[PATCH 0/5] Backport to 3.10.y for fix CVE-2014-0181

[PATCH 0/5] Backport to 3.10.y for fix CVE-2014-0181

[Xiangyu Lu]

Hi Greg,
    This backport fix CVE-2014-0181 which would still be vulnerable in
the latest 3.10.y, please add it.

Eric W. Biederman (5):
  netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed
  net: Move the permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo to
    packet_diag_dump
  net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets
  net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages
  net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink
    messages

 crypto/crypto_user.c            |  2 +-
 drivers/connector/cn_proc.c     |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c     |  2 +-
 include/linux/netlink.h         |  7 ++++
 include/linux/sock_diag.h       |  2 +-
 include/net/sock.h              |  5 +++
 kernel/audit.c                  |  4 +--
 net/can/gw.c                    |  4 +--
 net/core/rtnetlink.c            | 20 ++++++-----
 net/core/sock.c                 | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/core/sock_diag.c            |  4 +--
 net/dcb/dcbnl.c                 |  2 +-
 net/decnet/dn_dev.c             |  4 +--
 net/decnet/dn_fib.c             |  4 +--
 net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c       |  2 +-
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c        | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 net/netlink/genetlink.c         |  2 +-
 net/packet/diag.c               |  7 +++-
 net/phonet/pn_netlink.c         |  8 ++---
 net/sched/act_api.c             |  2 +-
 net/sched/cls_api.c             |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_api.c             |  6 ++--
 net/tipc/netlink.c              |  2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c            |  2 +-
 25 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

-- 
1.8.3.4

[PATCH 1/5] netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed

[Xiangyu Lu]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 5187cd055b6e81fc6526109456f8b20623148d5f upstream.

netlink_capable is a static internal function in af_netlink.c and we
have better uses for the name netlink_capable.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[xl: Backported to 3.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index c9c2a84..3f1d67e 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ retry:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static inline int netlink_capable(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
+static inline int netlink_allowed(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
 {
 	return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) ||
 		ns_capable(sock_net(sock->sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 
 	/* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */
 	if (nladdr->nl_groups) {
-		if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
+		if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
 			return -EPERM;
 		err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
 		if (err)
@@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Only superuser is allowed to send multicasts */
-	if (nladdr->nl_groups && !netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
+	if (nladdr->nl_groups && !netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!nlk->portid)
@@ -1921,7 +1921,7 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 		break;
 	case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
 	case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: {
-		if (!netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
+		if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
 			return -EPERM;
 		err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
 		if (err)
@@ -2072,7 +2072,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 		dst_group = ffs(addr->nl_groups);
 		err =  -EPERM;
 		if ((dst_group || dst_portid) &&
-		    !netlink_capable(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
+		    !netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_SEND))
 			goto out;
 	} else {
 		dst_portid = nlk->dst_portid;
-- 
1.8.3.4

[PATCH 2/5] net: Move the permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo to packet_diag_dump

[Xiangyu Lu]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit a53b72c83a4216f2eb883ed45a0cbce014b8e62d upstream.

The permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo is wrong, and it is so removed
from it's sources it is not clear why it is wrong.  Move the computation
into packet_diag_dump and pass a bool of the result into sock_diag_filterinfo.

This does not yet correct the capability check but instead simply moves it to make
it clear what is going on.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/sock_diag.h | 2 +-
 net/core/sock_diag.c      | 4 ++--
 net/packet/diag.c         | 7 ++++++-
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sock_diag.h b/include/linux/sock_diag.h
index 302ab80..46cca4c 100644
--- a/include/linux/sock_diag.h
+++ b/include/linux/sock_diag.h
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int sock_diag_check_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie);
 void sock_diag_save_cookie(void *sk, __u32 *cookie);
 
 int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attr);
-int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
+int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(bool may_report_filterinfo, struct sock *sk,
 			     struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/net/core/sock_diag.c b/net/core/sock_diag.c
index 6a7fae2..c38e7a2 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int sock_diag_put_meminfo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_diag_put_meminfo);
 
