From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3)
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 07:56:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1530025017.27091.1.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWYx5nCtwGAqTZBWOB+aw+eEcnQhe6Sn1o+O356g7Km9A@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2018-06-25 at 22:26 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > This series introduces CET - Shadow stack
> I think you should add some mitigation against sigreturn-oriented
> programming. How about creating some special token on the shadow
> stack that indicates the presence of a signal frame at a particular
> address when delivering a signal and verifying and popping that token
> in sigreturn? The token could be literally the address of the signal
> frame, and you could make this unambiguous by failing sigreturn if
> CET
> is on and the signal frame is in executable memory.
>
> IOW, it would be a shame if sigreturn() itself became a convenient
> CET-bypassing gadget.
>
> --Andy
I will look into that.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3)
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 07:56:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1530025017.27091.1.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWYx5nCtwGAqTZBWOB+aw+eEcnQhe6Sn1o+O356g7Km9A@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2018-06-25 at 22:26 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > This series introduces CET - Shadow stack
> I think you should add some mitigation against sigreturn-oriented
> programming. How about creating some special token on the shadow
> stack that indicates the presence of a signal frame at a particular
> address when delivering a signal and verifying and popping that token
> in sigreturn? The token could be literally the address of the signal
> frame, and you could make this unambiguous by failing sigreturn if
> CET
> is on and the signal frame is in executable memory.
>
> IOW, it would be a shame if sigreturn() itself became a convenient
> CET-bypassing gadget.
>
> --Andy
I will look into that.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3)
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 07:56:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1530025017.27091.1.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWYx5nCtwGAqTZBWOB+aw+eEcnQhe6Sn1o+O356g7Km9A@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, 2018-06-25 at 22:26 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > This series introduces CET - Shadow stack
> I think you should add some mitigation against sigreturn-oriented
> programming.A A How about creating some special token on the shadow
> stack that indicates the presence of a signal frame at a particular
> address when delivering a signal and verifying and popping that token
> in sigreturn?A A The token could be literally the address of the signal
> frame, and you could make this unambiguous by failing sigreturn if
> CET
> is on and the signal frame is in executable memory.
>
> IOW, it would be a shame if sigreturn() itself became a convenient
> CET-bypassing gadget.
>
> --Andy
I will look into that.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-26 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 205+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-07 14:37 [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 17:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 17:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 17:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 17:55 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 11:56 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 11:56 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 18:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 20:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:31 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-11 8:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-11 8:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-11 15:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-11 15:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 1:30 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 1:30 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 14:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:58 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 18:58 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 19:51 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08 12:07 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:12 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:17 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 20:17 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86/cet: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 19:47 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:47 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:47 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 14:53 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 14:53 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 14:53 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 15:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:50 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08 15:50 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-08 15:50 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 06/10] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:30 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 21:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 22:02 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-07 22:02 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-07 23:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 23:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 4:09 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:09 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:24 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 12:24 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:52 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08 15:52 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08 4:22 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:22 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 4:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 4:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:17 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 12:17 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 10:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 10:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 11:43 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 11:43 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:05 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:05 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:51 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:51 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 18:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 18:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 19:34 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 19:34 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-18 22:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-18 22:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 0:52 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 0:52 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 6:40 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-19 6:40 ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-19 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 16:59 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 17:07 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 17:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 17:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 20:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 20:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 20:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 22:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 22:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 22:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-20 0:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-20 0:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-21 23:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-21 23:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-21 23:07 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 07/10] mm: Prevent mprotect from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 08/10] mm: Prevent mremap of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 09/10] mm: Prevent madvise from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 21:09 ` Nadav Amit
2018-06-07 21:09 ` Nadav Amit
2018-06-07 21:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:18 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 10/10] mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 10:56 ` [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 10:56 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 17:24 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 17:24 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 20:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 1:07 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 1:07 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-17 3:16 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-17 3:16 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-18 21:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-18 21:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 8:52 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-19 8:52 ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-26 2:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-06-26 2:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 5:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-26 5:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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