* [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry
2017-03-13 10:51 [PATCH v1 0/3] x86/vvmx: fixes for mov-ss and shadow vmcs handling Sergey Dyasli
@ 2017-03-13 10:51 ` Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:59 ` Andrew Cooper
` (2 more replies)
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vvmx: correct nested shadow VMCS handling Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch Sergey Dyasli
2 siblings, 3 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Sergey Dyasli @ 2017-03-13 10:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Kevin Tian, Jan Beulich, Jun Nakajima, Sergey Dyasli
Intel SDM states that if there is a current VMCS and there is MOV-SS
blocking, VMFailValid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch and vmresume.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index e2c0951..09e4250 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
bool_t launched;
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
+ unsigned long intr_shadow;
int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
@@ -1583,6 +1584,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
+ __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
+ if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
+ {
+ vmfail_valid(regs, VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+
launched = vvmcs_launched(&nvmx->launched_list,
PFN_DOWN(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_shadow_maddr));
if ( !launched )
@@ -1598,6 +1606,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
bool_t launched;
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
+ unsigned long intr_shadow;
int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
@@ -1609,6 +1618,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
+ __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
+ if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
+ {
+ vmfail_valid(regs, VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+
launched = vvmcs_launched(&nvmx->launched_list,
PFN_DOWN(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_shadow_maddr));
if ( launched )
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index f465fff..dc5d91f 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ enum vmx_insn_errno
VMX_INSN_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_ID = 11,
VMX_INSN_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT = 12,
VMX_INSN_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT = 15,
+ VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS = 26,
VMX_INSN_FAIL_INVALID = ~0,
};
--
2.9.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry Sergey Dyasli
@ 2017-03-13 10:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-03-14 9:00 ` Tian, Kevin
2017-03-16 18:23 ` Krish Sadhukhan
2 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Cooper @ 2017-03-13 10:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli, xen-devel; +Cc: Kevin Tian, Jan Beulich, Jun Nakajima
On 13/03/17 10:51, Sergey Dyasli wrote:
> Intel SDM states that if there is a current VMCS and there is MOV-SS
> blocking, VMFailValid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>
> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch and vmresume.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
The content here looks correct, so Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper
<andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
I am wondering however whether we can start introducing transparent
unions and bitfields for the controls, like I did with ept_qual_t
~Andrew
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:59 ` Andrew Cooper
@ 2017-03-14 9:00 ` Tian, Kevin
2017-03-16 18:23 ` Krish Sadhukhan
2 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tian, Kevin @ 2017-03-14 9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli, xen-devel; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Nakajima, Jun
> From: Sergey Dyasli [mailto:sergey.dyasli@citrix.com]
> Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 6:52 PM
>
> Intel SDM states that if there is a current VMCS and there is MOV-SS blocking,
> VMFailValid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>
> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch and vmresume.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-03-14 9:00 ` Tian, Kevin
@ 2017-03-16 18:23 ` Krish Sadhukhan
2017-03-17 9:00 ` Sergey Dyasli
2 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Krish Sadhukhan @ 2017-03-16 18:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli, xen-devel
The Intel SDM also mentions POP-SS. Are you planning to do it via
another patch ?
Also, I was wondering if it makes more sense to rename the new enum code as
VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED
since it can then also be used for POP-SS.
-Krish
On 03/13/2017 03:51 AM, Sergey Dyasli wrote:
> Intel SDM states that if there is a current VMCS and there is MOV-SS
> blocking, VMFailValid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>
> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch and vmresume.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> index e2c0951..09e4250 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> @@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> bool_t launched;
> struct vcpu *v = current;
> struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
> + unsigned long intr_shadow;
> int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
>
> if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
> @@ -1583,6 +1584,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> }
>
> + __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
> + if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
> + {
> + vmfail_valid(regs, VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
> + return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> + }
> +
> launched = vvmcs_launched(&nvmx->launched_list,
> PFN_DOWN(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_shadow_maddr));
> if ( !launched )
> @@ -1598,6 +1606,7 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> bool_t launched;
> struct vcpu *v = current;
> struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
> + unsigned long intr_shadow;
> int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
>
> if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
> @@ -1609,6 +1618,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> }
>
> + __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
> + if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
> + {
> + vmfail_valid(regs, VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
> + return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> + }
> +
> launched = vvmcs_launched(&nvmx->launched_list,
> PFN_DOWN(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_shadow_maddr));
> if ( launched )
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> index f465fff..dc5d91f 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> @@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ enum vmx_insn_errno
> VMX_INSN_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_ID = 11,
> VMX_INSN_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT = 12,
> VMX_INSN_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT = 15,
> + VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS = 26,
> VMX_INSN_FAIL_INVALID = ~0,
> };
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry
2017-03-16 18:23 ` Krish Sadhukhan
@ 2017-03-17 9:00 ` Sergey Dyasli
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Sergey Dyasli @ 2017-03-17 9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: krish.sadhukhan; +Cc: Sergey Dyasli, xen-devel
On Thu, 2017-03-16 at 11:23 -0700, Krish Sadhukhan wrote:
> The Intel SDM also mentions POP-SS. Are you planning to do it via
> another patch ?
