[PATCH 0/2] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[PATCH 0/2] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

This is the second version. It adds a strategy for the sysctls so that we
can reject any change to a value that was already negative. This way it's
possible to disable modify_ldt temporarily or permanently (eg: lock down a
server) as suggested by Kees.

Willy Tarreau (2):
  sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on
    negative values
  x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+)

-- 
1.7.12.1

[PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values

[Willy Tarreau]

The new function is proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(), it refuses to change
the value if the current one is already negative. This will be used to
lock down some settings such as sensitive system calls.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 kernel/sysctl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..86c95a8 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 #endif
 
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+
 static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
@@ -2249,6 +2252,33 @@ static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/* Like minmax except that it refuses any change if the value was already
+ * negative. It silently ignores overrides with the same negative value.
+ */
+static int do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
+					 int *valp,
+					 int write, void *data)
+{
+	if (write && *valp < 0 && (!*negp || *valp != (int)*lvalp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(negp, lvalp, valp, write, data);
+}
+
+/* Like proc_dointvec_minmax() except that it refuses any change once
+ * the destination is negative. Used to permanently disable some settings.
+ */
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param param = {
+		.min = (int *) table->extra1,
+		.max = (int *) table->extra2,
+	};
+	return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
+				do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv, &param);
+}
+
 static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -2751,6 +2781,12 @@ int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
 int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-- 
1.7.12.1

[PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values

[Willy Tarreau]

The new function is proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(), it refuses to change
the value if the current one is already negative. This will be used to
lock down some settings such as sensitive system calls.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 kernel/sysctl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..86c95a8 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 #endif
 
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+
 static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
@@ -2249,6 +2252,33 @@ static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/* Like minmax except that it refuses any change if the value was already
+ * negative. It silently ignores overrides with the same negative value.
+ */
+static int do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
+					 int *valp,
+					 int write, void *data)
+{
+	if (write && *valp < 0 && (!*negp || *valp != (int)*lvalp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(negp, lvalp, valp, write, data);
+}
+
+/* Like proc_dointvec_minmax() except that it refuses any change once
+ * the destination is negative. Used to permanently disable some settings.
+ */
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param param = {
+		.min = (int *) table->extra1,
+		.max = (int *) table->extra2,
+	};
+	return do_proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos,
+				do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv, &param);
+}
+
 static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -2751,6 +2781,12 @@ int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	return -ENOSYS;
 }
 
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+		    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
 int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 		    void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-- 
1.7.12.1

[PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at
runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be
a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that
it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt syscall.
+Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or
+segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is
+not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to
+exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled. When permanently disabled, it is not possible to change
+the value anymore until the next system reboot.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..420fc8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (sysctl_modify_ldt <= 0) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 86c95a8..ec1170d 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -963,6 +966,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm,
+		.extra1		= &neg_one,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

[PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at
runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be
a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that
it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt syscall.
+Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or
+segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is
+not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to
+exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled. When permanently disabled, it is not possible to change
+the value anymore until the next system reboot.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..420fc8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (sysctl_modify_ldt <= 0) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 86c95a8..ec1170d 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -963,6 +966,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm,
+		.extra1		= &neg_one,
+		.extra2		= &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

Re: [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> The new function is proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(), it refuses to change
> the value if the current one is already negative. This will be used to
> lock down some settings such as sensitive system calls.
>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  kernel/sysctl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 19b62b5..86c95a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>                                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
>  #endif
>
> +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> +               void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> +
>  static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
> @@ -2249,6 +2252,33 @@ static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
>  #endif
>  }
>
> +/* Like minmax except that it refuses any change if the value was already
> + * negative. It silently ignores overrides with the same negative value.
> + */
> +static int do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
> +                                        int *valp,
> +                                        int write, void *data)
> +{
> +       if (write && *valp < 0 && (!*negp || *valp != (int)*lvalp))

I could easily have failed to follow the bizarre negative sign
convention, but shouldn't that be "*valp != -(int)*lvalp" or similar?

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> The new function is proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(), it refuses to change
> the value if the current one is already negative. This will be used to
> lock down some settings such as sensitive system calls.
>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  kernel/sysctl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 19b62b5..86c95a8 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>                                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
>  #endif
>
> +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> +               void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> +
>  static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
>                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
> @@ -2249,6 +2252,33 @@ static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
>  #endif
>  }
>
> +/* Like minmax except that it refuses any change if the value was already
> + * negative. It silently ignores overrides with the same negative value.
> + */
> +static int do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
> +                                        int *valp,
> +                                        int write, void *data)
> +{
> +       if (write && *valp < 0 && (!*negp || *valp != (int)*lvalp))

I could easily have failed to follow the bizarre negative sign
convention, but shouldn't that be "*valp != -(int)*lvalp" or similar?

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
> modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
> sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at
> runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be
> a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that
> it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.
>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - kptr_restrict
>  - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
>  - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
> +- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
>  - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
>  - modules_disabled
>  - msg_next_id                [ sysv ipc ]
> @@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
>
>  ==============================================================
>
> +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> +
> +Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt syscall.
> +Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or
> +segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is
> +not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to
> +exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +

I'm not entirely convinced that the lock bit should work this way.  At
some point, we might want a setting for "32-bit only" or even "32-bit,
present, not non-conforming only" (like we do unconditionally for
set_thread_area).  When we do that, having -1 act like 0 might be
confusing.

I'd actually favor rigging it up to support enumerated values and/or
the word "locked" somewhere in the text.  So we could have "0", "1
locked", "1" or even "enabled" "enabled locked", "disabled", "disabled
locked", "safe 32-bit", "safe 32-bit locked", etc.

I'll add an explicit 16-bit check to my infinite todo list for the asm
part.  Now that the synchronous modify_ldt code is merged, it won't be
racy, and it would make a 32-bit only mode actually be useful (except
maybe on AMD -- someone needs to test just how badly broken IRET is on
AMD systems -- I know that AMD has IRET-to-16-bit differently broken
from Intel, and that causes test-cast failures.  Grump.)

