[PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:

	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings

The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
system trusted keyring.

However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.

Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
quite the right solution.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
---

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 9e9e5a6a9ed6..2a44b3752471 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -321,8 +321,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 			goto error_free_cert;
 	} else if (!prep->trusted) {
 		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
-		if (ret)
-			ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());
 		if (!ret)
 			prep->trusted = 1;
 	}

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[James Morris]

> Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> 
> 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> 

If you need this applied to a tree, please state which.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

> Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> 
> 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> 
> The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> system trusted keyring.
> 
> However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> 
> Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> quite the right solution.

Please apply this to security/next.

Thanks,
David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > 
> > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > 
> > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > system trusted keyring.
> > 
> > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.

Hm, I'm not able to add a key to the system keyring that is signed by a
key on either the system or the IMA MOK keyrings.  The system keyring
seems to be "locked".  A key that is signed by either a key on the
system or the IMA MOK keyring can be added to the IMA keyring.

keyctl show %keyring:.system_keyring
Keyring
 973688077 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .system_keyring
    
evmctl import m1-cert-signed.der 973688077
add_key failed
errno: Permission denied (13)

Mimi

> > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > quite the right solution.

> Please apply this to security/next.
> 
> Thanks,
> David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2016-01-06 at 21:13 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > > 
> > > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> > > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > > 
> > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > > system trusted keyring.
> > > 
> > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> 
> Hm, I'm not able to add a key to the system keyring that is signed by a
> key on either the system or the IMA MOK keyrings.  The system keyring
> seems to be "locked".  A key that is signed by either a key on the
> system or the IMA MOK keyring can be added to the IMA keyring.
> 
> keyctl show %keyring:.system_keyring
> Keyring
>  973688077 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .system_keyring
>     
> evmctl import m1-cert-signed.der 973688077
> add_key failed
> errno: Permission denied (13)

The "KEY_USR_WRITE" permission is required in order to add keys to a
keyring.  This permission is specified for the IMA keyring, but not for
the system keyring, which explains why I could add a key to the IMA
keyring, but not the system keyring.

       system_trusted_keyring =
                keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
                              KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(),
                              ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
                              KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_SEARCH),
                              KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);

       keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
                                    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
                                    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
                                     KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
                                     KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
                                    KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);

The only keys added to the system keyring should be those listed in the
Kconfig SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS specified file.
  
Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > 
> > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > 
> > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > system trusted keyring.
> > 
> > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> > 
> > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > quite the right solution.
> 
> Please apply this to security/next.

The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does
not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings.

For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled,
get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior.  For
systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA
keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK
keyring.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[James Morris]

On Thu, 7 Jan 2016, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > > 
> > > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> > > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > > 
> > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > > system trusted keyring.
> > > 
> > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> > > 
> > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > > quite the right solution.
> > 
> > Please apply this to security/next.
> 
> The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does
> not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings.
> 
> For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled,
> get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior.  For
> systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA
> keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK
> keyring.
> 

Is this a NAK on the patch?


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Sun, 2016-01-10 at 21:36 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 7 Jan 2016, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > > David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > 
> > > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > > > 
> > > > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
> > > > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > > > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > > > 
> > > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > > > system trusted keyring.
> > > > 
> > > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> > > > 
> > > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > > > quite the right solution.
> > > 
> > > Please apply this to security/next.
> > 
> > The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does
> > not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings.
> > 
> > For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled,
> > get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior.  For
> > systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA
> > keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK
> > keyring.
> > 
> 
> Is this a NAK on the patch?

Yes

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> > Is this a NAK on the patch?
> 
> Yes

I would like to counter Mimi's NAK:

 (1) Commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893 doesn't do what it
     says.  Given the change I want to revert, this bit of the description:


	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
	key which CA is in .system keyring.

     is *not* true.  A key in the .ima_mok keyring will *also* allow a key
     into the .ima_mok keyring.  Thus the .ima_mok keyring is redundant and
     should be merged into the .system keyring.

 (2) You can use KEYCTL_LINK to link trusted keys between trusted keyrings
     if the key being linked grants permission.  Add a new key to one open
     keyring and you can then link it across to another.

     Keyrings need to guard against *link* as per my recently posted
     patches.

 (3) In the current model, the trusted-only keyring and trusted-key concept
     ought really to apply only to the .system keyring as the concept of
     'trust' is boolean in this implementation.

     Again, I want to change this as per my recently posted patches.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

On 16-01-10 17:46:30, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > Is this a NAK on the patch?
> > 
> > Yes
> 
> I would like to counter Mimi's NAK:
> 
>  (1) Commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893 doesn't do what it
>      says.  Given the change I want to revert, this bit of the description:
> 
> 
> 	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
> 	key which CA is in .system keyring.
> 
>      is *not* true.  A key in the .ima_mok keyring will *also* allow a key

This is correct, but is also the desired result.  Assume that you have multi 
tenant machine where the manufacturer signs the owner's/tenant's key and those 
also need to sign other sub-tenant keys.  One can't put them on the system 
keyring so they end up in .ima_mok.

>      into the .ima_mok keyring.  Thus the .ima_mok keyring is redundant and
>      should be merged into the .system keyring.

I share Mimi's opinion that .system keyring must be static and ultimately 
trusted.  Since .ima_mok is a dynamic keyring, merging them will break the 
semantics.

>  (2) You can use KEYCTL_LINK to link trusted keys between trusted keyrings
>      if the key being linked grants permission.  Add a new key to one open
>      keyring and you can then link it across to another.
> 
>      Keyrings need to guard against *link* as per my recently posted
>      patches.

I'd rather rely on a certificate being properly signed in order to land in a 
particular keyring, rather than being linked based on permissions model.

>  (3) In the current model, the trusted-only keyring and trusted-key concept
>      ought really to apply only to the .system keyring as the concept of
>      'trust' is boolean in this implementation.

The .system keyring should be read-only, IOW static.  Only keys present at build 
time should go there.  Everything else goes to the machine owner keyring (MOK) 
or whatever the name.  MOK should be read-write and (maybe) hold only second 
level CAs, signed by CA in the system keyring.

I introduced .ima_mok just because my work had limited scope at the time and i 
consider the name as misleading.

The way i see kernel's keyrings:

                           /---> .ima
            /----> MOK ---<
.system ---<               \---> .evm
            \----> BL       \---> .whatever need to be "trusted"

The graph could be a lot more complex, but to wrap your head around the idea 
think of big ass machine with years of uptime and multiple simultaneous users, 
all pre-installed files IMA signed, ability to add other IMA signed packages on 
the fly.  The machine must be FIPS certifiable, etc.  A terabit switching 
machine should be able to do that and there are real users for this scenario out 
there.

The black-list keyring is equally important so one can revoke CAs if need be.  
On the fly.


