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From: Steve Dickson <SteveD@redhat.com>
To: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>,
	"David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Linux NFS list <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS devel list <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Security List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	SELinux List <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data.
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 12:50:36 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1369241446-7680-4-git-send-email-SteveD@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1369241446-7680-1-git-send-email-SteveD@redhat.com>

From: David Quigley <dpquigl@davequigley.com>

There is no way to differentiate if a text mount option is passed from user
space or the kernel. A flags field is being added to the
security_sb_set_mnt_opts hook to allow for in kernel security flags to be sent
to the LSM for processing in addition to the text options received from mount.
This patch also updated existing code to fix compilation errors.

Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
---
 fs/nfs/super.c           |  3 ++-
 include/linux/security.h | 13 ++++++++++---
 security/capability.c    |  5 ++++-
 security/security.c      |  7 +++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
index a366107..c1bbb53 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
@@ -2411,7 +2411,8 @@ static int nfs_bdi_register(struct nfs_server *server)
 int nfs_set_sb_security(struct super_block *s, struct dentry *mntroot,
 			struct nfs_mount_info *mount_info)
 {
-	return security_sb_set_mnt_opts(s, &mount_info->parsed->lsm_opts);
+	return security_sb_set_mnt_opts(s, &mount_info->parsed->lsm_opts,
+								0, NULL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_set_sb_security);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index cff3e4f..aa656fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1456,7 +1456,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*sb_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
 			     struct path *new_path);
 	int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
 	int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb,
 				   struct super_block *newsb);
 	int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
@@ -1747,7 +1749,10 @@ int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 		      const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
 int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
-int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 				struct super_block *newsb);
 int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
@@ -2037,7 +2042,9 @@ static inline int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
 }
 
 static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
-					   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+					   struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+					   unsigned long kern_flags,
+					   unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index b3e8b93..32b5157 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 }
 
 static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
-			       struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+			       struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+			       unsigned long kern_flags,
+			       unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+
 {
 	if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c3ceb75..8d0b9a7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -294,9 +294,12 @@ int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 }
 
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return security_ops->sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, opts);
+	return security_ops->sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, opts, kern_flags,
+						set_kern_flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index bbf219a..f3b5446 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -552,7 +552,9 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
  * labeling information.
  */
 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
-				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+				struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int rc = 0, i;
@@ -580,6 +582,12 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			"before the security server is initialized\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
+		/* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+		 * place the results is not allowed */
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
@@ -980,7 +988,7 @@ static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		goto out_err;
 
 out:
-	rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
+	rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
 
 out_err:
 	security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
-- 
1.8.1.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-05-22 16:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-05-22 16:50 [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: 3.10-rc2 release Steve Dickson
     [not found] ` <1369241446-7680-1-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-05-22 16:50   ` [PATCH 01/13] Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50     ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50   ` [PATCH 04/13] SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50     ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50   ` [PATCH 07/13] NFSv4: Introduce new label structure Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50     ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50   ` [PATCH 08/13] NFSv4: Extend fattr bitmaps to support all 3 words Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50     ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50   ` [PATCH 12/13] NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespace Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50     ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-30 19:53   ` [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: 3.10-rc2 release Myklebust, Trond
2013-05-30 19:53     ` Myklebust, Trond
     [not found]     ` <1369943609.3111.4.camel-5lNtUQgoD8Pfa3cDbr2K10B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>
2013-05-31 21:11       ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-31 21:11         ` Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 02/13] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` Steve Dickson [this message]
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 05/13] NFSv4.2: Added NFS v4.2 support to the NFS client Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 06/13] NFSv4: Add label recommended attribute and NFSv4 flags Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 09/13] NFS:Add labels to client function prototypes Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 10/13] NFS: Add label lifecycle management Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 11/13] NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS Steve Dickson
2013-05-22 16:50 ` [PATCH 13/13] Kconfig: Add Kconfig entry for Labeled NFS V4 client Steve Dickson
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-05-16 15:56 Froe e71bf1d708e1294b3bae64d04f03228b3625f2a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 Steve Dickson
2013-05-16 15:56 ` [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data Steve Dickson
2013-05-20 21:15   ` Eric Paris
2013-05-20 21:15     ` Eric Paris
2013-05-13 19:11 [PATCH 00/13] lnfs: linux-3.10-rc1 release Steve Dickson
     [not found] ` <1368472317-5602-1-git-send-email-SteveD-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-05-13 19:11   ` [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data Steve Dickson
2013-05-13 19:11     ` Steve Dickson
2012-12-17 15:42 [PATCH 00/13] NFSv4: Label NFS Patches Steve Dickson
2012-12-17 15:43 ` [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data Steve Dickson
2012-11-12  6:15 Labeled NFS [v5] David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15 ` [PATCH 03/13] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data David Quigley
2012-11-12  6:15   ` David Quigley

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