P.S. Hey CPU vendors: please consider stopping your utter suckage when
it comes to critical system instructions.  Intel and AMD both
terminally screwed up IRET in multiple ways that clearly took actual
effort.  Intel screwed up SYSRET pretty badly (AFAIK every single
64-bit OS has had at least one root hole as a result), and AMD screwed
SYSRET up differently (userspace crash bug that requires a performance
hit to mitigate because no one at AMD realized that one might preempt
a process during a syscall).

P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).

P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
> modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
> sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at
> runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be
> a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that
> it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.
>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - kptr_restrict
>  - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
>  - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
> +- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
>  - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
>  - modules_disabled
>  - msg_next_id                [ sysv ipc ]
> @@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
>
>  ==============================================================
>
> +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> +
> +Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt syscall.
> +Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or
> +segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is
> +not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to
> +exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +

I'm not entirely convinced that the lock bit should work this way.  At
some point, we might want a setting for "32-bit only" or even "32-bit,
present, not non-conforming only" (like we do unconditionally for
set_thread_area).  When we do that, having -1 act like 0 might be
confusing.

I'd actually favor rigging it up to support enumerated values and/or
the word "locked" somewhere in the text.  So we could have "0", "1
locked", "1" or even "enabled" "enabled locked", "disabled", "disabled
locked", "safe 32-bit", "safe 32-bit locked", etc.

I'll add an explicit 16-bit check to my infinite todo list for the asm
part.  Now that the synchronous modify_ldt code is merged, it won't be
racy, and it would make a 32-bit only mode actually be useful (except
maybe on AMD -- someone needs to test just how badly broken IRET is on
AMD systems -- I know that AMD has IRET-to-16-bit differently broken
from Intel, and that causes test-cast failures.  Grump.)

P.S. Hey CPU vendors: please consider stopping your utter suckage when
it comes to critical system instructions.  Intel and AMD both
terminally screwed up IRET in multiple ways that clearly took actual
effort.  Intel screwed up SYSRET pretty badly (AFAIK every single
64-bit OS has had at least one root hole as a result), and AMD screwed
SYSRET up differently (userspace crash bug that requires a performance
hit to mitigate because no one at AMD realized that one might preempt
a process during a syscall).

P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).

P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:33:30AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> > The new function is proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(), it refuses to change
> > the value if the current one is already negative. This will be used to
> > lock down some settings such as sensitive system calls.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> > ---
> >  kernel/sysctl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > index 19b62b5..86c95a8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> >                                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> >  #endif
> >
> > +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> > +               void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> > +
> >  static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> >                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
> > @@ -2249,6 +2252,33 @@ static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
> >  #endif
> >  }
> >
> > +/* Like minmax except that it refuses any change if the value was already
> > + * negative. It silently ignores overrides with the same negative value.
> > + */
> > +static int do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
> > +                                        int *valp,
> > +                                        int write, void *data)
> > +{
> > +       if (write && *valp < 0 && (!*negp || *valp != (int)*lvalp))
> 
> I could easily have failed to follow the bizarre negative sign
> convention, but shouldn't that be "*valp != -(int)*lvalp" or similar?

Not exactly since the sign is passed via negp apparently. There
is an expression in the called function which first assigns lvalp
or -lvalp to val depending on val, then uses the resulting value.

The code above is the (simplified for me) equivalent of :

     int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp;

     if (write && *valp < 0 && *valp != val)
             return -EINVAL;

Maybe you find it more readable in which case I can redo it this way ?
In my case it was the opposite in fact, I want to reject non-negative
values as well as the negative ones not equal to *valp.

Note that we could have decided to make it even simpler and always
reject writes once *valp is < 0 but I find that it would be annoying
for hardening scripts which would not be idempotent anymore.

Willy

Re: [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on negative values

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:33:30AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> > The new function is proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(), it refuses to change
> > the value if the current one is already negative. This will be used to
> > lock down some settings such as sensitive system calls.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> > ---
> >  kernel/sysctl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > index 19b62b5..86c95a8 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> > @@ -185,6 +185,9 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> >                                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> >  #endif
> >
> > +static int proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> > +               void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> > +
> >  static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> >                 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_COREDUMP
> > @@ -2249,6 +2252,33 @@ static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
> >  #endif
> >  }
> >
> > +/* Like minmax except that it refuses any change if the value was already
> > + * negative. It silently ignores overrides with the same negative value.
> > + */
> > +static int do_proc_dointvec_negperm_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
> > +                                        int *valp,
> > +                                        int write, void *data)
> > +{
> > +       if (write && *valp < 0 && (!*negp || *valp != (int)*lvalp))
> 
> I could easily have failed to follow the bizarre negative sign
> convention, but shouldn't that be "*valp != -(int)*lvalp" or similar?

Not exactly since the sign is passed via negp apparently. There
is an expression in the called function which first assigns lvalp
or -lvalp to val depending on val, then uses the resulting value.

The code above is the (simplified for me) equivalent of :

     int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp;

     if (write && *valp < 0 && *valp != val)
             return -EINVAL;

Maybe you find it more readable in which case I can redo it this way ?
In my case it was the opposite in fact, I want to reject non-negative
values as well as the negative ones not equal to *valp.

Note that we could have decided to make it even simpler and always
reject writes once *valp is < 0 but I find that it would be annoying
for hardening scripts which would not be idempotent anymore.

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I'm not entirely convinced that the lock bit should work this way.  At
> some point, we might want a setting for "32-bit only" or even "32-bit,
> present, not non-conforming only" (like we do unconditionally for
> set_thread_area).  When we do that, having -1 act like 0 might be
> confusing.
> 
> I'd actually favor rigging it up to support enumerated values and/or
> the word "locked" somewhere in the text.  So we could have "0", "1
> locked", "1" or even "enabled" "enabled locked", "disabled", "disabled
> locked", "safe 32-bit", "safe 32-bit locked", etc.

