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From: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
To: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] xen: arm: reenable support for 32-bit userspace running in 64-bit guest.
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 17:23:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1410279813.8217.239.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1410279730.8217.238.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com>

On Tue, 2014-09-09 at 17:22 +0100, Ian Campbell wrote:

Not sure why I put RFC in the subject here, it's not, it's an actual
submission of patches.

> XSA-102/CVE-2014-5147[0] concerned a crash when trapping from 32-bit
> userspace in a 64-bit guest. Part of that security patch was c0020e09970
> "xen: arm: Handle traps from 32-bit userspace on 64-bit kernel as undef
> fix" which turned the exploitable crash into a #undef to the guest (so
> as to kill the process but not the host) as a workaround for the issue.
> 
> However while this prevented the exploit it did not make 32-bit
> userspaces which were prone to triggering the issue actually work.
> 
> This series consists of some patches which I originally wrote for
> XSA-102 to fix the issue properly before it was determined that those
> fixes were too invasive by far for a security update. At the end of the
> series is a new patch which removes the XSA-102 workaround since all
> problematic traps should now be handled.
> 
> Since these were originally intended to be the security fix they have
> had a fair bit of scrutiny already in private . However since there is
> now a risk of reintroducing XSA-102 I would appreciate a pretty thorough
> second pair of eyes on it this time around.
> 
> I've tested this with a local utility which tries to access the various
> cp and system registers from both 32- and 64-bit processes and checks
> that they either work or give the expected traps. Since this tool is
> effectively an exploit for XSA-102 I'm not sharing here but if you ask
> nicely and appear to be wearing the correct colour hat I might share it
> with you (it's not terribly impressive, so don't get too excited).
> 
> I've also successfully booted the VM which originally caused XSA-102 to
> be discovered (FSO successfully, since the VM image appears to be
> broken, but it no longer crashes for 32-on-64 reasons...)
> 
> Ian.
> 
> [0] http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-102.html

      parent reply	other threads:[~2014-09-09 16:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-09 16:22 [RFC PATCH 0/9] xen: arm: reenable support for 32-bit userspace running in 64-bit guest Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 1/9] xen: arm: Correct PMXEV cp register definitions Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 23:04   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 2/9] xen: arm: Factor out psr_mode_is_user Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 23:08   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 3/9] xen: arm: Handle 32-bit EL0 on 64-bit EL1 when advancing PC after trap Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 23:12   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 4/9] xen: arm: turn vtimer traps for cp32/64 and sysreg into #undef Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 23:31   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-10  9:46     ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-10 18:54       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-11  8:43         ` Ian Campbell
2015-01-14 16:33           ` Ian Campbell
2015-01-14 16:57             ` Julien Grall
2015-01-15 10:26               ` Ian Campbell
2015-01-15 12:27                 ` Julien Grall
2015-01-15 12:35                   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 5/9] xen: arm: Handle CP15 register traps from userspace Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 23:42   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-10  9:48     ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-10 18:56       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-18  1:31         ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 6/9] xen: arm: Handle CP14 32-bit register accesses " Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 23:45   ` Julien Grall
2014-09-10  9:48     ` Ian Campbell
2015-02-10  3:40       ` Ian Campbell
2015-02-10  4:14         ` Julien Grall
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 7/9] xen: arm: correctly handle sysreg " Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 8/9] xen: arm: handle remaining traps " Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 16:23 ` [PATCH 9/9] xen: arm: Allow traps from 32 bit userspace on 64 bit hypervisors again Ian Campbell
2014-09-09 16:23 ` Ian Campbell [this message]

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