		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote:

> > I would like to counter Mimi's NAK:
> > 
> >  (1) Commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893 doesn't do what it
> >      says.  Given the change I want to revert, this bit of the description:
> > 
> > 	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
> > 	key which CA is in .system keyring.
> > 
> >      is *not* true.  A key in the .ima_mok keyring will *also* allow a key
> 
> This is correct, but is also the desired result.

Not really.  What if you want a trusted keyring that is not governed by the
.ima_mok keyring?  You can't have it.

> Assume that you have multi tenant machine where the manufacturer signs the
> owner's/tenant's key and those also need to sign other sub-tenant keys.  One
> can't put them on the system keyring

Why not?  We can enable user-write on the system keyring.  Are you saying that
there should be multiple .ima_mok keyrings?  If so, your change is wrong.

> so they end up in .ima_mok.
> 
> >      into the .ima_mok keyring.  Thus the .ima_mok keyring is redundant and
> >      should be merged into the .system keyring.
> 
> I share Mimi's opinion that .system keyring must be static and ultimately 
> trusted.

I don't necessarily share the opinion that it must remain static.  If you can
change the .ima_mok keyring, then it's as good as being able to change the
.system keyring by your change that I want to revert.

The one thing I grant that enabling the .system keyring will allow is deletion
of trusted keys - and once you've deleted them, you can't necessarily get them
back without rebooting.

> Since .ima_mok is a dynamic keyring, merging them will break the 
> semantics.

So what you're saying is that .ima_mok is just a staging area for changes
that would otherwise go in .system?  In which case, why is it IMA-related at
all?  Why isn't it called ".mok" or ".system_overrides" or something like that
and in certs/system_keyring.c?

Remember: IMA is optional.  We want to be able to disable it.  So if you want
this feature, it really needs to be separated from IMA.

And why shouldn't we change these semantics?

And why can't .system be a dynamic keyring?

> >  (2) You can use KEYCTL_LINK to link trusted keys between trusted keyrings
> >      if the key being linked grants permission.  Add a new key to one open
> >      keyring and you can then link it across to another.
> > 
> >      Keyrings need to guard against *link* as per my recently posted
> >      patches.
> 
> I'd rather rely on a certificate being properly signed in order to land in a 
> particular keyring, rather than being linked based on permissions model.

Then the patches I posted *are* necessary.  Currently KEYCTL_LINK will let you
link a "trusted" key between trusted-only keyrings if the Link permission is
set because trustedness is currently evaluated only once - at key preparse
time - because we currently throw away all the metadata you need to do further
checks.

The patches I posted validate the certificate signature on addition of a
*link* into a keyring (add_key(), if it doesn't update a key, creates a key
and then does a link operation).  The gatekeeper function is settable
per-keyring.

> >  (3) In the current model, the trusted-only keyring and trusted-key concept
> >      ought really to apply only to the .system keyring as the concept of
> >      'trust' is boolean in this implementation.
> 
> The .system keyring should be read-only, IOW static.  Only keys present at
> build time should go there.

Why?  You haven't given a reason why .ima_mok shouldn't be integrated into
.system and that opened up.  Because you prefer it the way you've done it
isn't necessarily a good reason.

> Everything else goes to the machine owner keyring (MOK) or whatever the
> name.  MOK should be read-write and (maybe) hold only second level CAs,
> signed by CA in the system keyring.  I introduced .ima_mok just because my
> work had limited scope at the time and i consider the name as misleading.

What would you call it then, if not .ima_mok?  Given its current name, it
seems that it should relate to the UEFI BIOS data if such is available.

> The way i see kernel's keyrings:
> 
>                            /---> .ima
>             /----> MOK ---<
> .system ---<               \---> .evm
>             \----> BL       \---> .whatever need to be "trusted"
> 
> The graph could be a lot more complex, but to wrap your head around the idea
> think of big ass machine with years of uptime and multiple simultaneous
> users, all pre-installed files IMA signed, ability to add other IMA signed
> packages on the fly.  The machine must be FIPS certifiable, etc.  A terabit
> switching machine should be able to do that and there are real users for
> this scenario out there.

Given you seem to have one .system ring and one MOK ring, why do you need
separate rings?

> The black-list keyring is equally important so one can revoke CAs if need
> be.  On the fly.

I've no objection to a blacklist.  I can see that you might want it to be a
separate keyring to have the no-removal clause in place.  I would consider
making a blacklist key type and have it contain a bundle of key IDs to reduce
resource consumption, but that's an implementation detail (the match function
can check against all the IDs in a bundle).

However, the blacklist also should be separated from the IMA subsystem and
moved to system_keyring.c.  I can probably backport the code we use in Fedora
for this.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

On 16-01-12 01:38:13, David Howells wrote:
> Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote:
> 
> > > I would like to counter Mimi's NAK:
> > > 
> > >  (1) Commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893 doesn't do what it
> > >      says.  Given the change I want to revert, this bit of the description:
> > > 
> > > 	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
> > > 	key which CA is in .system keyring.
> > > 
> > >      is *not* true.  A key in the .ima_mok keyring will *also* allow a key
> > 
> > This is correct, but is also the desired result.
> 
> Not really.  What if you want a trusted keyring that is not governed by the 
> .ima_mok keyring?  You can't have it.

There is no need for .ima_mok if here is .mok, which should be system wide 
keyring.  I'm trying to say that once we have .mok (you're more than welcome to 
suggest better name) we'll get rid of .ima_mok.

> > Assume that you have multi tenant machine where the manufacturer signs the
> > owner's/tenant's key and those also need to sign other sub-tenant keys.  One
> > can't put them on the system keyring
> 
> Why not?  We can enable user-write on the system keyring.  Are you saying that 
> there should be multiple .ima_mok keyrings?  If so, your change is wrong.

Nope, no multiple MOK keyrings.  One, read-write trusted keyring should be 
enough.

> > so they end up in .ima_mok.
> > 
> > >      into the .ima_mok keyring.  Thus the .ima_mok keyring is redundant and
> > >      should be merged into the .system keyring.
> > 
> > I share Mimi's opinion that .system keyring must be static and ultimately 
> > trusted.
> 
> I don't necessarily share the opinion that it must remain static.  If you can 
> change the .ima_mok keyring, then it's as good as being able to change the 
> .system keyring by your change that I want to revert.

I still see value in immutable system keyring.  Being able to reboot to a known 
state is only one of the reasons.  The other is the ultimate trust one should 
have in .system...

> The one thing I grant that enabling the .system keyring will allow is deletion 
> of trusted keys - and once you've deleted them, you can't necessarily get them 
> back without rebooting.

Can't we incorporate this functionality in .blacklist and avoid rebooting.

> > Since .ima_mok is a dynamic keyring, merging them will break the semantics.
> 
> So what you're saying is that .ima_mok is just a staging area for changes that 
> would otherwise go in .system?  In which case, why is it IMA-related at all?  
> Why isn't it called ".mok" or ".system_overrides" or something like that and 
> in certs/system_keyring.c?

