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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>,
	Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>,
	Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
	Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>,
	Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>, Liu hua <sdu.liu@huawei.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <Nikolay.Borisov@arm.com>,
	Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
	Doug Anderson <dianders@google.com>,
	Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 8/8] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be read-only
Date: Wed,  3 Sep 2014 14:57:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1409781429-27593-9-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1409781429-27593-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

This introduces CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, making kernel text and rodata
read-only. Additionally, this splits rodata from text so that rodata can
also be NX, which may lead to wasted memory when aligning to SECTION_SIZE.
The read-only areas are made writable during ftrace updates and kexec.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 10 ++++++++
 arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c          | 19 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c   |  1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S     |  3 +++
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig               | 12 ++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/init.c                | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 6 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 79ecb4f34ffb..9108292edcb5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -486,6 +486,16 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void);
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
+void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
+#else
+static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
+static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
+#endif
+
 void flush_uprobe_xol_access(struct page *page, unsigned long uaddr,
 			     void *kaddr, unsigned long len);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
index af9a8a927a4e..b8c75e45a950 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/opcodes.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,22 @@
 
 #define	OLD_NOP		0xe1a00000	/* mov r0, r0 */
 
+static int __ftrace_modify_code(void *data)
+{
+	int *command = data;
+
+	set_kernel_text_rw();
+	ftrace_modify_all_code(*command);
+	set_kernel_text_ro();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void arch_ftrace_update_code(int command)
+{
+	stop_machine(__ftrace_modify_code, &command, NULL);
+}
+
 static unsigned long ftrace_nop_replace(struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
 {
 	return rec->arch.old_mcount ? OLD_NOP : NOP;
@@ -73,6 +90,8 @@ int ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(void)
 int ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process(void)
 {
 	set_all_modules_text_ro();
+	/* Make sure any TLB misses during machine stop are cleared. */
+	flush_tlb_all();
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
index 8f75250cbe30..4423a565ef6f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
 	reboot_code_buffer = page_address(image->control_code_page);
 
 	/* Prepare parameters for reboot_code_buffer*/
+	set_kernel_text_rw();
 	kexec_start_address = image->start;
 	kexec_indirection_page = page_list;
 	kexec_mach_type = machine_arch_type;
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index a3d07ca2bbb4..542e58919bd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ SECTIONS
 			ARM_CPU_KEEP(PROC_INFO)
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
+#endif
 	RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
 
 	. = ALIGN(4);
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index 7a0756df91a2..c9cd9c5bf1e1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1017,3 +1017,15 @@ config ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
 	  padded to section-size (1MiB) boundaries (because their permissions
 	  are different and splitting the 1M pages into 4K ones causes TLB
 	  performance problems), wasting memory.
+
+config DEBUG_RODATA
+	bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
+	depends on ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
+	default y
+	help
+	  If this is set, kernel text and rodata will be made read-only. This
+	  is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
+	  kernel's executable code. Additionally splits rodata from kernel
+	  text so it can be made explicitly non-executable. This creates
+	  another section-size padded region, so it can waste more memory
+	  space while gaining the read-only protections.
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
index e6bfe76b2f59..dc2db779cdf4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -622,9 +622,10 @@ struct section_perm {
 	unsigned long end;
 	pmdval_t mask;
 	pmdval_t prot;
+	pmdval_t clear;
 };
 
-struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
+static struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
 	/* Make pages tables, etc before _stext RW (set NX). */
 	{
 		.start	= PAGE_OFFSET,
@@ -639,8 +640,35 @@ struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
 		.mask	= ~PMD_SECT_XN,
 		.prot	= PMD_SECT_XN,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+	/* Make rodata NX (set RO in ro_perms below). */
+	{
+		.start  = (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
+		.end    = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+		.mask   = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
+		.prot   = PMD_SECT_XN,
+	},
+#endif
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+static struct section_perm ro_perms[] = {
+	/* Make kernel code and rodata RX (set RO). */
+	{
+		.start  = (unsigned long)_stext,
+		.end    = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
+		.mask   = ~PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+		.prot   = PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+#else
+		.mask   = ~(PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE),
+		.prot   = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+		.clear  = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+#endif
+	},
+};
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Updates section permissions only for the current mm (sections are
  * copied into each mm). During startup, this is the init_mm. Is only
@@ -704,6 +732,24 @@ static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
 {
 	set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void)
+{
+	set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+{
+	set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
+{
+	set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
+
 #else
 static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS */
-- 
1.9.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 8/8] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be read-only
Date: Wed,  3 Sep 2014 14:57:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1409781429-27593-9-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1409781429-27593-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

This introduces CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, making kernel text and rodata
read-only. Additionally, this splits rodata from text so that rodata can
also be NX, which may lead to wasted memory when aligning to SECTION_SIZE.
The read-only areas are made writable during ftrace updates and kexec.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 10 ++++++++
 arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c          | 19 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c   |  1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S     |  3 +++
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig               | 12 ++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/init.c                | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 6 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 79ecb4f34ffb..9108292edcb5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -486,6 +486,16 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void);
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
+void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
+#else
+static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
+static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
+#endif
+
 void flush_uprobe_xol_access(struct page *page, unsigned long uaddr,
 			     void *kaddr, unsigned long len);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
index af9a8a927a4e..b8c75e45a950 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/opcodes.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,22 @@
 
