Patch "IB/core: Don't enforce PKey security on SMI MADs" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

Patch "IB/core: Don't enforce PKey security on SMI MADs" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

[gregkh]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    IB/core: Don't enforce PKey security on SMI MADs

to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     ib-core-don-t-enforce-pkey-security-on-smi-mads.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From 0fbe8f575b15585eec3326e43708fbbc024e8486 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 22:30:02 +0200
Subject: IB/core: Don't enforce PKey security on SMI MADs

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

commit 0fbe8f575b15585eec3326e43708fbbc024e8486 upstream.

Per the infiniband spec an SMI MAD can have any PKey. Checking the pkey
on SMI MADs is not necessary, and it seems that some older adapters
using the mthca driver don't follow the convention of using the default
PKey, resulting in false denials, or errors querying the PKey cache.

SMI MAD security is still enforced, only agents allowed to manage the
subnet are able to receive or send SMI MADs.

Reported-by: Chris Blake <chrisrblake93@gmail.com>
Fixes: 47a2b338fe63 ("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c
@@ -739,8 +739,11 @@ int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_ma
 	if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed)
-		return -EACCES;
+	if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI) {
+		if (!map->agent.smp_allowed)
+			return -EACCES;
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	return ib_security_pkey_access(map->agent.device,
 				       map->agent.port_num,


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from danielj@mellanox.com are

queue-4.14/ib-core-don-t-enforce-pkey-security-on-smi-mads.patch
queue-4.14/ib-core-bound-check-alternate-path-port-number.patch