All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] ima: force the re-evaluation of files on untrusted file systems
Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 10:36:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1517845002.3736.72.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADZs7q7oyC3LPmCFDTK9a7rdpXAAS=kT5HSURcN3t3oirvBpmg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 2018-02-05 at 15:24 +0100, Alban Crequy wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:40 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On filesystems, such as fuse or remote filesystems, that we can not
> > detect or rely on the filesystem to tell us when a file has changed,
> > always re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit the file.
> >
> > Signed-of-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >
> > ---
> > Hi Miklos,
> >
> > Was something like this what you had in mind?
> >
> > Mimi
> > ---
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> >  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 6d78cb26784d..a428bd75232e 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> >                                int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
> >  {
> >         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> > +       struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
> >         struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
> >         struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
> >         char *pathbuf = NULL;
> > @@ -228,9 +229,16 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> >                                  IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
> >                                  IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
> >
> > -       if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
> > -               /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */
> > +       /*
> > +        * Re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit a file, if the security
> > +        * xattrs changed or if the file is on an untrusted file system
> > +        * (eg. FUSE, remote filesystems).
> > +        */
> > +       if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
> > +           (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_revalidate)) {
> 
> It seems dangerous to rely implicitly on "d_revalidate != NULL". vfat
> has a d_revalidate for handling 8.3 filenames but it's not a network
> filesystem.

Files might be unnecessarily re-evaluated, impacting performance, but
I'm not sure that it is dangerous.  For example, local OCFS2 files are
unnecessarily re-evaluated.

Mimi

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH] ima: force the re-evaluation of files on untrusted file systems
Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 10:36:42 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1517845002.3736.72.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADZs7q7oyC3LPmCFDTK9a7rdpXAAS=kT5HSURcN3t3oirvBpmg@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, 2018-02-05 at 15:24 +0100, Alban Crequy wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:40 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On filesystems, such as fuse or remote filesystems, that we can not
> > detect or rely on the filesystem to tell us when a file has changed,
> > always re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit the file.
> >
> > Signed-of-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >
> > ---
> > Hi Miklos,
> >
> > Was something like this what you had in mind?
> >
> > Mimi
> > ---
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> >  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index 6d78cb26784d..a428bd75232e 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> >                                int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
> >  {
> >         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> > +       struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
> >         struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
> >         struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
> >         char *pathbuf = NULL;
> > @@ -228,9 +229,16 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
> >                                  IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
> >                                  IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
> >
> > -       if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
> > -               /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */
> > +       /*
> > +        * Re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit a file, if the security
> > +        * xattrs changed or if the file is on an untrusted file system
> > +        * (eg. FUSE, remote filesystems).
> > +        */
> > +       if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
> > +           (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_revalidate)) {
> 
> It seems dangerous to rely implicitly on "d_revalidate != NULL". vfat
> has a d_revalidate for handling 8.3 filenames but it's not a network
> filesystem.

Files might be unnecessarily re-evaluated, impacting performance, but
I'm not sure that it is dangerous. ?For example, local OCFS2 files are
unnecessarily re-evaluated.

Mimi

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-05 15:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-05 13:40 [RFC PATCH] ima: force the re-evaluation of files on untrusted file systems Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 13:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 14:24 ` Alban Crequy
2018-02-05 14:24   ` Alban Crequy
2018-02-05 15:36   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-02-05 15:36     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 15:50 ` James Bottomley
2018-02-05 15:50   ` James Bottomley
2018-02-05 15:50   ` James Bottomley
2018-02-05 16:12   ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-02-05 16:12     ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-02-05 16:21     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 16:21       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 16:30       ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-02-05 16:30         ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-02-05 16:37         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 16:37           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-05 16:37           ` Mimi Zohar

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1517845002.3736.72.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --to=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=alban@kinvolk.io \
    --cc=dongsu@kinvolk.io \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.