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From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 18:56:54 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497286620-15027-6-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 6 ++++++
 mm/mmap.c                 | 9 +++++++++
 security/security.c       | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cc0937e..6934cc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@
  *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
  *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @check_vmflags:
+ *	Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed.
+ *	@vmflags contains requested the vmflags.
+ *	Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue.
  * @file_lock:
  *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
  *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
@@ -1482,6 +1486,7 @@
 				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
 	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 				unsigned long prot);
+	int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg);
@@ -1753,6 +1758,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head mmap_addr;
 	struct list_head mmap_file;
 	struct list_head file_mprotect;
+	struct list_head check_vmflags;
 	struct list_head file_lock;
 	struct list_head file_fcntl;
 	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 19bc364..67e33b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
@@ -830,6 +831,11 @@ static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f82741e..e19f04e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
 		if (!can_do_mlock())
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -2833,6 +2836,9 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long request, unsigned long
 		return -EINVAL;
 	flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
 	if (offset_in_page(error))
 		return error;
@@ -3208,6 +3214,9 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping(
 	int ret;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e390f99..25d58f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -905,6 +905,11 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags);
+}
+
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
-- 
1.9.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: s.mesoraca16@gmail.com (Salvatore Mesoraca)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 18:56:54 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497286620-15027-6-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm at kvack.org
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 6 ++++++
 mm/mmap.c                 | 9 +++++++++
 security/security.c       | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cc0937e..6934cc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@
  *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
  *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @check_vmflags:
+ *	Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed.
+ *	@vmflags contains requested the vmflags.
+ *	Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue.
  * @file_lock:
  *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
  *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
@@ -1482,6 +1486,7 @@
 				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
 	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 				unsigned long prot);
+	int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg);
@@ -1753,6 +1758,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head mmap_addr;
 	struct list_head mmap_file;
 	struct list_head file_mprotect;
+	struct list_head check_vmflags;
 	struct list_head file_lock;
 	struct list_head file_fcntl;
 	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 19bc364..67e33b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
@@ -830,6 +831,11 @@ static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f82741e..e19f04e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
 		if (!can_do_mlock())
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -2833,6 +2836,9 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long request, unsigned long
 		return -EINVAL;
 	flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
 	if (offset_in_page(error))
 		return error;
@@ -3208,6 +3214,9 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping(
 	int ret;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e390f99..25d58f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -905,6 +905,11 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags);
+}
+
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
-- 
1.9.1

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 18:56:54 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497286620-15027-6-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 6 ++++++
 mm/mmap.c                 | 9 +++++++++
 security/security.c       | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cc0937e..6934cc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@
  *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
  *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @check_vmflags:
+ *	Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed.
+ *	@vmflags contains requested the vmflags.
+ *	Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue.
  * @file_lock:
  *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
  *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
@@ -1482,6 +1486,7 @@
 				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
 	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 				unsigned long prot);
+	int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg);
@@ -1753,6 +1758,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head mmap_addr;
 	struct list_head mmap_file;
 	struct list_head file_mprotect;
+	struct list_head check_vmflags;
 	struct list_head file_lock;
 	struct list_head file_fcntl;
 	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 19bc364..67e33b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
@@ -830,6 +831,11 @@ static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f82741e..e19f04e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
 		if (!can_do_mlock())
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -2833,6 +2836,9 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long request, unsigned long
 		return -EINVAL;
 	flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
 	if (offset_in_page(error))
 		return error;
@@ -3208,6 +3214,9 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping(
 	int ret;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e390f99..25d58f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -905,6 +905,11 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags);
+}
+
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
-- 
1.9.1

--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2017 18:56:54 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1497286620-15027-6-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1497286620-15027-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>

Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags,
for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not.
It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags" and "__install_special_mapping".

Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++
 include/linux/security.h  | 6 ++++++
 mm/mmap.c                 | 9 +++++++++
 security/security.c       | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cc0937e..6934cc5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -483,6 +483,10 @@
  *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
  *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @check_vmflags:
+ *	Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed.
+ *	@vmflags contains requested the vmflags.
+ *	Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue.
  * @file_lock:
  *	Check permission before performing file locking operations.
  *	Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
@@ -1482,6 +1486,7 @@
 				unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
 	int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 				unsigned long prot);
+	int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 	int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 	int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 				unsigned long arg);
@@ -1753,6 +1758,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head mmap_addr;
 	struct list_head mmap_file;
 	struct list_head file_mprotect;
+	struct list_head check_vmflags;
 	struct list_head file_lock;
 	struct list_head file_fcntl;
 	struct list_head file_set_fowner;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 19bc364..67e33b6 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags);
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
@@ -830,6 +831,11 @@ static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f82741e..e19f04e 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1363,6 +1363,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
 		if (!can_do_mlock())
 			return -EPERM;
@@ -2833,6 +2836,9 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long request, unsigned long
 		return -EINVAL;
 	flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
 	if (offset_in_page(error))
 		return error;
@@ -3208,6 +3214,9 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping(
 	int ret;
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
+	if (security_check_vmflags(vm_flags))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
 	vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e390f99..25d58f0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -905,6 +905,11 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
 }
 
+int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags);
+}
+
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
-- 
1.9.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-12 16:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 124+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-12 16:56 [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 01/11] S.A.R.A. Documentation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:49   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2017-06-12 17:49     ` Jann Horn
2017-06-13  7:43     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:43       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-27 22:51   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:51     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-27 22:54       ` Kees Cook
2017-07-04 10:12     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-04 10:12       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-04 10:12       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 02/11] S.A.R.A. framework creation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 03/11] Creation of "usb_device_auth" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:35   ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-12 17:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-12 17:35     ` Krzysztof Opasiak
2017-06-13  7:47     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:47       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 19:38   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-12 19:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-12 19:38     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2017-06-13  7:50     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:50       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:50       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13  7:51     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:51       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  1:15   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  1:15     ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  1:15     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  3:11     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20  7:07   ` Pavel Machek
2017-06-20  7:07     ` [kernel-hardening] " Pavel Machek
2017-06-20  7:53     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20  7:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-20  7:53       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` Salvatore Mesoraca [this message]
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 21:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` [kernel-hardening] " Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-12 21:31     ` Casey Schaufler
2017-06-13  7:55     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:55       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:55       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  6:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  6:34     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-13  7:52     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:52       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:52       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:52       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 06/11] S.A.R.A. cred blob management Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 07/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 08/11] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 17:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-12 17:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-12 17:32     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-13  7:41     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  7:41       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 09/11] Trampoline emulation Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-13  0:02   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  0:02     ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-06-13  0:02     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-12 16:56 ` [PATCH 10/11] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:56   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57 ` [PATCH 11/11] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-06-12 16:57   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-09 19:35 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-10  7:59   ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10  7:59     ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-10 23:40     ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-07-11 16:58       ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 16:58         ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2017-07-11 17:49         ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 17:49           ` Matt Brown
2017-07-11 19:31           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-11 19:31             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 12:39             ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 12:39               ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 15:19               ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 15:19                 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-13 19:51                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 19:51                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-07-13 22:33                   ` Matt Brown
2017-07-13 22:33                     ` Matt Brown
2017-07-24  0:58                   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-24  0:58                     ` Casey Schaufler

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