-int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
+int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(bool may_report_filterinfo, struct sock *sk,
 			     struct sk_buff *skb, int attrtype)
 {
 	struct nlattr *attr;
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ int sock_diag_put_filterinfo(struct sock *sk,
 	unsigned int len;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+	if (!may_report_filterinfo) {
 		nla_reserve(skb, attrtype, 0);
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/net/packet/diag.c b/net/packet/diag.c
index ec8b6e8..cbf7391 100644
--- a/net/packet/diag.c
+++ b/net/packet/diag.c
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ static int pdiag_put_fanout(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *nlskb)
 
 static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct packet_diag_req *req,
+			bool may_report_filterinfo,
 			struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 			u32 portid, u32 seq, u32 flags, int sk_ino)
 {
@@ -171,7 +172,8 @@ static int sk_diag_fill(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		goto out_nlmsg_trim;
 
 	if ((req->pdiag_show & PACKET_SHOW_FILTER) &&
-	    sock_diag_put_filterinfo(sk, skb, PACKET_DIAG_FILTER))
+	    sock_diag_put_filterinfo(may_report_filterinfo, sk, skb,
+			 PACKET_DIAG_FILTER))
 		goto out_nlmsg_trim;
 
 	return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
@@ -187,9 +189,11 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 	struct packet_diag_req *req;
 	struct net *net;
 	struct sock *sk;
+	bool may_report_filterinfo;
 
 	net = sock_net(skb->sk);
 	req = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
+	may_report_filterinfo = ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
 
 	mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
 	sk_for_each(sk, &net->packet.sklist) {
@@ -199,6 +203,7 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 			goto next;
 
 		if (sk_diag_fill(sk, skb, req,
+				 may_report_filterinfo,
 				 sk_user_ns(NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).sk),
 				 NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
 				 cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI,
-- 
1.8.3.4

[PATCH 3/5] net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets

[Xiangyu Lu]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit a3b299da869d6e78cf42ae0b1b41797bcb8c5e4b upstream.

sk_net_capable - The common case, operations that are safe in a network namespace.
sk_capable - Operations that are not known to be safe in a network namespace
sk_ns_capable - The general case for special cases.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com>
---
 include/net/sock.h |  5 +++++
 net/core/sock.c    | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index 8f32b77..72f710d 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -2248,6 +2248,11 @@ extern void sock_enable_timestamp(struct sock *sk, int flag);
 extern int sock_get_timestamp(struct sock *, struct timeval __user *);
 extern int sock_get_timestampns(struct sock *, struct timespec __user *);
 
+bool sk_ns_capable(const struct sock *sk,
+		   struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap);
+bool sk_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap);
+bool sk_net_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap);
+
 /*
  *	Enable debug/info messages
  */
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index d743099..af65d17 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -142,6 +142,55 @@
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(proto_list_mutex);
 static LIST_HEAD(proto_list);
 
+/**
+ * sk_ns_capable - General socket capability test
+ * @sk: Socket to use a capability on or through
+ * @user_ns: The user namespace of the capability to use
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket had when the socket was
+ * created and the current process has the capability @cap in the user
+ * namespace @user_ns.
+ */
+bool sk_ns_capable(const struct sock *sk,
+		   struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+	return file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, user_ns, cap) &&
+		ns_capable(user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * sk_capable - Socket global capability test
+ * @sk: Socket to use a capability on or through
+ * @cap: The global capbility to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket had when the socket was
+ * created and the current process has the capability @cap in all user
+ * namespaces.
+ */
+bool sk_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap)
+{
+	return sk_ns_capable(sk, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_capable);
+
+/**
+ * sk_net_capable - Network namespace socket capability test
+ * @sk: Socket to use a capability on or through
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket had when the socke was created
+ * and the current process has the capability @cap over the network namespace
+ * the socket is a member of.
+ */
+bool sk_net_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap)
+{
+	return sk_ns_capable(sk, sock_net(sk)->user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_net_capable);
+
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM
 int mem_cgroup_sockets_init(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, struct cgroup_subsys *ss)
 {
-- 
1.8.3.4