Got it, that makes sense indeed. I asked myself whether we'd use more
than these 3 values, and estimated that "locked on" didn't make much
sense here, and I thought that nobody would like to manipulate such
things using bitmaps. But with words like this it can indeed make
sense.

I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
patch available.

> I'll add an explicit 16-bit check to my infinite todo list for the asm
> part.  Now that the synchronous modify_ldt code is merged, it won't be
> racy, and it would make a 32-bit only mode actually be useful (except
> maybe on AMD -- someone needs to test just how badly broken IRET is on
> AMD systems -- I know that AMD has IRET-to-16-bit differently broken
> from Intel, and that causes test-cast failures.  Grump.)
> 
> P.S. Hey CPU vendors: please consider stopping your utter suckage when
> it comes to critical system instructions.  Intel and AMD both
> terminally screwed up IRET in multiple ways that clearly took actual
> effort.  Intel screwed up SYSRET pretty badly (AFAIK every single
> 64-bit OS has had at least one root hole as a result), and AMD screwed
> SYSRET up differently (userspace crash bug that requires a performance
> hit to mitigate because no one at AMD realized that one might preempt
> a process during a syscall).

Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
to emulate IRET though.

> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
> 
> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?

A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I'm not entirely convinced that the lock bit should work this way.  At
> some point, we might want a setting for "32-bit only" or even "32-bit,
> present, not non-conforming only" (like we do unconditionally for
> set_thread_area).  When we do that, having -1 act like 0 might be
> confusing.
> 
> I'd actually favor rigging it up to support enumerated values and/or
> the word "locked" somewhere in the text.  So we could have "0", "1
> locked", "1" or even "enabled" "enabled locked", "disabled", "disabled
> locked", "safe 32-bit", "safe 32-bit locked", etc.

Got it, that makes sense indeed. I asked myself whether we'd use more
than these 3 values, and estimated that "locked on" didn't make much
sense here, and I thought that nobody would like to manipulate such
things using bitmaps. But with words like this it can indeed make
sense.

I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
patch available.

> I'll add an explicit 16-bit check to my infinite todo list for the asm
> part.  Now that the synchronous modify_ldt code is merged, it won't be
> racy, and it would make a 32-bit only mode actually be useful (except
> maybe on AMD -- someone needs to test just how badly broken IRET is on
> AMD systems -- I know that AMD has IRET-to-16-bit differently broken
> from Intel, and that causes test-cast failures.  Grump.)
> 
> P.S. Hey CPU vendors: please consider stopping your utter suckage when
> it comes to critical system instructions.  Intel and AMD both
> terminally screwed up IRET in multiple ways that clearly took actual
> effort.  Intel screwed up SYSRET pretty badly (AFAIK every single
> 64-bit OS has had at least one root hole as a result), and AMD screwed
> SYSRET up differently (userspace crash bug that requires a performance
> hit to mitigate because no one at AMD realized that one might preempt
> a process during a syscall).

Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
to emulate IRET though.

> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
> 
> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?

A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> I'm not entirely convinced that the lock bit should work this way.  At
>> some point, we might want a setting for "32-bit only" or even "32-bit,
>> present, not non-conforming only" (like we do unconditionally for
>> set_thread_area).  When we do that, having -1 act like 0 might be
>> confusing.
>>
>> I'd actually favor rigging it up to support enumerated values and/or
>> the word "locked" somewhere in the text.  So we could have "0", "1
>> locked", "1" or even "enabled" "enabled locked", "disabled", "disabled
>> locked", "safe 32-bit", "safe 32-bit locked", etc.
>
> Got it, that makes sense indeed. I asked myself whether we'd use more
> than these 3 values, and estimated that "locked on" didn't make much
> sense here, and I thought that nobody would like to manipulate such
> things using bitmaps. But with words like this it can indeed make
> sense.
>
> I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
> we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
> patch available.

Sounds good to me.

>
>> I'll add an explicit 16-bit check to my infinite todo list for the asm
>> part.  Now that the synchronous modify_ldt code is merged, it won't be
>> racy, and it would make a 32-bit only mode actually be useful (except
>> maybe on AMD -- someone needs to test just how badly broken IRET is on
>> AMD systems -- I know that AMD has IRET-to-16-bit differently broken
>> from Intel, and that causes test-cast failures.  Grump.)
>>
>> P.S. Hey CPU vendors: please consider stopping your utter suckage when
>> it comes to critical system instructions.  Intel and AMD both
>> terminally screwed up IRET in multiple ways that clearly took actual
>> effort.  Intel screwed up SYSRET pretty badly (AFAIK every single
>> 64-bit OS has had at least one root hole as a result), and AMD screwed
>> SYSRET up differently (userspace crash bug that requires a performance
>> hit to mitigate because no one at AMD realized that one might preempt
>> a process during a syscall).
>
> Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
> least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
> to emulate IRET though.

You sure?  I'm reasonably confident that Athlon 64 and newer support
SYSRET in legacy and long mode.  Of course, I think that SYSCALL is
totally worthless in legacy mode (SYSCALL_MASK isn't available, so I
suspect that the lack of sensible TF handling would be a
show-stopper).

>
>> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
>> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
>> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
>>
>> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
>> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
>
> A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
> so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
> one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.
>

How about a dedicated "NMI masked" flag in EFLAGS?  That would be
straightforward and dead simple to handle.

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> I'm not entirely convinced that the lock bit should work this way.  At
>> some point, we might want a setting for "32-bit only" or even "32-bit,
>> present, not non-conforming only" (like we do unconditionally for
>> set_thread_area).  When we do that, having -1 act like 0 might be
>> confusing.
>>
>> I'd actually favor rigging it up to support enumerated values and/or
>> the word "locked" somewhere in the text.  So we could have "0", "1
>> locked", "1" or even "enabled" "enabled locked", "disabled", "disabled
>> locked", "safe 32-bit", "safe 32-bit locked", etc.
>
> Got it, that makes sense indeed. I asked myself whether we'd use more
> than these 3 values, and estimated that "locked on" didn't make much
> sense here, and I thought that nobody would like to manipulate such
> things using bitmaps. But with words like this it can indeed make
> sense.
>
> I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
> we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
> patch available.

