) {
 			if (!status && encrypt) {
 				l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
+				del_timer(&conn->security_timer);
 				l2cap_chan_ready(sk);
 			}
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index b6f52ab..96e8b3f 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
 
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT 30000 /* 30 seconds */
+
 static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
 {
 	int i;
@@ -233,6 +235,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
 
+	mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -307,6 +312,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
 
+	mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -387,6 +395,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
+	mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
 	set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -420,6 +431,9 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 		memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
+		mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	} else {
 		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
-- 
1.7.4.1

Re: [bluetooth-next 14/15] Bluetooth: Add support for SMP timeout

[Gustavo F. Padovan]

* Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:55 -0300]:

> This patch adds support for disconnecting the link when SMP procedure
> takes more than 30 seconds.

As this is a SMP procedure, doesn't make more sense put this timer in SMP
code? It does not fit quite well to me in l2cap.

-- 
Gustavo F. Padovan
http://profusion.mobi

Re: [bluetooth-next 14/15] Bluetooth: Add support for SMP timeout

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

Hi Gustavo,

On 21:14 Wed 06 Apr, Gustavo F. Padovan wrote:
> * Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org> [2011-04-05 22:51:55 -0300]:
> 
> > This patch adds support for disconnecting the link when SMP procedure
> > takes more than 30 seconds.
> 
> As this is a SMP procedure, doesn't make more sense put this timer in SMP
> code? It does not fit quite well to me in l2cap.

The only reason is that SMP code isn't able to tell that the pairing
finished or not. We only can tell that the pairing finished when we receive
the Encryption Changed HCI event or the connection is terminated.

And I don't think that SMP code has to be informed of any of these conditions.

> 
> -- 
> Gustavo F. Padovan
> http://profusion.mobi

Cheers,
-- 
Vinicius

[bluetooth-next 15/15] Bluetooth: Add key size checks for SMP

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This patch implements a check in smp cmd pairing request and pairing
response to verify if encryption key maximum size is compatible in both
slave and master when SMP Pairing is requested. Keys are also masked to
the correct negotiated size.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Briglia <anderson.briglia@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    1 +
 include/net/bluetooth/smp.h   |    3 ++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c           |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index a542757..5505c4d 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ struct l2cap_conn {
 	__u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random */
 	__u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 	__u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+	__u8		smp_key_size;
 
 	struct timer_list security_timer;
 
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 111853a..4fb7d19 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
 #define SMP_UNSPECIFIED		0x08
 #define SMP_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS		0x09
 
+#define SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE		7
+#define SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE		16
+
 /* SMP Commands */
 int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level);
 int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 96e8b3f..0ea639c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -205,35 +205,51 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 {
 	cmd->io_capability = SMP_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT;
 	cmd->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
-	cmd->max_key_size = 16;
+	cmd->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 	cmd->init_key_dist = 0x00;
 	cmd->resp_key_dist = 0x00;
 	cmd->auth_req = authreq;
 }
 
+static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
+{
+	if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
+			(max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	conn->smp_key_size = max_key_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+	u8 key_size;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
-	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
-	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+	memcpy(&conn->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
-	if (rp->oob_flag)
+	if (req->oob_flag)
 		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
 
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so no requirements */
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, rp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &rsp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+
+	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
 	/* Just works */
 	memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
 
 	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
-	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
+	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
 
-	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(*rp), rp);
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
 
 	mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
 					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
@@ -243,24 +259,30 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
 	int ret;
-	u8 res[16];
+	u8 res[16], key_size;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	req = (void *) &conn->preq[1];
 
-	if (rp->oob_flag)
+	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
+	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	if (rsp->oob_flag)
 		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
 
 	/* Just works */
 	memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
 
 	conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
-	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rp, sizeof(*rp));
+	memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
 
 	ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
 	if (ret)
@@ -352,6 +374,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->prnd, key);
 		swap128(key, hcon->ltk);
 
+		memset(hcon->ltk + conn->smp_key_size, 0,
+				SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - conn->smp_key_size);
+
 		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, hcon->ltk);
 
 		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf,
@@ -366,6 +391,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, random, key);
 		swap128(key, hcon->ltk);
 
+		memset(hcon->ltk + conn->smp_key_size, 0,
+				SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - conn->smp_key_size);
+
 		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf,
 							sizeof(buf), 0);
 		BT_DBG("key %s", buf);
-- 
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 00/15] SMP Just Works Implementation

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

Hi,

This patch series implement the Just Works SMP procedures for LE links.