[PATCH 4/5] net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages

[Xiangyu Lu]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit aa4cf9452f469f16cea8c96283b641b4576d4a7b upstream.

netlink_net_capable - The common case use, for operations that are safe on a network namespace
netlink_capable - For operations that are only known to be safe for the global root
netlink_ns_capable - The general case of capable used to handle special cases

__netlink_ns_capable - Same as netlink_ns_capable except taking a netlink_skb_parms instead of
		       the skbuff of a netlink message.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[xl: Backported to 3.10: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/netlink.h  |  7 ++++++
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/netlink.h b/include/linux/netlink.h
index 6358da5..438b312 100644
--- a/include/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/linux/netlink.h
@@ -144,4 +144,11 @@ static inline int netlink_dump_start(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return __netlink_dump_start(ssk, skb, nlh, control);
 }
 
+bool __netlink_ns_capable(const struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp,
+			  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+bool netlink_ns_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
+bool netlink_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+bool netlink_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+
 #endif	/* __LINUX_NETLINK_H */
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 3f1d67e..e846e3e 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1219,6 +1219,71 @@ retry:
 	return err;
 }
 
+/**
+ * __netlink_ns_capable - General netlink message capability test
+ * @nsp: NETLINK_CB of the socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace.
+ * @user_ns: The user namespace of the capability to use
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap in the user namespace @user_ns.
+ */
+bool __netlink_ns_capable(const struct netlink_skb_parms *nsp,
+			struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+	return sk_ns_capable(nsp->sk, user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__netlink_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * netlink_ns_capable - General netlink message capability test
+ * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
+ * @user_ns: The user namespace of the capability to use
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap in the user namespace @user_ns.
+ */
+bool netlink_ns_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+			struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap)
+{
+	return __netlink_ns_capable(&NETLINK_CB(skb), user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * netlink_capable - Netlink global message capability test
+ * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap in all user namespaces.
+ */
+bool netlink_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+{
+	return netlink_ns_capable(skb, &init_user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_capable);
+
+/**
+ * netlink_net_capable - Netlink network namespace message capability test
+ * @skb: socket buffer holding a netlink command from userspace
+ * @cap: The capability to use
+ *
+ * Test to see if the opener of the socket we received the message
+ * from had when the netlink socket was created and the sender of the
+ * message has has the capability @cap over the network namespace of
+ * the socket we received the message from.
+ */
+bool netlink_net_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
+{
+	return netlink_ns_capable(skb, sock_net(skb->sk)->user_ns, cap);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(netlink_net_capable);
+
 static inline int netlink_allowed(const struct socket *sock, unsigned int flag)
 {
 	return (nl_table[sock->sk->sk_protocol].flags & flag) ||
-- 
1.8.3.4

[PATCH 5/5] net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages

[Xiangyu Lu]

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e upstream.

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[xl: Backported to 3.10: 
 - Adjust context
 - ns_capable() is used by nfnetlink_rcv_msg() but not nfnetlink_rcv()]
Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com>
---
 crypto/crypto_user.c            |  2 +-
 drivers/connector/cn_proc.c     |  2 +-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c     |  2 +-
 kernel/audit.c                  |  4 ++--
 net/can/gw.c                    |  4 ++--
 net/core/rtnetlink.c            | 20 +++++++++++---------
 net/dcb/dcbnl.c                 |  2 +-
 net/decnet/dn_dev.c             |  4 ++--
 net/decnet/dn_fib.c             |  4 ++--
 net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c |  2 +-
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c       |  2 +-
 net/netlink/genetlink.c         |  2 +-
 net/packet/diag.c               |  2 +-
 net/phonet/pn_netlink.c         |  8 ++++----
 net/sched/act_api.c             |  2 +-
 net/sched/cls_api.c             |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_api.c             |  6 +++---
 net/tipc/netlink.c              |  2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c            |  2 +-
 19 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
index 1512e41..43665d0 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
 	link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
diff --git a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
index 18c5b9b..3165811 100644
--- a/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
+++ b/drivers/connector/cn_proc.c
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static void cn_proc_mcast_ctl(struct cn_msg *msg,
 		return;
 