Sounds good to me.

>
>> I'll add an explicit 16-bit check to my infinite todo list for the asm
>> part.  Now that the synchronous modify_ldt code is merged, it won't be
>> racy, and it would make a 32-bit only mode actually be useful (except
>> maybe on AMD -- someone needs to test just how badly broken IRET is on
>> AMD systems -- I know that AMD has IRET-to-16-bit differently broken
>> from Intel, and that causes test-cast failures.  Grump.)
>>
>> P.S. Hey CPU vendors: please consider stopping your utter suckage when
>> it comes to critical system instructions.  Intel and AMD both
>> terminally screwed up IRET in multiple ways that clearly took actual
>> effort.  Intel screwed up SYSRET pretty badly (AFAIK every single
>> 64-bit OS has had at least one root hole as a result), and AMD screwed
>> SYSRET up differently (userspace crash bug that requires a performance
>> hit to mitigate because no one at AMD realized that one might preempt
>> a process during a syscall).
>
> Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
> least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
> to emulate IRET though.

You sure?  I'm reasonably confident that Athlon 64 and newer support
SYSRET in legacy and long mode.  Of course, I think that SYSCALL is
totally worthless in legacy mode (SYSCALL_MASK isn't available, so I
suspect that the lack of sensible TF handling would be a
show-stopper).

>
>> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
>> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
>> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
>>
>> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
>> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
>
> A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
> so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
> one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.
>

How about a dedicated "NMI masked" flag in EFLAGS?  That would be
straightforward and dead simple to handle.

--Andy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 12:06:12PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
(...)
> > I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
> > we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
> > patch available.
> 
> Sounds good to me.

OK I'll send the other one instead once I unpack my PC.

> > Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
> > least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
> > to emulate IRET though.
> 
> You sure?  I'm reasonably confident that Athlon 64 and newer support
> SYSRET in legacy and long mode.  Of course, I think that SYSCALL is
> totally worthless in legacy mode (SYSCALL_MASK isn't available, so I
> suspect that the lack of sensible TF handling would be a
> show-stopper).

I meant loadall cannot be screwed since it was replaced.

> >> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
> >> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
> >> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
> >>
> >> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> >> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
> >
> > A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
> > so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
> > one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.
> >
> 
> How about a dedicated "NMI masked" flag in EFLAGS?  That would be
> straightforward and dead simple to handle.

Sounds like an oxymoron. But such a flag should be atomically manipulated
so that you don't re-arm queued NMIs before calling iret. With two flags,
a read-only one for "NMI masked" and a modifiable one "keep NMI masked",
you can provide an atomic behaviour where you have this latch executed
on iret :

     NMI_MASKED &= KEEP_NMI_MASKED;
     KEEP_NMI_MASKED = 0;

But anyway we're discussing in the void, this CPU doesn't exist so unless
intel/AMD designers want to improve their design (and start by talking
together to reach the exact same behavior), we'll never see anything like
this :-/

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 12:06:12PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
(...)
> > I feel like it's probably part of a larger project then. Do you think
> > we should step back and only support 0/1 for now ? I also have the
> > patch available.
> 
> Sounds good to me.

OK I'll send the other one instead once I unpack my PC.

> > Well the good thing is that SYSRET reused the LOADALL opcode so at
> > least this one cannot be screwed on 64-bit :-) It would have helped us
> > to emulate IRET though.
> 
> You sure?  I'm reasonably confident that Athlon 64 and newer support
> SYSRET in legacy and long mode.  Of course, I think that SYSCALL is
> totally worthless in legacy mode (SYSCALL_MASK isn't available, so I
> suspect that the lack of sensible TF handling would be a
> show-stopper).

I meant loadall cannot be screwed since it was replaced.

> >> P.P.S. You know what would be *way* better than allowing IRET to
> >> fault?  Just allow IRET to continue executing the next instruction on
> >> failure (I'm talking about #GP, #NP, and #SS here, not page faults).
> >>
> >> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> >> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
> >
> > A dedicated flag "don't clear NMI yet" would have been nice in EFLAGS
> > so that the software stack could set it in fault handlers. It would be
> > one-shot and always cleared by IRET. That would have been very handy.
> >
> 
> How about a dedicated "NMI masked" flag in EFLAGS?  That would be
> straightforward and dead simple to handle.

Sounds like an oxymoron. But such a flag should be atomically manipulated
so that you don't re-arm queued NMIs before calling iret. With two flags,
a read-only one for "NMI masked" and a modifiable one "keep NMI masked",
you can provide an atomic behaviour where you have this latch executed
on iret :

     NMI_MASKED &= KEEP_NMI_MASKED;
     KEEP_NMI_MASKED = 0;

But anyway we're discussing in the void, this CPU doesn't exist so unless
intel/AMD designers want to improve their design (and start by talking
together to reach the exact same behavior), we'll never see anything like
this :-/

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
> modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
> sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at
> runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be
> a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that
> it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.
>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - kptr_restrict
>  - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
>  - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
> +- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
>  - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
>  - modules_disabled
>  - msg_next_id                [ sysv ipc ]
> @@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
>
>  ==============================================================
>
> +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> +
> +Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt syscall.
> +Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or
> +segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is
> +not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to
> +exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +
> +This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
> +system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
> +was already disabled. When permanently disabled, it is not possible to change
> +the value anymore until the next system reboot.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
>  modules_disabled:
>
>  A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
>           surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
>
>           Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
> +         If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
> +
> +config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +       bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
> +       depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +       default y
> +       ---help---
> +         Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
> +         16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
> +         a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
> +         and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
> +         the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +
> +         For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
> +         feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
> +         the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
> +         by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
>
>  source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> index 2bcc052..420fc8f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
>  #include <linux/smp.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> @@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
>  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>  #include <asm/syscalls.h>
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
> +       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
> +#endif
> +
>  /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
>  static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
>  {
> @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
>  {
>         int ret = -ENOSYS;
>
> +       if (sysctl_modify_ldt <= 0) {
> +               printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO

pr_info_ratelimited? *shrug*

> +                       "Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> +                       " Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> +                       current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +                       from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> +               return ret;
> +       }
> +
>         switch (func) {
>         case 0:
>                 ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 86c95a8..ec1170d 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
>  #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
>  extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
> +#endif
>
>  /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
> @@ -963,6 +966,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>                 .mode           = 0644,
>                 .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
>         },
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +       {
> +               .procname       = "modify_ldt",
> +               .data           = &sysctl_modify_ldt,
> +               .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
> +               .mode           = 0644,
> +               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm,
> +               .extra1         = &neg_one,
> +               .extra2         = &one,
> +       },
> +#endif
>  #endif
>  #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
>         {
> --
> 1.7.12.1
>

Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :)

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
> modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
> sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at
> runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be
> a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that
> it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.
>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - kptr_restrict
>  - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
>  - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
> +- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
>  - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
>  - modules_disabled
>  - msg_next_id                [ sysv ipc ]
> @@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
>
>  ==============================================================
>
> +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> +
> +Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt syscall.
> +Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or
> +segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is
> +not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to
> +exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +
> +This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
> +system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
> +was already disabled. When permanently disabled, it is not possible to change
> +the value anymore until the next system reboot.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
>  modules_disabled:
>
>  A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
>           surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
>
>           Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
> +         If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
> +
> +config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +       bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
> +       depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +       default y
> +       ---help---
> +         Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
> +         16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
> +         a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
> +         and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
> +         the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +
> +         For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
> +         feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
> +         the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
> +         by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
>
>  source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> index 2bcc052..420fc8f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
>  #include <linux/smp.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> @@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
>  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>  #include <asm/syscalls.h>
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
> +       IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
> +#endif
> +
>  /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
>  static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
>  {
> @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
>  {
>         int ret = -ENOSYS;
>
> +       if (sysctl_modify_ldt <= 0) {
> +               printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO

pr_info_ratelimited? *shrug*

> +                       "Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> +                       " Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> +                       current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +                       from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> +               return ret;
> +       }
> +
>         switch (func) {
>         case 0:
>                 ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 86c95a8..ec1170d 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
>  #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
>  extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
> +#endif
>
>  /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
> @@ -963,6 +966,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>                 .mode           = 0644,
>                 .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
>         },
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +       {
> +               .procname       = "modify_ldt",
> +               .data           = &sysctl_modify_ldt,
> +               .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
> +               .mode           = 0644,
> +               .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm,
> +               .extra1         = &neg_one,
> +               .extra2         = &one,
> +       },
> +#endif
>  #endif
>  #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
>         {
> --
> 1.7.12.1
>

Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :)

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 03:35:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :)

Andy would like to see this evolve towards something possibly
more complete and/or generic. I think this needs more thoughts
and that we should possibly stick to 0/1 for now and decide how
we want to make this evolve later to cover permanent disable,
various ABIs, etc...

What do you think ?

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 03:35:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :)

Andy would like to see this evolve towards something possibly
more complete and/or generic. I think this needs more thoughts
and that we should possibly stick to 0/1 for now and decide how
we want to make this evolve later to cover permanent disable,
various ABIs, etc...

What do you think ?

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 4:19 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 03:35:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :)
>
> Andy would like to see this evolve towards something possibly
> more complete and/or generic. I think this needs more thoughts
> and that we should possibly stick to 0/1 for now and decide how
> we want to make this evolve later to cover permanent disable,
> various ABIs, etc...
>
> What do you think ?

That's probably the best way forward. I still think a generic syscall
disabling feature would be nice. :) I won't have time to work on it
for a little while, though.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 4:19 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 03:35:15PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :)
>
> Andy would like to see this evolve towards something possibly
> more complete and/or generic. I think this needs more thoughts
> and that we should possibly stick to 0/1 for now and decide how
> we want to make this evolve later to cover permanent disable,
> various ABIs, etc...
>
> What do you think ?

That's probably the best way forward. I still think a generic syscall
disabling feature would be nice. :) I won't have time to work on it
for a little while, though.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Borislav Petkov]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?

What happened with asking Intel for a sane IRET-NG?

Should be relatively easy - take the current IRET microcode, get rid
of the nasty crap, allocate a new opcode and done. Validation should
actually have *less* to do and can reuse all current test cases.

:-)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
--

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Borislav Petkov]

On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?

What happened with asking Intel for a sane IRET-NG?

Should be relatively easy - take the current IRET microcode, get rid
of the nasty crap, allocate a new opcode and done. Validation should
actually have *less* to do and can reuse all current test cases.

:-)

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
--

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Tue, Aug 04, 2015 at 05:54:51AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> > whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
> 
> What happened with asking Intel for a sane IRET-NG?
> 
> Should be relatively easy - take the current IRET microcode, get rid
> of the nasty crap, allocate a new opcode and done. Validation should
> actually have *less* to do and can reuse all current test cases.

Even easier, just add a few flags (probably 2 or 3 only) that IRET can
check to adjust its behaviour. Basically "don't re-enable NMIs yet",
maybe something to adjust the behaviour on bad CS/SS/SP/IP and a few
such things could possibly help. Maybe all of this could be summarized
as a single flag "I'm in a fault handler".

Willy

Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

[Willy Tarreau]

On Tue, Aug 04, 2015 at 05:54:51AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 03, 2015 at 11:45:24AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > P.P.P.S.  Who thought that IRET faults unmasking NMIs made any sense
> > whatsoever when NMIs run on an IST stack?  Seriously, people?
> 
> What happened with asking Intel for a sane IRET-NG?
> 
> Should be relatively easy - take the current IRET microcode, get rid
> of the nasty crap, allocate a new opcode and done. Validation should
> actually have *less* to do and can reuse all current test cases.

Even easier, just add a few flags (probably 2 or 3 only) that IRET can
check to adjust its behaviour. Basically "don't re-enable NMIs yet",
maybe something to adjust the behaviour on bad CS/SS/SP/IP and a few
such things could possibly help. Maybe all of this could be summarized
as a single flag "I'm in a fault handler".