(SDM from Dec 2016) In "Table 24-3. Format of Interruptibility State"
it reads "This document uses the term “blocking by MOV SS,” but it
applies equally to POP SS."
>
> Also, I was wondering if it makes more sense to rename the new enum code as
>
> VMX_INSN_VMENTRY_BLOCKED
>
> since it can then also be used for POP-SS.
--
Thanks,
Sergey
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vvmx: correct nested shadow VMCS handling
2017-03-13 10:51 [PATCH v1 0/3] x86/vvmx: fixes for mov-ss and shadow vmcs handling Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry Sergey Dyasli
@ 2017-03-13 10:51 ` Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-14 9:11 ` Tian, Kevin
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch Sergey Dyasli
2 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Sergey Dyasli @ 2017-03-13 10:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Kevin Tian, Jan Beulich, Jun Nakajima, Sergey Dyasli
Currently xen always sets the shadow VMCS-indicator bit on nested
vmptrld and always clears it on nested vmclear. This behavior is
wrong when the guest loads a shadow VMCS: shadow bit will be lost
on nested vmclear.
Fix this by checking if the guest has provided a shadow VMCS.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index 09e4250..3017849 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -1119,10 +1119,19 @@ static bool_t nvmx_vpid_enabled(const struct vcpu *v)
static void nvmx_set_vmcs_pointer(struct vcpu *v, struct vmcs_struct *vvmcs)
{
+ struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
paddr_t vvmcs_maddr = v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_shadow_maddr;
__vmpclear(vvmcs_maddr);
- vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id |= VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK;
+ if ( !nvmx->shadow_vmcs )
+ {
+ /*
+ * We must set the shadow VMCS-indicator in order for the next vmentry
+ * to succeed with a newly set up link pointer in vmcs01.
+ * Note: guest can see that this bit was set.
+ */
+ vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id |= VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK;
+ }
__vmwrite(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vvmcs_maddr);
__vmwrite(VMREAD_BITMAP, page_to_maddr(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmread_bitmap));
__vmwrite(VMWRITE_BITMAP, page_to_maddr(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmwrite_bitmap));
@@ -1130,10 +1139,13 @@ static void nvmx_set_vmcs_pointer(struct vcpu *v, struct vmcs_struct *vvmcs)
static void nvmx_clear_vmcs_pointer(struct vcpu *v, struct vmcs_struct *vvmcs)
{
+ struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
paddr_t vvmcs_maddr = v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_shadow_maddr;
__vmpclear(vvmcs_maddr);
- vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id &= ~VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK;
+ if ( !nvmx->shadow_vmcs )
+ vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id &= ~VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK;
+ nvmx->shadow_vmcs = false;
__vmwrite(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, ~0ul);
__vmwrite(VMREAD_BITMAP, 0);
__vmwrite(VMWRITE_BITMAP, 0);
@@ -1674,12 +1686,14 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmptrld(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
if ( writable )
{
+ struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
struct vmcs_struct *vvmcs = vvmcx;
+ nvmx->shadow_vmcs =
+ vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id & ~VMX_BASIC_REVISION_MASK;
if ( ((vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id ^ vmx_basic_msr) &
VMX_BASIC_REVISION_MASK) ||
- (!cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing &&
- (vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id & ~VMX_BASIC_REVISION_MASK)) )
+ (!cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing && nvmx->shadow_vmcs) )
{
hvm_unmap_guest_frame(vvmcx, 1);
vmfail(regs, VMX_INSN_VMPTRLD_INCORRECT_VMCS_ID);
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
index ca2fb25..9a65218 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct nestedvmx {
} ept;
uint32_t guest_vpid;
struct list_head launched_list;
+ bool shadow_vmcs;
};
#define vcpu_2_nvmx(v) (vcpu_nestedhvm(v).u.nvmx)
--
2.9.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vvmx: correct nested shadow VMCS handling
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vvmx: correct nested shadow VMCS handling Sergey Dyasli
@ 2017-03-14 9:11 ` Tian, Kevin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tian, Kevin @ 2017-03-14 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli, xen-devel; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Nakajima, Jun
> From: Sergey Dyasli [mailto:sergey.dyasli@citrix.com]
> Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 6:52 PM
>
> Currently xen always sets the shadow VMCS-indicator bit on nested vmptrld
> and always clears it on nested vmclear. This behavior is wrong when the
> guest loads a shadow VMCS: shadow bit will be lost on nested vmclear.
