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From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
To: Colin Vidal <colin@cvidal.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	David Windsor <dave@progbits.org>
Subject: RE: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2016 07:35:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612B41BF93F3@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1477512469.2263.141.camel@cvidal.org>


>On Wed, 2016-10-26 at 12:52 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 26, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Colin Vidal <colin@cvidal.org> wrote:
> > 
> > > 
> > > BTW, I just looked to the generic implementation of atomic64. It 
> > > seems quite understandable: methods use spinlock to access/modify 
> > > to the value of an atomic64 variable. It seems possible to check 
> > > the value before the increment/decrements and if the resulting 
> > > value is 0, but the value before the operation was different of -1 
> > > or 1, is that an overflow just happened (well, it is not exactly 
> > > right, but this is the global idea). Hence, we revert the change, 
> > > release the lock, and kill the process.
> > > 
> > > If this idea is correct, it would avoid specific implementation of 
> > > protected version of atomic64 for architecture with 
> > > GENERIC_ATOMIC64. And case (3) would be easily protected. What do 
> > > you think?
> > 
> > What I am saying here is quite confusing. Here is a cleaner
> > explanation:
> > 
> >  * the generic atomic64 method enter and takes the lock
> >  * before making the operation, check v->counter > INT_MAX - value 
> > (ifadd) or check v->counter < INT_MIN - value (if sub)
> >  * if the previous check is true, release the lock and kill the 
> > process
> >  * otherwise, let the operation process.
> > 
> > Obviously, if this approach is not wrong, there will be a 
> > significant overhead, but it happens only on CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64 
> > && CONFIG_HARDENED_ATOMIC.
> 
> I think this would be fine -- though I think it should be a distinct 
> patch. Anything we can do to separate changes into logical chunks 
> makes reviewing easier.
> 
> i.e. patch ordering could look like this:
> 
> - original series with HARDENED_ATOMIC depending on !GENERIC_ATOMIC64
> - implementation of protection on GENERIC_ATOMIC64, removing above 
> depends limitation
> - ARM hardened atomic implementation

>Great!

>Elena, I will wait that you applies HARDENED_ATOMIC depending on !GENERIC_ATOMIC64, and I submit a new RFC with the implementation of protection on GENERIC_ATOMIC64 and a v2 of ARM port. Sounds good for everybody? 

Change pushed. Now it should be !GENERIC_ATOMIC64. Hopefully this for now concludes our state on atomic64* variables. 

Now we are left with local_wrap_t problem still... But it doesn’t concern arm I think at all. 

Best Regards,
Elena.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-27  7:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-20 10:25 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base Elena Reshetova
2016-10-24 23:04   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-25  0:28     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25  7:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-25  8:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-25  9:46     ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-26  7:38       ` AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-27 13:47         ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-25 18:20     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-25 22:18       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-26 10:27         ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26 20:44           ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25 22:16     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 02/13] percpu-refcount: leave atomic counter unprotected Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 03/13] kernel: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 04/13] mm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 05/13] fs: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 06/13] net: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 07/13] net: atm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 08/13] security: " Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 09/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 1/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 10/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 2/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 11/13] x86: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-10-26  5:06   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-26  6:55     ` David Windsor
2016-10-26 11:15       ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26 20:51         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-26 21:48           ` David Windsor
2016-10-26 21:52             ` Kees Cook
2016-10-20 10:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 13/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow Elena Reshetova
2016-10-24 23:14   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25  8:56   ` AKASHI Takahiro
2016-10-25  9:04     ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-25  9:11       ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-25 18:30         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-20 13:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-24 22:38   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-25  9:05     ` Hans Liljestrand
2016-10-25 17:18       ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-25 17:51         ` David Windsor
2016-10-25 20:53           ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26  8:17             ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26  8:44               ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26  9:46                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-26 18:52                   ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26 19:47                     ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26 19:52                       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-26 20:07                         ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-27  7:35                           ` Reshetova, Elena [this message]
2016-10-27 12:00                           ` Reshetova, Elena
     [not found]                             ` <CAEXv5_jDAPAqHp7vfOzU+WqN_h3g00_VUOz2_xxp9nJNzzFjxg@mail.gmail.com>
2016-10-27 13:03                               ` David Windsor
2016-10-28 13:02                                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-28 15:20                                   ` David Windsor
2016-10-28 19:51                                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-29  5:27                                       ` David Windsor
2016-10-29 10:31                                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-29 11:48                                       ` David Windsor
2016-10-29 17:56                                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-29 18:05                                           ` David Windsor
2016-10-29 18:08                                             ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-10-28  8:37                             ` Colin Vidal
2016-10-26 19:49                   ` Kees Cook

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