.ima_mok was designed at a time when i did not see it as a system-level trusted 
keyring.  It later occurred that it should be moved out of the IMA subsystem as 
there are potentially other users.

> Remember: IMA is optional.  We want to be able to disable it.  So if you want 
> this feature, it really needs to be separated from IMA.

Moving it out, or being enabled if IMA (or other sybsystem) is selected, will do 
the trick

> And why shouldn't we change these semantics?
> 
> And why can't .system be a dynamic keyring?

Because this makes me uneasy.  What are we saving?  A few pages of memory?..

> > >  (2) You can use KEYCTL_LINK to link trusted keys between trusted keyrings
> > >      if the key being linked grants permission.  Add a new key to one open
> > >      keyring and you can then link it across to another.
> > > 
> > >      Keyrings need to guard against *link* as per my recently posted
> > >      patches.
> > 
> > I'd rather rely on a certificate being properly signed in order to land in a 
> > particular keyring, rather than being linked based on permissions model.
> 
> Then the patches I posted *are* necessary.  Currently KEYCTL_LINK will let you 
> link a "trusted" key between trusted-only keyrings if the Link permission is 
> set because trustedness is currently evaluated only once - at key preparse 
> time - because we currently throw away all the metadata you need to do further 
> checks.

I don't mind linking in general as long as the permission check is supplementary 
to the keys CA hierarchy verification.

> The patches I posted validate the certificate signature on addition of a 
> *link* into a keyring (add_key(), if it doesn't update a key, creates a key 
> and then does a link operation).  The gatekeeper function is settable 
> per-keyring.

Splendid.  I've no issue with this.

> > >  (3) In the current model, the trusted-only keyring and trusted-key concept
> > >      ought really to apply only to the .system keyring as the concept of
> > >      'trust' is boolean in this implementation.
> > 
> > The .system keyring should be read-only, IOW static.  Only keys present at
> > build time should go there.
> 
> Why?  You haven't given a reason why .ima_mok shouldn't be integrated into 
> .system and that opened up.  Because you prefer it the way you've done it 
> isn't necessarily a good reason.

Err...  I've stated my motive numerous times.  Please let me know if i miss the 
point somewhere.

> > Everything else goes to the machine owner keyring (MOK) or whatever the
> > name.  MOK should be read-write and (maybe) hold only second level CAs,
> > signed by CA in the system keyring.  I introduced .ima_mok just because my
> > work had limited scope at the time and i consider the name as misleading.
> 
> What would you call it then, if not .ima_mok?  Given its current name, it 
> seems that it should relate to the UEFI BIOS data if such is available.

Nope, the name is indeed misleading.  I don't insist on MOK in the name as long 
as the semantics is preserved.  I also do not want to involve UEFI-embedded 
certificates.  Just because they are in my machine's NV memory does not mean i 
trust them.  I'd rather trust the kernel and certificates that i've made.

There are companies that make their own hardware and build all of their 
software.  UEFI may or may not be present.  Again, think of big machines.

> > The way i see kernel's keyrings:
> > 
> >                            /---> .ima
> >             /----> MOK ---<
> > .system ---<               \---> .evm
> >             \----> BL       \---> .whatever need to be "trusted"
> > 
> > The graph could be a lot more complex, but to wrap your head around the idea
> > think of big ass machine with years of uptime and multiple simultaneous
> > users, all pre-installed files IMA signed, ability to add other IMA signed
> > packages on the fly.  The machine must be FIPS certifiable, etc.  A terabit
> > switching machine should be able to do that and there are real users for
> > this scenario out there.
> 
> Given you seem to have one .system ring and one MOK ring, why do you need
> separate rings?

If .system is RO, then we need something that is both second level CA hierarchy 
and is RW.

> > The black-list keyring is equally important so one can revoke CAs if need
> > be.  On the fly.
> 
> I've no objection to a blacklist.  I can see that you might want it to be a 
> separate keyring to have the no-removal clause in place.  I would consider 
> making a blacklist key type and have it contain a bundle of key IDs to reduce 
> resource consumption, but that's an implementation detail (the match function 
> can check against all the IDs in a bundle).

I think blacklist keyring is important.  Being write-only is also important.  
Once this situation is resolved i'll have to post a patch that makes use of 
.blacklist as we already have users for this scenario.

> However, the blacklist also should be separated from the IMA subsystem and 
> moved to system_keyring.c.  I can probably backport the code we use in Fedora 
> for this.

I totally agree with you here.  If the certificate used to sign certain kernel 
modules is revoked we would very much like to forbid loading those modules.


		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote:

> There is no need for .ima_mok if here is .mok, which should be system wide
> keyring.  I'm trying to say that once we have .mok (you're more than welcome
> to suggest better name) we'll get rid of .ima_mok.

If we really must have separate keyrings - and I still don't see that it's
necessary - then maybe:

	.builtin_trusted_keys (RO)
	.secondarily_trusted_keys (RW).

I'd prefer to avoid "mok" as that might be misconstrued in a UEFI system.

> I still see value in immutable system keyring.  Being able to reboot to a
> known state is only one of the reasons.

I'm not sure what you mean.  Changes to .system_keyring would not be
persistent across reboot.

> The other is the ultimate trust one should have in .system...

Do you have a use case where you would use an immutable set of keys
exclusively?

> > The one thing I grant that enabling the .system keyring will allow is
> > deletion of trusted keys - and once you've deleted them, you can't
> > necessarily get them back without rebooting.
> 
> Can't we incorporate this functionality in .blacklist and avoid rebooting.

I think you misunderstood.  Once you've discarded a builtin keyring you cannot
get it back without rebooting (unless you hold another trusted key that signed
it).  Once you blacklist a builtin keyring you cannot get it back without
rebooting (unless you can remove things from a blacklist).

Clearing .system_keyring would be equivalent to blacklisting all the keys held
therein.  However, I presume you would have it that you cannot add to
.blacklist unless your bundle of keys to be blacklisted is appropriately
signed.

> > And why can't .system be a dynamic keyring?
> 
> Because this makes me uneasy.  What are we saving?  A few pages of memory?..

A key struct and some associative array metadata plus the cost of looking up
in a second keyring.

I'm not sure why it makes you any more uneasy than having .ima_mok at all.
However, if it makes you able to sleep at night (;-)), and you're willing to
accept modification of the trust model along the lines of the patchset I
posted (which will need a couple of alterations) and move the new trust
keyring and blacklist keyring to the core, then okay, we can do that.

> I don't mind linking in general as long as the permission check is
> supplementary to the keys CA hierarchy verification.

