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From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <trivial@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Subject: [PATCH trivial] security: Grammar s/allocates/allocated/
Date: Tue,  2 May 2017 20:27:41 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1493749661-22686-1-git-send-email-geert@linux-m68k.org> (raw)

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
---
 security/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 213df4d4f2c1527a..1bb0c5bc9caadf8c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
 	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
 	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
-	  separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
+	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
 	  or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
 	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
 
-- 
2.7.4

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: geert@linux-m68k.org (Geert Uytterhoeven)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH trivial] security: Grammar s/allocates/allocated/
Date: Tue,  2 May 2017 20:27:41 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1493749661-22686-1-git-send-email-geert@linux-m68k.org> (raw)

Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
---
 security/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 213df4d4f2c1527a..1bb0c5bc9caadf8c 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
 	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
 	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
 	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
-	  separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
+	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
 	  or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
 	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
 
-- 
2.7.4

--
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             reply	other threads:[~2017-05-02 18:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-02 18:27 Geert Uytterhoeven [this message]
2017-05-02 18:27 ` [PATCH trivial] security: Grammar s/allocates/allocated/ Geert Uytterhoeven
2017-05-15  0:00 ` James Morris
2017-05-15  0:00   ` James Morris

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