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From: Colin Vidal <colin@cvidal.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2016 19:18:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1477415895.2263.43.camel@cvidal.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161025090559.eqsll3d7y2ifdaug@thigreal>

Hi Kees, Hans,

> > > > This series brings the PaX/Grsecurity PAX_REFCOUNT
> > > > feature support to the upstream kernel. All credit for the
> > > > feature goes to the feature authors.
> > > > 
> > > > The name of the upstream feature is HARDENED_ATOMIC
> > > > and it is configured using CONFIG_HARDENED_ATOMIC and
> > > > HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_ATOMIC.
> > > > 
> > > > This series only adds x86 support; other architectures are expected
> > > > to add similar support gradually.
> > > 
> > > I have some worries on the generic arch independent implementation of
> > > atomic64_t/atomic64_wrap_t (include/asm-generic/atomic64.h). We provide _wrap
> > > versions for atomic64, but protection is dependant on arch implementation and
> > > config. That is, one could possibly implement HARDENED_ATOMIC support while
> > > leaving atomic64_t unprotected depending on specific configs, for instance by
> > > then defaulting to CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64 (in linuc/hardened/atomic.h:676). Or
> > > maybe I'm just under-/overthinking this?
> > 
> > IIUC, ARMv6 builds could have GENERIC_ATOMIC64 and (once implemented)
> > HARDENED_ATOMIC, so I think that combination is worth spending time
> > on.
> 
> I'm not completely sure what you mean? Our current patchset doesn't implement
> any protections for the generic atomic64, but rather relies on HARDENED_ATOMIC
> enabled archs to provide a protected implementation. So currently any
> HARDENED_ATOMIC archs cannot depend on GENERIC_ATOMIC64. Does this sound
> reasonable?

In the actual situation, you can use a architecture with
GENERIC_ATOMIC64 (imx_v6_v7_defconfig on arm for instance), and set
CONFIG_HARDENED_ATOMIC=y. That will broke the build. Therefore, we
should put a negative dependency between GENERIC_ATOMIC64 and
HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_ATOMIC, in order to be sure that HARDENED_ATOMIC
cannot be set when GENERIC_ATOMIC64 is set.

But it seems wired, or a pity, that HARDENED_ATOMIC is disabled on some
architecture just because code implementation issues, no?

> > > My concern is that this is a very easy place to include errors and
> > > inconsistencies. We've been trying to cleanly fix this, but haven't really found
> > > a satisfactory solution (e.g. one that actually works on different configs/arcs
> > > and isn't a horrible mess). I recall that the hardened_atomic ARM implementation
> > > already faced issues with atomic64, so this seems to be a real cause for
> > > problems. Any suggestions on how to do this more cleanly?
> > 
> > I haven't looked too closely yet, though maybe Colin will have some
> > thoughts as he looks at the ARM port.
> 
> Ok, that would probably be helpful. It would be good to get this cleanly done
> from the start so it doesn't grow increasingly messy with every arch needing to
> do incremental fixes/hacks as they get implemented.

Since GENERIC_ATOMIC64 is only on few architecture (arm, metatag,
microblaze, sparc, and perhaps mips?), I wonder if it would not be a
better idea to drop asm-generic/atomic64.h: it will induces a code
duplication, for sure, but avoid the wired situation above.

That said, I don't really understand how asm-generic/atomic64.h works:
it defines lot of extern functions (atomic64_add, for instance) and a
can't find the implementation in the arch directory (in sparc, for
instance)... Some ideas? It could be an interesting workaround: define
atomic64_*_wrap prototypes in asm-generic/atomic64.h, and each
architecture with GENERIC_ATOMIC64 must implement them.

Thanks,

Colin

  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-25 17:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-20 10:25 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base Elena Reshetova
2016-10-24 23:04   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-25  0:28     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25  7:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-25  8:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-25  9:46     ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-26  7:38       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-27 13:47         ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-25 18:20     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-25 22:18       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-26 10:27         ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26 20:44           ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25 22:16     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 02/13] percpu-refcount: leave atomic counter unprotected Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 03/13] kernel: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 04/13] mm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 05/13] fs: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 06/13] net: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 07/13] net: atm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 08/13] security: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 09/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 1/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 10/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 2/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 11/13] x86: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-10-26  5:06   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-26  6:55     ` David Windsor
2016-10-26 11:15       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26 20:51         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-26 21:48           ` David Windsor
2016-10-26 21:52             ` Kees Cook
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 13/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow Elena Reshetova
2016-10-24 23:14   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25  8:56   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-25  9:04     ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-25  9:11       ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-25 18:30         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-20 13:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-24 22:38   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25  9:05     ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-25 17:18       ` Colin Vidal [this message]
2016-10-25 17:51         ` David Windsor
2016-10-25 20:53           ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26  8:17             ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26  8:44               ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26  9:46                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26 18:52                   ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26 19:47                     ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26 19:52                       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-26 20:07                         ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-27  7:35                           ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-27 12:00                           ` Reshetova, Elena
     [not found]                             ` <CAEXv5_jDAPAqHp7vfOzU+WqN_h3g00_VUOz2_xxp9nJNzzFjxg@mail.gmail.com>
2016-10-27 13:03                               ` David Windsor
2016-10-28 13:02                                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-28 15:20                                   ` David Windsor
2016-10-28 19:51                                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-29  5:27                                       ` David Windsor
2016-10-29 10:31                                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-29 11:48                                       ` David Windsor
2016-10-29 17:56                                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-29 18:05                                           ` David Windsor
2016-10-29 18:08                                             ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-28  8:37                             ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26 19:49                   ` Kees Cook

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