Willy

[PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Future improvements regarding permanent disabling will have to be done
in consideration for other syscalls, ABIs and general use cases.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---

So this is the third version which only allows to temporarily enable or
disable the modify_ldt syscall. Permanent changes will have to be thought
about later. It applies on top of Andy's series.


 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
+such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
+some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..cb64b85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..492aeba 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

[PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Future improvements regarding permanent disabling will have to be done
in consideration for other syscalls, ABIs and general use cases.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---

So this is the third version which only allows to temporarily enable or
disable the modify_ldt syscall. Permanent changes will have to be thought
about later. It applies on top of Andy's series.


 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
+such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
+some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..cb64b85 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..492aeba 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Ingo Molnar]

* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
>  {
>  	int ret = -ENOSYS;
>  
> +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> +			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));

UI nit: so this message should really tell the user _which_ sysctl to configure, 
instead of passive-aggressively alluding to the fact that there's a sysctl 
somewhere that might do the trick...

Thanks,

	Ingo

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Ingo Molnar]

* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
>  {
>  	int ret = -ENOSYS;
>  
> +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> +			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));

UI nit: so this message should really tell the user _which_ sysctl to configure, 
instead of passive-aggressively alluding to the fact that there's a sysctl 
somewhere that might do the trick...

Thanks,

	Ingo

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

Hi Ingo,

On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 10:00:37AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> 
> > @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
> >  {
> >  	int ret = -ENOSYS;
> >  
> > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > +			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> > +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> > +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> 
> UI nit: so this message should really tell the user _which_ sysctl to configure, 
> instead of passive-aggressively alluding to the fact that there's a sysctl 
> somewhere that might do the trick...

I agree, I did it first and changed my mind due to the repetition of
the word "modify_ldt".

Here's an updated version instead.

Willy


>From 17b2720cd54df0fde6686c1d85aaed38d679cbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
+such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
+some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..354e854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,16 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"
+			" exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..492aeba 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

Hi Ingo,

On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 10:00:37AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> 
> > @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
> >  {
> >  	int ret = -ENOSYS;
> >  
> > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > +			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> > +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> > +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> 
> UI nit: so this message should really tell the user _which_ sysctl to configure, 
> instead of passive-aggressively alluding to the fact that there's a sysctl 
> somewhere that might do the trick...

I agree, I did it first and changed my mind due to the repetition of
the word "modify_ldt".

Here's an updated version instead.

Willy


>From 17b2720cd54df0fde6686c1d85aaed38d679cbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
+such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
+some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
+	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..354e854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,16 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"
+			" exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..492aeba 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Ingo Molnar]

* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> Hi Ingo,
> 
> On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 10:00:37AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > 
> > * Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> > 
> > > @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
> > >  {
> > >  	int ret = -ENOSYS;
> > >  
> > > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > > +			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> > > +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> > > +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> > 
> > UI nit: so this message should really tell the user _which_ sysctl to configure, 
> > instead of passive-aggressively alluding to the fact that there's a sysctl 
> > somewhere that might do the trick...
> 
> I agree, I did it first and changed my mind due to the repetition of
> the word "modify_ldt".
> 
> Here's an updated version instead.
> 
> Willy
> 
> 
> From 17b2720cd54df0fde6686c1d85aaed38d679cbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime
> 
> For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
> modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
> sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
> by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
> attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.
> 
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - kptr_restrict
>  - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
>  - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
> +- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
>  - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
>  - modules_disabled
>  - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
> @@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
>  
>  ==============================================================
>  
> +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> +
> +Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
> +(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code

s/run a/run

> +such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed

s/Dosemu/DOSEMU

> +to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
> +some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.

So that's pretty vague IMHO, and a bit FUD-ish in character. How about:

  ... , and which system call exposes complex, rarely used legacy hardware 
  features and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the past.

> +
> +This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
> +system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
> +was already disabled.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
>  modules_disabled:
>  
>  A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
>  	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
>  
>  	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
> +	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
> +
> +config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
> +	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +	default y
> +	---help---
> +	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
> +	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
> +	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
> +	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
> +	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +
> +	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
> +	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
> +	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
> +	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.

Here I'd do the same modifications as to the sysctl text above.

> +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> +			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"

Would it really be so difficult to write this as:

  Set "sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.

99% of the users seeing this message will see it right after an app of theirs 
ended up not working. Let's not add to the annoyance factor!

> +			" exploit attempt.\n",
> +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));

Also generally please don't break message lines in the source code while they are 
a single line in the syslog, to make it easier to grep for and to expose kernel 
hackers to the form of message they are emitting. Ignore checkpatch.

> @@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>  		.mode		= 0644,
>  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
>  	},
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +	{
> +		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
> +		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> +		.mode		= 0644,
> +		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> +		.extra1         = &zero,
> +		.extra2         = &one,
> +	},
> +#endif

So I'd actually make the permissions 0600: to make it a tiny bit harder for 
exploits to silently query the current value to figure out whether they can safely 
attempt the syscall or not ...

(Sadly /etc/sysctl.conf is world-readable on most distros.)

Thanks,

	Ingo

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Ingo Molnar]

* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> Hi Ingo,
> 
> On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 10:00:37AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > 
> > * Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
> > 
> > > @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
> > >  {
> > >  	int ret = -ENOSYS;
> > >  
> > > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > > +			" Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
> > > +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> > > +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> > 
> > UI nit: so this message should really tell the user _which_ sysctl to configure, 
> > instead of passive-aggressively alluding to the fact that there's a sysctl 
> > somewhere that might do the trick...
> 
> I agree, I did it first and changed my mind due to the repetition of
> the word "modify_ldt".
> 
> Here's an updated version instead.
> 
> Willy
> 
> 
> From 17b2720cd54df0fde6686c1d85aaed38d679cbe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime
> 
> For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
> modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
> sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
> by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
> attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.
> 
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 6fccb69..60c7c7a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - kptr_restrict
>  - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
>  - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
> +- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
>  - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
>  - modules_disabled
>  - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
> @@ -391,6 +392,20 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
>  
>  ==============================================================
>  
> +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> +
> +Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
> +(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code

s/run a/run

> +such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed

s/Dosemu/DOSEMU

> +to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
> +some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.