Which it currently isn't really.  As things stand, the CA hierarchy
verification takes place once at key creation and is assumed applicable to all
trusted keyrings thereafter.  KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY was only really supposed
to apply to the system keyring.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

On 16-01-12 17:08:44, David Howells wrote:
> Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote:
> 
> > There is no need for .ima_mok if here is .mok, which should be system wide
> > keyring.  I'm trying to say that once we have .mok (you're more than welcome
> > to suggest better name) we'll get rid of .ima_mok.
> 
> If we really must have separate keyrings - and I still don't see that it's
> necessary - then maybe:
>
> 	.builtin_trusted_keys (RO)
> 	.secondarily_trusted_keys (RW).

Yep, that's the basic idea.

> I'd prefer to avoid "mok" as that might be misconstrued in a UEFI system.

It is a good idea to avoid confusion.

> > I still see value in immutable system keyring.  Being able to reboot to a
> > known state is only one of the reasons.
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean.  Changes to .system_keyring would not be 
> persistent across reboot.

Among other things it is nice to have a keyring with a known good state without 
the need to reboot.  You (the root user and only under certain circumstances) 
should always be able to zap the secondary keyring, but not the .system.

> > The other is the ultimate trust one should have in .system...
> 
> Do you have a use case where you would use an immutable set of keys 
> exclusively?

Yep.  Certain government structures will not use the machine in multi tenant 
mode so they'll settle with the vendor keys.

> > Can't we incorporate this functionality in .blacklist and avoid rebooting.
> 
> I think you misunderstood.  Once you've discarded a builtin keyring you cannot 
> get it back without rebooting (unless you hold another trusted key that signed 
> it).  Once you blacklist a builtin keyring you cannot get it back without 
> rebooting (unless you can remove things from a blacklist).

I do not get that part about blacklisting an entire keyring.  I hope we will be 
able to blacklist particular key, not the whole keyring.

> Clearing .system_keyring would be equivalent to blacklisting all the keys held 
> therein.  However, I presume you would have it that you cannot add to 
> .blacklist unless your bundle of keys to be blacklisted is appropriately 
> signed.
> 
> > > And why can't .system be a dynamic keyring?
> > 
> > Because this makes me uneasy.  What are we saving?  A few pages of memory?..
> 
> A key struct and some associative array metadata plus the cost of looking up
> in a second keyring.

Hopefully something that will be done only when importing new trusted key.

> I'm not sure why it makes you any more uneasy than having .ima_mok at all. 
> However, if it makes you able to sleep at night (;-)), and you're willing to 
> accept modification of the trust model along the lines of the patchset I 
> posted (which will need a couple of alterations) and move the new trust 
> keyring and blacklist keyring to the core, then okay, we can do that.

I'll sleep much better once i grasp your entire patch-set, although it will 
require some lack of sleep on my part. ;-)

I am also afraid these "couple of alternations" should be communicated to all 
stakeholders (Mimi, for one), especially if we decide to make .ima_mok to be 
system wide .secondarily_trusted_keys.  I volunteer to be excluded from the name 
giving competition. :-)

It is also not clear to me how we'll move keys to the blacklist keyring.  They 
should obviously be signed by CA in primary/secondary trusted keyring(s), the 
permissions should be set correctly, but i somehow feel this is not enough.

Mark, would you please comment on the above?

> > I don't mind linking in general as long as the permission check is 
> > supplementary to the keys CA hierarchy verification.
> 
> Which it currently isn't really.  As things stand, the CA hierarchy 
> verification takes place once at key creation and is assumed applicable to all 
> trusted keyrings thereafter.  KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY was only really supposed 
> to apply to the system keyring.

I am not opposed to everything what you suggest.  Since we did that work in 
parallel (your stuff and the IMA keyring additions) with no communication 
between us, we ended up with broken IMA model.  I see three possibilities:

  - dump the IMA changes for this release (not happy about it);

  - try to quickly adapt the IMA system to your changes (not sure if it can be 
    done easily and/or quickly) and do it properly for 4.6;

  - elevate .ima_mok/blacklist to system wide RW keyrings (we may miss the merge 
    window);



		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 18:31 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> On 16-01-12 17:08:44, David Howells wrote:
> > Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > There is no need for .ima_mok if here is .mok, which should be system wide
> > > keyring.  I'm trying to say that once we have .mok (you're more than welcome
> > > to suggest better name) we'll get rid of .ima_mok.
> > 
> > If we really must have separate keyrings - and I still don't see that it's
> > necessary - then maybe:
> >
> > 	.builtin_trusted_keys (RO)
> > 	.secondarily_trusted_keys (RW).
> 
> Yep, that's the basic idea.

The "builtin_trusted_keys" is fine.  It would be
"secondary_trusted_keys".  This secondary keyring needs to be Kconfig
optional.

> > I'm not sure why it makes you any more uneasy than having .ima_mok at all. 
> > However, if it makes you able to sleep at night (;-)), and you're willing to 
> > accept modification of the trust model along the lines of the patchset I 
> > posted (which will need a couple of alterations) and move the new trust 
> > keyring and blacklist keyring to the core, then okay, we can do that.
> 
> I'll sleep much better once i grasp your entire patch-set, although it will 
> require some lack of sleep on my part. ;-)
> 
> I am also afraid these "couple of alternations" should be communicated to all 
> stakeholders (Mimi, for one), especially if we decide to make .ima_mok to be 
> system wide .secondarily_trusted_keys.  I volunteer to be excluded from the name 
> giving competition. :-)
> 
> It is also not clear to me how we'll move keys to the blacklist keyring.  They 
> should obviously be signed by CA in primary/secondary trusted keyring(s), the 
> permissions should be set correctly, but i somehow feel this is not enough.

> Mark, would you please comment on the above?
> 
> > > I don't mind linking in general as long as the permission check is 
> > > supplementary to the keys CA hierarchy verification.
> > 
> > Which it currently isn't really.  As things stand, the CA hierarchy 
> > verification takes place once at key creation and is assumed applicable to all 
> > trusted keyrings thereafter.  KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY was only really supposed 
> > to apply to the system keyring.
> 
> I am not opposed to everything what you suggest.  Since we did that work in 
> parallel (your stuff and the IMA keyring additions) with no communication 
> between us, we ended up with broken IMA model.  I see three possibilities:
> 
>   - dump the IMA changes for this release (not happy about it);
> 
>   - try to quickly adapt the IMA system to your changes (not sure if it can be 
>     done easily and/or quickly) and do it properly for 4.6;
> 
>   - elevate .ima_mok/blacklist to system wide RW keyrings (we may miss the merge 
>     window);

I beg to differ.  The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
being upstreamed.  The basic concepts developed will continue to be
used, perhaps not directly by IMA.