>
> Fix this by checking if the guest has provided a shadow VMCS.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch
2017-03-13 10:51 [PATCH v1 0/3] x86/vvmx: fixes for mov-ss and shadow vmcs handling Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] x86/vvmx: add mov-ss blocking check to vmentry Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vvmx: correct nested shadow VMCS handling Sergey Dyasli
@ 2017-03-13 10:51 ` Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-14 9:11 ` Tian, Kevin
2017-03-16 18:24 ` Krish Sadhukhan
2 siblings, 2 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Sergey Dyasli @ 2017-03-13 10:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Kevin Tian, Jan Beulich, Jun Nakajima, Sergey Dyasli
Intel SDM states that if the current VMCS is a shadow VMCS,
VMFailInvalid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index 3017849..173ec74 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -1630,6 +1630,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
+ /* Check that guest is not using a shadow vmcs for vmentry */
+ if ( nvmx->shadow_vmcs )
+ {
+ vmfail_invalid(regs);
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
+
__vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
{
--
2.9.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch Sergey Dyasli
@ 2017-03-14 9:11 ` Tian, Kevin
2017-03-16 18:24 ` Krish Sadhukhan
1 sibling, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tian, Kevin @ 2017-03-14 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli, xen-devel; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Nakajima, Jun
> From: Sergey Dyasli [mailto:sergey.dyasli@citrix.com]
> Sent: Monday, March 13, 2017 6:52 PM
>
> Intel SDM states that if the current VMCS is a shadow VMCS, VMFailInvalid
> occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>
> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
> ---
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch
2017-03-13 10:51 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch Sergey Dyasli
2017-03-14 9:11 ` Tian, Kevin
@ 2017-03-16 18:24 ` Krish Sadhukhan
2017-03-16 18:32 ` Krish Sadhukhan
1 sibling, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Krish Sadhukhan @ 2017-03-16 18:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli; +Cc: xen-devel
This one looks good to me.
-Krish
On 03/13/2017 03:51 AM, Sergey Dyasli wrote:
> Intel SDM states that if the current VMCS is a shadow VMCS,
> VMFailInvalid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>
> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> index 3017849..173ec74 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> @@ -1630,6 +1630,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> }
>
> + /* Check that guest is not using a shadow vmcs for vmentry */
> + if ( nvmx->shadow_vmcs )
> + {
> + vmfail_invalid(regs);
> + return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> + }
> +
> __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
> if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
> {
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch
2017-03-16 18:24 ` Krish Sadhukhan
@ 2017-03-16 18:32 ` Krish Sadhukhan
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Krish Sadhukhan @ 2017-03-16 18:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sergey Dyasli; +Cc: xen-devel
Acknowledging it formally...
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
The review was based on Intel SDM chapters 24 and 30.
-Krish
On 03/16/2017 11:24 AM, Krish Sadhukhan wrote:
> This one looks good to me.
>
> -Krish
>
> On 03/13/2017 03:51 AM, Sergey Dyasli wrote:
>> Intel SDM states that if the current VMCS is a shadow VMCS,
>> VMFailInvalid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>>
>> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
>> ---
>> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 7 +++++++
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
>> index 3017849..173ec74 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
>> @@ -1630,6 +1630,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs
>> *regs)
>> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> }
>> + /* Check that guest is not using a shadow vmcs for vmentry */
>> + if ( nvmx->shadow_vmcs )
>> + {
>> + vmfail_invalid(regs);
>> + return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> + }
>> +
>> __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
>> if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
>> {
>
>
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