So that's pretty vague IMHO, and a bit FUD-ish in character. How about:

  ... , and which system call exposes complex, rarely used legacy hardware 
  features and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the past.

> +
> +This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
> +system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
> +was already disabled.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
>  modules_disabled:
>  
>  A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index beabf30..88d10a0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
>  	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
>  
>  	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
> +	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
> +
> +config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
> +	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +	default y
> +	---help---
> +	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a
> +	  16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via
> +	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
> +	  and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of
> +	  the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> +
> +	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
> +	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
> +	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
> +	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.

Here I'd do the same modifications as to the sysctl text above.

> +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> +			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"

Would it really be so difficult to write this as:

  Set "sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.

99% of the users seeing this message will see it right after an app of theirs 
ended up not working. Let's not add to the annoyance factor!

> +			" exploit attempt.\n",
> +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));

Also generally please don't break message lines in the source code while they are 
a single line in the syslog, to make it easier to grep for and to expose kernel 
hackers to the form of message they are emitting. Ignore checkpatch.

> @@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>  		.mode		= 0644,
>  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
>  	},
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> +	{
> +		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
> +		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> +		.mode		= 0644,
> +		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> +		.extra1         = &zero,
> +		.extra2         = &one,
> +	},
> +#endif

So I'd actually make the permissions 0600: to make it a tiny bit harder for 
exploits to silently query the current value to figure out whether they can safely 
attempt the syscall or not ...

(Sadly /etc/sysctl.conf is world-readable on most distros.)

Thanks,

	Ingo

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 10:26:16AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> > +
> > +Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
> > +(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
> 
> s/run a/run

good catch, thanks.

> > +such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
> 
> s/Dosemu/DOSEMU

I didn't know. Fixed.

> > +to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
> > +some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> 
> So that's pretty vague IMHO, and a bit FUD-ish in character. How about:
> 
>   ... , and which system call exposes complex, rarely used legacy hardware 
>   features and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the past.

OK fine for me, fixed.

> > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > +			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"
> 
> Would it really be so difficult to write this as:
> 
>   Set "sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.

It's just a matter of taste. Normally I consider the kernel distro-agnostic
so I don't like to suggest one way to adjust sysctls nor to reference config
files. Here we're in a case where only standard distro users may hit the
issue, and users of embedded distros will not face this message or will
easily translate it into their respective configuration scheme. So OK for
this one.

> 99% of the users seeing this message will see it right after an app of theirs 
> ended up not working. Let's not add to the annoyance factor!

That's exactly why I wrote the message in the first place!

> > +			" exploit attempt.\n",
> > +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> > +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> 
> Also generally please don't break message lines in the source code while they are 
> a single line in the syslog, to make it easier to grep for and to expose kernel 
> hackers to the form of message they are emitting. Ignore checkpatch.

I'm fine with this rule as well, it's only in the kenrel that I tend to
care about the 80-col limit, in my own code I easily ignore it for the
same reason.

> > @@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> >  		.mode		= 0644,
> >  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
> >  	},
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> > +	{
> > +		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
> > +		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
> > +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> > +		.mode		= 0644,
> > +		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> > +		.extra1         = &zero,
> > +		.extra2         = &one,
> > +	},
> > +#endif
> 
> So I'd actually make the permissions 0600: to make it a tiny bit harder for 
> exploits to silently query the current value to figure out whether they can safely 
> attempt the syscall or not ...

That's a good point. If we later make other syscalls configurable, it might
be different because some users might want to contact their admin to ask for
a specific one. But here, there's usually no admin so I'm fine with hardening
it.

> (Sadly /etc/sysctl.conf is world-readable on most distros.)

Yes, just like most executables are readable while not strictly needed,
especially setuid ones which allow the code to be studied in place or
easily duplicated to script some exploits. But we could discuss hours
about basic system hardening!

I've updated the patch with your suggestions.

Thanks,
Willy


>From 8521f170515dfc0f390c396100140504c8dfbcfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..7dcdebd 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run 16-bit or segmented code
+such as DOSEMU or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which exposes complex, rarely used legacy
+hardware features and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the
+past.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..e528fb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as DOSEMU or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which exposes complex, rarely used legacy hardware features
+	  and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the past.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..b8a4f2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Set \"sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1\" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..f7eb41f 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

On Wed, Aug 05, 2015 at 10:26:16AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > +modify_ldt: (X86 only)
> > +
> > +Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
> > +(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or segmented code
> 
> s/run a/run

good catch, thanks.

> > +such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
> 
> s/Dosemu/DOSEMU

I didn't know. Fixed.

> > +to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to exploit
> > +some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities.
> 
> So that's pretty vague IMHO, and a bit FUD-ish in character. How about:
> 
>   ... , and which system call exposes complex, rarely used legacy hardware 
>   features and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the past.

OK fine for me, fixed.

> > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > +			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"
> 
> Would it really be so difficult to write this as:
> 
>   Set "sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.

It's just a matter of taste. Normally I consider the kernel distro-agnostic
so I don't like to suggest one way to adjust sysctls nor to reference config
files. Here we're in a case where only standard distro users may hit the
issue, and users of embedded distros will not face this message or will
easily translate it into their respective configuration scheme. So OK for
this one.

> 99% of the users seeing this message will see it right after an app of theirs 
> ended up not working. Let's not add to the annoyance factor!

That's exactly why I wrote the message in the first place!

> > +			" exploit attempt.\n",
> > +			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> > +			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
> 
> Also generally please don't break message lines in the source code while they are 
> a single line in the syslog, to make it easier to grep for and to expose kernel 
> hackers to the form of message they are emitting. Ignore checkpatch.

I'm fine with this rule as well, it's only in the kenrel that I tend to
care about the 80-col limit, in my own code I easily ignore it for the
same reason.