David's proposal is a major redesign of keyrings and the system keyring
in particular.  It looks promising, but will need to be reviewed.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

On 16-01-13 12:51:36, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 18:31 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> > 
> > I am not opposed to everything what you suggest.  Since we did that work in 
> > parallel (your stuff and the IMA keyring additions) with no communication 
> > between us, we ended up with broken IMA model.  I see three possibilities:
> > 
> >   - dump the IMA changes for this release (not happy about it);
> > 
> >   - try to quickly adapt the IMA system to your changes (not sure if it can be 
> >     done easily and/or quickly) and do it properly for 4.6;
> > 
> >   - elevate .ima_mok/blacklist to system wide RW keyrings (we may miss the merge 
> >     window);
> 
> I beg to differ.  The IMA model is not broken with the current patches being 
> upstreamed.  The basic concepts developed will continue to be used, perhaps 
> not directly by IMA.
> 
> David's proposal is a major redesign of keyrings and the system keyring in 
> particular.  It looks promising, but will need to be reviewed.

Due to time limitations i was not able to study David's changes in detail.  I 
only commented on what (i thought) i understood. :)

I assume a wider discussion will clean out the details.


		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> I beg to differ.  The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
> being upstreamed.  The basic concepts developed will continue to be
> used, perhaps not directly by IMA.

I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it
reverting or removing.  It affects module signing too.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > I beg to differ.  The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
> > being upstreamed.  The basic concepts developed will continue to be
> > used, perhaps not directly by IMA.
> 
> I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it 
> reverting or removing.  It affects module signing too.

The only problem i see with the code is that in case .ima_mok is not configured 
x509_validate_trust() returns NULL, which falsely set the key as trusted.  This 
could easily be fixed.

Some users do want to be able to load kernel modules signed by other trusted 
parties.  Think of .ima_mok as system wide keyring in this case.  It is 
semantically broken, but it does the right thing.


		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 20:35 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote:
> > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > I beg to differ.  The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
> > > being upstreamed.  The basic concepts developed will continue to be
> > > used, perhaps not directly by IMA.
> > 
> > I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it 
> > reverting or removing.  It affects module signing too.
> 
> The only problem i see with the code is that in case .ima_mok is not configured 
> x509_validate_trust() returns NULL, which falsely set the key as trusted.  This 
> could easily be fixed.

When IMA_MOK_KEYRING  is not enabled, get_ima_mok_keyring() will return
NULL.  x509_validate_trust() will return -EOPNOTSUPP.

The code is fine.

Mimi

> Some users do want to be able to load kernel modules signed by other trusted 
> parties.  Think of .ima_mok as system wide keyring in this case.  It is 
> semantically broken, but it does the right thing.
> 
> 
> 		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

On 16-01-13 13:56:39, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-01-13 at 20:35 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> > On 16-01-13 18:19:10, David Howells wrote:
> > > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > 
> > > > I beg to differ.  The IMA model is not broken with the current patches
> > > > being upstreamed.  The basic concepts developed will continue to be
> > > > used, perhaps not directly by IMA.
> > > 
> > > I still object to the change to x509_key_preparse() and still want it 
> > > reverting or removing.  It affects module signing too.
> > 
> > The only problem i see with the code is that in case .ima_mok is not configured 
> > x509_validate_trust() returns NULL, which falsely set the key as trusted.  This 
> > could easily be fixed.
> 
> When IMA_MOK_KEYRING is not enabled, get_ima_mok_keyring() will return NULL.  
> x509_validate_trust() will return -EOPNOTSUPP.
> 
> The code is fine.

Oops, my bad.  It's been a while since i wrote that code... :)


		Petko

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > Is this a NAK on the patch?
> > 
> > Yes
> 
> I would like to counter Mimi's NAK:
> 
>  (1) Commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893 doesn't do what it
>      says.  Given the change I want to revert, this bit of the description:
> 
> 	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
> 	key which CA is in .system keyring.
> 
>      is *not* true.  A key in the .ima_mok keyring will *also* allow a key
>      into the .ima_mok keyring.  Thus the .ima_mok keyring is redundant and
>      should be merged into the .system keyring.
> 
>  (2) You can use KEYCTL_LINK to link trusted keys between trusted keyrings
>      if the key being linked grants permission.  Add a new key to one open
>      keyring and you can then link it across to another.
> 
>      Keyrings need to guard against *link* as per my recently posted
>      patches.
> 
>  (3) In the current model, the trusted-only keyring and trusted-key concept
>      ought really to apply only to the .system keyring as the concept of
>      'trust' is boolean in this implementation.
> 
>      Again, I want to change this as per my recently posted patches.

 (4) Marcel asked to have user-based 'trusted' keyrings - where userspace
     can load a keyring up and then mark it as 'trusted' thereby limiting
     further additions - for the use with kernel-based TLS.

     These would *not* depend on the .system keyring.  Unless we're willing
     to store the root CA certificate for the world in the kernel, we can't
     really do that.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Sun, 2016-01-10 at 20:33 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

>  (4) Marcel asked to have user-based 'trusted' keyrings - where userspace
>      can load a keyring up and then mark it as 'trusted' thereby limiting
>      further additions - for the use with kernel-based TLS.
> 
>      These would *not* depend on the .system keyring.  Unless we're willing
>      to store the root CA certificate for the world in the kernel, we can't
>      really do that.

Is this the primary use case scenario for your patches?   Unfortunately,
your posted patches would break the existing IMA trust model.   Let's
identify the different use case scenarios and work together to meet the
different requirements.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> Is this the primary use case scenario for your patches?   Unfortunately,
> your posted patches would break the existing IMA trust model.

Why so?

The patches give you per-keyring control over restricting what is permitted in
a keyring, allows you to use any criteria you like, whether it be just the
contents of that keyring or CA certs in some other keyring(s) and a blacklist.

In other words, it should be able to do everything one can do now - except
that it controls linkage between trusted keyrings with the same restrictions
as adding new keys.

So if it breaks the IMA trust model, then doesn't that suggest that the trust
model is broken anyway?

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mark D. Baushke]

Hi David,

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes:

> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > Is this the primary use case scenario for your patches?
> > Unfortunately, your posted patches would break the existing IMA
> > trust model.
> 
> Why so?

The intent is that the 'vendor' of a software solution be able to
provide a kernel with one or more .system keys as the root of trust.
(In many cases, this root of trust may be tied to a system that does
measured boot as well.)

Further, that the 'vendor' provide a mechanism where a 'machine owner'
is able to be delegated to add new certificate authorities to a machine
owner keyring and those certificates may be used to sign signing keys
which may in turn be added to the .ima and/or .evm system keyrings to
ensure that IMA signed files are able to be run by the system.

As you suggested in an earlier message thread, it is NOT intended that
generic commercial Certificate Authorities get involved with this set of
operations.

The 'machine owner' key may also be used to add additional third-party
certificate authorities or signing keys to appropriate keyrings in the
system (generally the '.ima_mok' or the .ima keyrings).