 	/* Can only change if privileged. */
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+	if (!__netlink_ns_capable(nsp, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
 		err = EPERM;
 		goto out;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
index fe30ea9..109802f 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_netlink.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ scsi_nl_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)
 			goto next_msg;
 		}
 
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+		if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 			err = -EPERM;
 			goto next_msg;
 		}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 6def25f..a6c6327 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -593,13 +593,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
 	case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
 	case AUDIT_TRIM:
 	case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
-		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+		if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
-		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+		if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	default:  /* bad msg */
diff --git a/net/can/gw.c b/net/can/gw.c
index 3ee690e..de25455 100644
--- a/net/can/gw.c
+++ b/net/can/gw.c
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static int cgw_create_job(struct sk_buff *skb,  struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct cgw_job *gwj;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ static int cgw_remove_job(struct sk_buff *skb,  struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct can_can_gw ccgw;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*r))
diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index 87ec574..054ebbf 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1294,7 +1294,8 @@ static int do_set_master(struct net_device *dev, int ifindex)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int do_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
+static int do_setlink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+		      struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
 		      struct nlattr **tb, char *ifname, int modified)
 {
 	const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
@@ -1306,7 +1307,7 @@ static int do_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
 			err = PTR_ERR(net);
 			goto errout;
 		}
-		if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+		if (!netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
 			err = -EPERM;
 			goto errout;
 		}
@@ -1560,7 +1561,7 @@ static int rtnl_setlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto errout;
 
-	err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, 0);
+	err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, ifname, 0);
 errout:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -1678,7 +1679,8 @@ err:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtnl_create_link);
 
-static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct net *net, int group,
+static int rtnl_group_changelink(const struct sk_buff *skb,
+		struct net *net, int group,
 		struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
 		struct nlattr **tb)
 {
@@ -1687,7 +1689,7 @@ static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct net *net, int group,
 
 	for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
 		if (dev->group == group) {
-			err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
+			err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
 			if (err < 0)
 				return err;
 		}
@@ -1789,12 +1791,12 @@ replay:
 				modified = 1;
 			}
 
-			return do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
+			return do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, tb, ifname, modified);
 		}
 
 		if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE)) {
 			if (ifm->ifi_index == 0 && tb[IFLA_GROUP])
-				return rtnl_group_changelink(net,
+				return rtnl_group_changelink(skb, net,
 						nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_GROUP]),
 						ifm, tb);
 			return -ENODEV;
@@ -2179,7 +2181,7 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 	__u8 *addr;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ndm), tb, NDA_MAX, NULL);
@@ -2635,7 +2637,7 @@ static int rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	sz_idx = type>>2;
 	kind = type&3;
 
-	if (kind != 2 && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (kind != 2 && !netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (kind == 2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
index 40d5829..1074ffb 100644
--- a/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
+++ b/net/dcb/dcbnl.c
@@ -1670,7 +1670,7 @@ static int dcb_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct nlmsghdr *reply_nlh = NULL;
 	const struct reply_func *fn;
 
-	if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	ret = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*dcb), tb, DCB_ATTR_MAX,
diff --git a/net/decnet/dn_dev.c b/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
index 7d91970..b5e5210 100644
--- a/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_dev.c
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ static int dn_nl_deladdr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct dn_ifaddr __rcu **ifap;
 	int err = -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ static int dn_nl_newaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct dn_ifaddr *ifa;
 	int err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
diff --git a/net/decnet/dn_fib.c b/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
index 57dc159..d332aef 100644
--- a/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
+++ b/net/decnet/dn_fib.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int dn_fib_rtm_delroute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct nlattr *attrs[RTA_MAX+1];
 	int err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int dn_fib_rtm_newroute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	struct nlattr *attrs[RTA_MAX+1];
 	int err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index 2a7efe3..f3dc69a 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
 		return;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
 