These patches can also be reached from here[1].


Cheers,
--
Vinicius

[1] http://git.infradead.org/users/vcgomes/linux-2.6.git (for-next branch)

Anderson Briglia (7):
  Bluetooth: Implement the first SMP commands
  Bluetooth: Start SMP procedure
  Bluetooth: simple SMP pairing negotiation
  Bluetooth: LE SMP Cryptoolbox functions
  Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation structs
  Bluetooth: Add SMP confirmation checks methods
  Bluetooth: Minor fix in SMP methods

Vinicius Costa Gomes (8):
  Bluetooth: Add support for using the crypto subsystem
  Bluetooth: Add support for LE Start Encryption
  Bluetooth: Add support for resuming socket when SMP is finished
  Bluetooth: Fix initial security level of LE links
  Bluetooth: Update the security level when link is encrypted
  Bluetooth: Add support for Pairing features exchange
  Bluetooth: Add support for SMP timeout
  Bluetooth: Add key size checks for SMP

 include/net/bluetooth/hci.h      |   34 +++
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |   10 +
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h    |    9 +
 include/net/bluetooth/smp.h      |   46 ++++
 net/bluetooth/Kconfig            |    6 +
 net/bluetooth/Makefile           |    2 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |   47 ++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         |   22 ++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   69 +++++
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c       |  137 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c       |   17 ++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              |  535 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 12 files changed, 876 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 net/bluetooth/smp.c

--
1.7.4.1

[bluetooth-next 09/15] Bluetooth: Add support for LE Start Encryption

[Vinicius Costa Gomes]

This adds support for starting SMP Phase 2 Encryption, when the initial
SMP negotiation is successful. This adds the LE Start Encryption and LE
Long Term Key Request commands and related events.

Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@openbossa.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci.h      |   34 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    5 +++
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              |    9 ++++-
 5 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
index a5f8c46..f95b1e6 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h
@@ -688,6 +688,33 @@ struct hci_cp_le_conn_update {
 	__le16   max_ce_len;
 } __packed;
 
+#define HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC		0x2019
+struct hci_cp_le_start_enc {
+	__le16	handle;
+	__u8	rand[8];
+	__le16	ediv;
+	__u8	ltk[16];
+} __packed;
+
+#define HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY		0x201a
+struct hci_cp_le_ltk_reply {
+	__le16	handle;
+	__u8	ltk[16];
+} __packed;
+struct hci_rp_le_ltk_reply {
+	__u8	status;
+	__le16	handle;
+} __packed;
+
+#define HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY		0x201b
+struct hci_cp_le_ltk_neg_reply {
+	__le16	handle;
+} __packed;
+struct hci_rp_le_ltk_neg_reply {
+	__u8	status;
+	__le16	handle;
+} __packed;
+
 /* ---- HCI Events ---- */
 #define HCI_EV_INQUIRY_COMPLETE		0x01
 
@@ -967,6 +994,13 @@ struct hci_ev_le_conn_complete {
 	__u8     clk_accurancy;
 } __packed;
 
+#define HCI_EV_LE_LTK_REQ		0x05
+struct hci_ev_le_ltk_req {
+	__le16	handle;
+	__u8	random[8];
+	__le16	ediv;
+} __packed;
+
 /* Internal events generated by Bluetooth stack */
 #define HCI_EV_STACK_INTERNAL	0xfd
 struct hci_ev_stack_internal {
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index e8dbde8..aeae4b4 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ struct hci_conn {
 	__u8		power_save;
 	__u16		disc_timeout;
 	unsigned long	pend;
+	__u8		ltk[16];
 
 	__u8		remote_cap;
 	__u8		remote_oob;
@@ -781,4 +782,8 @@ void hci_req_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 cmd, int result);
 
 void hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max,
 					u16 latency, u16 to_multiplier);
+void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16]);
+void hci_le_ltk_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16]);
+void hci_le_ltk_neg_reply(struct hci_conn *conn);
+
 #endif /* __HCI_CORE_H */
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index a050a69..e75b2a6 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -203,6 +203,52 @@ void hci_le_conn_update(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 min, u16 max,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_le_conn_update);
 