> The patches give you per-keyring control over restricting what is
> permitted in a keyring, allows you to use any criteria you like,
> whether it be just the contents of that keyring or CA certs in some
> other keyring(s) and a blacklist.

Could you ellaboriate on the identify of 'you' in this case? Is it the
vendor the system which is trying to warranty the software provided to
the machine owner? Or, is it the 'machine owner'?

> In other words, it should be able to do everything one can do now -
> except that it controls linkage between trusted keyrings with the same
> restrictions as adding new keys.

Hmmm... I suspect I may be missing something.

If the 'vendor' selling the software desires that the 'machine owner'
not extend the kernel with new kernel modules, how is that provided for
in your linkage model?

Another use case, is that the 'vendor' trusts a third-party to properly
deliver both LKMs and user-land programs, but only if the 'machine
owner' explicitly authorizes the keys for that 'third-party' explicitly.

As you may see here, I am attempting to outline a use modle where it is
possible to build up a hierarchy tree of trust rather than a flat set of
keys that are all-powerful.

Delegation to add a key into the .ima keyring is important.

Keeping signing keys separate from delegated certificate authority keys
is also important.

> So if it breaks the IMA trust model, then doesn't that suggest that
> the trust model is broken anyway?

It is possible that I do not properly understand your new per-key
control over a keyring. I would welcome enlightenment.

One of the fundamental assumptions of a big server is that a kernel that
might need to be running non-stop for many years, but might unload and
reload LKMs more often than that and will certainly have the possibility
of updating user-land software (hopefully without needing a reboot) on a
periodic basis.

I hope that my message provides some insight into the problem at hand.

	Thank you,
	-- Mark

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:

> David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > Is this the primary use case scenario for your patches?
> > > Unfortunately, your posted patches would break the existing IMA
> > > trust model.
> > 
> > Why so?
> 
> The intent is that the 'vendor' of a software solution be able to
> provide a kernel with one or more .system keys as the root of trust.
> (In many cases, this root of trust may be tied to a system that does
> measured boot as well.)

Yep.

> Further, that the 'vendor' provide a mechanism where a 'machine owner'
> is able to be delegated to add new certificate authorities to a machine
> owner keyring

Why not the .system keyring?

> The 'machine owner' key may also be used to add additional third-party
> certificate authorities or signing keys to appropriate keyrings in the
> system (generally the '.ima_mok' or the .ima keyrings).

The change I objected to makes the keys in the .system keyring and the
.ima_mok keyring effectively equivalent - so why not merge .ima_mok into
.system_keyring?

> > The patches give you per-keyring control over restricting what is
> > permitted in a keyring, allows you to use any criteria you like,
> > whether it be just the contents of that keyring or CA certs in some
> > other keyring(s) and a blacklist.
> 
> Could you ellaboriate on the identify of 'you' in this case? Is it the
> vendor the system which is trying to warranty the software provided to
> the machine owner? Or, is it the 'machine owner'?

Sorry, I meant you the kernel code author.  When said author calls
keyring_alloc(), they can supply a gatekeeper function as one of the
parameters.  This function gets to pass judgement on any link that userspace
might try to make into a keyring.  Note that *adding* a new key involves
making a link in the keyring.

See the patch ensubjected:

  [RFC PATCH 14/15] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to  __key_link()

Search for keyring_alloc and particularly restrict_link_by_ima_mok.

The restriction function cannot currently be cleared or modified by userspace
- though I have an idea to make it possible to *impose* a restriction through
keyctl() on any keyring that doesn't yet have a restriction imposed.

The restriction function can impose any restrictions it likes, using the key's
parsed payload, key type, the current keyring contents and any other keyring
contents as it wishes in evaluating the trustworthiness of a key.

> > In other words, it should be able to do everything one can do now -
> > except that it controls linkage between trusted keyrings with the same
> > restrictions as adding new keys.
> 
> Hmmm... I suspect I may be missing something.

Currently we're using the KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY key flags
to gatekeeper a additions to a keyring.  KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is set when a new
proposed key is parsed, using the contents of .system_keyring - and now
.ima_mok - as the authority source.  KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is set on a keyring
just after it is created (a window of opportunity which doesn't matter for
pre-module keyrings).  KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY means that only keys marked
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED may be *added* to a keyring.  It doesn't gate against linking
trusted keys between keyrings.

> If the 'vendor' selling the software desires that the 'machine owner'
> not extend the kernel with new kernel modules, how is that provided for
> in your linkage model?

If .system_keyring was writable:

	keyctl clear %:.system_keyring

would prevent any new keys from being added and would prevent signed modules
from being loaded.

> Another use case, is that the 'vendor' trusts a third-party to properly
> deliver both LKMs and user-land programs, but only if the 'machine
> owner' explicitly authorizes the keys for that 'third-party' explicitly.
>
> As you may see here, I am attempting to outline a use modle where it is
> possible to build up a hierarchy tree of trust rather than a flat set of
> keys that are all-powerful.

However, given that the KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED mark is somewhat naive in its
operation, .system_keyring and .ima_mok are effectively unioned.  In the log
message of the commit I want to partially revert, the .ima_mok is not
self-allowing - which at least makes it worth differentiating, though that's
not what the code change actually does.

> Keeping signing keys separate from delegated certificate authority keys
> is also important.

Signing keys go in .ima only?

> > So if it breaks the IMA trust model, then doesn't that suggest that
> > the trust model is broken anyway?
> 
> It is possible that I do not properly understand your new per-key
> control over a keyring. I would welcome enlightenment.
> 
> One of the fundamental assumptions of a big server is that a kernel that
> might need to be running non-stop for many years, but might unload and
> reload LKMs more often than that and will certainly have the possibility
> of updating user-land software (hopefully without needing a reboot) on a
> periodic basis.
> 
> I hope that my message provides some insight into the problem at hand.

It still doesn't clarify entirely why .ima_mok exists separately from
.system_keyring from a technical point of view.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mark D. Baushke]

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes:

> Signing keys go in .ima only?

Yes, that is the current intent... it is not yet clear to me if it
should also be in play for any .evm keys or not.

> It still doesn't clarify entirely why .ima_mok exists separately from
> .system_keyring from a technical point of view.

IMA is an optional subsystem. Having a keyring for it to use as needed
seems more flexible to me than getting all of the .system_keyring
stakeholders to agree to any new semantics that might be needed.

Rules on how .system_keyring mature and are managed would seem to be
something that has multiple stakeholders.

If a .ima_mok exists, then we can partition the rules associated with
.ima_mok additions and deletions to being a chain of trust that is used
to authorize a given .ima key entry to be permitted to be used and not
fight with other .system_keyring semantics.

For example,

    keyctl clear %:.sysmtem_keyring

locks out adding keys to the primary keystore. That may be exactly the
correct thing to do to stop adding new LKM keys. While still allowing
new keys to be added to the .ima_mok that can in turn only authorize
the addition/deletion of .ima keys.

