From: Steve Dickson <SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> To: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust-HgOvQuBEEgTQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>, "David P. Quigley" <dpquigl-+05T5uksL2qpZYMLLGbcSA@public.gmane.org> Cc: Linux NFS list <linux-nfs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, Linux FS devel list <linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, Linux Security List <linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, SELinux List <selinux-+05T5uksL2qpZYMLLGbcSA@public.gmane.org> Subject: [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model. Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 11:56:37 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1368719808-14584-3-git-send-email-SteveD@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1368719808-14584-1-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> From: David Quigley <dpquigl-a7DkhOHRHBuN9aS15agKxg@public.gmane.org> The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd-DABiIiYg7OfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM-geVtEqcQUv4Eyxwt80+Gtti2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene-geVtEqcQUv4Eyxwt80+Gtti2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG-geVtEqcQUv4Eyxwt80+Gtti2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org> --- include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ security/capability.c | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c2af462..cff3e4f 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1323,6 +1323,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * + * @ismaclabel: + * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name + * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC + * attribute otherwise returns 0. + * @name full extended attribute name to check against + * LSM as a MAC label. + * * @secid_to_secctx: * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned. @@ -1604,6 +1611,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); + int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name); int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen); @@ -1857,6 +1865,7 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen); @@ -2547,6 +2556,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); } +static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 7aeec66..b3e8b93 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -823,6 +823,11 @@ static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, return -EINVAL; } +static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -1042,6 +1047,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0fe2b2e..c3ceb75 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1057,6 +1057,12 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); } +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return security_ops->ismaclabel(name); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); + int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index b1f7bd7..bbf219a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5454,6 +5454,11 @@ abort_change: return error; } +static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); +} + static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); @@ -5692,6 +5697,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, + .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel, .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d52c780..a7f485b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3329,6 +3329,16 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ /** + * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label + * @name: Full xattr name to check. + */ +static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0); +} + + +/** * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid * @secid: incoming integer * @secdata: destination @@ -3524,6 +3534,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free, #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + .ismaclabel = smack_ismaclabel, .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx, -- 1.8.1.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Steve Dickson <SteveD@redhat.com> To: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>, "David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Linux NFS list <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>, Linux FS devel list <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, Linux Security List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, SELinux List <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Subject: [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model. Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 11:56:37 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1368719808-14584-3-git-send-email-SteveD@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1368719808-14584-1-git-send-email-SteveD@redhat.com> From: David Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com> The interface to request security labels from user space is the xattr interface. When requesting the security label from an NFS server it is important to make sure the requested xattr actually is a MAC label. This allows us to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM. Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> --- include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ security/capability.c | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 11 +++++++++++ 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index c2af462..cff3e4f 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -1323,6 +1323,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * + * @ismaclabel: + * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name + * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC + * attribute otherwise returns 0. + * @name full extended attribute name to check against + * LSM as a MAC label. + * * @secid_to_secctx: * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned. @@ -1604,6 +1611,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); + int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name); int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen); @@ -1857,6 +1865,7 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode); int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value); int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size); int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name); int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen); int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid); void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen); @@ -2547,6 +2556,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); } +static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 7aeec66..b3e8b93 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -823,6 +823,11 @@ static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, return -EINVAL; } +static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -1042,6 +1047,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0fe2b2e..c3ceb75 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1057,6 +1057,12 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); } +int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return security_ops->ismaclabel(name); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); + int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index b1f7bd7..bbf219a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5454,6 +5454,11 @@ abort_change: return error; } +static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); +} + static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); @@ -5692,6 +5697,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr, .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, + .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel, .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d52c780..a7f485b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3329,6 +3329,16 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ /** + * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label + * @name: Full xattr name to check. + */ +static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name) +{ + return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0); +} + + +/** * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid * @secid: incoming integer * @secdata: destination @@ -3524,6 +3534,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free, #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + .ismaclabel = smack_ismaclabel, .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx, .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx, -- 1.8.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-05-16 15:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2013-05-16 15:56 Froe e71bf1d708e1294b3bae64d04f03228b3625f2a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 01/13] Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry Steve Dickson [not found] ` <1368719808-14584-2-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-20 21:14 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:14 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:14 ` Eric Paris [not found] ` <1368719808-14584-1-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-16 15:56 ` Steve Dickson [this message] 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson [not found] ` <1368719808-14584-3-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-20 21:15 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:15 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:15 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data Steve Dickson 2013-05-20 21:15 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:15 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 04/13] SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels Steve Dickson 2013-05-20 21:16 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:16 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 05/13] NFSv4.2: Added NFS v4.2 support to the NFS client Steve Dickson [not found] ` <1368719808-14584-6-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-20 19:06 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-20 19:06 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-30 20:51 ` Bryan Schumaker [not found] ` <51A7BBEB.60005-HgOvQuBEEgTQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-31 21:12 ` Steve Dickson 2013-05-31 21:12 ` Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 06/13] NFSv4: Add label recommended attribute and NFSv4 flags Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 07/13] NFSv4: Introduce new label structure Steve Dickson 2013-05-20 19:12 ` Myklebust, Trond [not found] ` <1369077151.6115.22.camel-5lNtUQgoD8Pfa3cDbr2K10B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-21 18:53 ` Steve Dickson 2013-05-21 18:53 ` Steve Dickson [not found] ` <519BC29E.6080803-AfCzQyP5zfLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-21 18:55 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-21 18:55 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 08/13] NFSv4: Extend fattr bitmaps to support all 3 words Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 09/13] NFS:Add labels to client function prototypes Steve Dickson [not found] ` <1368719808-14584-10-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-20 19:24 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-20 19:24 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 10/13] NFS: Add label lifecycle management Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 11/13] NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS Steve Dickson [not found] ` <1368719808-14584-12-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> 2013-05-20 19:33 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-20 19:33 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-20 19:40 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 12/13] NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespace Steve Dickson 2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 13/13] Kconfig: Add Kconfig entry for Labeled NFS V4 client Steve Dickson 2013-05-20 20:57 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 20:57 ` Eric Paris 2013-05-20 21:12 ` Myklebust, Trond 2013-05-20 21:14 ` Myklebust, Trond -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2013-05-22 16:50 [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: 3.10-rc2 release Steve Dickson 2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson 2013-05-13 19:11 [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: linux-3.10-rc1 release Steve Dickson 2013-05-13 19:11 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson 2012-12-17 15:42 [PATCH 00/13] NFSv4: Label NFS Patches Steve Dickson 2012-12-17 15:43 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson 2012-11-12 6:15 Labeled NFS [v5] David Quigley 2012-11-12 6:15 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model David Quigley 2012-11-12 6:15 ` David Quigley 2012-11-12 12:15 ` J. Bruce Fields 2012-11-12 14:56 ` Dave Quigley 2012-11-12 14:56 ` Dave Quigley 2012-11-12 16:36 ` J. Bruce Fields 2012-11-12 19:36 ` David P. Quigley 2012-11-12 19:36 ` David P. Quigley 2012-11-12 21:43 ` J. Bruce Fields 2012-11-13 0:12 ` Dave Quigley 2012-11-13 0:12 ` Dave Quigley
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