+void hci_le_start_enc(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
+	struct hci_cp_le_start_enc cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("%p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+	memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk, sizeof(cp.ltk));
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_le_start_enc);
+
+void hci_le_ltk_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
+	struct hci_cp_le_ltk_reply cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("%p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+	memcpy(cp.ltk, ltk, sizeof(ltk));
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(hci_le_ltk_reply);
+
+void hci_le_ltk_neg_reply(struct hci_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
+	struct hci_cp_le_ltk_neg_reply cp;
+
+	BT_DBG("%p", conn);
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+}
+
 /* Device _must_ be locked */
 void hci_sco_setup(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 98b5764..829ba49 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -796,6 +796,30 @@ static void hci_cc_le_read_buffer_size(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 	hci_req_complete(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_READ_BUFFER_SIZE, rp->status);
 }
 
+static void hci_cc_le_ltk_reply(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct hci_rp_le_ltk_reply *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, rp->status);
+
+	if (rp->status)
+		return;
+
+	hci_req_complete(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, rp->status);
+}
+
+static void hci_cc_le_ltk_neg_reply(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct hci_rp_le_ltk_neg_reply *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, rp->status);
+
+	if (rp->status)
+		return;
+
+	hci_req_complete(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY, rp->status);
+}
+
 static inline void hci_cs_inquiry(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 status)
 {
 	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, status);
@@ -1163,6 +1187,11 @@ static void hci_cs_le_create_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 status)
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 }
 
+static void hci_cs_le_start_enc(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status)
+{
+	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%x", hdev->name, status);
+}
+
 static inline void hci_inquiry_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	__u8 status = *((__u8 *) skb->data);
@@ -1728,6 +1757,14 @@ static inline void hci_cmd_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *sk
 		hci_cc_le_read_buffer_size(hdev, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY:
+		hci_cc_le_ltk_reply(hdev, skb);
+		break;
+
+	case HCI_OP_LE_LTK_NEG_REPLY:
+		hci_cc_le_ltk_neg_reply(hdev, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("%s opcode 0x%x", hdev->name, opcode);
 		break;
@@ -1806,6 +1843,10 @@ static inline void hci_cmd_status_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		hci_cs_le_create_conn(hdev, ev->status);
 		break;
 
+	case HCI_OP_LE_START_ENC:
+		hci_cs_le_start_enc(hdev, ev->status);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("%s opcode 0x%x", hdev->name, opcode);
 		break;
@@ -2432,6 +2473,28 @@ unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 }
 
+static inline void hci_le_ltk_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
+						struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct hci_ev_le_ltk_req *ev = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct hci_cp_le_ltk_reply cp;
+	struct hci_conn *conn;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s handle %d", hdev->name, cpu_to_le16(ev->handle));
+
+	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+
+	conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, __le16_to_cpu(ev->handle));
+
+	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+	cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
+	memcpy(cp.ltk, conn->ltk, sizeof(conn->ltk));
+
+	hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_LTK_REPLY, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+}
+
 static inline void hci_le_meta_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct hci_ev_le_meta *le_ev = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -2443,6 +2506,10 @@ static inline void hci_le_meta_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		hci_le_conn_complete_evt(hdev, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case HCI_EV_LE_LTK_REQ:
+		hci_le_ltk_request_evt(hdev, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 52241fd..6d32bcc 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -280,13 +280,16 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb
 
 static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hcon->hdev->tfm;
 	int ret;
 	u8 key[16], res[16], random[16], confirm[16], buf[128];
 
 	swap128(skb->data, random);
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(random));
 
+	memset(hcon->ltk, 0, sizeof(hcon->ltk));
+
 	if (conn->hcon->out)
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
 				conn->src, 0, conn->dst, res);
@@ -311,6 +314,9 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->prnd, key);
+		swap128(key, hcon->ltk);
+
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, hcon->ltk);
 
 		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
 		BT_DBG("key %s", buf);
@@ -321,6 +327,7 @@ static void smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r);
 
 		smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, random, key);
+		swap128(key, hcon->ltk);
 
 		hex_dump_to_buffer(key, sizeof(key), 16, 1, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
 		BT_DBG("key %s", buf);
-- 
1.7.4.1