With regard to a .blacklist keyring type, I have no objections to
sharing a blacklist accross the system.

Sometime soon I need to hunt down the [RFC PATCH 14/15] KEYS:... and
figure out how the restriction functions are supposed to work.

I appreciate the time you have taken to write a response to my message.

I hope that I have managed to provide you have a better understanding of
the goals of a multi-tenant IMA system...

	Thanks,
	-- Mark

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Tue, 2016-01-12 at 02:03 +0000, David Howells wrote:

> See the patch ensubjected:
> 
>   [RFC PATCH 14/15] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to  __key_link()
> 
> Search for keyring_alloc and particularly restrict_link_by_ima_mok.
> 
> The restriction function cannot currently be cleared or modified by userspace
> - though I have an idea to make it possible to *impose* a restriction through
> keyctl() on any keyring that doesn't yet have a restriction imposed.
> 
> The restriction function can impose any restrictions it likes, using the key's
> parsed payload, key type, the current keyring contents and any other keyring
> contents as it wishes in evaluating the trustworthiness of a key.

One assumption is that ima-mok is always enabled, which isn't true and
not the default.  Depending on whether it is enabled, the ima keyring
would need to be restricted by "restrict_link_by_ima_mok" or
"restrict_link_by_system_trusted".

The IMA MOK and blacklist are restricted to "public_key_restrict_link".
Does this only allow keys signed by keys on the respective keyring or
also by the system keyring? 

As long as the system keyring is limited to just the builtin keys, then
this looks promising.  Otherwise, perhaps a separate "builtin" keyring
should be defined.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> The IMA MOK and blacklist are restricted to "public_key_restrict_link".
> Does this only allow keys signed by keys on the respective keyring or
> also by the system keyring? 

As my patches stand, the following are implemented:

 (1) public_key_restrict_link() restricts to asymmetric keys that are signed
     by a CA in the specified keyring.  It returns -ENOKEY if no matching key
     is found rather than -EKEYREJECTED, however, so you can call it several
     times for different keyrings.  -EKEYREJECTED is only returned if a
     signature check fails.  This is used by the following two functions.

 (2) restrict_link_by_system_trusted() restricts to asymmetric keys that are
     signed by a CA in the system keyring.  This ignores the keyring argument
     it is given.

     Note that the system_trusted_keyring is then no longer exported because
     verify_pkcs7_signature() is also in certs/system_keyring.c and uses that
     by default if NULL is passed.

 (3) restrict_link_by_ima_mok() restricts to asymmetric keys signed by a CA in
     either .system_keyring or .ima_mok.

So the trusted keyrings are then restricted as follows:

 (1) .system_keyring uses restrict_link_by_system_trusted() - though it lacks
     any sort of write permission, so it's currently moot.  It could just as
     well be replaced with a function that just returns -EPERM.

 (2) .ima_mok should be using restrict_link_by_system_trusted(), but I failed
     to update this when I split the public_key_restrict_link() function.
     I've updated this in my patch.  This would then be correct according to
     Petko's commit log:

	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
	key which CA is in .system keyring.

     However, from what Petko says, this is wrong and it should instead be
     using restrict_link_by_ima_mok().

 (3) .ima_blacklist should be using restrict_link_by_system_trusted() also.
     I've no idea whether additions to this should be permitted by keys in
     .ima_mok also.

 (4) .ima uses restrict_link_by_ima_mok(), as per:

	On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA
	in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings.
    
 (5) .evm is not restricted by my patches.  This is a mistake on my part - but
     I'm not sure what the restriction actually needs to be as it's not
     mentioned in Petko's commit message.  Presumably it needs the same as
     .ima.

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Tue, 2016-01-12 at 10:08 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > The IMA MOK and blacklist are restricted to "public_key_restrict_link".
> > Does this only allow keys signed by keys on the respective keyring or
> > also by the system keyring? 
> 
> As my patches stand, the following are implemented:
> 
>  (1) public_key_restrict_link() restricts to asymmetric keys that are signed
>      by a CA in the specified keyring.  It returns -ENOKEY if no matching key
>      is found rather than -EKEYREJECTED, however, so you can call it several
>      times for different keyrings.  -EKEYREJECTED is only returned if a
>      signature check fails.  This is used by the following two functions.

Ok, so it is restricted it to CAs.  Combining it with an option to limit
it to the builtin CA keys based on the builtin flag would be nice.
 
>  (2) restrict_link_by_system_trusted() restricts to asymmetric keys that are
>      signed by a CA in the system keyring.  This ignores the keyring argument
>      it is given.

>      Note that the system_trusted_keyring is then no longer exported because
>      verify_pkcs7_signature() is also in certs/system_keyring.c and uses that
>      by default if NULL is passed.

Ok

>  (3) restrict_link_by_ima_mok() restricts to asymmetric keys signed by a CA in
>      either .system_keyring or .ima_mok.

> So the trusted keyrings are then restricted as follows:
> 
>  (1) .system_keyring uses restrict_link_by_system_trusted() - though it lacks
>      any sort of write permission, so it's currently moot.  It could just as
>      well be replaced with a function that just returns -EPERM.

Why not retain the current semantics of the system keyring of not being
writable and create a new keyring for new feature(s)?

>  (2) .ima_mok should be using restrict_link_by_system_trusted(), but I failed
>      to update this when I split the public_key_restrict_link() function.
>      I've updated this in my patch.  This would then be correct according to
>      Petko's commit log:
> 
> 	To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a
> 	key which CA is in .system keyring.
> 
>      However, from what Petko says, this is wrong and it should instead be
>      using restrict_link_by_ima_mok().

The name "restrict_link_by_ima_mok()" doesn't reflect that it is either
the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring.

>  (3) .ima_blacklist should be using restrict_link_by_system_trusted() also.
>      I've no idea whether additions to this should be permitted by keys in
>      .ima_mok also.

Petko/Mark, please correct me if I'm wrong.  It would be the same as the
IMA MOK keyring.

>  (4) .ima uses restrict_link_by_ima_mok(), as per:
> 
> 	On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA
> 	in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings.

Currently, if IMA MOK is not enabled, then the keyring isn't created and
shouldn't be referenced.  The default should be
restrict_link_by_system_trusted.

>  (5) .evm is not restricted by my patches.  This is a mistake on my part - but
>      I'm not sure what the restriction actually needs to be as it's not
>      mentioned in Petko's commit message.  Presumably it needs the same as
>      .ima.

Currently, security.evm xattrs are not portable across systems.  On
first access, security.evm xattrs containing file signatures are
converted to an HMAC.   This probably will change in the future, but for
now .evm should be restrict_link_by_system_trusted as well.

