* [PATCH] mm: avoid undefined behavior in hardened usercopy check
@ 2016-08-19 19:15 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2016-08-19 19:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keescook; +Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, Eric Biggers
check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
ptr + n < ptr
Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
(long)n < 0
Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 8ebae91..82f81df 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
static inline const char *check_bogus_address(const void *ptr, unsigned long n)
{
/* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
- if (ptr + n < ptr)
+ if ((unsigned long)ptr + n < (unsigned long)ptr)
return "<wrapped address>";
/* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
--
2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] mm: avoid undefined behavior in hardened usercopy check
@ 2016-08-19 19:15 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2016-08-19 19:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keescook; +Cc: linux-mm, linux-kernel, Eric Biggers
check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
ptr + n < ptr
Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
(long)n < 0
Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 8ebae91..82f81df 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
static inline const char *check_bogus_address(const void *ptr, unsigned long n)
{
/* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
- if (ptr + n < ptr)
+ if ((unsigned long)ptr + n < (unsigned long)ptr)
return "<wrapped address>";
/* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
--
2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] mm: avoid undefined behavior in hardened usercopy check
2016-08-19 19:15 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2016-08-19 20:47 ` Kees Cook
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-08-19 20:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers; +Cc: Linux-MM, LKML
On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> wrote:
> check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
> where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
>
> ptr + n < ptr
>
> Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
> treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
>
> (long)n < 0
>
> Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
> code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
> fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
> treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
> reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cool, thanks. I'll get this into my tree.
-Kees
> ---
> mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index 8ebae91..82f81df 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
> static inline const char *check_bogus_address(const void *ptr, unsigned long n)
> {
> /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
> - if (ptr + n < ptr)
> + if ((unsigned long)ptr + n < (unsigned long)ptr)
> return "<wrapped address>";
>
> /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
> --
> 2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
>
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] mm: avoid undefined behavior in hardened usercopy check
@ 2016-08-19 20:47 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-08-19 20:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers; +Cc: Linux-MM, LKML
On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> wrote:
> check_bogus_address() checked for pointer overflow using this expression,
> where 'ptr' has type 'const void *':
>
> ptr + n < ptr
>
> Since pointer wraparound is undefined behavior, gcc at -O2 by default
> treats it like the following, which would not behave as intended:
>
> (long)n < 0
>
> Fortunately, this doesn't currently happen for kernel code because kernel
> code is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow. But the expression should be
> fixed anyway to use well-defined integer arithmetic, since it could be
> treated differently by different compilers in the future or could be
> reported by tools checking for undefined behavior.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cool, thanks. I'll get this into my tree.
-Kees
> ---
> mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
> index 8ebae91..82f81df 100644
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr,
> static inline const char *check_bogus_address(const void *ptr, unsigned long n)
> {
> /* Reject if object wraps past end of memory. */
> - if (ptr + n < ptr)
> + if ((unsigned long)ptr + n < (unsigned long)ptr)
> return "<wrapped address>";
>
> /* Reject if NULL or ZERO-allocation. */
> --
> 2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
>
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2016-08-19 19:15 [PATCH] mm: avoid undefined behavior in hardened usercopy check Eric Biggers
2016-08-19 19:15 ` Eric Biggers
2016-08-19 20:47 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-19 20:47 ` Kees Cook
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