* Patch "module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules" has been added to the 3.14-stable tree
@ 2016-08-18 13:23 gregkh
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From: gregkh @ 2016-08-18 13:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ben, gregkh, rusty; +Cc: stable, stable-commits
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules
to the 3.14-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
module-invalidate-signatures-on-force-loaded-modules.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2016 09:24:01 +0930
Subject: module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd upstream.
Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else. Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/module.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2449,13 +2449,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
int err = -ENOKEY;
const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
const void *mod = info->hdr;
- if (info->len > markerlen &&
+ /*
+ * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+ * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+ */
+ if (flags == 0 &&
+ info->len > markerlen &&
memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2477,7 +2482,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_
return err;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -3210,7 +3215,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info
struct module *mod;
long err;
- err = module_sig_check(info);
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ben@decadent.org.uk are
queue-3.14/module-invalidate-signatures-on-force-loaded-modules.patch
queue-3.14/documentation-module-signing.txt-note-need-for-version-info-if-reusing-a-key.patch
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2016-08-18 13:23 Patch "module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules" has been added to the 3.14-stable tree gregkh
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