From: Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> To: sfrench-eUNUBHrolfbYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org, linux-cifs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, samba-technical-w/Ol4Ecudpl8XjKLYN78aQ@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org Cc: taesoo-/4noJB3qBVQ3uPMLIKxrzw@public.gmane.org, changwoo-/4noJB3qBVQ3uPMLIKxrzw@public.gmane.org, sanidhya-/4noJB3qBVQ3uPMLIKxrzw@public.gmane.org, blee-/4noJB3qBVQ3uPMLIKxrzw@public.gmane.org, csong84-/4noJB3qBVQ3uPMLIKxrzw@public.gmane.org, Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] cifs: potential memory leaks when parsing mnt opts Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 19:08:30 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1426979310-31201-1-git-send-email-tsgatesv@gmail.com> (raw) For example, when mount opt is redundently specified (e.g., "user=A,user=B,user=C"), kernel kept allocating new key/val with kstrdup() and overwrite previous ptr (to be freed). Althouhg mkfs.cifs in userspace performs a bit of sanitization (e.g., forcing one user option), current implementation is not robust. Other options such as iocharset and domainanme are similary vulnerable. Signed-off-by: Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index d3aa999..4cb8450 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, pr_warn("CIFS: username too long\n"); goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } + + kfree(vol->username); vol->username = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->username) goto cifs_parse_mount_err; @@ -1700,6 +1702,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } + kfree(vol->domainname); vol->domainname = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->domainname) { pr_warn("CIFS: no memory for domainname\n"); @@ -1731,6 +1734,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, } if (strncasecmp(string, "default", 7) != 0) { + kfree(vol->iocharset); vol->iocharset = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->iocharset) { -- 2.3.3
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv@gmail.com> To: sfrench@samba.org, linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, samba-technical@lists.samba.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: taesoo@gatech.edu, changwoo@gatech.edu, sanidhya@gatech.edu, blee@gatech.edu, csong84@gatech.edu, Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv@gmail.com> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] cifs: potential memory leaks when parsing mnt opts Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 19:08:30 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1426979310-31201-1-git-send-email-tsgatesv@gmail.com> (raw) For example, when mount opt is redundently specified (e.g., "user=A,user=B,user=C"), kernel kept allocating new key/val with kstrdup() and overwrite previous ptr (to be freed). Althouhg mkfs.cifs in userspace performs a bit of sanitization (e.g., forcing one user option), current implementation is not robust. Other options such as iocharset and domainanme are similary vulnerable. Signed-off-by: Taesoo Kim <tsgatesv@gmail.com> --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index d3aa999..4cb8450 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, pr_warn("CIFS: username too long\n"); goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } + + kfree(vol->username); vol->username = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->username) goto cifs_parse_mount_err; @@ -1700,6 +1702,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, goto cifs_parse_mount_err; } + kfree(vol->domainname); vol->domainname = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->domainname) { pr_warn("CIFS: no memory for domainname\n"); @@ -1731,6 +1734,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(const char *mountdata, const char *devname, } if (strncasecmp(string, "default", 7) != 0) { + kfree(vol->iocharset); vol->iocharset = kstrdup(string, GFP_KERNEL); if (!vol->iocharset) { -- 2.3.3
next reply other threads:[~2015-03-21 23:08 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2015-03-21 23:08 Taesoo Kim [this message] 2015-03-21 23:08 ` [PATCH 1/1] cifs: potential memory leaks when parsing mnt opts Taesoo Kim [not found] ` <1426979310-31201-1-git-send-email-tsgatesv-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> 2015-03-22 2:10 ` Scott Lovenberg 2015-03-22 2:10 ` Scott Lovenberg [not found] ` <CAFB9KM3==40uUXxxOD_CD09zFPj3Fmr-Brt7x4SZj86NTf3_vg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org> 2015-03-22 3:23 ` Taesoo Kim 2015-03-22 3:23 ` Taesoo Kim [not found] ` <20150322032340.GD5170-Q1ymHw66ZoYdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org> 2015-03-22 3:54 ` Scott Lovenberg 2015-03-22 3:54 ` Scott Lovenberg 2015-03-24 4:43 ` Steve French 2015-03-24 4:43 ` Steve French
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