David, thank you for the detailed explanation.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> >  (1) public_key_restrict_link() restricts to asymmetric keys that are
> >      signed by a CA in the specified keyring.  It returns -ENOKEY if no
> >      matching key is found rather than -EKEYREJECTED, however, so you can
> >      call it several times for different keyrings.  -EKEYREJECTED is only
> >      returned if a signature check fails.  This is used by the following
> >      two functions.
> 
> Ok, so it is restricted it to CAs.  Combining it with an option to limit
> it to the builtin CA keys based on the builtin flag would be nice.

Is there a point to the builtin flag if .system_keyring is closed?  Currently
all keys that go into .system_keyring are marked BUILTIN.

But, yes, the restriction can include only using built in CAs.

> >  (1) .system_keyring uses restrict_link_by_system_trusted() - though it
> >      lacks any sort of write permission, so it's currently moot.  It could
> >      just as well be replaced with a function that just returns -EPERM.
> 
> Why not retain the current semantics of the system keyring of not being
> writable and create a new keyring for new feature(s)?

I think that the problem we have is that it can be argued either way.  You
would rather create a new keyring to hold additional keys, whereas I would
prefer to use the keyring we already have.

Do you have a technical reason why we can't just open the system keyring?
It's not precisely a new feature, but rather an extension to an existing one
that's been under consideration for a while.

> The name "restrict_link_by_ima_mok()" doesn't reflect that it is either
> the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring.

How about restrict_link_by_ima_trusted()?

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Tue, 2016-01-12 at 13:55 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > >  (1) public_key_restrict_link() restricts to asymmetric keys that are
> > >      signed by a CA in the specified keyring.  It returns -ENOKEY if no
> > >      matching key is found rather than -EKEYREJECTED, however, so you can
> > >      call it several times for different keyrings.  -EKEYREJECTED is only
> > >      returned if a signature check fails.  This is used by the following
> > >      two functions.
> > 
> > Ok, so it is restricted it to CAs.  Combining it with an option to limit
> > it to the builtin CA keys based on the builtin flag would be nice.
> 
> Is there a point to the builtin flag if .system_keyring is closed?  Currently
> all keys that go into .system_keyring are marked BUILTIN.

It becomes a problem if the existing system keyring semantics of not
being writable change or if non builtin keys are added to the system
keyring.

Discussion continued below.

> But, yes, the restriction can include only using built in CAs.

> > >  (1) .system_keyring uses restrict_link_by_system_trusted() - though it
> > >      lacks any sort of write permission, so it's currently moot.  It could
> > >      just as well be replaced with a function that just returns -EPERM.
> > 
> > Why not retain the current semantics of the system keyring of not being
> > writable and create a new keyring for new feature(s)?
> 
> I think that the problem we have is that it can be argued either way.  You
> would rather create a new keyring to hold additional keys, whereas I would
> prefer to use the keyring we already have.
> 
> Do you have a technical reason why we can't just open the system keyring?
> It's not precisely a new feature, but rather an extension to an existing one
> that's been under consideration for a while.

There are two main concerns:
- Different keys are trusted for different things (eg. firmware,
modules, regular files) and at different levels of the OS.  I guess this
could be addressed, as you've previously suggested, by identifiers.

- The other issue is transitive trust (eg. A trusts B.  B trusts C.
Permit anything signed by C).  In some use case scenarios this is
desired, in others it is not.  We would need the option to limit trust
to just the builtin keys to support both use cases.

Even with the identifier support and ability to limit transitive trust,
I doubt it is as safe as limiting the system keyring to just the builtin
keys.   Refer to Petko's post.

> > The name "restrict_link_by_ima_mok()" doesn't reflect that it is either
> > the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring.
> 
> How about restrict_link_by_ima_trusted()?

Good.  restrict_link_by_ima_trusted would only check the IMA MOK keyring
if it was configured.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[David Howells]

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> > > The name "restrict_link_by_ima_mok()" doesn't reflect that it is either
> > > the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring.
> > 
> > How about restrict_link_by_ima_trusted()?
> 
> Good.  restrict_link_by_ima_trusted would only check the IMA MOK keyring
> if it was configured.

And the system keyring?

David

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Tue, 2016-01-12 at 15:56 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > > The name "restrict_link_by_ima_mok()" doesn't reflect that it is either
> > > > the system keyring or the IMA MOK keyring.
> > > 
> > > How about restrict_link_by_ima_trusted()?
> > 
> > Good.  restrict_link_by_ima_trusted would only check the IMA MOK keyring
> > if it was configured.
> 
> And the system keyring?

Only keys signed by the system keyring can be added to the .ima keyring,
unless IMA MOK is enabled.  In that case, keys signed by either the
system or IMA MOK keyring can be added to the .ima keyring.

Mimi

Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Petko Manolov]

Guys, i'd like to take a step back, make a short keyring overview (the way i see 
it) and see if we're all on the same page.  Implementation details matters, but 
only if we've agreed on the architecture first.  This is how i see the _trusted_ 
keyrings hierarchy in the kernel.  I don't claim i am right... :)


(1) I really think the system keyring should remain static.  The only time you 
can really trust your kernel is at it's build time.  Later on, when it is 
running, it may fail you in a great many and spectacular ways, thanks to the 
bugs we all introduce.

Unless the kernel is terribly broken the system keyring should not contain 
anything else but the built-in certificates.  This will serve as foothold of 
sanity in an extremely dynamic and sometimes quite messy world.  Most production 
grade kernels are built in a clean room environment with restricted physical 
access.  You can't get as good level of security once they are released in the 
wild.


(2) IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings - right now they are implemented as an aid to 
the IMA subsystem, but really should be system-wide keyrings.  Assuming the 
.system is read-only the only way you can dynamically add _trusted_ certificates 
to your kernel is via some sort of read-write keyring that is _dependent_ on 
the .system.

MOK (or, again, whatever the name) should be the second level of _trusted_ 
keyrings.  .ima and .evm are the obvious users, but there may be others in the 
future and represents the leafs of the trusted keyring graph.


(3) the blacklist keyring - it is at the same hierarchy level as the system 
keyring, but for obvious reasons, can't be read-only.  Since it should be the 
first keyring we check we can't allow stuff to go there randomly.  One thing i 
can think of is the standard CA signature verification.  Only keys that are 
properly signed should go there.  This check should not be enough to guarantee 
entry in .blacklist otherwise it will be very easy to DoS IMA-appraisal enabled 
system.  Additional criteria should be introduced when moving keys to this 
keyring.


I would like to once again state that .ima_mok and .ima_blacklist should really 
be system wide keyrings.  It so happened that i worked with Mimi Zohar and Mark 
Baushke and my focus was the IMA/EVM subsystem.  I (maybe naively) thought IMA 
would serve as a test ground for the concept and once it mature it may move up.  
It now seems that we need to agree on an architecture that will serve all newly 
introduced use-cases.



		Petko