 	/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index 572d87dc..0a03662 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int nfnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
 	int type, err;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* All the messages must at least contain nfgenmsg */
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index 393f17e..ade434b 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family,
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	    !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/packet/diag.c b/net/packet/diag.c
index cbf7391..53b0300 100644
--- a/net/packet/diag.c
+++ b/net/packet/diag.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int packet_diag_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 
 	net = sock_net(skb->sk);
 	req = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
-	may_report_filterinfo = ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
+	may_report_filterinfo = netlink_net_capable(cb->skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN);
 
 	mutex_lock(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
 	sk_for_each(sk, &net->packet.sklist) {
diff --git a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
index dc15f43..b64151a 100644
--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	int err;
 	u8 pnaddr;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	ASSERT_RTNL();
@@ -233,10 +233,10 @@ static int route_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	int err;
 	u8 dst;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	ASSERT_RTNL();
diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c
index fd70728..15d46b9 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_api.c
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_action(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
 	u32 portid = skb ? NETLINK_CB(skb).portid : 0;
 	int ret = 0, ovr = 0;
 
-	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETACTION) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETACTION) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	ret = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(struct tcamsg), tca, TCA_ACT_MAX, NULL);
diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c
index 8e118af..2ea40d1 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tfilter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
 	int err;
 	int tp_created = 0;
 
-	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTFILTER) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 replay:
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index 51b968d..2d2f079 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static int tc_get_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
 	struct Qdisc *p = NULL;
 	int err;
 
-	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETQDISC) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETQDISC) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
 	struct Qdisc *q, *p;
 	int err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 replay:
@@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n)
 	u32 qid;
 	int err;
 
-	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTCLASS) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if ((n->nlmsg_type != RTM_GETTCLASS) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	err = nlmsg_parse(n, sizeof(*tcm), tca, TCA_MAX, NULL);
diff --git a/net/tipc/netlink.c b/net/tipc/netlink.c
index 8bcd498..1e6081f 100644
--- a/net/tipc/netlink.c
+++ b/net/tipc/netlink.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int handle_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	int hdr_space = nlmsg_total_size(GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
 	u16 cmd;
 
-	if ((req_userhdr->cmd & 0xC000) && (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
+	if ((req_userhdr->cmd & 0xC000) && (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
 		cmd = TIPC_CMD_NOT_NET_ADMIN;
 	else
 		cmd = req_userhdr->cmd;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 3f565e4..7a70a5a 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2362,7 +2362,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
 	link = &xfrm_dispatch[type];
 
 	/* All operations require privileges, even GET */
-	if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) ||
-- 
1.8.3.4

Re: [PATCH 0/5] Backport to 3.10.y for fix CVE-2014-0181

[Cong Wang]

On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com> wrote:
> Hi Greg,
>     This backport fix CVE-2014-0181 which would still be vulnerable in
> the latest 3.10.y, please add it.

This is not how netdev works for stable. You need to check the
FAQ:

https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/netdev-FAQ.txt

Q: How can I tell what patches are queued up for backporting to the
   various stable releases?

A: Normally Greg Kroah-Hartman collects stable commits himself, but
   for networking, Dave collects up patches he deems critical for the
   networking subsystem, and then hands them off to Greg.

Re: [PATCH 0/5] Backport to 3.10.y for fix CVE-2014-0181

[Xiangyu Lu]

On 2014/6/14 1:04, Cong Wang wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Xiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com> wrote:
>> Hi Greg,
>>      This backport fix CVE-2014-0181 which would still be vulnerable in
>> the latest 3.10.y, please add it.
> This is not how netdev works for stable. You need to check the
> FAQ:
>
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/netdev-FAQ.txt
>
> Q: How can I tell what patches are queued up for backporting to the
>     various stable releases?
>
> A: Normally Greg Kroah-Hartman collects stable commits himself, but
>     for networking, Dave collects up patches he deems critical for the
>     networking subsystem, and then hands them off to Greg.
>

OK, thanks! I will check it.