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From: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, ashok.raj@intel.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com,
	youquan.song@intel.com, youquan.song@linux.intel.com,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <kernellwp@gmail.com>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>, "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH 24/24] x86/spectre_v2: Don't check microcode versions when running under hypervisors
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 00:27:20 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1523939240-16508-24-git-send-email-youquan.song@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1523939240-16508-1-git-send-email-youquan.song@intel.com>

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

(cherry picked from commit 36268223c1e9981d6cfc33aff8520b3bde4b8114)

As:

 1) It's known that hypervisors lie about the environment anyhow (host
    mismatch)

 2) Even if the hypervisor (Xen, KVM, VMWare, etc) provided a valid
    "correct" value, it all gets to be very murky when migration happens
    (do you provide the "new" microcode of the machine?).

And in reality the cloud vendors are the ones that should make sure that
the microcode that is running is correct and we should just sing lalalala
and trust them.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@gmail.com>
Cc: kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180226213019.GE9497@char.us.oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Yi Sun <yi.y.sun@linux.intel.com> [v4.4 backport]
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index af28610..221c030 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -71,6 +71,13 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	/*
+	 * We know that the hypervisor lie to us on the microcode version so
+	 * we may as well hope that it is running the correct version.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return false;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
 		if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
 		    c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
-- 
1.8.3.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-16 16:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-17  4:26 [PATCH 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf Youquan Song
2018-04-16 18:27 ` Greg KH
2018-04-17  4:26 ` [PATCH 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:26 ` [PATCH 03/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 04/24] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 05/24] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 06/24] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 07/24] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 08/24] x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 09/24] x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 10/24] x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 11/24] x86/mm: Give each mm TLB flush generation a unique ID Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 12/24] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 15/24] KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 16/24] KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 17/24] KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 18/24] KVM/x86: Add IBPB support Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 19/24] KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 20/24] KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 21/24] KVM/SVM: " Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 22/24] KVM/x86: Remove indirect MSR op calls from SPEC_CTRL Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` [PATCH 23/24] KVM/VMX: Optimize vmx_vcpu_run() and svm_vcpu_run() by marking the RDMSR path as unlikely() Youquan Song
2018-04-17  4:27 ` Youquan Song [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-04-18  3:18 [PATCH 00/24] Backport Speculation Control support for 4.4 Youquan Song
2018-04-18  3:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] x86/spectre_v2: Don't check microcode versions when running under hypervisors Youquan Song
     [not found] <1523903583-14881-1-git-send-email-youquan.song@intel.com>
2018-04-16 18:33 ` Youquan Song

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