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From: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] prctl.2: describe PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH/PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 14:47:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1406296033-32693-18-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1406296033-32693-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com>

---
 man2/prctl.2 | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)

diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
index 119989183ed3..f5f71af249f2 100644
--- a/man2/prctl.2
+++ b/man2/prctl.2
@@ -295,6 +295,41 @@ A value of 1 indicates
 .BR execve (2)
 will operate in the privilege-restricting mode described above.
 .TP
+.BR PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH " (since Linux 3.??)"
+Set the calling process's
+.I openat_beneath
+bit to the value in
+.IR arg2 .
+With
+.I openat_beneath
+set to 1, all
+.BR openat (2)
+and
+.BR open (2)
+operations act as though the
+.B O_BENEATH
+flag is set.
+Once set, this bit cannot be unset.
+The setting of this bit is inherited by children created by
+.BR fork (2)
+and
+.BR clone (2),
+and preserved across
+.BR execve (2).
+.TP
+.BR PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH " (since Linux 3.??)"
+Return (as the function result) the value of the
+.I openat_beneath
+bit for the current process.
+A value of 0 indicates the regular behavior.
+A value of 1 indicates that
+.BR openat (2)
+and
+.BR open (2)
+will operate in the implicit
+.B O_BENEATH
+mode described above.
+.TP
 .BR PR_SET_PDEATHSIG " (since Linux 2.1.57)"
 Set the parent process death signal
 of the calling process to \fIarg2\fP (either a signal value
-- 
2.0.0.526.g5318336


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Drysdale <drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman
	<gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro
	<viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>,
	Meredydd Luff <meredydd-zPN50pYk8eUaUu29zAJCuw@public.gmane.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
	James Morris
	<james.l.morris-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul-r2n+y4ga6xFZroRs9YW3xA@public.gmane.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	David Drysdale <drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] prctl.2: describe PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH/PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2014 14:47:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1406296033-32693-18-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1406296033-32693-1-git-send-email-drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

---
 man2/prctl.2 | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)

diff --git a/man2/prctl.2 b/man2/prctl.2
index 119989183ed3..f5f71af249f2 100644
--- a/man2/prctl.2
+++ b/man2/prctl.2
@@ -295,6 +295,41 @@ A value of 1 indicates
 .BR execve (2)
 will operate in the privilege-restricting mode described above.
 .TP
+.BR PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH " (since Linux 3.??)"
+Set the calling process's
+.I openat_beneath
+bit to the value in
+.IR arg2 .
+With
+.I openat_beneath
+set to 1, all
+.BR openat (2)
+and
+.BR open (2)
+operations act as though the
+.B O_BENEATH
+flag is set.
+Once set, this bit cannot be unset.
+The setting of this bit is inherited by children created by
+.BR fork (2)
+and
+.BR clone (2),
+and preserved across
+.BR execve (2).
+.TP
+.BR PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH " (since Linux 3.??)"
+Return (as the function result) the value of the
+.I openat_beneath
+bit for the current process.
+A value of 0 indicates the regular behavior.
+A value of 1 indicates that
+.BR openat (2)
+and
+.BR open (2)
+will operate in the implicit
+.B O_BENEATH
+mode described above.
+.TP
 .BR PR_SET_PDEATHSIG " (since Linux 2.1.57)"
 Set the parent process death signal
 of the calling process to \fIarg2\fP (either a signal value
-- 
2.0.0.526.g5318336

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-07-25 13:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-07-25 13:46 [RFC PATCHv2 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:46 ` [PATCH 01/11] fs: add O_BENEATH flag to openat(2) David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:46 ` [PATCH 02/11] selftests: Add test of O_BENEATH & openat(2) David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:46 ` [PATCH 03/11] capsicum: rights values and structure definitions David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 04/11] capsicum: implement fgetr() and friends David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 05/11] capsicum: convert callers to use fgetr() etc David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 06/11] capsicum: implement sockfd_lookupr() David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 07/11] capsicum: convert callers to use sockfd_lookupr() etc David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 08/11] capsicum: invoke Capsicum on FD/file conversion David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 09/11] capsicum: add syscalls to limit FD rights David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 10/11] capsicum: prctl(2) to force use of O_BENEATH David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-25 14:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-25 16:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-27 12:08       ` David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: Add tgid and tid into seccomp_data David Drysdale
2014-07-25 15:59   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 17:10     ` Kees Cook
2014-07-25 17:18       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 17:38         ` Kees Cook
2014-07-25 18:24           ` Julien Tinnes
2014-07-25 18:24             ` Julien Tinnes
     [not found]           ` <CAKyRK=j-f92xHTL3+TNr9WOv_y47dkZR=WZkpY_a5YW3Q8HfaQ@mail.gmail.com>
2014-07-25 18:32             ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-27 12:10               ` David Drysdale
2014-07-27 12:10                 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-27 12:09         ` David Drysdale
2014-07-28 21:18         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-28 21:18           ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30  4:05           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-30  4:05             ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-30  4:08             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30  4:08               ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30  4:35               ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]                 ` <8761ifie81.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
2014-07-30 14:52                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-30 14:52                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 1/6] open.2: describe O_BENEATH flag David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 2/6] capsicum.7: describe Capsicum capability framework David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 3/6] rights.7: Describe Capsicum primary rights David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 4/6] cap_rights_limit.2: limit FD rights for Capsicum David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` [PATCH 5/6] cap_rights_get.2: retrieve Capsicum fd rights David Drysdale
2014-07-25 13:47 ` David Drysdale [this message]
2014-07-25 13:47   ` [PATCH 6/6] prctl.2: describe PR_SET_OPENAT_BENEATH/PR_GET_OPENAT_BENEATH David Drysdale
2014-07-26 21:04 ` [RFC PATCHv2 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-26 21:04   ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-28 12:30   ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-28 12:30     ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-28 16:04   ` David Drysdale
2014-07-28 21:13     ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-28 21:13       ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-29  8:43       ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-29  8:43         ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-29 10:58       ` David Drysdale
2014-07-30  6:22         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30  6:22           ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-07-30 14:51           ` Andy Lutomirski

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