From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"kexec@lists.infradead.org" <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
"linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 21:18:23 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363749503.24132.482.camel@bling.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51492828.5070803@zytor.com>
On Tue, 2013-03-19 at 20:08 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/19/2013 07:48 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > On 03/19/2013 06:28 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> Mm. The question is whether we can reliably determine the ranges a
> device should be able to access without having to trust userspace
> (and, ideally, without having to worry about whether iommu vendors
> have done their job). It's pretty important for PCI passthrough, so we
> do need to care.
> >
> > It is actually very simple: the device should be able to DMA into/out of:
> >
> > 1. pinned pages
> > 2. owned by the process controlling the device
> >
> > ... and nothing else.
> >
>
> The "pinning" process needs to involve a call to the kernel to process
> the page for DMA (pinning the page and opening it in the iommu) and
> return a transaction address, of course.
>
> I think we have the interface for that in vfio, but I haven't followed
> that work.
Yes, vfio does this and is meant to provide a secure-boot-friendly PCI
passthrough interface. Thanks,
Alex
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org"
<kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-pci-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-pci-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 21:18:23 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363749503.24132.482.camel@bling.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51492828.5070803-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
On Tue, 2013-03-19 at 20:08 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/19/2013 07:48 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > On 03/19/2013 06:28 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> Mm. The question is whether we can reliably determine the ranges a
> device should be able to access without having to trust userspace
> (and, ideally, without having to worry about whether iommu vendors
> have done their job). It's pretty important for PCI passthrough, so we
> do need to care.
> >
> > It is actually very simple: the device should be able to DMA into/out of:
> >
> > 1. pinned pages
> > 2. owned by the process controlling the device
> >
> > ... and nothing else.
> >
>
> The "pinning" process needs to involve a call to the kernel to process
> the page for DMA (pinning the page and opening it in the iommu) and
> return a transaction address, of course.
>
> I think we have the interface for that in vfio, but I haven't followed
> that work.
Yes, vfio does this and is meant to provide a secure-boot-friendly PCI
passthrough interface. Thanks,
Alex
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
"kexec@lists.infradead.org" <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2013 21:18:23 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1363749503.24132.482.camel@bling.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <51492828.5070803@zytor.com>
On Tue, 2013-03-19 at 20:08 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 03/19/2013 07:48 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > On 03/19/2013 06:28 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> Mm. The question is whether we can reliably determine the ranges a
> device should be able to access without having to trust userspace
> (and, ideally, without having to worry about whether iommu vendors
> have done their job). It's pretty important for PCI passthrough, so we
> do need to care.
> >
> > It is actually very simple: the device should be able to DMA into/out of:
> >
> > 1. pinned pages
> > 2. owned by the process controlling the device
> >
> > ... and nothing else.
> >
>
> The "pinning" process needs to involve a call to the kernel to process
> the page for DMA (pinning the page and opening it in the iommu) and
> return a transaction address, of course.
>
> I think we have the interface for that in vfio, but I haven't followed
> that work.
Yes, vfio does this and is meant to provide a secure-boot-friendly PCI
passthrough interface. Thanks,
Alex
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-03-20 3:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 124+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-03-20 1:28 [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 2:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 2:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 2:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:08 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:18 ` Alex Williamson [this message]
2013-03-20 3:18 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:18 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:18 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 3:27 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:27 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:27 ` Alex Williamson
2013-03-20 3:27 ` Alex Williamson
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-03-21 16:32 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-21 16:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-21 16:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-21 16:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:09 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:07 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 1:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-18 21:32 Matthew Garrett
2013-03-18 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-19 4:47 ` James Morris
2013-03-19 4:47 ` James Morris
2013-03-19 4:47 ` James Morris
2013-03-20 1:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 16:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 16:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 18:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 18:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 20:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-03-20 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-21 13:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 13:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 13:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 13:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 15:58 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:04 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:04 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:04 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-03-21 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-03-21 1:58 ` James Morris
2013-03-21 1:58 ` James Morris
2013-03-19 7:18 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2013-03-19 7:18 ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2013-03-20 1:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:05 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 1:05 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 13:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 13:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 13:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 13:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 15:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 15:14 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-03-20 16:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-03-20 16:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
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