> > @@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> >  		.mode		= 0644,
> >  		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
> >  	},
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
> > +	{
> > +		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
> > +		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
> > +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> > +		.mode		= 0644,
> > +		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> > +		.extra1         = &zero,
> > +		.extra2         = &one,
> > +	},
> > +#endif
> 
> So I'd actually make the permissions 0600: to make it a tiny bit harder for 
> exploits to silently query the current value to figure out whether they can safely 
> attempt the syscall or not ...

That's a good point. If we later make other syscalls configurable, it might
be different because some users might want to contact their admin to ask for
a specific one. But here, there's usually no admin so I'm fine with hardening
it.

> (Sadly /etc/sysctl.conf is world-readable on most distros.)

Yes, just like most executables are readable while not strictly needed,
especially setuid ones which allow the code to be studied in place or
easily duplicated to script some exploits. But we could discuss hours
about basic system hardening!

I've updated the patch with your suggestions.

Thanks,
Willy


>From 8521f170515dfc0f390c396100140504c8dfbcfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2015 12:18:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the
modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a
sysctl to enable or/disable it at runtime, and proposes to disable it
by default. This can be a safe alternative. A message is logged if an
attempt was stopped so that it's easy to spot if/when it is needed.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6fccb69..7dcdebd 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
 - kptr_restrict
 - kstack_depth_to_print       [ X86 only ]
 - l2cr                        [ PPC only ]
+- modify_ldt                  [ X86 only ]
 - modprobe                    ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
 - modules_disabled
 - msg_next_id		      [ sysv ipc ]
@@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If
 
 ==============================================================
 
+modify_ldt: (X86 only)
+
+Enables (1) or disables (0) the modify_ldt syscall. Modifying the LDT
+(Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run 16-bit or segmented code
+such as DOSEMU or Wine. This is done via a system call which is not needed
+to run portable applications, and which exposes complex, rarely used legacy
+hardware features and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the
+past.
+
+This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the
+system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it
+was already disabled.
+
+==============================================================
+
 modules_disabled:
 
 A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index beabf30..e528fb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
 	  surface.  Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call.
 
 	  Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels.
+	  If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime.
+
+config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default"
+	depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	default y
+	---help---
+	  Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run
+	  16-bit or segmented code such as DOSEMU or Wine. This is done via
+	  a system call which is not needed to run portable applications,
+	  and which exposes complex, rarely used legacy hardware features
+	  and semantics that had suffered vulnerabilities in the past.
+
+	  For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the
+	  feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave
+	  the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed
+	  by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl.
 
 source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index 2bcc052..b8a4f2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,11 @@
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL);
+#endif
+
 /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */
 static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm)
 {
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr,
 {
 	int ret = -ENOSYS;
 
+	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
+			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
+			" Set \"sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1\" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.\n",
+			current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
+			from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()));
+		return ret;
+	}
+
 	switch (func) {
 	case 0:
 		ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 19b62b5..f7eb41f 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+extern int sysctl_modify_ldt;
+#endif
 
 /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
 #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -960,6 +963,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
+	{
+		.procname	= "modify_ldt",
+		.data		= &sysctl_modify_ldt,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0600,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+#endif
 #endif
 #if defined(CONFIG_MMU)
 	{
-- 
1.7.12.1

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Ingo Molnar]

* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> > > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > > +			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"
> > 
> > Would it really be so difficult to write this as:
> > 
> >   Set "sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.
> 
> It's just a matter of taste. Normally I consider the kernel distro-agnostic so I 
> don't like to suggest one way to adjust sysctls nor to reference config files. 
> Here we're in a case where only standard distro users may hit the issue, and 
> users of embedded distros will not face this message or will easily translate it 
> into their respective configuration scheme. So OK for this one.

So it's a side issue, but it's not a matter of taste at all: why should we end up 
hurting 99% of Linux users (that use regular distros), just to make it slightly 
more 'correct' for the weird 1% 'embedded distro' case that decided to put sysctl 
configuration elsewhere?

Users of 'embedded' distros won't normally see kernel messages, and even if they 
do, the message is crystal clear even to them...

Such messages should be as helpful to the regular case as possible. The weird 
cases will be OK too: and it does not help to make a message unhelpful for _both_ 
cases.

Thanks,

	Ingo

Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Ingo Molnar]

* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> > > +	if (!sysctl_modify_ldt) {
> > > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
> > > +			"Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)."
> > > +			" Adjust the modify_ldt sysctl if this was not an"
> > 
> > Would it really be so difficult to write this as:
> > 
> >   Set "sys.kernel.modify_ldt = 1" in /etc/sysctl.conf if this was not an exploit attempt.
> 
> It's just a matter of taste. Normally I consider the kernel distro-agnostic so I 
> don't like to suggest one way to adjust sysctls nor to reference config files. 
> Here we're in a case where only standard distro users may hit the issue, and 
> users of embedded distros will not face this message or will easily translate it 
> into their respective configuration scheme. So OK for this one.

So it's a side issue, but it's not a matter of taste at all: why should we end up 
hurting 99% of Linux users (that use regular distros), just to make it slightly 
more 'correct' for the weird 1% 'embedded distro' case that decided to put sysctl 
configuration elsewhere?

Users of 'embedded' distros won't normally see kernel messages, and even if they 
do, the message is crystal clear even to them...

Such messages should be as helpful to the regular case as possible. The weird 
cases will be OK too: and it does not help to make a message unhelpful for _both_ 
cases.

Thanks,

	Ingo

[PATCH 0/2] x86: allow to enable/disable modify_ldt at run time

[Willy Tarreau]

This is the second version. It adds a strategy for the sysctls so that we
can reject any change to a value that was already negative. This way it's
possible to disable modify_ldt temporarily or permanently (eg: lock down a
server) as suggested by Kees.

Willy Tarreau (2):
  sysctl: add a new generic strategy to make permanent changes on
    negative values
  x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime

 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                | 17 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c           | 15 +++++++++++++
 kernel/sysctl.c                 | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+)

-- 
1.7.12.1