 #define	OLD_NOP		0xe1a00000	/* mov r0, r0 */
 
+static int __ftrace_modify_code(void *data)
+{
+	int *command = data;
+
+	set_kernel_text_rw();
+	ftrace_modify_all_code(*command);
+	set_kernel_text_ro();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void arch_ftrace_update_code(int command)
+{
+	stop_machine(__ftrace_modify_code, &command, NULL);
+}
+
 static unsigned long ftrace_nop_replace(struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
 {
 	return rec->arch.old_mcount ? OLD_NOP : NOP;
@@ -73,6 +90,8 @@ int ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(void)
 int ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process(void)
 {
 	set_all_modules_text_ro();
+	/* Make sure any TLB misses during machine stop are cleared. */
+	flush_tlb_all();
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
index 8f75250cbe30..4423a565ef6f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
 	reboot_code_buffer = page_address(image->control_code_page);
 
 	/* Prepare parameters for reboot_code_buffer*/
+	set_kernel_text_rw();
 	kexec_start_address = image->start;
 	kexec_indirection_page = page_list;
 	kexec_mach_type = machine_arch_type;
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index a3d07ca2bbb4..542e58919bd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ SECTIONS
 			ARM_CPU_KEEP(PROC_INFO)
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+	. = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
+#endif
 	RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
 
 	. = ALIGN(4);
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index 7a0756df91a2..c9cd9c5bf1e1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1017,3 +1017,15 @@ config ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
 	  padded to section-size (1MiB) boundaries (because their permissions
 	  are different and splitting the 1M pages into 4K ones causes TLB
 	  performance problems), wasting memory.
+
+config DEBUG_RODATA
+	bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
+	depends on ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
+	default y
+	help
+	  If this is set, kernel text and rodata will be made read-only. This
+	  is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
+	  kernel's executable code. Additionally splits rodata from kernel
+	  text so it can be made explicitly non-executable. This creates
+	  another section-size padded region, so it can waste more memory
+	  space while gaining the read-only protections.
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
index e6bfe76b2f59..dc2db779cdf4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
@@ -622,9 +622,10 @@ struct section_perm {
 	unsigned long end;
 	pmdval_t mask;
 	pmdval_t prot;
+	pmdval_t clear;
 };
 
-struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
+static struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
 	/* Make pages tables, etc before _stext RW (set NX). */
 	{
 		.start	= PAGE_OFFSET,
@@ -639,8 +640,35 @@ struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
 		.mask	= ~PMD_SECT_XN,
 		.prot	= PMD_SECT_XN,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+	/* Make rodata NX (set RO in ro_perms below). */
+	{
+		.start  = (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
+		.end    = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+		.mask   = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
+		.prot   = PMD_SECT_XN,
+	},
+#endif
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+static struct section_perm ro_perms[] = {
+	/* Make kernel code and rodata RX (set RO). */
+	{
+		.start  = (unsigned long)_stext,
+		.end    = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
+		.mask   = ~PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+		.prot   = PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
+#else
+		.mask   = ~(PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE),
+		.prot   = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+		.clear  = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
+#endif
+	},
+};
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Updates section permissions only for the current mm (sections are
  * copied into each mm). During startup, this is the init_mm. Is only
@@ -704,6 +732,24 @@ static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
 {
 	set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
+void mark_rodata_ro(void)
+{
+	set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
+{
+	set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear);
+}
+
+void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
+{
+	set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
+
 #else
 static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS */
-- 
1.9.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-09-03 22:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-03 21:57 [PATCH v5 0/8] arm: support CONFIG_RODATA Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] arm: use generic fixmap.h Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] ARM: expand fixmap region to 3MB Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] arm: fixmap: implement __set_fixmap() Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-04 17:03   ` Will Deacon
2014-09-04 17:03     ` Will Deacon
2014-09-04 17:23     ` Kees Cook
2014-09-04 17:23       ` Kees Cook
2014-09-04 17:27       ` Will Deacon
2014-09-04 17:27         ` Will Deacon
2014-09-05 19:41         ` Kees Cook
2014-09-05 19:41           ` Kees Cook
2014-09-08 10:39           ` Will Deacon
2014-09-08 10:39             ` Will Deacon
2014-09-08 18:38             ` Kees Cook
2014-09-08 18:38               ` Kees Cook
2014-09-08 19:16         ` Kees Cook
2014-09-08 19:16           ` Kees Cook
2014-09-08 21:55           ` Rabin Vincent
2014-09-08 21:55             ` Rabin Vincent
2014-09-08 22:40             ` Kees Cook
2014-09-08 22:40               ` Kees Cook
2014-09-09 12:38               ` Will Deacon
2014-09-09 12:38                 ` Will Deacon
2014-09-09 14:33                 ` Kees Cook
2014-09-09 14:33                   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-10 17:51                   ` Will Deacon
2014-09-10 17:51                     ` Will Deacon
2014-09-11 15:27                     ` Kees Cook
2014-09-11 15:27                       ` Kees Cook
2014-09-11 16:05                       ` Kees Cook
2014-09-11 16:05                         ` Kees Cook
2014-09-11 16:16                         ` Will Deacon
2014-09-11 16:16                           ` Will Deacon
2014-09-11 16:27                           ` Kees Cook
2014-09-11 16:27                             ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] arm: use fixmap for text patching when text is RO Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] ARM: kexec: Make .text R/W in machine_kexec Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] arm: kgdb: Handle read-only text / modules Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] ARM: mm: allow non-text sections to be non-executable Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57   ` Kees Cook
2014-09-03 21:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2014-09-03 21:57   ` [PATCH v5 8/8] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be read-only Kees Cook

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