[PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[Ian Campbell]

The Xen netback implementation contains a couple of flaws which can
allow a guest to cause a DoS in the backend domain, potentially
affecting other domains in the system.

CVE-2013-0216 is a failure to sanity check the ring producer/consumer
pointers which can allow a guest to cause netback to loop for an
extended period preventing other work from occurring.

CVE-2013-0217 is a memory leak on an error path which is guest
triggerable.

The following series contains the fixes for these issues, as previously
included in Xen Security Advisory 39:
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-announce/2013-02/msg00001.html

Changes in v2:
 - Typo and block comment format fixes 
 - Added stable Cc

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[Ian Campbell]

On Fri, 2013-02-08 at 04:31 +0000, David Miller wrote:

> Applied, please don't add stable CC:'s to networking patches, instead
> ask me to queue it up to my -stable todo pile instead.

Thanks & Ack.

> I don't like it when patches instantly be submitted to -stable when
> they hit Linus's tree, I'd rather it soak upstream for a week or two
> instead.  That's why I do it this way.

Very reasonable.

Ian.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[Ian Campbell]

On Fri, 2013-02-08 at 04:31 +0000, David Miller wrote:

> Applied, please don't add stable CC:'s to networking patches, instead
> ask me to queue it up to my -stable todo pile instead.

Thanks & Ack.

> I don't like it when patches instantly be submitted to -stable when
> they hit Linus's tree, I'd rather it soak upstream for a week or two
> instead.  That's why I do it this way.

Very reasonable.

Ian.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[David Miller]

From: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 09:41:18 +0000

> The Xen netback implementation contains a couple of flaws which can
> allow a guest to cause a DoS in the backend domain, potentially
> affecting other domains in the system.
> 
> CVE-2013-0216 is a failure to sanity check the ring producer/consumer
> pointers which can allow a guest to cause netback to loop for an
> extended period preventing other work from occurring.
> 
> CVE-2013-0217 is a memory leak on an error path which is guest
> triggerable.
> 
> The following series contains the fixes for these issues, as previously
> included in Xen Security Advisory 39:
> http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-announce/2013-02/msg00001.html
> 
> Changes in v2:
>  - Typo and block comment format fixes 
>  - Added stable Cc

Applied, please don't add stable CC:'s to networking patches, instead
ask me to queue it up to my -stable todo pile instead.

I don't like it when patches instantly be submitted to -stable when
they hit Linus's tree, I'd rather it soak upstream for a week or two
instead.  That's why I do it this way.

Thanks.

Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[David Miller]

From: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2013 09:41:18 +0000

> The Xen netback implementation contains a couple of flaws which can
> allow a guest to cause a DoS in the backend domain, potentially
> affecting other domains in the system.
> 
> CVE-2013-0216 is a failure to sanity check the ring producer/consumer
> pointers which can allow a guest to cause netback to loop for an
> extended period preventing other work from occurring.
> 
> CVE-2013-0217 is a memory leak on an error path which is guest
> triggerable.
> 
> The following series contains the fixes for these issues, as previously
> included in Xen Security Advisory 39:
> http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-announce/2013-02/msg00001.html
> 
> Changes in v2:
>  - Typo and block comment format fixes 
>  - Added stable Cc

Applied, please don't add stable CC:'s to networking patches, instead
ask me to queue it up to my -stable todo pile instead.

I don't like it when patches instantly be submitted to -stable when
they hit Linus's tree, I'd rather it soak upstream for a week or two
instead.  That's why I do it this way.

Thanks.

[PATCH v2 0/4] XSA-39 CVE-2013-021[67]: Linux netback DoS via malicious guest ring.

[Ian Campbell]

The Xen netback implementation contains a couple of flaws which can
allow a guest to cause a DoS in the backend domain, potentially
affecting other domains in the system.

CVE-2013-0216 is a failure to sanity check the ring producer/consumer
pointers which can allow a guest to cause netback to loop for an
extended period preventing other work from occurring.

CVE-2013-0217 is a memory leak on an error path which is guest
triggerable.

The following series contains the fixes for these issues, as previously
included in Xen Security Advisory 39:
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-announce/2013-02/msg00001.html

Changes in v2:
 - Typo and block comment format fixes 
 - Added stable Cc